Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7/c14

Chapter 14

Latin	English
↵ Manifestum autem ex ipsis hiis accidens et ydeas dicentibus substantias et separabiles esse et simul speciem ex genere facientibus et differentiis. Si enim sunt species, et animal in homine et equo, aut unum et idem numero est aut alterum.	Chapter 14. It is clear also from these very facts what consequence confronts those who say the Ideas are substances capable of separate existence, and at the same time make the Form consist of the genus and the differentiae. For if the Forms exist and ‘animal’ is present in ‘man’ and ‘horse’, it is either one and the same in number, or different.
Ratione namque palam quia unum; eandem enim ↵ exhibebit rationem dicens in utrolibet. Ergo si est aliquis homo ipsum secundum se hoc aliquid et separatum, necesse et ex quibus, ut animal et bipes, hoc aliquid significare et esse separabilia et substantias; quare et animal.	(In formula it is clearly one; for he who states the formula will go through the formula in either case.) If then there is a ‘man-in-himself’ who is a ‘this’ and exists apart, the parts also of which he consists, e.g. ‘animal’ and ‘two-footed’, must indicate ‘thises’, and be capable of separate existence, and substances; therefore ‘animal’, as well as ‘man’, must be of this sort.
Si quidem igitur idem et in equo sicut tu in te ipso quomodo ↵ in separatim existentibus unum erit?	Now (1) if the ‘animal’ in ‘the horse’ and in ‘man’ is one and the same, as you are with yourself, (a) how will the [39b]one in things that exist apart be one,
Et quare non et sine ipso erit animal hoc?	and how will this ‘animal’ escape being divided even from itself?
Deinde si quidem participatione bipedis et multipedis, impossibile aliquid accidit: contraria namque ƿ simul inerunt ipsi uni et huic enti. Si autem non, quis modus, cum dixerit utique aliquis animal esse bipes aut gressibile? ↵ Sed forsam componitur et copulatur aut miscetur? Verum omnia inconvenientia.	Further, (b) if it is to share in ‘two-footed’ and ‘many-footed’, an impossible conclusion follows; for contrary attributes will belong at the same time to it although it is one and a ‘this’. If it is not to share in them, what is the relation implied when one says the animal is two-footed or possessed of feet? But perhaps the two things are ‘put together’ and are ‘in contact’, or are ‘mixed’. Yet all these expressions are absurd.
Sed alterum in unoquoque. Infinita ergo erunt, ut consequens dicere, quorum substantia animal; non enim secundum accidens ex animali homo.	But (2) suppose the Form to be different in each species. Then there will be practically an infinite number of things whose substance is animal’; for it is not by accident that ‘man’ has ‘animal’ for one of its elements.
Amplius multa erit ipsum animal. Substantiaque enim quod in unoquoque animal; non enim de ↵ alio dicitur; si autem non, ex illo erit homo et genus ipsius illud.	Further, many things will be ‘animal-itself’. For (i) the ‘animal’ in each species will be the substance of the species; for it is after nothing else that the species is called; if it were, that other would be an element in ‘man’, i.e. would be the genus of man.
Et amplius ydee omnia ex quibus homo. Igitur non alterius quidem erit ydea alterius vero substantia; impossibile namque. Ipsum igitur animal erit unumquodque eorum quae in animalibus.	And further, (ii) all the elements of which ‘man’ is composed will be Ideas. None of them, then, will be the Idea of one thing and the substance of another; this is impossible. The ‘animal’, then, present in each species of animals will be animal-itself.
Amplius ex quo hoc, et quomodo ex ipso ↵ animali? Aut quomodo possibile est esse animal, quod substantia hoc ipsum, praeter ipsum animal?	Further, from what is this ‘animal’ in each species derived, and how will it be derived from animal-itself? Or how can this ‘animal’, whose essence is simply animality, exist apart from animal-itself?
Amplius autem in sensibilibus haec accidunt et hiis absurdiora. Si itaque impossibile sic se habere, palam quia non est ydea ipsorum sic ut quidam dicunt.	Further, (3)in the case of sensible things both these consequences and others still more absurd follow. If, then, these consequences are impossible, clearly there are not Forms of sensible things in the sense in which some maintain their existence.