Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l9/c2

Chapter 2

Latin	English
ƿ Quoniam autem haec quidem in inanimatis insunt principia talia, illa vero in animatis et in anima et anime in ratio↵nem habente, palam quia et potentiarum aliae erunt irrationabiles aliae cum ratione. Quapropter omnes artes et factive scientie potentie sunt; principia namque permutativa * in alio aut in quantum aliud.	Chapter 2. Since some such originative sources are present in soulless things, and others in things possessed of soul, and in [46b] soul, and in the rational part of the soul, clearly some potencies will, be non-rational and some will be non-rational and some will be accompanied by a rational formula. This is why all arts, i.e. all productive forms of knowledge, are potencies; they are originative sources of change in another thing or in the artist himself considered as other.
Et quae quidem cum ratione * omnes contra↵riorum sunt eaedem, et quae irrationabiles una unius; ut calidum calefaciendi solum, medicativa autem infirmitatis et sanitatis.	And each of those which are accompanied by a rational formula is alike capable of contrary effects, but one non-rational power produces one effect; e.g. the hot is capable only of heating, but the medical art can produce both disease and health.
Causa autem quia ratio est scientia; ratio autem eadem ostendit rem et privationem, tamen non similiter, et est ut amborum, est autem ut existentis magis. Quare necesse et tales scien↵tias esse quidem contrariorum, esse vero huius quidem secundum se illius vero non secundum se; et enim ratio huius quidem secundum se illius vero modo quodam secundum accidens. Nam negatione et ablatione ostendit contrarium; etenim privatio prima contrarium, haec autem * ablatio alterius.	The reason is that science is a rational formula, and the same rational formula explains a thing and its privation, only not in the same way; and in a sense it applies to both, but in a sense it applies rather to the positive fact. Therefore such sciences must deal with contraries, but with one in virtue of their own nature and with the other not in virtue of their nature; for the rational formula applies to one object in virtue of that object _ s nature, and to the other, in a sense, accidentally. For it is by denial and removal that it exhibits the contrary; for the contrary is the primary privation, and this is the removal of the positive term.
Quoniam ↵ autem contraria non fiunt in eodem, scientia autem * potentia in habendo rationem, et anima motus habet principium: salubre quidem sanitatem solum facit et calefactivum caliditatem et infrigidativum frigiditatem, sciens vero ambo. Est enim ↵ amborum quidem ratio, non similiter autem, et in anima quae habet motus principium; quare ambo ab eodem principio movebit ad ipsum copulans. Propter quod secundum rationem potentia sine ratione potentibus faciunt contraria; unum enim principium continetur ratione.	Now since contraries do not occur in the same thing, but science is a potency which depends on the possession of a rational formula, and the soul possesses an originative source of movement; therefore, while the wholesome produces only health and the calorific only heat and the frigorific only cold, the scientific man produces both the contrary effects. For the rational formula is one which applies to both, though not in the same way, and it is in a soul which possesses an originative source of movement; so that the soul will start both processes from the same originative source, having linked them up with the same thing. And so the things whose potency is according to a rational formula act contrariwise to the things whose potency is non-rational; for the products of the former are included under one originative source, the rational formula.
Palam autem quia ipsius ↵ bene potentiam sequitur solum faciendi aut patiendi potentia, hanc vero illa non semper. Necesse enim bene facientem facere, sed solum facientem non necesse et bene facere.	It is obvious also that the potency of merely doing a thing or having it done to one is implied in that of doing it or having it done well, but the latter is not always implied in the former: for he who does a thing well must also do it, but he who does it merely need not also do it well.