Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l2/c1

Chapter 1

Sicut enim nicticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et anime nostre intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium nature manifestissima."For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all"

Latin	English
METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER SECUNDUS	Aristotle Metaphysics Book 2 (A1)
ƿ De veritate theoria sic quidem difficilis est, sic vero faci↵lis.	Chapter 1. THE investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy.
Signum autem est neque digne nullum adipisci ipsam ↵ posse nec omnes exsortes esse, sed unumquemque aliquid de natura dicere,	An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not collectively fail, but every one says something true about the nature of things,
Et secundum unum quidem nihil aut parum ei immittere, ex omnibus autem coarticulatis fieri magnitudinem aliquam.	And while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed.
Quare si videtur habere ut proverbialiter dicimus fcin foribus quis delinquet?’, sic quidem utique erit facilis; ↵ habere autem totum et partem non posse difficultatem eius ostendit.	Therefore, since the truth seems to be like the proverbial door, which no one can fail to hit, in this respect it must be easy, but the fact that we can have a whole truth and not the particular part we aim at shows the difficulty of it.
Forsan autem et difficultate secundum duos existente modos, non in rebus sed in nobis est eius causa. Sicut enim nicticoracum oculi ad lucem diei se habent, sic et anime nostre ↵ intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium nature manifestissima.	Perhaps, too, as difficulties are of two kinds, the cause of the present difficulty is not in the facts but in us. For as the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all.
Non solum autem hiis dicere gratiam iustum est quorum aliquis opinionibus communicaverit, sed et hiis qui adhuc superficialiter enuntiaverunt; et enim hii conferunt aliquid, nam habitum nostrum preexercitati sunt. Nam si Thimotheus ↵ non fuisset, multam melodiam non haberemus; si autem non Phrinis, thimotheus non fuisset. Eodem vero modo et de enunƿtiantibus veritatem; a quibusdam enim opiniones quasdam accepimus, sed alii ut hii forent causa fuerunt.	It is just that we should be grateful, not only to those with whose views we may agree, but also to those who have expressed more superficial views; for these also contributed something, by developing before us the powers of thought. It is true that if there had been no Timotheus we should have been without much of our lyric poetry; but if there had been no Phrynis there would have been no Timotheus. The same holds good of those who have expressed views about the truth; for from some thinkers we have inherited certain opinions, while the others have been responsible for the appearance of the former.
↵ Vocari vero philosophiam veritatis scientiam recte habet. Nam theorice finis est veritas et practice opus; et enim si quomodo se habet intendant, non causam secundum se sed ad aliquid et nunc speculantur practici.	It is right also that philosophy should be called knowledge of the truth. For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action (for even if they consider how things are, practical men do not study the eternal, but what is relative and in the present).
Nescimus autem verum sine causa. Unumquodque vero * rmaxime ipsum aliorum ↵ secundum quod et aliis inest univocatio, puta ignis * calidissimus; et enim est causa aliis hic caloris. * quare et verissimum quod posterioribus est causa ut sint vera. Quapropter semper existentium principia semper esse verissima est necesse; non ↵ enim quandoque vera nec illis causa aliquid est ut sint, sed illa aliis. Quare unumquodque sicut se habet ut sit, ita et ad veritatem.	Now we do not know a truth without its cause; and a thing has a quality in a higher degree than other things if in virtue of it the similar quality belongs to the other things as well (e.g. fire is the hottest of things; for it is the cause of the heat of all other things); so that that causes derivative truths to be true is most true. Hence the principles of eternal things must be always most true (for they are not merely sometimes true, nor is there any cause of their being, but they themselves are the cause of the being of other things), so that as each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth.