Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l8/c6

Chapter 6

Latin	English
De dubitatione vero dicta * circa diffinitiones et numeros: quae causa essendi unum? Omnium enim quaecumque ↵ plures partes habent et non est ut aceruus quod totum sed est aliquid totum praeter partes, est aliqua causa. Quoniam et in corporibus hiis quidem tactus causa est unum essendi, aliis vero viscositas aut aliqua passio altera talis. Diffinitio vero ratio * est una non coniunctione quemadmodum Ylias sed per unius esse. Quid igitur est quod facit unum hominem, et propƿter quid unum sed non multa, puta animalque et bipes?	Chapter 6. To return to the difficulty which has been stated with respect both to definitions and to numbers, what is the cause of their unity? In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something beside the parts, there is a cause; for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality. And a definition is a set of words which is one not by being connected together, like the Iliad, but by dealing with one object.-What then, is it that makes man one; why is he one and not many, e.g. animal + biped,
Ali↵terque et si est, ut aiunt quidam, ipsum aliquid animal et ipsum bipes. Quare namque non illa ipsa homo est, et erunt secundum participationem homines non hominis neque unius sed duorum, scilicet animalis et bipedis, et totaliter utique non erit ↵ homo unum sed plura, animal et bipes?	especially if there are, as some say, an animal-itself and a biped-itself? Why are not those Forms themselves the man, so that men would exist by participation not in man, nor in-one Form, but in two, animal and biped, and in general man would be not one but more than one thing, animal and biped?
Palam itaque quia sic quidem acceptantibus ut consueverunt diffinire et dicere, non contingit reddere et soluere dubitationem. Si autem est, ut dicimus, hoc quidem materia illud vero forma, et hoc quidem potentia illud vero actu, non adhuc dubitatio utique videbitur esse quod quaeritur.	Clearly, then, if people proceed thus in their usual manner of definition and speech, they cannot explain and solve the difficulty. But if, as we say, one element is matter and another is form, and one is potentially and the other actually, the question will no longer be thought a difficulty.
Est enim haec ↵ dubitatio eadem et si terminus vestimenti sit rotundum es; sit enim utique signum nomen hoc rationis, quare * quod quaeritur est: quid causa est unum essendi rotundum et es? Non adhuc itaque dubitatio videtur, quia hoc quidem materia illud vero forma. Quid igitur huius causa, eius scilicet quod ↵ potentia ens actu sit, praeter faciens, in quibuscumque generatio? Nulla namque est causa altera eius quod potestate speram actu esse speram, sed hoc erat quod quid erat esse utrique.	For this difficulty is the same as would arise if round bronze were the definition of cloak ; for this word would be a sign of the definitory formula, so that the question is, what is the cause of the unity of round and bronze ? The difficulty disappears, because the one is matter, the other form. What, then, causes this-that which was potentially to be actually-except, in the case of things which are generated, the agent? For there is no other cause of the potential sphere _ s becoming actually a sphere, but this was the essence of either.
Est autem materiae alia intellectualis alia sensibilis, et semper rationis hoc quidem materia illud vero actus est, ut circulus ↵ figura superficialis.	Of matter some is intelligible, some perceptible, and in a formula there is always an element of matter as well as one of actuality; e.g. the circle is a plane figure .
Quaecumque vero non habent materiam, nec intellectualem nec sensibilem, statim quod quidem unum ali* ↵ quid esse est unumquodque quemadmodum et quod * ens aliquid: quod hoc, quod quale *, quod quantum. Quapropter et non inest in diffinitionibus nec ens nec unum. Et quod quid erat esse statim unum aliquid est sicut et ens aliquid. Quapropter non est aliqua alia causa unum essendi nulli horum ↵ neque essendi ens aliquid; statim enim unumquodque est ƿ ens aliquid et unum aliquid, non ut in genere ente et uno, nec ut separabilibus existentibus praeter singularia.	But of the things which have no matter, either intelligible or perceptible, each is by its [45b] nature essentially a kind of unity, as it is essentially a kind of being-individual substance, quality, or quantity (and so neither existent nor one is present in their definitions), and the essence of each of them is by its very nature a kind of unity as it is a kind of being-and so none of these has any reason outside itself, for being one, nor for being a kind of being; for each is by its nature a kind of being and a kind of unity, not as being in the genus being or one nor in the sense that being and unity can exist apart from particulars.
Propter hanc vero dubitationem hii quidem participationem dicunt, et causam aliquam participationis et quid est participare ↵ dubitant; hii autem coexistentiam anime, sicut Licofron ait esse scientiam eius quod est scire et anime; alii vero compositionem aut coniunctionem anime cum corpore vivere.	Owing to the difficulty about unity some speak of participation , and raise the question, what is the cause of participation and what is it to participate; and others speak of communion , as Lycophron says knowledge is a communion of knowing with the soul; and others say life is a composition or connexion of soul with body.
Et quidem eadem ratio in omnibus. Et enim sanum esse erit aut coexistentia aut colligatio aut coniunctio anime et sanitatis, ↵ et es esse trigonum compositio eris et trigoni, et album esse compositio superficiei et albedinis.	Yet the same account applies to all cases; for being healthy, too, will on this showing be either a communion or a connexion or a composition of soul and health, and the fact that the bronze is a triangle will be a composition of bronze and triangle, and the fact that a thing is white will be a composition of surface and whiteness.
Causa vero quia potentie et actus quaerunt unum faciens et differentiam. Est autem, ut dictum est, et ultima materia et forma idem et ↵ potentia, hoc autem actu. Quare simile est quaerere unius quae causa et unum essendi; unum enim aliquid unumquodque, et quod potentia et quod actu unum aliqualiter est. Quare causa nulla alia nisi id quod ut movens ex potentia ad actum. Quaecumque vero non habent materiam, omnia simpliciter quod vere entia aliquid.	The reason is that people look for a unifying formula, and a difference, between potency and complete reality. But, as has been said, the proximate matter and the form are one and the same thing, the one potentially, and the other actually. Therefore it is like asking what in general is the cause of unity and of a thing _ s being one; for each thing is a unity, and the potential and the actual are somehow one. Therefore there is no other cause here unless there is something which caused the movement from potency into actuality. And all things which have no matter are without qualification essentially unities.