Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7/c6

Chapter 6

Greek	Latin	English
πότερον δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον, σκεπτέον. ἔστι γάρ τι πρὸ ἔργου πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας σκέψιν:	↵ Utrum autem idem est aut alterum quod quid erat esse et unumquodque, perscrutandum est Est enim aliquid pre opere ad de substantia perscrutationem.	Chapter 6. We must inquire whether each thing and its essence are the same or different. This is of some use for the inquiry concerning substance;
ἕκαστόν τε γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο δοκεῖ εἶναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγεται εἶναι ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία.	Singulum enim non aliud videtur esse a suimet substantia, et quod quid erat esse dicitur singuli substantia.	for each thing is thought to be not different from its substance, and the essence is said to be the substance of each thing.
ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν λεγομένων κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δόξειεν ἂν [20] ἕτερον εἶναι, οἷον λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἕτερον καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι (εἰ γὰρ τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ αὐτό: τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὡς φασίν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ: ἢ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ὅσα κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι [25] ταὐτά, οὐ γὰρ ὡσαύτως τὰ ἄκρα γίγνεται ταὐτά: ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως γε ἐκεῖνο δόξειεν ἂν συμβαίνειν, τὰ ἄκρα γίγνεσθαι ταὐτὰ τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μουσικῷ: δοκεῖ δὲ οὔ):	In dictis quidem itaque secundum accidens videbitur utique ↵ diversum esse, ut albus homo alterum et albo homini esse. Si enim idem, homini esse et albo homini idem; idem enim homo et albus homo, ut dicunt; quare et albo homini et homini. Aut non necesse est quaecumque secundum accidens ↵ esse eadem; non enim similiter extremitates fiunt eedem. Sed forsan illud videtur accidere: extremitates fieri easdem secundum accidens, ut albo esse et musico; videtur autem non.	Now in the case of accidental unities the two would be generally thought to be different, e.g. white man would be thought to be different from the essence of white man. For if they are the same, the essence of man and that of white man are also the same; for a man and a white man are the same thing, as people say, so that the essence of white man and that of man would be also the same. But perhaps it does not follow that the essence of accidental unities should be the same as that of the simple terms. For the extreme terms are not in the same way identical with the middle term. But perhaps this might be thought to follow, that the extreme terms, the accidents, should turn out to be the same, e.g. the essence of white and that of musical; but this is not actually thought to be the case.
ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ λεγομένων ἆρ᾽ ἀνάγκη ταὐτὸ εἶναι, οἷον εἴ τινες εἰσὶν οὐσίαι ὧν ἕτεραι [30] μὴ εἰσὶν οὐσίαι μηδὲ φύσεις ἕτεραι πρότεραι, οἵας φασὶ τὰς ἰδέας εἶναί τινες; εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ἕτερον αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, καὶ ζῷον καὶ τὸ ζῴῳ, καὶ τὸ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ὄν, [1031β] [1] ἔσονται ἄλλαι τε οὐσίαι καὶ φύσεις καὶ ἰδέαι παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας, καὶ πρότεραι οὐσίαι ἐκεῖναι, εἰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐσία ἐστίν.	ƿ In dictis vero secundum se semper necesse idem esse, ut si quae sunt substantiae a quibus alterae non sunt substantiae nec ↵ alterae naturae priores, quales dicunt ydeas esse quidam. Si enim erit alterum ipsum bonum et quod bono esse, animal et quod animali et ens quod enti, erunt aliae substantiae ↵ et naturae et ydee praeter dictas, et priores substantiae illae, si quod quid erat esse substantiae est.	But in the case of so-called self-subsistent things, is a thing necessarily the same as its essence? E.g. if there are some substances which have no other substances nor entities prior to them – substances such as some assert the Ideas to be? – If the essence of good is to be different from good-itself, and the essence of animal from animal-itself, and the essence of being from being-itself [31b], there will, firstly, be other substances and entities and Ideas besides those which are asserted, and, secondly, these others will be prior substances, if essence is substance.
καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπολελυμέναι ἀλλήλων, τῶν μὲν οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔσται ὄντα (λέγω δὲ τὸ ἀπολελύσθαι [5] εἰ μήτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθῷ μήτε τούτῳ τὸ εἶναι ἀγαθόν): ἐπιστήμη τε γὰρ ἑκάστου ἔστιν ὅταν τὸ τί ἦν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι γνῶμεν, καὶ ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἔχει, ὥστε εἰ μηδὲ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὐδὲ τὸ ὄντι ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ ἑνὶ ἕν: ὁμοίως δὲ πάντα ἔστιν ἢ οὐθὲν τὰ [10] τί ἦν εἶναι, ὥστ᾽ εἰ μηδὲ τὸ ὄντι ὄν, οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδέν. ἔτι ᾧ μὴ ὑπάρχει ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, οὐκ ἀγαθόν.	Et si quidem absolute ab invicem, harum quidem non erit scientia, haec autem non erunt entia. (Dico autem absolvi, si nec bono ipsi existit esse ↵ bono nec huic esse bonum). Scientia enim cuiuslibet haec: quod quid erat illi esse. Et in bono et in aliis similiter se habet; quare si nec bono esse bonum, nec quod enti ens nec quod uni unum. Similiter autem omnia sunt aut nullum quae quid ↵ erat esse; quare si neque quod enti ens, nec aliorum nullum. Amplius cui non inest bono esse, non bonum.	And if the posterior substances and the prior are severed from each other, (a) there will be no knowledge of the former, and (b) the latter will have no being. (By ‘severed’ I mean, if the good-itself has not the essence of good, and the latter has not the property of being good.) For (a) there is knowledge of each thing only when we know its essence. And (b) the case is the same for other things as for the good; so that if the essence of good is not good, neither is the essence of reality real, nor the essence of unity one. And all essences alike exist or none of them does; so that if the essence of reality is not real, neither is any of the others. Again, that to which the essence of good does not belong is not good.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, <καὶ> ὅσα μὴ κατ᾽ ἄλλο λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ καὶ πρῶτα: καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν ἂν ὑπάρχῃ, κἂν μὴ ᾖ εἴδη, [15] μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως κἂν ᾖ εἴδη (ἅμα δὲ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι εἴπερ εἰσὶν αἱ ἰδέαι οἵας τινές φασιν, οὐκ ἔσται τὸ ὑποκείμενον οὐσία: ταύτας γὰρ οὐσίας μὲν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, μὴ καθ᾽ ὑποκειμένου δέ: ἔσονται γὰρ κατὰ μέθεξιν). ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ ἕκαστον [20] καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι γε τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἕκαστον τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν ἀνάγκη ἕν τι εἶναι ἄμφω	Necesse igitur unum esse benignum et benigno esse et bonum et bono esse, quaecumque non secundum aliud dicuntur, sed prima et secundum se. Et enim hoc sufficiens si extiterit, quamquam non sint species; magis autem forsan et si sint species. ↵ Simulque palam quia si sunt ydee quales quidam dicunt, non erit subiectum substantia. Has enim substantias esse est necesse, non de subiecto autem; erunt enim secundum participationem. Ex hiis itaque rationibus unum et idem non secundum accidens ipsum unumquodque et quod quid erat esse, et quod ↵ scire unumquodque horum est quod quid erat esse scire; quare secundum expositionem necesse unum aliquid esse ambo.	The good, then, must be one with the essence of good, and the beautiful with the essence of beauty, and so with all things which do not depend on something else but are self-subsistent and primary. For it is enough if they are this, even if they are not Forms; or rather, perhaps, even if they are Forms. (At the same time it is clear that if there are Ideas such as some people say there are, it will not be substratum that is substance; for these must be substances, but not predicable of a substratum; for if they were they would exist only by being participated in.) Each thing itself, then, and its essence are one and the same in no merely accidental way, as is evident both from the preceding arguments and because to know each thing, at least, is just to know its essence, so that even by the exhibition of instances it becomes clear that both must be one.
(τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεγόμενον, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν ἢ λευκόν, διὰ τὸ διττὸν σημαίνειν [24] οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὡς ταὐτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό: καὶ [25] γὰρ ᾧ συμβέβηκε λευκὸν καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός, ὥστ᾽ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ταὐτόν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό: τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ ταὐτό, τῷ πάθει δὲ ταὐτό).	Secundum accidens vero dictum, ut musicum aut album, propter duplex signficare non est verum dicere quia idem quod quid erat esse et ipsum. Et enim cui accidit album ↵ et accidens, quare est quidem ut idem, est autem ut non idem ƿ quod quid erat esse et ipsum; nam homini et albo homini non idem, passioni autem idem.	(But of an accidental term, e.g.’the musical’ or ‘the white’, since it has two meanings, it is not true to say that it itself is identical with its essence; for both that to which the accidental quality belongs, and the accidental quality, are white, so that in a sense the accident and its essence are the same, and in a sense they are not; for the essence of white is not the same as the man or the white man, but it is the same as the attribute white.)
ἄτοπον δ᾽ ἂν φανείη κἂν εἴ τις ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα θεῖτο τῶν τί ἦν εἶναι: ἔσται γὰρ καὶ παρ᾽ ἐκεῖνο [30] ἄλλο, οἷον τῷ τί ἦν εἶναι ἵππῳ τί ἦν εἶναι [ἵππῳ] ἕτερον. καίτοι τί κωλύει καὶ νῦν εἶναι ἔνια εὐθὺς τί ἦν εἶναι, εἴπερ οὐσία τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι; ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐ μόνον ἕν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς αὐτῶν, ὡς δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων: [1032α] [1] οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἓν τὸ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ ἕν.	Absurdum vero apparebit et si quis unicuique nomen ↵ imposuerit ipsorum quid erat esse. Erit enim et praeter illud aliud ei quod quid erat esse equo: ipsi quod quid erat esse equo alterum. Et quid prohibet et nunc esse quaedam statim quid erat esse, siquidem substantia est quod quid erat esse? At vero ↵ non solum unum, sed et ratio eadem ipsorum, sicut palam est ex dictis; non enim secundum accidens unum quod uni esse et unum.	The absurdity of the separation would appear also if one were to assign a name to each of the essences; for there would be yet another essence besides the original one, e.g. to the essence of horse there will belong a second essence. Yet why should not some things be their essences from the start, since essence is substance? But indeed not only are a thing and its essence one, but the formula of them is also [32a] the same, as is clear even from what has been said; for it is not by accident that the essence of one, and the one, are one.
ἔτι εἰ ἄλλο ἔσται, εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν: τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔσται τί ἦν εἶναι τοῦ ἑνὸς τὸ δὲ τὸ ἕν, ὥστε καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνων ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται λόγος. ὅτι [5] μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ λεγομένων τὸ ἑκάστῳ εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν ἐστι, δῆλον:	Amplius si aliud erit, in infinitum sunt; hoc quidem erit quid erat esse le uni esse illud vero unum, ↵ quare et in illis erit eadem ration. Quod quidem igitur in primis et secundum se dictis unicuique esse et unumquodque idem et unum, palam.	Further, if they are to be different, the process will go on to infinity; for we shall have (1) the essence of one, and (2) the one, so that to terms of the former kind the same argument will be applicable. Clearly, then, each primary and self-subsistent thing is one and the same as its essence.
οἱ δὲ σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι πρὸς τὴν θέσιν ταύτην φανερὸν ὅτι τῇ αὐτῇ λύονται λύσει καὶ εἰ ταὐτὸ Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτει εἶναι: οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει οὔτε ἐξ ὧν ἐρωτήσειεν ἄν τις οὔτε ἐξ ὧν [10] λύων ἐπιτύχοι. πῶς μὲν οὖν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ταὐτὸν καὶ πῶς οὐ ταὐτὸν ἑκάστῳ, εἴρηται.	Sophisti autem elenchi ad positionem hanc palam quod eadem solvuntur solutione, et si idem Socrates et Socrati esse; nihil enim differt ↵ nec ex quibus interrogabit utique aliquis nec ex quibus solvens fuerit. Quomodo quidem igitur quod quid erat esse idem et quomodo non idem unicuique, dictum est.	The sophistical objections to this position, and the question whether Socrates and to be Socrates are the same thing, are obviously answered by the same solution; for there is no difference either in the standpoint from which the question would be asked, or in that from which one could answer it successfully. We have explained, then, in what sense each thing is the same as its essence and in what sense it is not.