Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l9/c5

Chapter 5

Latin	English
Omnibus autem potentiis existentibus hiis quidem cognatis, ut sensibus, hiis autem consuetudine, ut quae est fistulandi, aliis autem disciplinatu, ut quae est artium: has quidem * necesse eos qui preexercitati fuerint habere, quaecumque ↵ consuetudine * et ratione, * non tales autem et eas quae sunt in pati non necesse.	Chapter 5. As all potencies are either innate, like the senses, or come by practice, like the power of playing the flute, or by learning, like artistic power, those which come by practice or by rational formula we must acquire by previous exercise but this is not necessary with those which are not of this nature and which imply passivity.
↵ Quoniam autem possibile aliquid possibile et quando et quomodo et quaecumque alia necesse adesse in diffinitione, et haec quidem secundum rationem possunt movere et potentie ipsorum cum ratione, haec autem irrationabilia et potentie ↵ * irrationabiles, et illas quidem necesse in animato esse has vero in ambobus:	Since that which is capable is capable of something and [48a] at some time and in some way (with all the other qualifications which must be present in the definition), and since some things can produce change according to a rational formula and their potencies involve such a formula, while other things are nonrational and their potencies are non-rational, and the former potencies must be in a living thing, while the latter can be both in the living and in the lifeless;
tales quidem potentias necesse, quando ut possint passivum et activum appropinquant, hoc quidem facere illud vero pati, illas vero non necesse.	as regards potencies of the latter kind, when the agent and the patient meet in the way appropriate to the potency in question, the one must act and the other be acted on, but with the former kind of potency this is not necessary.
Hae quidem enim omnes * una unius factiva, ille autem contrariorum, quare ↵ simul facient contraria; hoc autem impossibile.	For the nonrational potencies are all productive of one effect each, but the rational produce contrary effects, so that if they produced their effects necessarily they would produce contrary effects at the same time; but this is impossible.
Necesse ergo alterum aliquid esse quod dominans *. Dico autem hoc appetitum aut proheresim. Quod enim desiderabit principaliter, hoc faciet quando ut possit extiterit et appropinquaverit ƿ passivo. Quare potens secundum rationem omne necesse, quando desiderat cuius habet potentiam et ut habet, hoc facere. ↵ habet autem presente passivo et ita se habente facere. Si autem non, facere non poterit.	There must, then, be something else that decides; I mean by this, desire or will. For whichever of two things the animal desires decisively, it will do, when it is present, and meets the passive object, in the way appropriate to the potency in question. Therefore everything which has a rational potency, when it desires that for which it has a potency and in the circumstances in which it has the potency, must do this. And it has the potency in question when the passive object is present and is in a certain state; if not it will not be able to act.
'Nullo namque exteriorum prohibente' adiungere nihil adhuc oportet. Potentiam enim habet [70 ut est potentia faciendi. Est autem non omnino sed habentium aliquo modo, in quibus excludentur quae exterius prohibent; removent enim haec eorum quae in determinatione apponuntur ↵ quaedam.)	(To add the qualification if nothing external prevents it is not further necessary; for it has the potency on the terms on which this is a potency of acting, and it is this not in all circumstances but on certain conditions, among which will be the exclusion of external hindrances; for these are barred by some of the positive qualifications.)
Propter quod nec si simul volunt aut cupiunt facere duo aut contraria, non facient; non enim ita simul habent ipsorum potentiam nec est simul faciendi potentia, quoniam quorum est sic faciet.	And so even if one has a rational wish, or an appetite, to do two things or contrary things at the same time, one will not do them; for it is not on these terms that one has the potency for them, nor is it a potency of doing both at the same time, since one will do the things which it is a potency of doing, on the terms on which one has the potency.