Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7/c11

Chapter 11

Latin	English
Dubitatur autem merito quae speciei sunt partes et quae non, sed simul sumpti. Hoc enim non manifesto existente non est diffinire unumquodque; universalis enim et speciei est ↵ diffinitio. Quae igitur sunt partium ut materia et quae non, si non fuerint manifeste, nec ratio erit manifesta quae rei.	Chapter 11. Another question is naturally raised, viz. what sort of parts belong to the form and what sort not to the form, but to the concrete thing. Yet if this is not plain it is not possible to define any thing; for definition is of the universal and of the form. If then it is not evident what sort of parts are of the nature of matter and what sort are not, neither will the formula of the thing be evident.
Quecumque quidem igitur videntur facta in vidersis specie, ut circulus in aere et lapide et ligno, haec quidem manifesta esse videntur quia nihil circuli substantiae es neque lapis propter ƿ separari ab ipsis.Quae vero non videntur separata, nihil ↵ prohibet similiter hiis habere, ut si circuli omnes videantur aenei; ↵ nihil enim utique minus erat aes speciei. Hoc autem auferre mente est difficile. Ut hominis species semper in carnibus apparet et ossibus et talibus partibus. Utrum igitur et sunt partes ↵ haec speciei et rationis aut non, sed materia? Sed quia non et in aliis fiunt, non possumus separare.	In the case of things which are found to occur in specifically different materials, as a circle may exist in bronze or stone or wood, it seems plain that these, the bronze or the stone, are no part of the essence of the circle, since it is found apart from them. Of things which are not seen to exist apart, there [36b] is no reason why the same may not be true, just as if all circles that had ever been seen were of bronze; for none the less the bronze would be no part of the form; but it is hard to eliminate it in thought. E.g. the form of man is always found in flesh and bones and parts of this kind; are these then also parts of the form and the formula? No, they are matter; but because man is not found also in other matters we are unable to perform the abstraction.
Quoniam autem hoc videtur contingere, immanifestum autem quando dubitant quidam iam et in circulo et in trigono, quasi non sit competens lineis diffiniri et continuo, sed omnia haec similiter dici ac si ↵ ut carnes et ossa hominis et aes et lapis circuli; et referunt omnes ad numeros, et lineae rationem eam quae duorum esse dicunt. Et ydeas dicentium hii quidem ipsammet lineam dualitatem, hii autem speciem lineae. Quaedam enim esse eadem, ↵ speciem et cuius species, ut dualitatem et speciem dualitatis; in linea vero non adhuc.	Since this is thought to be possible, but it is not clear when it is the case, some people already raise the question even in the case of the circle and the triangle, thinking that it is not right to define these by reference to lines and to the continuous, but that all these are to the circle or the triangle as flesh and bones are to man, and bronze or stone to the statue; and they reduce all things to numbers, and they say the formula of ‘line’ is that of ‘two’. And of those who assert the Ideas some make ‘two’ the line-itself, and others make it the Form of the line; for in some cases they say the Form and that of which it is the Form are the same, e.g. ‘two’ and the Form of two; but in the case of ‘line’ they say this is no longer so.
Accidit itaque unum multorum esse speciem quorum species videtur esse altera (quod et Pytagoricis accidit), et contingit unam omnium facere per se speciem, ↵ alia vero non species; quamvis sic unum omnia erunt. Quod quidem igitur habent dubitationem quandam quae sunt circa diffinitiones, et propter quam causam, dictum est.	It follows then that there is one Form for many things whose form is evidently different (a conclusion which confronted the Pythagoreans also); and it is possible to make one thing the Form-itself of all, and to hold that the others are not Forms; but thus all things will be one. We have pointed out, then, that the question of definitions contains some difficulty, and why this is so.
Quare omnia reducere ita et auferre materiam superfluum est; quaedam enim forsam hoc in hoc sunt aut sic haec habentia. Et parabola de animali, quam consuevit Socrates iunior ↵ ƿ dicere, non bene se habet; abducit enim a veritate et facit suspicari quasi contingens sit hominem esse sine partibus, sicut sine aere circulum. Sed hoc non simile; sensibile namque aliquid ↵ forsan animal, et sine motu non est diffinire, quare nec sine partibus se habentibus qualitercumque. Non enim omni modo hominis est pars manus, sed potens opus perficere, quare animata existens; non animata vero non pars.	And so to reduce all things thus to Forms and to eliminate the matter is useless labour; for some things surely are a particular form in a particular matter, or particular things in a particular state. And the comparison which Socrates the younger used to make in the case of ‘animal’ is not sound; for it leads away from the truth, and makes one suppose that man can possibly exist without his parts, as the circle can without the bronze.But the case is not similar; for an animal is something perceptible, and it is not possible to define it without reference to movement – nor, therefore, without reference to the parts’ being in a certain state. For it is not a hand in any and every state that is a part of man, but only when it can fulfil its work, and therefore only when it is alive; if it is not alive it is not a part.
Circa mathematica autem, quare non sunt partes rationes rationum, ut circuli ↵ emikiclia? Non enim sunt sensibilia haec. Aut nil differt; ↵ erit enim materia quorundam et non sensibilium, et omnis quod non est quid erat esse et species eadem secundum se sed hoc aliquid. Circuli quidem igitur non erit eius qui universalis, singularium vero erunt partes hee, sicut dictum est prius. ↵ Est enim materia haec quidem sensibilis, haec autem intellectualis.	Regarding the objects of mathematics, why are the formulae of the parts not parts of the formulae of the wholes; e.g. why are not the semicircles included in the formula of the circle? It cannot be said, ‘because these parts are perceptible things’; for they are not. But perhaps this makes no difference; for even some things [37a] which are not perceptible must have matter; indeed there is some matter in everything which is not an essence and a bare form but a ‘this’. The semicircles, then, will not be parts of the universal circle, but will be parts of the individual circles, as has been said before; for while one kind of matter is perceptible, there is another which is intelligible.
Palam autem et quod anima quidem substantia prima, corpus autem materia; homo vero aut animal quod est ex utrisque ut universaliter. Socrates autem et Coriscus, si quidem anima, dupliciter: alii namque ut animam alii vero ut totum; si vero simpliciter anima haec et corpus hoc, ut quod quidem ↵ universale et singulare.	It is clear also that the soul is the primary substance and the body is matter, and man or animal is the compound of both taken universally; and ‘Socrates’ or ‘Coriscus’, if even the soul of Socrates may be called Socrates, has two meanings (for some mean by such a term the soul, and others mean the concrete thing), but if ‘Socrates’ or ‘Coriscus’ means simply this particular soul and this particular body, the individual is analogous to the universal in its composition.
Utrum autem est praeter materiam talium aliqua substantiarum alia, et oportet quaerere substantium ipsorum alteram quandam ut numeros aut aliquid tale, perscrutandum est posteƿrius. Huius enim gratia et de sensibilibus substantiis temptamus diffinire, quoniam modo quodam phisice et secundae philosophiae ↵ opus circa sensibiles substantias speculatio. Non enim solum de materia oportet scire phisicum sed et de ea quae secundum rationem, et magis. In diffinitionibus vero quomodo partes quae in ratione, et quare una ratio diffinitio? Palam enim quia res una. Res vero quo una partes habens, speculandum ↵ est posterius.	Whether there is, apart from the matter of such substances, another kind of matter, and one should look for some substance other than these, e.g. numbers or something of the sort, must be considered later. For it is for the sake of this that we are trying to determine the nature of perceptible substances as well, since in a sense the inquiry about perceptible substances is the work of physics, i.e. of second philosophy; for the physicist must come to know not only about the matter, but also about the substance expressed in the formula, and even more than about the other. And in the case of definitions, how the elements in the formula are parts of the definition, and why the definition is one formula (for clearly the thing is one, but in virtue of what is the thing one, although it has parts?), – this must be considered later.
Quid quidem igitur est quod quid erat esse et quomodo ipsum secundum se, universaliter de omni dictum est. Et quare horum quidem ratio quae eius quod quid erat esse habet partes diffiniti, horum autem non. Et quod in substantiae quidem ratione quae sic partes ut materia non inerunt. Neque ↵ enim sunt illius partes substantiae sed totius; huius autem est aliqualiter ratio et non est. Nam cum materia non est, indeterminatum enim; secundum primam autem substantiam est, ut hominis quae animae ratio. Substantia namque est species quae inest, ex qua et materia tota dicitur, ut ↵ concavitas; nam ex hac et naso simus nasus et simitas est; bis enim in hiis inerit nasus. In tota vero substantia, ut naso simo aut Callia, inest et materia. Et quod quod quid erat esse et ↵ unumquodque in quibusdam idem, ut in primis substantiis, ut curvitas et curvitati esse, si prima est; dico autem prima quae non dicitur per aliud in alio esse et subiecto ut materia. Quaecumque vero ut materia aut concepta cum materia, non ↵ ƿ idem, neque secundum accidens unum, ut Socrates et musicum; haec enim eadem secundum accidens.	What the essence is and in what sense it is independent, has been stated universally in a way which is true of every case, and also why the formula of the essence of some things contains the parts of the thing defined, while that of others does not. And we have stated that in the formula of the substance the material parts will not be present (for they are not even parts of the substance in that sense, but of the concrete substance; but of this there is in a sense a formula, and in a sense there is not; for there is no formula of it with its matter, for this is indefinite, but there is a formula of it with reference to its primary substance – e.g. in the case of man the formula of the soul – , for the substance is the indwelling form, from which and the matter the so-called concrete substance is derived; e.g. concavity is a form of this sort, for from this and the nose arise ‘snub nose’ and ‘snubness’); but in the concrete substance, e.g. a snub nose or Callias, the matter also will be present. And we have stated that the essence and the [37b] thing itself are in some cases the same; ie. in the case of primary substances, e.g. curvature and the essence of curvature if this is primary. (By a ‘primary’ substance I mean one which does not imply the presence of something in something else, i.e. in something that underlies it which acts as matter.) But things which are of the nature of matter, or of wholes that include matter, are not the same as their essences, nor are accidental unities like that of ‘Socrates’ and ‘musical’; for these are the same only by accident.