Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l5/c6

Chapter 6 One

Latin	English
Unum dicitur aliud secundum accidens aliud secundum se. Secundum accidens quidem ut Coriscus et musicum, et Coriscus musicus (idem enim est dicere Coriscus et musicum ↵ et Coriscus musicus), et musicum et iustum, et musicus iustus ƿ Coriscus. Omnia enim haec unum dicuntur secundum accidens, iustum quidem et musicum, quia uni substantiae acciderunt, musicum vero et Coriscus, quia alterum alteri accidit. Similiter autem et modo quodam musicus Coriscus cum Corisco unum, quia altera partium alteri accidit earum quae sunt * in oratione, ↵ ut musicum Corisco. Et musicus Coriscus iusto Corisco, quia utriusque pars eidem uni accidit, unum. Nihil enim differt quam Corisco musicum accidere. Similiter autem sive in genere sive in universalis * alicuius nominibus dicatur accidens, ut quia homo idem * et musicus homo; aut enim quia homini ↵ uni existenti substantiae accidit musicum, aut quia ambo singularium alicui accidunt, ut Corisco. Tamen non eodem modo ambo insunt, sed hoc quidem forsan ut genus et in substantia, illud vero * ut habitus aut passio substantiae.	Chapter 6. One means (1) that which is one by accident, (2) that which is one by its own nature. (1) Instances of the accidentally one are Coriscus and what is musical , and musical Coriscus (for it is the same thing to say Coriscus and what is musical , and musical Coriscus ), and what is musical and what is just , and musical Coriscus and just Coriscus . For all of these are called one by virtue of an accident, what is just and what is musical because they are accidents of one substance, what is musical and Coriscus because the one is an accident of the other; and similarly in a sense musical Coriscus is one with Coriscus because one of the parts of the phrase is an accident of the other, i.e. musical is an accident of Coriscus; and musical Coriscus is one with just Coriscus because one part of each is an accident of one and the same subject. The case is similar if the accident is predicated of a genus or of any universal name, e.g. if one says that man is the same as musical man ; for this is either because musical is an accident of man, which is one substance, or because both are accidents of some individual, e.g. Coriscus. Both, however, do not belong to him in the same way, but one presumably as genus and included in his substance, the other as a state or affection of the substance.
Ergo quaecumque secundum accidens dicuntur unum, hoc ↵ modo dicuntur. Secundum se vero unum dictorum alia dicuntur eo quod continua sint, ut honus * vinculo et ligna cum ↵ visco; et linea, et si flexa sit, continua autem, una dicitur, sicut et partium singule, tibia et brachium. Ipsorum autem horum magis unum * natura continua quam arte. Continuum ↵ vero dicitur cuius motus * unus secundum se et non possibile aliter; unus autem cuius indivisibilis, indivisibilis autem secundum tempus.	The things, then, that are called one in virtue of an accident, are called so in this way. (2) Of things that are called one in virtue of their own nature some (a) are so called because [16a] they are continuous, e.g. a bundle is made one by a band, and pieces of wood are made one by glue; and a line, even if it is bent, is called one if it is continuous, as each part of the body is, e.g. the leg or the arm. Of these themselves, the continuous by nature are more one than the continuous by art. A thing is called continuous which has by its own nature one movement and cannot have any other; and the movement is one when it is indivisible, and it is indivisible in respect of time.
Secundum se autem continua quaecumque non tactu sunt unum; nam si ponis se tangentia ligna, non dices haec unum esse nec lignum nec corpus nec aliud continuum nullum. Quae itaque omnino sunt continua unum dicuntur ↵ quamvis reflexionem habeant, et adhuc magis quae non habent reflexionem, ut tibia aut crus quam skelos, quia contingit ƿ non unum esse motum skeli. Et recta quam flexa magis unum. Reflexam vero et angulum habentem unam et non ↵ unam dicimus, quia contingit et non simul esse motum eius et simul recte vero semper simul, et nulla pars habens magnitudinem haec quidem quiescit illa vero movetur, quemadmodum reflexe.	Those things are continuous by their own nature which are one not merely by contact; for if you put pieces of wood touching one another, you will not say these are one piece of wood or one body or one continuum of any other sort. Things, then, that are continuous in any way called one, even if they admit of being bent, and still more those which cannot be bent; e.g. the shin or the thigh is more one than the leg, because the movement of the leg need not be one. And the straight line is more one than the bent; but that which is bent and has an angle we call both one and not one, because its movement may be either simultaneous or not simultaneous; but that of the straight line is always simultaneous, and no part of it which has magnitude rests while another moves, as in the bent line.
Amplius alio modo dicitur * eo quod subiectum sit specie * indifferens; indifferens vero quorum indivisibilis * species secun↵dum sensum. Subiectum autem aut primum aut ultimum ad finem. Vinum enim unum dicitur et aqua una in quantum * indivisibile secundum speciem, et iiquores omnes unum dicuntur (ut oleum, vinum) et fluida, quia omnium ultimum subiectum * idem; nam aqua aut aer omnia haec sunt.	(b)(i) Things are called one in another sense because their substratum does not differ in kind; it does not differ in the case of things whose kind is indivisible to sense. The substratum meant is either the nearest to, or the farthest from, the final state. For, one the one hand, wine is said to be one and water is said to be one, qua indivisible in kind; and, on the other hand, all juices, e.g. oil and wine, are said to be one, and so are all things that can be melted, because the ultimate substratum of all is the same; for all of these are water or air.
Dicuntur ↵ autem unum et quorum genus unum differens oppositis differentiis. Et haec dicuntur omnia unum quia genus unum quod subicitur differentiis, ut equus, homo, canis unum quid, quia omnia animalia. Et modo itaque simili sicut materia una. Haec autem quandoque quidem ita unum dicuntur, quandoque vero ↵ genere superiore quod idem dicitur, si sint ultime species generis superiores hiis; ut isoskeles et isopleurus rsunt una et eadem1 figura, quia ambo triangulus; sed trianguli non iidem.	(ii) Those things also are called one whose genus is one though distinguished by opposite differentiae – these too are all called one because the genus which underlies the differentiae is one (e.g. horse, man, and dog form a unity, because all are animals), and indeed in a way similar to that in which the matter is one. These are sometimes called one in this way, but sometimes it is the higher genus that is said to be the same (if they are infimae species of their genus) – the genus above the proximate genera; e.g. the isosceles and the equilateral are one and the same figure because both are triangles; but they are not the same triangles.
Amplius autem unum dicuntur quorumcumque ratio quae quod quid erat esse dicit indivisibilis est ad aliam significan↵tem quid erat esse rem (ipsa enim secundum se omnis ratio divisibilis). Sic enim augmentatum et minutum unum sunt, quia ↵ ratio una, sicut in superficiebus quae speciei una.	(c) Two things are called one, when the definition which states the essence of one is indivisible from another definition which shows us the other (though in itself every definition is divisible). Thus even that which has increased or is diminishing is one, because its definition is one, as, in [16b] the case of plane figures, is the definition of their form.
Omnino vero ƿ quorum intelligentia indivisibilis intelligens quid erat esse, et non potest separari neque tempore neque loco neque ratione, maxime haec unum, et horum quaecumque substantia.	In general those things the thought of whose essence is indivisible, and cannot separate them either in time or in place or in definition, are most of all one, and of these especially those which are substances.
Universaliter enim quaecumque non habent divisionem, in quantum non habent, sic unum dicuntur; ut si in quantum homo non habet ↵ divisionem, unus homo, si vero in quantum animal, unum animal, et si in quantum magnitudo, una magnitudo. Plurima quidem igitur unum dicuntur per alterum aliquid facere aut pati aut habere aut ad aliquid esse unum, quae autem primo dicuntur unum quorum substantia una, una vero aut continuatione aut specie aut ratione; et enim numeramus ut plura ↵ aut quae non continua aut quorum non una species aut quorum ratio non una.	For in general those things that do not admit of division are called one in so far as they do not admit of it; e.g. if two things are indistinguishable qua man, they are one kind of man; if qua animal, one kind of animal; if qua magnitude, one kind of magnitude. Now most things are called one because they either do or have or suffer or are related to something else that is one, but the things that are primarily called one are those whose substance is one, – and one either in continuity or in form or in definition; for we count as more than one either things that are not continuous, or those whose form is not one, or those whose definition is not one.
Amplius autem est quidem ut quodcumque unum continuitate dicimus esse, si sit quantum et continuum, est autem ut non, si non aliquod totum sit, hoc autem si non speciem habeat unam; ut non utique dicemus rsimiliter unum videntes1 qualitercumque partes compositas calciamenti, nisi propter continuitatem, sed si sic ut calciamentum sit et 1016b 15 speciem habeat aliquam iam unam. Quapropter et quae circuli maxime una linearum, quia tota et perfecta est.	While in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless it has unity of form; e.g. if we saw the parts of a shoe put together anyhow we should not call them one all the same (unless because of their continuity); we do this only if they are put together so as to be a shoe and to have already a certain single form. This is why the circle is of all lines most truly one, because it is whole and complete.
Uni vero esse principium alicui est numero esse; prima namque mensura principium; nam quo primo cognoscimus, hoc est prima mensura cuiusque generis; principium ergo ↵ cognoscibilis circa quodlibet unum. Non idem autem in omnibus generibus * unum. Hic quidem enim est diesis, illic autem vocalis aut consonans; gravitatis autem alterum et motus aliud. Vbique vero unum aut quantitate aut specie indivisibile. * secundum quantum quidem igitur et in quantum quantum ƿ ↵ indivisibile: quod quidem omnino et sine positione dicitur unitas, quod autem omnino et positionem habens punctum; quod autem secundum unum linea, quod vero secundum duo superficies, omnino vero et tripliciter divisibile secundum quantitatem corpus. Facta autem conversione: dualiter quidem divisibile superficies, unice autem linea, nullatenus divisibile ↵ secundum quantitatem punctum et unitas; hoc quidem non habens positionem unitas, illud vero habens positionem punctum.	(3) The essence of what is one is to be some kind of beginning of number; for the first measure is the beginning, since that by which we first know each class is the first measure of the class; the one, then, is the beginning of the knowable regarding each class. But the one is not the same in all classes. For here it is a quarter-tone, and there it is the vowel or the consonant; and there is another unit of weight and another of movement. But everywhere the one is indivisible either in quantity or in kind. Now that which is indivisible in quantity is called a unit if it is not divisible in any dimension and is without position, a point if it is not divisible in any dimension and has position, a line if it is divisible in one dimension, a plane if in two, a body if divisible in quantity in all i.e. in three dimensions. And, reversing the order, that which is divisible in two dimensions is a plane, that which is divisible in one a line, that which is in no way divisible in quantity is a point or a unit, – that which has not position a unit, that which has position a point.
Amplius autem alia secundum numerum sunt unum, alia secundum speciem, alia secundum genus, alia secundum analogiam; numero quidem quorum materia una, specie quorum ratio una, genere quorum eadem figura predicationis, secundum ↵ proportionem quaecumque se habent ut aliud ad aliud. Semper itaque posteriora precedentia sequuntur, ut quaecumque numero ↵ specie unum, sed quaecumque specie non omnia numero; sed genere omnia unum quaecumque et specie, quaecumque vero genere non omnia specie sed proportione; et quaecumque unum proportione non omnia genere.	Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in species those whose definition is one, in genus those to which the same figure of predication applies, by analogy those which are related as a third thing is to a fourth. The latter kinds of unity are always found when the former are; e.g. things that are one in number are also one in species, while things that are one in species are not [17a] all one in number; but things that are one in species are all one in genus, while things that are so in genus are not all one in species but are all one by analogy; while things that are one by analogy are not all one in genus.
Palam autem et quod multa opposite dicentur uni; nam alia non existendo continua, alia ↵ in habendo materiam divisibilem secundum speciem, aut primam aut ultimam, alia in habendo rationes plures quid erat esse dicentes.	Evidently many will have meanings opposite to those of one ; some things are many because they are not continuous, others because their matter – either the proximate matter or the ultimate – is divisible in kind, others because the definitions which state their essence are more than one.