Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l6/c4

Chapter 4

Greek	Latin	English
περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντος ἀφείσθω (διώρισται γὰρ ἱκανῶς):	Ergo de ente secundum accidens praetermittatur; determinatum enim est sufficienter.	Chapter 4 Let us dismiss accidental being; for we have sufficiently determined its nature.
τὸ δὲ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὄν, καὶ μὴ ὂν ὡς ψεῦδος, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ σύνθεσίν ἐστι καὶ διαίρεσιν, τὸ δὲ σύνολον [20] περὶ μερισμὸν ἀντιφάσεως (τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς τὴν κατάφασιν ἐπὶ τῷ συγκειμένῳ ἔχει τὴν δ᾽ ἀπόφασιν ἐπὶ τῷ διῃρημένῳ, τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος τούτου τοῦ μερισμοῦ τὴν ἀντίφασιν:	Quod autem * ut verum ens et non ens ut falsum, quoniam secundum compositionem est et ↵ * divisionem, totaliter vero circa partitionem contradictionis; verum quidem enim affirmationem in composito habet negationem vero in disiuncto, sed falsum huius partitionis ƿ * contradictionem.	But since that which is in the sense of being true, or is not in the sense of being false, depends on combination and separation, and truth and falsity together depend on the allocation of a pair of contradictory judgements (for the true judgement affirms where the subject and predicate really are combined, and denies where they are separated, while the false judgement has the opposite of this allocation;
πῶς δὲ τὸ ἅμα ἢ τὸ χωρὶς νοεῖν συμβαίνει, ἄλλος λόγος, λέγω δὲ τὸ ἅμα καὶ τὸ χωρὶς ὥστε μὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς [25] ἀλλ᾽ ἕν τι γίγνεσθαι):	Quomodo autem quod simul aut quod separatim intelligere accidit, alius * sermo; dico autem quod simul et quod separatim ut non eo quod consequenter sed ↵ in unum aliquid fieri.	it is another question, how it happens that we think things together or apart; by together and apart I mean thinking them so that there is no succession in the thoughts but they become a unity);
οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ κακὸν εὐθὺς ψεῦδος, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν διανοίᾳ, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστιν οὐδ᾽ ἐν διανοίᾳ: ὅσα μὲν οὖν δεῖ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὸ οὕτως ὂν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον:	Non enim est falsum et verum in rebus, ut quod quidem bonum verum quod autem malum falsum, sed in mente; circa vero simplicia et quid est nec in mente est. Ergo quaecumque oportet speculari circa sic ens et non ens, posterius perscrutandum est.	for falsity and truth are not in things – it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false – but in thought; while with regard to simple concepts and whats falsity and truth do not exist even in thought – this being so, we must consider later what has to be discussed with regard to that which is or is not in this sense.
ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ συμπλοκή [30] ἐστιν καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν διανοίᾳ ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, τὸ δ᾽ οὕτως ὂν ἕτερον ὂν τῶν κυρίως (ἢ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ποιὸν ἢ ὅτι ποσὸν ἤ τι ἄλλο συνάπτει ἢ ἀφαιρεῖ ἡ διάνοια), τὸ μὲν ὡς συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὂν ἀφετέον—τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μὲν ἀόριστον τοῦ δὲ τῆς διανοίας τι πάθος, [1028α] [1] καὶ ἀμφότερα περὶ τὸ λοιπὸν γένος τοῦ ὄντος, καὶ οὐκ ἔξω δηλοῦσιν οὖσάν τινα φύσιν τοῦ ὄντος—διὸ ταῦτα μὲν ἀφείσθω, σκεπτέον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ τὰ αἴτια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ᾗ ὄν. [φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐν οἷς διωρισάμεθα περὶ [5] τοῦ ποσαχῶς λέγεται ἕκαστον, ὅτι πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν.]	Quoniam autem complexio est et ↵ divisio in mente et non in rebus, quod autem * ita ens alterum * ens a propriis (aut enim quod quid est aut quia quale * aut quia quantum aut si quid aliud copulat aut dividit mens), quod quidem ut accidens et quod ut verum ens praetermittendum. Causa enim huius quidem indefinita illius vero mentis aliqua ↵ passio, et utraque circa reliquum genus entis, et non extra ostendunt entem aliquam naturam entis. Quapropter ea quidem praetermittantur, perscrutande vero sunt entis ipsius causae et principia in quantum ens *. Palam autem in quibus determinavimus de * quotiens unumquodque dicitur, quia multipliciter ↵ dicitur ens. Significat enim hoc quidem quid est.	But since the combination and the separation are in thought and not in the things, and that which is in this sense is a different sort of being from the things that are in the full sense (for the thought attaches or removes either the subject's what or its having a certain quality or quantity or something else), that which is accidentally and that which is in the sense of being true must be dismissed. For the cause of the former is indeterminate, and that of the latter is some affection of the thought [28a], and both are related to the remaining genus of being, and do not indicate the existence of any separate class of being. Therefore let these be dismissed, and let us consider the causes and the principles of being itself, qua being. (It was clear in our discussion of the various meanings of terms, that being has several meanings.)