Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l5/c7

Chapter 7 Being

Latin	English
Ens dicitur hoc quidem secundum accidens illud vero secundum se.	Chapter 7. Things are said to be (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their own nature.
Secundum accidens quidem, ut iustum musicum ↵ esse dicimus et hominem musicum et musicum hominem, similiter dicentes ut musicum edificare, quia accidit edificatori musicum esse aut musico edificatorem; hoc enim esse hoc significat accidere hoc huic. Sic autem et in dictis; hominem quando ↵ musicum dicimus et musicum hominem, aut album musicum ƿ aut hunc album: hoc quidem quia ambo eidem acciderunt, illud vero quia enti accidit *, hoc autem musicum hominem quia huic musicum accidit (sic autem dicitur et album esse, quia cui accidit, ille est). Quae quidem igitur secundum accidens esse dicuntur sic dicuntur aut eo quod eidem enti ambo ↵ insunt, aut quia enti illud inest, aut quia ipsum est cui inest de quo ipsum predicatur.	(1) In an accidental sense, e.g. we say "the righteous doer is musical" , and "the man is musical" , and "the musician is a man" , just as we say "the musician builds" , because the builder happens to be musical or the musician to be a builder; for here "one thing is another" means "one is an accident of another" . So in the cases we have mentioned; for when we say "the man is musical" and "the musician is a man" , or "he who is pale is musical" or "the musician is pale" , the last two mean that both attributes are accidents of the same thing; the first that the attribute is an accident of that which is, while "the musical is a man" means that musical is an accident of a man. (In this sense, too, the not-pale is said to be, because that of which it is an accident is.) Thus when one thing is said in an accidental sense to be another, this is either because both belong to the same thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute belongs is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of which it is itself predicated, itself is.
Secundum se vero esse dicuntur quaecumque significant figuras predicationis; quotiens enim dicitur, totiens esse significat. Quoniam ergo predicatorum alia quid ↵ est significant, alia quale, alia quantum, alia ad aliquid, alia facere, alia pati, alia ubi, alia quando, horum unicuique esse idem significant. Nil enim refert ‘homo conualescens esf aut ‘homo convalescit’, vel ‘homo vadens est aut secans’ aut ‘hominem vadere aut secare’; similiter autem et in aliis.	(2) The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of being are just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its where , others its when, being has a meaning answering to each of these. For there is no difference between the man is recovering and the man recovers , nor between the man is walking or cutting and the man walks or cuts ; and similarly in all other cases.
↵ Amplius esse et est significant quia verum, ** non esse autem quia non verum sed falsum, similiter in affirmatione et negatione; ut quod ‘est Socrates musicus’ quia hoc verum, aut quod ‘est Socrates non albus’, quod * verum; hoc autem ‘non est dyameter incommensurabilis’, quod falsum.	(3) Again, being and is mean that a statement is true, not being that it is not true but falses – and this alike in the case of affirmation and of negation; e.g. Socrates is musical means that this is true, or Socrates is not-pale means that this is true; but the diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side means that it is false to say it is.
↵ Amplius esse significat et ens: ens hoc quidem potestate ↵ dicibile illud vero actu. Horum dictorum terminorum enim esse dicimus: et quod potestate est dicibile terminorum et quod est actu; et scire similiter: et potens uti scientia et utens; ↵ et quiescens: et cui iam inest quies et potens quiescere. Similiter autem et in substantiis; et enim Mercurium in lapide dicimus esse, et medietatem lineae, et frumentum nondum perfectum. Quando vero potens et quando nondum, in aliis determinandum.	(4) Again, being and that which is mean that some [17b] of the things we have mentioned are potentially, others in complete reality. For we say both of that which sees potentially and of that which sees actually, that it is seeing , and both of that which can actualize its knowledge and of that which is actualizing it, that it knows, and both of that to which rest is already present and of that which can rest, that it rests. And similarly in the case of substances; we say the Hermes is in the stone, and the half of the line is in the line, and we say of that which is not yet ripe that it is corn. When a thing is potential and when it is not yet potential must be explained elsewhere.