Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c9

Chapter 9

Latin	English
De Pytagoricis ergo dimittatur ad presens; sufficit enim ipsa tangere tantum. Qui vero ydeas posuerunt primum quidem ↵ horum existentium accipere causas quaerentes alia hiis equalia numero attulerunt, ut si quis numerare volens paucioribus quidem existentibus putet non posse, plura vero faciens numeret. Nam fere equales, aut non pauciores, hiis sunt species de quibus ↵ quaerentes * causas ab hiis ad illas provenerunt. Secundum unumquodque enim equivocum (omonimum) aliquid est, et circa substantias aliorum est in multis unum, et in hiis et in sempiternis.	Chapter 9. Let us leave the Pythagoreans for the present; for it is enough to have touched on them as much as we have done. But as for those who posit the Ideas as causes, firstly, in seeking [90b] to grasp the causes of the things around us, they introduced others equal in number to these, as if a man who wanted to count things thought he would not be able to do it while they were few, but tried to count them when he had added to their number. For the Forms are practically equal to-or not fewer than-the things, in trying to explain which these thinkers proceeded from them to the Forms. For to each thing there answers an entity which has the same name and exists apart from the substances, and so also in the case of all other groups there is a one over many, whether the many are in this world or are eternal.
Amplius autem secundum quos modos ostendimus quia sunt species, secundum nullum videntur horum. Ex quibusdam ↵ ƿ enim non est necesse fieri sillogismum, ex quibusdam vero * et non quorum putamus horum species fiunt; quia secundum rationes eas quae ex scientiis species omnium erunt quo rumcumque sunt scientie, et secundum unum in multis et negationibus, et secundum intelligere autem aliquid corrupti ↵ corruptibilium; fantasma enim aliquid horum est.	Further, of the ways in which we prove that the Forms exist, none is convincing; for from some no inference necessarily follows, and from some arise Forms even of things of which we think there are no Forms. For according to the arguments from the existence of the sciences there will be Forms of all things of which there are sciences and according to the ‘one over many’ argument there will be Forms even of negations, and according to the argument that there is an object for thought even when the thing has perished, there will be Forms of perishable things; for we have an image of these.
Amplius autem rationum certissime aliae quidem eorum quae ad aliquid ydeas faciunu quorum non dicunt esse secundum se genus, aliae vero tertium hominem dicunt.	Further, of the more accurate arguments, some lead to Ideas of relations, of which we say there is no independent class, and others introduce the ‘third man’.
Et omnino quae sunt de speciebus rationes auferunt quae magis esse volunt dicen↵tes esse species quam ipsas ydeas esse. Accidit enim dualitatem non esse primam sed numerum, et ad aliquid ipso quod secundum se, et omnia quaecumque aliqui de speciebus opiniones sequentes opposuerunt principiis.	And in general the arguments for the Forms destroy the things for whose existence we are more zealous than for the existence of the Ideas; for it follows that not the dyad but number is first, i.e. that the relative is prior to the absolute,-besides all the other points on which certain people by following out the opinions held about the Ideas have come into conflict with the principles of the theory.
Amplius autem secundum existimationem quidem secundum quam esse dicimus ydeas, esse non solum substantiarum spe↵cies sed multorum et aliorum; et enim conceptus unus non solum circa substantias sed et de aliis est, et scientie non solum sunt ipsius substantiae sed et aliorum, accidunt autem et mille talia alia. Secundum vero necessitatem et opiniones de eis, si sunt participabiles species, substantiarum necesse ydeas esse ↵ solum. Non enim secundum accidens participantur, sed oportet hac uniuscuiusque participare in quantum non de subiecto ƿ dicitur. Dico autem ut si quid per se duplo participat, hoc et sempiterno participat, sed secundum accidens; accidit enim duplo sempiternum esse.	Further, according to the assumption on which our belief in the Ideas rests, there will be Forms not only of substances but also of many other things (for the concept is single not only in the case of substances but also in the other cases, and there are sciences not only of substance but also of other things, and a thousand other such difficulties confront them). But according to the necessities of the case and the opinions held about the Forms, if Forms can be shared in there must be Ideas of substances only. For they are not shared in incidentally, but a thing must share in its Form as in something not predicated of a subject (by ‘being shared in incidentally’ I mean that e.g. if a thing shares in ‘double itself’, it shares also in ‘eternal’, but incidentally; for ‘eternal’ happens to be predicable of the ‘double’).
Quare substantia erunt species; hae vero substantiam hic significant et ibi. Aut quid erit ipsum ↵ esse dicere aliquid praeter haec, unum in multis? Et si quidem eadem species ydearum et participantium, aliquid erit commune; quid enim magis in corruptibilibus dualitatibus, et dualitatibus multis quidem sed sempiternis, dualitas unum et idem, ↵ quam in hac et aliqua? Si vero non eadem species, equivocatio erit, et simile ut si quis vocat hominem Calliam et lignum, nullam eorum communitatem inspiciens.	Therefore the Forms will be substance; but the same terms indicate substance in this and in the ideal world [91a] (or what will be the meaning of saying that there is something apart from the particulars-the one over many?). And if the Ideas and the particulars that share in them have the same form, there will be something common to these; for why should ‘2’ be one and the same in the perishable 2’s or in those which are many but eternal, and not the same in the ‘2’ itself’ as in the particular 2? But if they have not the same form, they must have only the name in common, and it is as if one were to call both Callias and a wooden image a ‘man’, without observing any community between them.
Omnium autem dubitabit aliquis maxime quid conferunt species sempiternis sensibilium aut hiis quae fiunt et corrumpun↵tur; nec enim motus nec transmutationis nullius sunt causa eis.	Above all one might discuss the question what on earth the Forms contribute to sensible things, either to those that are eternal or to those that come into being and cease to be. For they cause neither movement nor any change in them.
At vero nec ad scientiam nihil auxiliatur eis quae est aliorum (nec enim ille horum substantia; nam in hiis essent) nec ad esse, cum non insint participantibus; sic enim forsan causa ↵ videbitur esse * album permixtum albo. Sed haec quidem ratio valde mobilis est, quam Anaxagoras prius et Eudoxus posterius et alii quidam dixerunt; facile namque colligere multa et impossibilia ad talem opinionem.	But again they help in no wise either towards the knowledge of the other things (for they are not even the substance of these, else they would have been in them), or towards their being, if they are not in the particulars which share in them; though if they were, they might be thought to be causes, as white causes whiteness in a white object by entering into its composition. But this argument, which first Anaxagoras and later Eudoxus and certain others used, is very easily upset; for it is not difficult to collect many insuperable objections to such a view.
At vero nec ex speciebus sunt alia secundum nullum modum ↵ dici consuetorum. Dicere vero exempla esse et eis alia participare vaniloquium est et metaphoras dicere poeticas. Quid enim est [Nam quid est] quod agitur ad ydeas respiciens? Contingit enim et esse et fieri simile quodcumque et non assimilatum ad illud; ↵ quare et existente Socrate et non existente fiet qualis Socrates. Similiter autem palam quia etiam si sit Socrates sempiternus. Erunt eiusdem exemplaria plura, quare et species, ut hominis animal et bipes, simul autem et autoanthropos. Amplius ƿ ↵ autem non solum sensibilium species exemplaria sed et ipsa↵rum, ut genus specierum; quare idem erit exemplar et ymago.	But, further, all other things cannot come from the Forms in any of the usual senses of ‘from’. And to say that they are patterns and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors. For what is it that works, looking to the Ideas? And anything can either be, or become, like another without being copied from it, so that whether Socrates or not a man Socrates like might come to be; and evidently this might be so even if Socrates were eternal. And there will be several patterns of the same thing, and therefore several Forms; e.g. ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’ and also ‘man himself’ will be Forms of man. Again, the Forms are patterns not only sensible things, but of Forms themselves also; i.e. the genus, as genus of various species, will be so; therefore the same thing will be pattern and copy.
Amplius videbitur [Amplius opinabitur] utique impossibile esse separatim substantiam et cuius est substantia. Quare quomodo ydee substantiae rerum existentes separatim erunt?	[91b] Again, it would seem impossible that the substance and that of which it is the substance should exist apart; how, therefore, could the Ideas, being the substances of things, exist apart?
In Fedone vero sic dicitur quasi ipsius esse et fieri cause ↵ sint species. Et etiam existentibus speciebus tamen non fiunt participantia, si non sit quod movit, et multa fiunt alia, ut domus et anulus, quorum non dicimus esse species. Quare palam quia contingit et alia et esse et fieri propter tales causas quales et nunc dicte.	In the Phaedo the case is stated in this way-that the Forms are causes both of being and of becoming; yet when the Forms exist, still the things that share in them do not come into being, unless there is something to originate movement; and many other things come into being (e.g. a house or a ring) of which we say there are no Forms. Clearly, therefore, even the other things can both be and come into being owing to such causes as produce the things just mentioned.
Amplius si sunt numeri species, quomodo cause erunt? ↵ utrum quia alii numeri sunt ipsa existentia, ut hic quidem numerus homo ille vero Socrates et alius Callias? Quid igitur hiis sunt cause illi? Nec enim si hii quidem sempiterni illi vero non, non differunt. Si vero quia rationes numerorum * et hic, ut symphonia, palam quia est unum quid quorum sunt rationes. ↵ Si itaque hoc materia, manifestum quia et ipsi numeri alique rationes erunt alius ad aliud. Dico autem ut si est Callias ratio in numeris ignis et terre et aque et aeris, et autoanthropos, ↵ sive numerus quis existens sive non, tamen erit ratio in numeris quorundam et non numerus, et non erit quis propter ea numerus.	Again, if the Forms are numbers, how can they be causes? Is it because existing things are other numbers, e.g. one number is man, another is Socrates, another Callias? Why then are the one set of numbers causes of the other set? It will not make any difference even if the former are eternal and the latter are not. But if it is because things in this sensible world (e.g. harmony) are ratios of numbers, evidently the things between which they are ratios are some one class of things. If, then, this—the matter—is some definite thing, evidently the numbers themselves too will be ratios of something to something else. E.g. if Callias is a numerical ratio between fire and earth and water and air, his Idea also will be a number of certain other underlying things; and man himself, whether it is a number in a sense or not, will still be a numerical ratio of certain things and not a number proper, nor will it be a of number merely because it is a numerical ratio.
Amplius ex multis numeris unus fit numerus, ex speciebus autem una species aliqualiter. Sed si nec ex ipsis sed ƿ ex unis *, ut in millenario, quomodo se habent unitates? Sive enim eiusdem speciei, multa inconvenientia accidunt, sive non eiusdem speciei, nec eaedem sibi invicem nec aliae omnes omni↵bus; * quo namque different * impassibiles existentes? Nec enim rationabilia * haec neque intelligentie confessa.	Again, from many numbers one number is produced, but how can one Form come from many Forms? And if the number comes not from the many numbers themselves but from the units in them, e.g. in 10,000, how is it with the units? If they are specifically alike, numerous absurdities will follow, and also if they are not alike (neither the units in one number being themselves like one another nor those in other numbers being all like to all); for in what will they differ, as they are without quality? This is not a plausible view, nor is it consistent with our thought on the matter.
Amplius autem aliud aliquod genus numeri facere est necesse circa quod sit arismetica; et omnia intermedia dicta ab aliquibus simpliciter, * ex quibus sunt principiis? Aut quare intermedia eorum ↵ quae hic et ipsorum erunt? Amplius unitates quae sunt in dualitate utraque est ex aliqua priore dualitate; quamvis impos↵sibile. Amplius quare unum numerus est collectus?	Further, they must set up a second kind of number (with which arithmetic deals), and all the objects which are called ‘intermediate’ by some thinkers; and how do these exist or from what principles do they proceed? Or why must they be intermediate between the things in this sensible world and the things-themselves? Further, the units in must each come from a prior but this is impossible. [92a] Further, why is a number, when taken all together, one?
Amplius cum dictis [Amplius autem], si sunt differentes unitates, oportebit ita dicere quemadmodum et quicumque elementa quatuor aut duo dicunt; et enim horum quilibet non commune dicit elementum, ↵ ut corpus, sed ignem et terram, sive sit commune corpus ipsum sive non. Nunc autem dicitur quasi uno existente quemadmodum igne aut aqua similium partium; si vero sic, non erunt substantiae numeri. Sed palam quia, si omne est aliquid unum ipsum et hoc est principium, multipliciter dicitur ipsum unum; aliter enim impossibile.	Again, besides what has been said, if the units are diverse the Platonists should have spoken like those who say there are four, or two, elements; for each of these thinkers gives the name of element not to that which is common, e.g. to body, but to fire and earth, whether there is something common to them, viz. body, or not. But in fact the Platonists speak as if the One were homogeneous like fire or water; and if this is so, the numbers will not be substances. Evidently, if there is a One itself and this is a first principle, ‘one’ is being used in more than one sense; for otherwise the theory is impossible.
↵ Volentes autem substantias ad principia reducere longitudines quidem ponimus ex producto et brevi (* ex aliquo paruo et magno) et planum ex lato et arto, corpus vero ex profundo et humili. Quamvis quomodo [attamen quomodo] habebit aut planum lineam aut solidum lineam et planum? Aliud enim genus et latum et artum ↵ et profundum et humile. Quemadmodum ergo nec numerus est in eis, quia multum et paucum ab hiis alterum *, palam quia nec aliud nihil superiorum inerit inferioribus. At vero nec ƿ * genus profundi latum; esset enim planum aliquod corpus. ↵ Amplius puncta ex quo inexistunt? Huic quidem igitur generi et Plato oppugnabat tamquam existente geometrico dogmati, sed * lineae principium vocabat. Hic autem multotiens * indivisibiles lineas posuit. Quamvis * necesse terminum aliquem harum esse; quare ex qua ratione linea est, et punctum est.	When we wish to reduce substances to their principles, we state that lines come from the short and long (i.e. from a kind of small and great), and the plane from the broad and narrow, and body from the deep and shallow. Yet how then can either the plane contain a line, or the solid a line or a plane? For the broad and narrow is a different class from the deep and shallow. Therefore, just as number is not present in these, because the many and few are different from these, evidently no other of the higher classes will be present in the lower. But again the broad is not a genus which includes the deep, for then the solid would have been a species of plane. Further, from what principle will the presence of the points in the line be derived? Plato even used to object to this class of things as being a geometrical fiction. He gave the name of principle of the line-and this he often posited-to the indivisible lines. Yet these must have a limit; therefore the argument from which the existence of the line follows proves also the existence of the point.
↵ Omnino autem sapientia de manifestis causam inquirente, hoc quidem praetermisimus; nihil enim de causa dicimus unde principium est transmutationis. Horum vero substantiam dicere putantes ipsorum alias quidem substantias esse dicimus, quomodo vero ille horum substantiae, uane dicimus; nam et partici↵pare, sicut prius diximus, nihil est.	In general, though philosophy seeks the cause of perceptible things, we have given this up (for we say nothing of the cause from which change takes its start), but while we fancy we are stating the substance of perceptible things, we assert the existence of a second class of substances, while our account of the way in which they are the substances of perceptible things is empty talk; for ‘sharing’, as we said before, means nothing.
Nec quam in scientiis videmus, existens causa, propter quam et omnis intellectus et omnis natura facit, nec hanc causam quam esse dicimus unum principiorum, nihil tangunt species, sed facta est mathema↵tica presentibus philosophia, dicentium aliorum gratia ea oportere tractari.	Nor have the Forms any connexion with what we see to be the cause in the case of the arts, that for whose sake both all mind and the whole of nature are operative,-with this cause which we assert to be one of the first principles; but mathematics has come to be identical with philosophy for modern thinkers, though they say that it should be studied for the sake of other things.
Amplius autem substantiam subiectam ut materiam magis mathematicam aliquis suscipiet, et magis predicari et differentiam esse substantiae et materiei, ut magnum et parvum. Sicut ↵ phisiologi aiunt rarum et spissum, primas subiecti dicentes esse differentias has; haec namque sunt superhabundantia quaedam et defectio. Et de motu, si quidem haec erunt motus, palam quia moventur species; sin autem, unde venit? Tota namque ↵ de natura auferetur perscrutatio.	[92b] Further, one might suppose that the substance which according to them underlies as matter is too mathematical, and is a predicate and differentia of the substance, ie. of the matter, rather than matter itself; i.e. the great and the small are like the rare and the dense which the physical philosophers speak of, calling these the primary differentiae of the substratum; for these are a kind of excess and defect. And regarding movement, if the great and the small are to he movement, evidently the Forms will be moved; but if they are not to be movement, whence did movement come? The whole study of nature has been annihilated.
Et quod videtur esse facile: ƿ monstrare quod unum omnia non fiunt. Expositione enim non fiunt omnia unum sed id aliquid unum, si quis dat omnia, et nec hoc, si non genus dat universale esse; hoc autem in quibusdam impossibile.	And what is thought to be easy-to show that all things are one-is not done; for what is proved by the method of setting out instances is not that all things are one but that there is a One itself,-if we grant all the assumptions. And not even this follows, if we do not grant that the universal is a genus; and this in some cases it cannot be.
Nullam autem [Nullam namque] rationem habent nec quae sunt post numeros longitudines, latitudines et solida, nec quomodo sunt aut futura sint, nec si aliquam habent virtutem; ↵ haec enim nec species possibile esse (non enim sunt numeri) nec intermedia (sunt enim illa mathematica) nec corruptibilia. Sed rursum quartum videtur aliud hoc * genus.	Nor can it be explained either how the lines and planes and solids that come after the numbers exist or can exist, or what significance they have; for these can neither be Forms (for they are not numbers), nor the intermediates (for those are the objects of mathematics), nor the perishable things. This is evidently a distinct fourth class.
Et omnino existentium quaerere elementa non dividentem multipliciter dicta invenire impossibile est, et aliter secundum ↵ hunc modum quaerentes ex quibus sunt elementis. Ex quibus enim * facere aut pati aut ipsum rectum non est accipere, sed siquidem, substantiarum solum esse contingit; quare existentium omnium elementa aut quaerere aut putare habere non est verum.	In general, if we search for the elements of existing things without distinguishing the many senses in which things are said to exist, we cannot find them, especially if the search for the elements of which things are made is conducted in this manner. For it is surely impossible to discover what ‘acting’ or ‘being acted on’, or ‘the straight’, is made of, but if elements can be discovered at all, it is only the elements of substances; therefore either to seek the elements of all existing things or to think one has them is incorrect.
Quomodo autem aliquis discet omnium elementa? Palam ↵ enim quia non est possibile preexistere cognoscentem prius. Sicut enim geometrizare discentem alia quidem oportet prescire, quorum autem est scientia et de quibus debet discere non prenoscit, ita et in aliis. Quare si qua est omnium scientia, ut quidam aiunt, nihil utique preexistet hic cognoscens. ↵ quamvis sit omnis disciplina per precognita aut omnia aut quaedam, aut per demonstrationem aut per diffinitiones (oportet enim ex quibus est diffinitio prescire et esse nota); similiter autem et quae per inductionem. At vero et si existit connatura↵ƿlis, mirum quomodo latemus habentes potissimam scientiarum.	And how could we learn the elements of all things? Evidently we cannot start by knowing anything before. For as he who is learning geometry, though he may know other things before, knows none of the things with which the science deals and about which he is to learn, so is it in all other cases. Therefore if there is a science of all things, such as some assert to exist, he who is learning this will know nothing before. Yet all learning is by means of premisses which are (either all or some of them) known before,-whether the learning be [92b 32] by demonstration or by definitions; for the elements of the definition must be known before and be familiar; and learning by induction proceeds [93a] similarly. But again, if the science were actually innate, it were strange that we are unaware of our possession of the greatest of sciences.
Amplius autem quomodo aliquis cognoscit ex quibus est, et quomodo erit manifestum? Et enim hoc habet dubitationem. Ambiget enim aliquis quemadmodum et circa quasdam ↵ sillabas; hii namque SMA ex S * et M et A dicunt esse, alii vero quendam alium sonum dicunt esse et cognitorum nullum.	Again, how is one to come to know what all things are made of, and how is this to be made evident? This also affords a difficulty; for there might be a conflict of opinion, as there is about certain syllables; some say za is made out of s and d and a, while others say it is a distinct sound and none of those that are familiar.
Amplius autem quorum est sensus, haec quomodo aliquis non habens sensum cognoscet? Quamvis oportebat, si omnium haec sunt elementa ex quibus, quemadmodum compo↵site voces sunt ex propriis elementis	Further, how could we know the objects of sense without having the sense in question? Yet we ought to, if the elements of which all things consist, as complex sounds consist of the clements proper to sound, are the same.