Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l8/c1

Chapter 1

Latin	English
METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER OCTAVUS	Aristotle Metaphysics Book 8 (H)
ƿ Ex dictis itaque sillogizare oportet et colligentes capitu↵lum finem imponere.	Chapter 1. WE must reckon up the results arising from what has been said, and compute the sum of them, and put the finishing touch to our inquiry.
Dictum est itaque quia substantiarum quaeruntur cause et principia et elementa.	We have said that the causes, principles, and elements of substances are the object of our search.
Substantiae vero hae quidem confesse sunt ab omnibus, sed de quibusdam singulariter quidam enuntiaverunt. Confesse quidem phisice, ut ignis, terra et aqua et alia simplicia corpora, deinde plante et ↵ partes earum, et animalia et partes animalium, et tandem celum et partes celi. Singulariter vero quidam substantias dicunt esse species * et mathematica.	And some substances are recognized by every one, but some have been advocated by particular schools. Those generally recognized are the natural substances, i.e. fire, earth, water, air, &c., the simple bodies; second plants and their parts, and animals and the parts of animals; and finally the physical universe and its parts; while some particular schools say that Forms and the objects of mathematics are substances.
Alias vero accidit ex rationibus substantias esse: quod quid erat esse et quod subi↵citur. Adhuc aliter genus magis speciebus et universale singularibus. Universali vero et generi et ydee copulantur; nam secundum eandem rationem substantiae videntur esse.	But there are arguments which lead to the conclusion that there are other substances, the essence and the substratum. Again, in another way the genus seems more substantial than the various species, and the universal than the particulars. And with the universal and the genus the Ideas are connected; it is in virtue of the same argument that they are thought to be substances.
Quoniam autem quod quid erat esse substantia *, huius autem ratio diffinitio, propter hoc de diffinitione et de secundum se * diffmitum est. Quoniam autem diffinitio ratio est, ratio autem partes ↵ habet, necesse et de parte erat considerare quae substantiae * partes et quae non, et si hae diffinitioni opus sunt. Amplius etiam nec universale substantia nec genus. De ydeis vero et mathematicis posterius perscrutandum est. Nam praeter sensibiles substantias quidam dicunt eas esse. ƿ Nunc autem de confessis substantiis tractabimus. Hae vero ↵ sensibiles;	And since the essence is substance, and the definition is a formula of the essence, for this reason we have discussed definition and essential predication. Since the definition is a formula, and a formula has parts, we had to consider also with respect to the notion of part , what are parts of the substance and what are not, and whether the parts of the substance are also parts of the definition. Further, too, neither the universal nor the genus is a substance; we must inquire later into the Ideas and the objects of mathematics; for some say these are substances as well as the sensible substances. But now let us resume the discussion of the generally recognized substances. These are the sensible substances,
sensibiles autem substantiae omnes materiam habent. Est autem substantia quod subicitur, aliter quidem materia *; materiam vero dico quae non hoc aliquid ens actu potestate est hoc aliquid. Aliter vero ratio et forma, quod hoc aliquid ens ratione separabile est. Tertium vero * quod est ex hiis, ↵ cuius solius generatio et corruptio, et separabile simpliciter; nam secundum rationem substantiarum hae quidem * ille vero non.	and sensible substances all have matter. The substratum is substance, and this is in one sense the matter (and by matter I mean that which, not being a this actually, is potentially a this ), and in another sense the formula or shape (that which being a this can be separately formulated), and thirdly the complex of these two, which alone is generated and destroyed, and is, without qualification, capable of separate existence; for of substances completely expressible in a formula some are separable and some are separable and some are not.
Quia vero substantia est materia, palam. Nam in omnibus oppositis mutationibus est aliquid quod subicitur mutationibus, ut puta secundum locum quod nunc hic iterum alibi, et ↵ secundum augmentum quod nunc quidem est tantum * iterum minus aut maius, et secundum alterationem quod nunc quidem est sanum * iterum laborat. Similiter autem secundum substan↵tiam quod nunc quidem est in generatione * iterum in corruptione, et nunc quidem quod subicitur ut hoc aliquid iterum autem quod subicitur ut secundum privationem.	But clearly matter also is substance; for in all the opposite changes that occur there is something which underlies the changes, e.g. in respect of place that which is now here and again elsewhere, and in respect of increase that which is now of one size and again less or greater, and in respect of alteration that which is now healthy and again diseased; [<a name=bk1042b></a>42b] and similarly in respect of substance there is something that is now being generated and again being destroyed, and now underlies the process as a this and again underlies it in respect of a privation of positive character.
Et hanc sequuntur aliae mutationes. Aliarum vero aut unam aut duas ↵ haec non sequitur; non enim necesse, si quid materiam habet localem, hoc et generabilem et corruptibilem habere. Quae enim differentia simpliciter fieri et non simpliciter, in phisicis dictum est.	And in this change the others are involved. But in either one or two of the others this is not involved; for it is not necessary if a thing has matter for change of place that it should also have matter for generation and destruction. The difference between becoming in the full sense and becoming in a qualified sense has been stated in our physical works.