Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7/c4

Chapter 4

Latin	English
Quoniam autem in principio divisimus quot ↵ determinamus substantiam, et horum unum quidem videtur esse quod quid erat esse, speculandam est de ipso. Praeopere enim ad transeundum ad quod notius est. Disciplina enim ita fit ↵ omniƿbus per minus nota naturae ad nota magis. Et hoc opus est: quemadmodum in actibus facere ex unicuique bonis totaliter bona unicuique bona, sic ex ipsi notioribus quae naturae quidem nota ipsi nota. Quae autem singulis nota et prima ↵ multotiens debiliter nota, et parum aut nihil entis habent. At tamen ex male quidem noscibilibus ipsi autem noscibilibus quae omnino noscibilia noscere temptandum, procedentis, sicut dictum est, per haec ipsa.	Chapter 4. Since at the start we distinguished the various marks by which we determine substance, and one of these was thought to be the essence, we must investigate this. For it is an advantage to advance to that which is more knowable. For learning proceeds for all in this way – through that which is less knowable by nature to that which is more knowable; and just as in conduct our task is to start from what is good for each and make what is without qualification good good for each, so it is our task to start from what is more knowable to oneself and make what is knowable by nature knowable to oneself. Now what is knowable and primary for particular sets of people is often knowable to a very small extent, and has little or nothing of reality. But yet one must start from that which is barely knowable but knowable to oneself, and try to know what is knowable without qualification, passing, as has been said, by way of those very things which one does know.
Et primo dicemus quaedam de eo logicae, quid est quod quid erat esse unumquodque quod dicitur secundum se. Non enim ↵ est tibi esse musicum esse; non enim secundum te ipsum es musicus. Quod ergo secundum te ipsum.	And first let us make some linguistic remarks about it. The essence of each thing is what it is said to be propter se. For being you is not being musical, since you are not by your very nature musical. What, then, you are by your very nature is your essence.
Neque etiam hoc omne; non enim quod ita secundum se ut superficiei album, quia non est superficiei esse album esse. At vero neque quod ex utrisque: superficiei albe esse. Quare? Quia adest haec. ↵ In qua igitur non inerit ratione ipsum dicente ipsu, haec ratio eius quod quid erat esse singulis. Quare si superficiei albe esse est superficiei esse, semper albo et levi esse idem et unum.	Nor yet is the whole of this the essence of a thing; not that which is propter se as white is to a surface, because being a surface is not identical with being white. But again the combination of both – ‘being a white surface’ – is not the essence of surface, because ‘surface’ itself is added. The formula, therefore, in which the term itself is not present but its meaning is expressed, this is the formula of the essence of each thing. Therefore if to be a white surface is to be a smooth surface, to be white and to be smooth are one and the same.
Quoniam vero sunt et secundum alias cathegorias composita (est enim aliquid subiectum cuique, ut qualitati et quantitati ↵ et quando et ubi et motui), perscrutandum ergo si est ratio ƿ ipsius quid erat cuiusque ipsorum esse, et inest hiis ipsum quid erat esse, ut albo homini quid erat albo homini. Sit itaque nomen ipsi 'vestis'. Quid est vesti esse?	But since there are also compounds answering to the other categories (for there is a substratum for each category, e.g. for quality, quantity, time, place, and motion), we must inquire whether there is a formula of the essence of each of them, i.e. whether to these compounds also there belongs an essence, e.g. ‘white man’. Let the compound be denoted by ‘cloak’. What is the essence of cloak?
At vero neque secundum se dictorum nec hoc. Aut ipsum 'non secundum se' dicitur ↵ dupliciter, et huius est aliquid hoc quidem ex additione illud vero non. Hoc quidem enim eo quod ipsum alii addi dicitur quod diffinitur, ut si albo esse diffiniens dicat albi hominis rationem; hoc autem eo quod aliud ipsi, ut si significat vestis album hominem, diffiniat vestem ut album. Albus itaque ↵ homo est quidem album, non tamen quid erat esse albo esse, sed vesti esse.Ergo est quid erat esse aliquid, aut totaliter aut non. Quod quidem enim quid erat esse est id quod aliquid erat esse. Quando vero aliud de alio dicitur, non est quod quidem hoc aliquid, ut albus homo non est quod vere hoc ↵ aliquid, siquidem le hoc substantiis inest solum. Quare quid erat esse est quorumcumque ratio est diffinitio. Diffinitio vero est non si nomen rationi idem significet (omnes enim essent rationes termini; erit enim nomen quod cuilibet rationi idem, quare et Ylias diffinitio erit), sed si primi alicuius fuerit; talia ↵ vero sunt quaecumque dicuntur non eo quod aliud de alio dicatur. Non erit igitur nulli non generis specierum existens quid erat esse, sed hiis solum; haec namque videntur non secundum participationem dici et passionum nec ut accidens. Sed ratio quidem erit cuiuslibet et aliorum quid significat, si est nomen, ↵ quia hoc huic inest, aut pro sermone simplici certior; diffinitio vero non erit nec quod quid erat esse.	But, it may be said, this also is not a propter se expression. We reply that there are just two ways in which a predicate may fail to be true of a subject propter se, and one of these results from the addition, and the other from the omission, of a determinant. One kind of predicate is not propter se because the term that is being defined is combined with another determinant, e.g. if in defining the essence of white one were to state the formula of white man; the other because in the subject another determinant is combined with that which is expressed in the formula, e.g. if ‘cloak’ meant ‘white man’, and one were to define cloak as white; white man is white indeed [30a], but its essence is not to be white.But is being-a-cloak an essence at all? Probably not. For the essence is precisely what something is; but when an attribute is asserted of a subject other than itself, the complex is not precisely what some ‘this’ is, e.g. white man is not precisely what some ‘this’ is, since thisness belongs only to substances. Therefore there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition. But we have a definition not where we have a word and a formula identical in meaning (for in that case all formulae or sets of words would be definitions; for there will be some name for any set of words whatever, so that even the Iliad will be a definition), but where there is a formula of something primary; and primary things are those which do not imply the predication of one element in them of another element. Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence – only species will have it, for these are thought to imply not merely that the subject participates in the attribute and has it as an affection, or has it by accident; but for ever thing else as well, if it has a name, there be a formula of its meaning – viz. that this attribute belongs to this subject; or instead of a simple formula we shall be able to give a more accurate one; but there will be no definition nor essence.
Aut et diffinitio sicut et quod quid est multipliciter dicitur? Et enim quod quid est uno quidem modo significat substantiam et hoc aliquid, alio vero quodcumque praedicamentorum, ↵ quantitatem, qualitatem et alia quaecumque talia. Sicut enim et le ƿ existit omnibus, sed non similiter sed huic quidem primum illis vero consequenter, ita et quod quid est simpliciter quidem substantiae aliquo vero modo aliis. Et enim qualitatem dicemus utique quid est, quare et qualitas eorum quae quid est ↵ quidem, sed non simpliciter, sed sicut de non ente logice dicunt quidam esse non ens, non simpliciter sed non ens, sic et qualitatem.	Or has ‘definition’, like ‘what a thing is’, several meanings? ‘What a thing is’ in one sense means substance and the ‘this’, in another one or other of the predicates, quantity, quality, and the like. For as ‘is’ belongs to all things, not however in the same sense, but to one sort of thing primarily and to others in a secondary way, so too ‘what a thing is’ belongs in the simple sense to substance, but in a limited sense to the other categories. For even of a quality we might ask what it is, so that quality also is a ‘what a thing is’, – not in the simple sense, however, but just as, in the case of that which is not, some say, emphasizing the linguistic form, that that is which is not is – not is simply, but is non-existent; so too with quality.
Oportet quidem igitur intendere et quomodo oportet dicere circa unumquodque, non tamen quam quomodo habet. Quapropter et nunc, quoniam quod dicitur ↵ manifestum, et quod quid erat esse similiter inerit primum quidem et simpliciter substantiae, deinde aliis, quemadmodum quid est, non simpliciter quid erat esse sed qualitati aut quantitati quid erat esse. Oportet enim equivoce haec dicere esse entia, aut addentes et auferentes, quemadmodum et quod non scibile scibile. Quoniam hoc quidem rectum est: neque ↵ equivoce dicere neque eodem modo, sed quemadmodum ↵ medicinale eo quod ad idem quidem et unum, non idem autem et unum, non tamen neque equivoce. Nihil enim medicativum corpus et opus et vas dicitur nec equivoce nec secundum unum, sed ad unum. Haec quidem igitur quocumque modo quis velit ↵ dicere differet nihil.	We must no doubt inquire how we should express ourselves on each point, but certainly not more than how the facts actually stand. And so now also, since it is evident what language we use, essence will belong, just as ‘what a thing is’ does, primarily and in the simple sense to substance, and in a secondary way to the other categories also, – not essence in the simple sense, but the essence of a quality or of a quantity. For it must be either by an equivocation that we say these are, or by adding to and taking from the meaning of ‘are’ (in the way in which that which is not known may be said to be known), – the truth being that we use the word neither ambiguously nor in the same sense, but just as we apply the word ‘medical’ by virtue of a reference to one and the same thing, not meaning one [30b] and the same thing, nor yet speaking ambiguously; for a patient and an operation and an instrument are called medical neither by an ambiguity nor with a single meaning, but with reference to a common end. But it does not matter at all in which of the two ways one likes to describe the facts;
Illud autem palam quia quae primo et simpliciter diffinitio et quod quid erat esse substantiarum est. Et non solum et aliorum similiter est, verumtamen non primo. Non enim est necesse, si hoc ponimus, huius diffinitionem esse quod utique rationi idem significat, sed cuidam rationi. Hoc autem si unius fuerit, non eo quod continuum ↵ sicut Ylias aut quaecumque colligatione, sed si quotiens dicitur unum. Unum vero dicitur sicut ens. Ens autem hoc quidem hoc aliquid, aliud vero quantitatem, aliud qualitatem significat. Quapropter erit albi hominis ratio et diffinitio, alio vero modo et albi et substantiae.	this is evident, that definition and essence in the primary and simple sense belong to substances. Still they belong to other things as well, only not in the primary sense. For if we suppose this it does not follow that there is a definition of every word which means the same as any formula; it must mean the same as a particular kind of formula; and this condition is satisfied if it is a formula of something which is one, not by continuity like the Iliad or the things that are one by being bound together, but in one of the main senses of ‘one’, which answer to the senses of ‘is’; now ‘that which is’ in one sense denotes a ‘this’, in another a quantity, in another a quality. And so there can be a formula or definition even of white man, but not in the sense in which there is a definition either of white or of a substance.