Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l9/c8

Chapter 8

Latin	English
ƿ Quoniam autem ipsum prius determinatum est quot ↵ modis dicitur, palam quia prior est actus potentia. Dico autem potentia non solum determinata quae dicitur principium permutativum in alio in quantum aliud *, sed totaliter omni principio motivo aut immobilitativo. Et enim natura in eodem fit, in eodem enim genere ipsi potentie; principium enim motivum, ↵ sed non in alio sed in eodem in quantum idem. Omni itaque tali prior est actus ratione et substantia; tempore vero est quidem ut *, est autem ut non.	Chapter 8. From our discussion of the various senses of prior , it is clear that actuality is prior to potency. And I mean by potency not only that definite kind which is said to be a principle of change in another thing or in the thing itself regarded as other, but in general every principle of movement or of rest. For nature also is in the same genus as potency; for it is a principle of movement-not, however, in something else but in the thing itself qua itself. To all such potency, then, actuality is prior both in formula and in substantiality; and in time it is prior in one sense, and in another not.
Ratione quidem igitur quia prior *, palam. Nam per contingere actu esse possibile est quod primo possibile, puta dico ↵ edificatorem potentem edificare, et speculatorem speculari, et visibile potens videri. Eadem autem * ratio et in aliis. Quare necesse rationem preexistere et notitiam notitia.	(1) Clearly it is prior in formula; for that which is in the primary sense potential is potential because it is possible for it to become active; e.g. I mean by capable of building that which can build, and by capable of seeing that which can see, and by visible that which can be seen. And the same account applies to all other cases, so that the formula and the knowledge of the one must precede the knowledge of the other.
Tempore vero prius: specie idem agens * prius, sed numero ↵ non. Dico autem hoc, quia hoc quidem homine iam ente secundum actum et frumento et vidente prius est tempore materia et semen et visivum, quae potentia sunt homo et frumentum et videns, nondum autem actu. Sed hiis tempore priora altera * entia actu ex quibus haec facta sunt; semper enim ex potestate ↵ ente fit * actu ens ab * actu ente, ut homo ex homine, * musicus a musico, semper movente aliquo primo; movens autem actu iam est. Dictum est autem in sermonibus de substantia quia omne quod fit fit ex aliquo et ab aliquo, et hoc specie idem.	(2) In time it is prior in this sense: the actual which is identical in species though not in number with a potentially existing thing is to it. I mean that to this particular man who now exists actually and to the corn and to the seeing subject the matter and the seed and that which is capable of seeing, which are potentially a man and corn and seeing, but not yet actually so, are prior in time; but prior in time to these are other actually existing things, from which they were produced. For from the potentially existing the actually existing is always produced by an actually existing thing, e.g. man from man, musician by musician; there is always a first mover, and the mover already exists actually. We have said in our account of substance that everything that is produced is something produced from something and by something, and that the same in species as it.
↵Quapropter et videtur impossibile esse edificatorem esse qui non edificavit nihil aut citharedum qui non citharizavit; nam addiscens citharizare citharizans addiscit citharizare, similiter autem et alii.	This is why it is thought impossible to be a builder if one has built nothing or a harper if one has never played the harp; for he who learns to play the harp learns to play it by playing it, and all other learners do similarly.
Unde sophisticus elenchus factus est quia non habens quis scientiam faciet cuius * scientia; addiscens ↵ enim non habet.	And thence arose the sophistical quibble, that one who does not possess a science will be doing that which is the object of the science; for he who is learning it does not possess it.
Sed quia eius quod fit factum est aliquid et totaliter eius quod movetur motum est aliquid (palam ↵ autem in hiis quae de motu hoc), et discentem necesse habere ƿ aliquid scientie forsan. Sed igitur et hac palam quia actus et sic prior potentia secundum generationem et tempus.	But since, of that which is coming to be, some part must have come to be, and, of that which, in general, is changing, some part must have changed (this is shown in the [50a] treatise on movement), he who is learning must, it would seem, possess some part of the science. But here too, then, it is clear that actuality is in this sense also, viz. in order of generation and of time, prior to potency.
At vero et substantia. Primum quidem quia quae generatione posteriora specie et substantia sunt priora, ut vir puero et homo ↵ spermate; hoc quidem enim iam habet speciem illud vero non.	But (3) it is also prior in substantiality; firstly, (a) because the things that are posterior in becoming are prior in form and in substantiality (e.g. man is prior to boy and human being to seed; for the one already has its form, and the other has not),
Et quia omne ad principium uadit quod fit et finem. Principium enim cuius causa, finis vero causa generatio; finis autem actus, et huius gratia potentia sumitur.	and because everything that comes to be moves towards a principle, i.e. an end (for that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is for the sake of the end), and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of this that the potency is acquired.
Non enim ut visum ↵ habeant vident animalia sed ut videant visum habent.	For animals do not see in order that they may have sight, but they have sight that they may see.
Similiter autem et edificandi scientiam ut edificent et theoricam ut speculentur, sed non speculantur ut theoricam habeant, nisi meditantes; hii autem non speculantur sed in quantum sic, aut quia non egent speculari.	And similarly men have the art of building that they may build, and theoretical science that they may theorize; but they do not theorize that they may have theoretical science, except those who are learning by practice; and these do not theorize except in a limited sense, or because they have no need to theorize.
Amplius materia est potentia, donec ↵ veniat ad speciem; quando vero actu est, tunc est in specie. Similiter autem et in aliis, et quorum motus est finis.	Further, matter exists in a potential state, just because it may come to its form; and when it exists actually, then it is in its form. And the same holds good in all cases, even those in which the end is a movement. And so, as teachers think they have achieved their end when they have exhibited the pupil at work, nature does likewise.
Propter quod sicut docentes operantem ostendentes putant finem reddidisse, et natura similiter. Nam si non fit ita, Passonos ↵ Mercurius erit; non manifestus enim, et scientia si interius aut exterius, quemadmodum ille. Opus enim finis, actus autem opus. Propter quod et nomen dicitur actus secundum opus et tendit versus endelichiam.	For if this is not the case, we shall have Pauson's Hermes over again, since it will be hard to say about the knowledge, as about the figure in the picture, whether it is within or without. For the action is the end, and the actuality is the action. And so even the word actuality is derived from action , and points to the complete reality.
Quoniam vero est horum quidem ultimum usus, ut visus visio, et praeter hanc nullum fit alte↵rum a visu opus, a quibusdam vero fit aliquid, ut ab edificatoria domus praeter edificationem; tamen non minus hic quidem finis, hic autem magis finis potentie est. Nam edificatio in edificato, et simul fit et est cum domo. Quorumcumque ergo ↵ ƿ aliquid alterum est quod fit praeter usum, horum actus in facto est, ut edificatio in edificato et contextio in contexto; similiter autem et in aliis, et totaliter motus in eo quod move↵tur. Quorum vero non est aliud aliquod opus praeter actionem, in ipsis existit actio, ut visio in vidente et speculatio in specu↵lante et vita in anima (quare et felicitas; vita namque qualis quaedam est).	And while in some cases the exercise is the ultimate thing (e.g. in sight the ultimate thing is seeing, and no other product besides this results from sight), but from some things a product follows (e.g. from the art of building there results a house as well as the act of building), yet none the less the act is in the former case the end and in the latter more of an end than the potency is. For the act of building is realized in the thing that is being built, and comes to be, and is, at the same time as the house. Where, then, the result is something apart from the exercise, the actuality is in the thing that is being made, e.g. the act of building is in the thing that is being built and that of weaving in the thing that is being woven, and similarly in all other cases, and in general the movement is in the thing that is being moved; but where there is no product apart from the actuality, the actuality is present in the agents, e.g. the act of seeing is in the seeing subject and that of theorizing in the theorizing subject and the life is in the soul (and [50b] therefore well-being also; for it is a certain kind of life).
Quare manifestum quod substantia et species actus quidam est. Secundum hanc itaque rationem palam quia prior substantia est actus potentia. Et ut diximus, tempore ↵ semper preaccipitur actus alius ante alium usque ad eum qui est semper moventis primum.	Obviously, therefore, the substance or form is actuality. According to this argument, then, it is obvious that actuality is prior in substantial being to potency; and as we have said, one actuality always precedes another in time right back to the actuality of the eternal prime mover.
At vero et magis proprie; nam sempiterna priora substantia sunt corruptibilibus, est autem nihil potentia sempiternum.	But (b) actuality is prior in a stricter sense also; for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things, and no eternal thing exists potentially.
Ratio vero haec. Omnis potentia simul contradictionis est; ↵ quod quidem enim non possibile existere non utique existet in aliquo, possibile autem omne contingit non actu esse. Quod ergo possibile esse contingit esse et non esse: idem igitur possibile esse et non esse. Possibile vero non esse contingit non esse. Contingens autem non esse corruptibile, aut simpliciter aut hoc ↵ ipsum quod dicitur contingere non esse, aut secundum locum aut secundum quantum aut secundum quale; simpliciter autem * quod * secundum substantiam.	The reason is this. Every potency is at one and the same time a potency of the opposite; for, while that which is not capable of being present in a subject cannot be present, everything that is capable of being may possibly not be actual. That, then, which is capable of being may either be or not be; the same thing, then, is capable both of being and of not being. And that which is capable of not being may possibly not be; and that which may possibly not be is perishable, either in the full sense, or in the precise sense in which it is said that it possibly may not be, i.e. in respect either of place or of quantity or quality; in the full sense means in respect of substance .
Nihil ergo incorruptibilium simpliciter potentia est ens simpliciter (aliquid autem nihil prohibet, ut quale aut ubi); actu ergo * omnia.	Nothing, then, which is in the full sense imperishable is in the full sense potentially existent (though there is nothing to prevent its being so in some respect, e.g. potentially of a certain quality or in a certain place); all imperishable things, then, exist actually.
Nec eorum quae ex necessitate sunt; et quidem ipsa prima; nam si haec ↵ non essent, nihil utique esset.	Nor can anything which is of necessity exist potentially; yet these things are primary; for if these did not exist, nothing would exist.
Neque utique motus, si quis est sempiternus; nec si quid motum sempiternum, non est secundum potentiam motum nisi unde quo; huius autem mateƿriam nihil prohibet existere.	Nor does eternal movement, if there be such, exist potentially; and, if there is an eternal mobile, it is not in motion in virtue of a potentiality, except in respect of whence and whither (there is nothing to prevent its having matter which makes it capable of movement in various directions).
Propter quod semper agit sol et astra et totum caelum; non est autem timendum ne quando stet, quod timent qui * de natura. Neque laborant hoc agentia. Non enim super potentiam contradictionis ipsis, ut corrup↵tibilibus, motus, ut laboriosa sit * continuatio motus; nam substantia materia et potentia, non actu, causa huius.	And so the sun and the stars and the whole heaven are ever active, and there is no fear that they may sometime stand still, as the natural philosophers fear they may. Nor do they tire in this activity; for movement is not for them, as it is for perishable things, connected with the potentiality for opposites, so that the continuity of the movement should be laborious; for it is that kind of substance which is matter and potency, not actuality, that causes this.
Imitantur autem incorruptibilia et quae in transmutatione sunt entia, ut terra, ignis. Et enim haec semper agunt; nam secundum ↵ se et in ipsis habent motum.	Imperishable things are imitated by those that are involved in change, e.g. earth and fire. For these also are ever active; for they have their movement of themselves and in themselves.
Potentiae vero aliae, ex quibus diffinitum est, omnes contradictionis sunt. Nam possibile sic movere potest et non sic, quaecumque secundum rationem; irrationabiles vero per adesse et non contradictionis erunt eaedem.	But the other potencies, according to our previous discussion, are all potencies for opposites; for that which can move another in this way can also move it not in this way, i.e. if it acts according to a rational formula; and the same non-rational potencies will produce opposite results by their presence or absence.
Si ergo alique sunt nature tales aut substantiae quales dicunt ↵ qui * in rationibus ydeas, multo magis sciens utique erit aliquid quam per se scientia et motum quam motus; haec enim 105u1 actus magis, illa autem rpotentie horum1. Quod quidem igitur est prius actus potentia et omni principio mutabili, palam.	If, then, there are any entities or substances such as the dialecticians say the Ideas are, there must be something much more scientific than science-itself and something more [51a] mobile than movement-itself; for these will be more of the nature of actualities, while science-itself and movement-itself are potencies for these. Obviously, then, actuality is prior both to potency and to every principle of change.