Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l10/c3

Chapter 3

Latin	English
Opponuntur autem unum et multa secundum plures ↵ modos, quorum uno unum et multitudo * ut indivisibile et divisibile. Quod quidem enim aut divisum aut divisibile multitudo quaedam dicitur, indivisibile vero aut non divisum unum.	Chapter 3. The one and the many are opposed in several ways, of which one is the opposition of the one and plurality as indivisible and divisible; for that which is either divided or divisible is called a plurality, and that which is indivisible or not divided is called one.
Quoniam ergo * quatuor modis oppositiones *, et horum secundum privationem dicitur alterum, contraria utique erunt ↵ et neque ut contradictio neque ut ad aliquid dicta.	Now since opposition is of four kinds, and one of these two terms is privative in meaning, they must be contraries, and neither contradictory nor correlative in meaning.
Dicitur autem ex contrario et ostenditur ipsum unum, ex divisibili indivisibile, propter magis sensibilem multitudinem esse et divisibile quam indivisibile. Quare ratione prior multitudo indivisibili propter sensum.	And the one derives its name and its explanation from its contrary, the indivisible from the divisible, because plurality and the divisible is more perceptible than the indivisible, so that in definition plurality is prior to the indivisible, because of the conditions of perception.
Est autem unius quidem, sicut et ↵ in divisione contrariorum descripsimus, idem et simile et equale; pluralitatis vero diversum et dissimile et inequale.	To the one belong, as we indicated graphically in our distinction of the contraries, the same and the like and the equal, and to plurality belong the other and the unlike and the unequal.
ƿ Dicto vero eodem multipliciter. Uno quidem modo secundum numerum, quod dicimus aliquando ipsum. Hoc autem si ↵ ratione et numero unum fuerit, ut tu tibi ipsi et specie et ↵ materia unum. Amplius autem si ratio prime substantiae una fuerit, ut equales lineae recte eaedem, et equalia et isogonia tetragona, et etiam plura; sed in hiis equalitas unitas.	The same has several meanings; (1) we sometimes mean the same numerically ; again, (2) we call a thing the same if it is one both in definition and in number, e.g. you are one with yourself both in form and in matter; and again, (3) if the definition of its primary [54b] essence is one; e.g. equal straight lines are the same, and so are equal and equal-angled quadrilaterals; there are many such, but in these equality constitutes unity.
Similia vero si non sint eadem simpliciter entia nec secun↵dum substantiam indifferentia subiectam, * secundum speciem eadem sint, ut maius tetragonum minori simile, et inequales recte; hae namque similes quidem, eaedem vero simpliciter non. Alia si eandem speciem habentia, in quibus magis et minus fit, nec magis sint nec minus. Alia si sit eadem passio et una ↵ specie, ut album, valde et minus, similia dicunt esse quia una species ipsorum. Alia si plura habent eadem quam altera, aut simpliciter aut quae in promptu, ut stagnum argento vel auro ignis aut rubicundum et rufum *.	Things are like if, not being absolutely the same, nor without difference in respect of their concrete substance, they are the same in form; e.g. the larger square is like the smaller, and unequal straight lines are like; they are like, but not absolutely the same. Other things are like, if, having the same form, and being things in which difference of degree is possible, they have no difference of degree. Other things, if they have a quality that is in form one and same – e.g. whiteness – in a greater or less degree, are called like because their form is one. Other things are called like if the qualities they have in common are more numerous than those in which they differ – either the qualities in general or the prominent qualities; e.g. tin is like silver, qua white, and gold is like fire, qua yellow and red.
Quare palam quod diversum et dissimile multipliciter dici↵tur. Et hoc quidem aliud opposite et idem, propter quod omne ad omne aut idem aut aliud. Hoc autem si non et materia et ratio una, quapropter et tu et propinquus diversus. Tertium autem * ut quae * in mathematicis. Diversum quidem igitur ƿ aut idem propter hoc omne ad omne dicitur, quaecumque dicuntur * unum et ens; non enim contradictio est ipsius ↵ eiusdem, quapropter non dicitur in non entibus * (non idem autem dicitur). In entibus vero omnibus; aut enim unum aut non unum aptum natum et ens et unum. Diversum quidem igitur et idem ita opponuntur.	Evidently, then, other and unlike also have several meanings. And the other in one sense is the opposite of the same (so that everything is either the same as or other than everything else). In another sense things are other unless both their matter and their definition are one (so that you are other than your neighbour). The other in the third sense is exemplified in the objects of mathematics. Other or the same can therefore be predicated of everything with regard to everything else – but only if the things are one and existent, for other is not the contradictory of the same ; which is why it is not predicated of non-existent things (while not the same is so predicated). It is predicated of all existing things; for everything that is existent and one is by its very nature either one or not one with anything else.
Differentia vero et diversitas aliud. Diversum enim et a quo est diversum non necesse aliquo esse diversum; omne namque ↵ aut diversum aut idem quodcumque est ens. Differens vero ab aliquo aliquo * differens, quare necesse ipsum idem aliquid esse * quo differunt. Hoc autem ipsum idem: * genus aut species. Omne namque differens differt aut genere aut specie. Genere quidem quorum non est communis materia nec generatio ad invicem, ut quorumcumque alia figura cathegorie. Specie ↵ vero quorum idem est genus. Dicitur autem genus * quod ambo idem dicuntur secundum substantiam differentia. Contraria vero differentia *, et contrarietas differentia quaedam.	The other, then, and the same are thus opposed. But difference is not the same as otherness. For the other and that which it is other than need not be other in some definite respect (for everything that is existent is either other or the same), but that which is different is different from some particular thing in some particular respect, so that there must be something identical whereby they differ. And this identical thing is genus or species; for everything that differs differs either in genus or in species, in genus if the things have not their matter in common and are not generated out of each other (i.e. if they belong to different figures of predication), and in species if they have the same genus ( genus meaning that identical thing which is essentially predicated of both the different things). Contraries are different, and contrariety is a kind of difference.
Quod autem hoc bene supponimus, palam ex inductione. Omnia enim differentia videntur et haec, non solum diversa entia sed haec ↵ quidem genere diversa, haec autem in eadem coelementatione cathegorie, quare in eodem genere et eadem specie. Determina↵tum autem est in aliis quae sunt genere eadem aut diversa.	That we are right in this supposition is shown by induction. For all of these too are seen to be different; they are not merely other, but some are other in genus, [55a] and others are in the same line of predication, and therefore in the same genus, and the same in genus. We have distinguished elsewhere what sort of things are the same or other in genus.