Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4/c2

Chapter 2

Latin	English
Ens autem multis quidem dicitur modis, sed ad unum et ad unam aliquam naturam et non equivoce. Sed quemadmodum salubre omne ad sanitatem, hoc quidem in conservatione, ↵ aliud vero in actione, aliud quia est signum sanitatis, hoc autem quia illius est susceptibile. Et medicinale ad medica↵tivam, hoc enim in habendo medicativam dicitur medicinale, ƿ illud vero in existendo bene natum ad ipsam, et aliud per esse opus medicative. Similiter autem et alia sumemus hiis dicta. ↵ ita vero et ens multipliciter dicitur quidem, sed omne ad unum principium. Haec enim quia substantiae, entia dicuntur, illa vero quia passiones substantiae, alia quia via ad substantiam, aut corruptiones aut privationes aut qualitates, aut effectiva aut generativa substantiae, aut ad substantiam dictorum, aut horum ↵ cuiusdam negationes aut substantiae. Quapropter et non ens esse non ens dicimus.	Chapter 2. There are many senses in which a thing may be said to be, but all that is is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to be by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is [03b] capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting-point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process towards substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these thing of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is nonbeing.
Quemadmodum ergo et salubrium omnium una est scientia, ita hoc et in aliis. Non enim solum eorum quae secundum unum dictorum est unius scientie speculari, sed et dictorum ad unam naturam; et enim haec modo ↵ quodam secundum unum dicuntur.	As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion.
Palam ergo quia et entia unius est speculari in quantum entia. Ubique vero proprie primi est scientia, et ex quo alia pendent et propter quod dicuntur. Ergo si hoc est substantia, substantiarum oportet principia et causas habere philosophum *.	It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study the things that are, qua being. But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names. If, then, this is substance, it will be of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes.
↵ Omnis autem generis et sensus unus unius * et scientia; ut gramatica una ens omnes speculatur voces. Quapropter et entis in quantum ens quascumque species speculari unius est scientie genere, species autem specierum.	Now for each one class of things, as there is one perception, so there is one science, as for instance grammar, being one science, investigates all articulate sounds. Hence to investigate all the species of being qua being is the work of a science which is generically one, and to investigate the several species is the work of the specific parts of the science.
Si igitur ens et unum idem et una natura eo quod se ad invicem consequuntur sicut principium et causa, sed non ut ↵ una ratione ostensa (nil autem differt nec si similiter suscipiamus, sed et pre opere magis).	If, now, being and unity are the same and are one thing in the sense that they are implied in one another as principle and cause are, not in the sense that they are explained by the same definition (though it makes no difference even if we suppose them to be like that-in fact this would even strengthen our case);
Idem enim * unus homo et homo, et ens homo et homo, et non diversum aliquid ostendit ƿ secundum dictionem repetitam * ‘est homo et homo et unus homo’; palam autem quia non separatur nec in generatione nec in corruptione. Similiter autem et in uno, quare palam quia ↵ additio in hiis idem ostendit, et nihil aliud unum praeter ens.	for one man and man are the same thing, and so are existent man and man, and the doubling of the words in one man and one existent man does not express anything different (it is clear that the two things are not separated either in coming to be or in ceasing to be); and similarly one existent man adds nothing to existent man, and that it is obvious that the addition in these cases means the same thing, and unity is nothing apart from being;
Amplius autem cuiusque substantia unum est non secundum accidens, similiter autem et quod quidem ens aliquid.	and if, further, the substance of each thing is one in no merely accidental way, and similarly is from its very nature something that is:
Quare quotcumque unius sunt species, tot et entis. De quibus quod quid est eiusdem scientie genere speculari. Dico autem ut de ↵ eodem et simili et aliis talibus. Fere autem omnia reducuntur ↵ contraria in principium hoc; speculata sunt autem a nobis * haec in ecloga contrariorum.	All this being so, there must be exactly as many species of being as of unity. And to investigate the essence of these is the work of a science which is generically one-I mean, for instance, the discussion of the same and the similar and the other concepts of this sort; and nearly all contraries may be referred [04a] to this origin; let us take them as having been investigated in the Selection of Contraries.
Et tot partes sunt philosophiae quot substantiae, quare * necessarium esse aliquam primam et habitam ipsis. Existunt enim statim genera habentia ens et ↵ unum; quapropter et scientie haec sequuntur. Est enim philosophus ut mathematicus dictus; et enim haec partes habet, et prima quaedam et secunda est scientia et aliae consequenter in mathematibus.	And there are as many parts of philosophy as there are kinds of substance, so that there must necessarily be among them a first philosophy and one which follows this. For being falls immediately into genera; for which reason the sciences too will correspond to these genera. For the philosopher is like the mathematician, as that word is used; for mathematics also has parts, and there is a first and a second science and other successive ones within the sphere of mathematics.
Quoniam autem unius est opposita speculari, uni autem ↵ opponitur pluralitas, negationem autem et privationem unius est speculari propter utroque modo speculari unum cuius negatio aut privatio, aut * simpliciter dicta quia non inest illi aut alicui generi; hic quidem igitur uni differentia adest praeter quod * in negatione, illius enim absentia negatio est, ↵ in privatione vero et subiecta quaedam fit natura de qua dicitur privatio.	Now since it is the work of one science to investigate opposites, and plurality is opposed to unity-and it belongs to one science to investigate the negation and the privation because in both cases we are really investigating the one thing of which the negation or the privation is a negation or privation (for we either say simply that that thing is not present, or that it is not present in some particular class; in the latter case difference is present over and above what is implied in negation; for negation means just the absence of the thing in question, while in privation there is also employed an underlying nature of which the privation is asserted):
Uni autem pluralitas opponitur, quare et opposita dictis, diversumque et dissimile et inequale et quaecumque alia dicuntur aut secundum eadem aut secundum pluralitatem et unum, est dicte cognoscere scientie. Quorum unum quidem ali↵ƿquid et contrarietas est; differentia enim quaedam contrarietas est, differentia autem diversitas.	-in view of all these facts, the contraries of the concepts we named above, the other and the dissimilar and the unequal, and everything else which is derived either from these or from plurality and unity, must fall within the province of the science above named. And contrariety is one of these concepts; for contrariety is a kind of difference, and difference is a kind of otherness.
Quare quoniam unum multipliciter dicitur, et haec multipliciter quidem dicentur, at tamen unius omnia cognoscere est; non enim si multipliciter, alte↵rius, sed si nec secundum unum nec ad unum rationes referuntur, alterius tunc. Quoniam vero omnia ad primum referuntur, ut quaecumque unum dicuntur ad primum unum, similiter dicendum est et de eodem et de diverso et contrariis se habere. Ergo divisum quotiens dicitur singulum, sic reddendum est ad ↵ primum in singulis predicamentis quomodo ad illud dicitur; haec enim in habendo illud, illa vero in faciendo, alia vero secundum alios dicentur tales modos.	Therefore, since there are many senses in which a thing is said to be one, these terms also will have many senses, but yet it belongs to one science to know them all; for a term belongs to different sciences not if it has different senses, but if it has not one meaning and its definitions cannot be referred to one central meaning. And since all things are referred to that which is primary, as for instance all things which are called one are referred to the primary one, we must say that this holds good also of the same and the other and of contraries in general; so that after distinguishing the various senses of each, we must then explain by reference to what is primary in the case of each of the predicates in question, saying how they are related to it; for some will be called what they are called because they possess it, others because they produce it, and others in other such ways.
Palam ergo, quod in dubitationibus dictum est, quia unius est de hiis et de substantia sermonem habere; hoc autem erat unum eorum quae in dubitationibus.	It is evident, then, that it belongs to one science to be able to give an account of these concepts as well as of substance (this was one of the questions in our book of problems),
Et philosophi est de omni↵bus posse speculari. Nam si non philosophi, quis erit qui investigabit si idem Socrates et Socrates sedens, aut si unum uni contrarium, aut quid est contrarium aut quotiens dicitur? Similiter autem et de aliis talibus. ↵ quoniam ergo unius in quantum est unum et entis in quantum est ens eaedem secundum se passiones sunt, sed non in quantum numeri aut lineae aut ignis, palam quia illius scientie et quid sunt * cognoscere et accidentia ipsis. Et non sic peccant qui de ipsis intendebant quasi non philosophantes, sed ↵ quia primum est substantia de qua nihil audiunt. Quoniam sicut sunt et numeri et in quantum numerus proprie passiones *, ut imparitas paritas, commensuratio equalitas, excedentia defectio, et haec * secundum se et ad invicem insunt numeris (similiter autem et solido et immobili et mobili et levi et gravi ↵ sunt alia propria), sic et enti in quantum est ens sunt quaedam ƿ propria, et ea sunt de quibus est philosophi perscrutari veritatem.	and that it is the function of the philosopher to be able to [04b] investigate all things. For if it is not the function of the philosopher, who is it who will inquire whether Socrates and Socrates seated are the same thing, or whether one thing has one contrary, or what contrariety is, or how many meanings it has? And similarly with all other such questions. Since, then, these are essential modifications of unity qua unity and of being qua being, not qua numbers or lines or fire, it is clear that it belongs to this science to investigate both the essence of these concepts and their properties. And those who study these properties err not by leaving the sphere of philosophy, but by forgetting that substance, of which they have no correct idea, is prior to these other things. For number qua number has peculiar attributes, such as oddness and evenness, commensurability and equality, excess and defect, and these belong to numbers either in themselves or in relation to one another. And similarly the solid and the motionless and that which is in motion and the weightless and that which has weight have other peculiar properties. So too there are certain properties peculiar to being as such, and it is about these that the philosopher has to investigate the truth.
Signum autem: dialetici namque et sophiste eandem subinduunt figuram philosopho, quia sophistica apparens solum est sophia, et dialetici de omnibus disputant; omnibus autem com↵mune ens est. Disputant autem et de hiis, videlicet quia philosophiae sunt ipsa propria. Nam circa idem genus versatur et sophistica et dialetica cum philosophia,	-An indication of this may be mentioned: dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher, for sophistic is Wisdom which exists only in semblance, and dialecticians embrace all things in their dialectic, and being is common to all things; but evidently their dialectic embraces these subjects because these are proper to philosophy.-For sophistic and dialectic turn on the same class of things as philosophy,
sed differt ab hac quidem modo potestatis, ab illa vero vite proheresi. Est autem ↵ dialetica temptativa de quibus philosophia est sciens. Et sophistica visa quidem, ens vero non.	but this differs from dialectic in the nature of the faculty required and from sophistic in respect of the purpose of the philosophic life. Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know, and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but is not.
Amplius contrariorum altera coelementatio privatio, et omnia referuntur ad ens et non ens et ad unum et pluralitatem, ut status unius et motus pluralitatis.	Again, in the list of contraries one of the two columns is privative, and all contraries are reducible to being and non-being, and to unity and plurality, as for instance rest belongs to unity and movement to plurality.
Entia vero et substantiam ↵ confitentur ex contrariis fere omnes componi. Omnes enim principia contraria dicunt; hii namque par et impar, illi vero calidum et frigidum, alii finem et infinitum, alii amorem et odium.	And nearly all thinkers agree that being and substance are composed of contraries; at least all name contraries as their first principles-some name odd and even, some hot and cold, some limit and the unlimited, some love and strife.
Omnia vero et alia reducta videntur ad unum et pluralitatem. Sumatur enim ipsa reductio nobis. Principia vero et omnino ↵ quae * ab aliis ut in * genera haec cadunt.	And all the others as well are evidently reducible to unity and [05a] plurality (this reduction we must take for granted), and the principles stated by other thinkers fall entirely under these as their genera.
Palam igitur et ex hiis quia unius est scientie ens in quantum * ens speculari. Omnia namque aut contraria aut ex contrariis, principia vero contrariorum unum et pluralitas. Haec autem unius scientie, sive ↵ secundum unum dicuntur sive non, ut forsan habet veritas. At tamen et si multipliciter dicitur unum, ad primum alia dicuntur, et contraria similiter; et propter hoc et si non est ens aut unum universaliter et idem in omnibus aut separabile, ut forsan ↵ non est, sed haec quidem ad unum illa vero in eo quod consequenter.	It is obvious then from these considerations too that it belongs to one science to examine being qua being. For all things are either contraries or composed of contraries, and unity and plurality are the starting-points of all contraries. And these belong to one science, whether they have or have not one single meaning. Probably the truth is that they have not; yet even if one has several meanings, the other meanings will be related to the primary meaning (and similarly in the case of the contraries), even if being or unity is not a universal and the same in every instance or is not separable from the particular instances (as in fact it probably is not; the unity is in some cases that of common reference, in some cases that of serial succession).
Et ideo non est geometre speculari quid contrarium aut perfectum aut unum aut ens aut idem aut diversum, nisi ex suppositione.	And for this reason it does not belong to the geometer to inquire what is contrariety or completeness or unity or being or the same or the other, but only to presuppose these concepts and reason from this starting-point.
Quod quidem igitur unius est scientie ens ƿ in quantum est ens speculari et quae insunt ei in quantum est ↵ ens, manifestum, et quia non solum substantiarum sed et existentium eadem est theorica, et de dictis et de priore et posteriore, et genere et specie, et toto et parte et aliis talibus.	Obviously then it is the work of one science to examine being qua being, and the attributes which belong to it qua being, and the same science will examine not only substances but also their attributes, both those above named and the concepts prior and posterior, genus and species , whole and part, and the others of this sort.