Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l8/c3

Chapter 3

Latin	English
ƿ Oportet autem non ignorare quia aliquando latet utrum ↵ significet nomen compositam substantiam aut actum et formam. Ut domus utrum signum communis * quia tegumentum ex lateribus et iapidibus sic positis, aut actus et speciei quia tegumentum; et linea utrum dualitas in longitudine aut quia ↵ dualitas, et animal utrum * anima in corpore aut anima; haec namque substantia et actus corporis alicuius.	Chapter 3. We must not fail to notice that sometimes it is not clear whether a name means the composite substance, or the actuality or form, e.g. whether house is a sign for the composite thing, a covering consisting of bricks and stones laid thus and thus , or for the actuality or form, a covering , and whether a line is twoness in length or twoness , and whether an animal is soul in a body or a soul _ ; for soul is the substance or actuality of some body.
Erit autem utique et in utrisque animal, non ut una ratione dictum sed quasi ad unum.	Animal might even be applied to both, not as something definable by one formula, but as related to a single thing.
Sed * haec * ad aliquid aliud quidem differunt *, ↵ ad questionem vero substantiae sensibilis nihil; nam quod quid erat esse speciei et actui existit. Nam anima et anime esse idem, homini vero esse et homo non idem, nisi et anima homo dicatur; sic autem alicui quidem, alicui vero non.	But this question, while important for another purpose, is of no importance for the inquiry into sensible substance; [<a name=bk1043b></a>43b] for the essence certainly attaches to the form and the actuality. For soul and to be soul are the same, but to be man and man are not the same, unless even the bare soul is to be called man; and thus on one interpretation the thing is the same as its essence, and on another it is not.
↵ Non videtur itaque quaerentibus sillaba ex elementis ens et compositione, nec domus lateres et compositio. Et hoc recte; non enim compositio et mixtio ex hiis quorum est compositio aut mixtio. Similiter autem nec aliorum nil; ut limes positione, ↵ non ex limine positio sed magis hoc ex illa. Nec itaque homo est animal et bipes, sed aliquid oportet esse quod praeter haec est, si haec materiae: neque autem elementum nec * ex elementis, sed substantia; quod auferentes materiam dicunt. Si ergo hoc causa ipsius esse, et substantia hoc, ipsam utique substantiam non dicent.	If we examine we find that the syllable does not consist of the letters + juxtaposition, nor is the house bricks + juxtaposition. And this is right; for the juxtaposition or mixing does not consist of those things of which it is the juxtaposition or mixing. And the same is true in all other cases; e.g. if the threshold is characterized by its position, the position is not constituted by the threshold, but rather the latter is constituted by the former. Nor is man animal + biped, but there must be something besides these, if these are matter,-something which is neither an element in the whole nor a compound, but is the substance; but this people eliminate, and state only the matter. If, then, this is the cause of the thing _ s being, and if the cause of its being is its substance, they will not be stating the substance itself.
↵ Necessarium itaque hanc aut sempiternam esse aut corruptibilem sine corrumpi et factam esse sine fieri. Monstratum ƿ autem est et declaratum in aliis quia speciem nullus facit nec generatur, sed efficitur hoc, fit autem quod * ex hiis.	(This, then, must either be eternal or it must be destructible without being ever in course of being destroyed, and must have come to be without ever being in course of coming to be. But it has been proved and explained elsewhere that no one makes or begets the form, but it is the individual that is made, i.e. the complex of form and matter that is generated.
Si autem sunt corruptibilium substantiae separabiles, nondum * palam.	Whether the substances of destructible things can exist apart, is not yet at all clear;
At tamen quia quorundam non contingit, palam: quaecumque ↵ non possibile est praeter ipsa aliqua esse, ut domum aut uas.	except that obviously this is impossible in some cases-in the case of things which cannot exist apart from the individual instances, e.g. house or utensil.
Forsan quidem igitur nec substantiae sunt neque aliquid ipsa haec nec aliquid aliorum quaecumque non natura constituta sunt; naturam enim solam utique quis ponet eorum quae in corruptibilibus substantiam.	Perhaps, indeed, neither these things themselves, nor any of the other things which are not formed by nature, are substances at all; for one might say that the nature in natural objects is the only substance to be found in destructible things.)
Quare dubitatio quam antistenici et sic indocti dubitaverunt habet tempus quoddam: quia non est ipsum quid est diffinire ↵ (terminum enim rationem esse longam), sed quale quidem aliquid est contingit et docere; sicut * argentum quid quidem est non, quia autem quale stagnum. Quare substantiae est quidem cuius contingit esse terminum et rationem, puta composite, sive sensibilis fuerit sive intellectualis; ^primorum autem ↵ ex quibus haec non est, siquidem aliquid de aliquo significat ratio diffinitiva et oportet hoc quidem ut materiam esse illud vero ut formam.	Therefore the difficulty which used to be raised by the school of Antisthenes and other such uneducated people has a certain timeliness. They said that the what cannot be defined (for the definition so called is a long rigmarole ) but of what sort a thing, e.g. silver, is, they thought it possible actually to explain, not saying what it is, but that it is like tin. Therefore one kind of substance can be defined and formulated, i.e. the composite kind, whether it be perceptible or intelligible; but the primary parts of which this consists cannot be defined, since a definitory formula predicates something of something, and one part of the definition must play the part of matter and the other that of form.
Palam autem et quia, si sint aliqualiter numeri substantiae, sic sunt et non ut quidam dicunt unitatum. Nam diffinitio numerus quidam; divisibilisque enim et in indivisibilia (non ↵ enim infinite rationes), et numerus autem tale.	It is also obvious that, if substances are in a sense numbers, they are so in this sense and not, as some say, as numbers of units. For a definition is a sort of number; for (1) it is divisible, and into indivisible parts (for definitory formulae are not infinite), and number also is of this nature.
Et quemadmodum nec a numero ablato aliquo aut addito ex quibus numerus est, non adhuc idem numerus est sed alter, quamvis minimum auferatur aut addatur, sic nec diffinitio nec quod quid ↵ erat esse non adhuc erit ablato aliquo aut addito.	And (2) as, when one of the parts of which a number consists has been taken from or added to the number, it is no longer the same number, but a different one, even if it is the very smallest part that has been taken [<a name=bk1044a></a>44a] away or added, so the definition and the essence will no longer remain when anything has been taken away or added.
Et numerum ƿ oportet esse aliquid quo unus, quod nunc non habent dicere quo unus, siquidem est unus; aut enim non est sed ut aceruus, ↵ aut siquidem est, dicendum quid quod est faciens unum ex multis. Et diffinitio una est, similiter autem neque hanc habent dicere. Et hoc merito accidit; eiusdem enim rationis, et substantia unum ita, sed non, ut dicunt quidam, ut unitas quaedam existens aut punctum, sed endelichia et natura quaedam unaque↵quae.	And (3) the number must be something in virtue of which it is one, and this these thinkers cannot state, what makes it one, if it is one (for either it is not one but a sort of heap, or if it is, we ought to say what it is that makes one out of many); and the definition is one, but similarly they cannot say what makes it one. And this is a natural result; for the same reason is applicable, and substance is one in the sense which we have explained, and not, as some say, by being a sort of unit or point; each is a complete reality and a definite nature.
Et quemadmodum nec numerus habet magis aut minus, nec quae secundum speciem * substantia, sed siquidem, quae cum materia.	And (4) as number does not admit of the more and the less, neither does substance, in the sense of form, but if any substance does, it is only the substance which involves matter.
De generatione quidem igitur et corruptione dictarum substantiarum, quomodo contingit et quomodo impossibile, et de reductione ad numerum, sit usque ad haec determinatum.	Let this, then, suffice for an account of the generation and destruction of so-called substances in what sense it is possible and in what sense impossible _ and of the reduction of things to number.