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|<span id=c22></span>Privatio dicitur uno quidem modo, si non habet aliquid * natorum haberi, et si non ipsum sit aptum natum habere, ut oculis privari dicitur planta. Alio vero si aptum natum habere, aut ipsum aut genus, non habet, ut aliter homo cecus {{ | |<span id=c22></span>Privatio dicitur uno quidem modo, si non habet aliquid * natorum haberi, et si non ipsum sit aptum natum habere, ut oculis privari dicitur planta. Alio vero si aptum natum habere, aut ipsum aut genus, non habet, ut aliter homo cecus {{a|bk1022b25|↵}} visu privari dicitur et talpa; hoc quidem secundum genus illud vero secundum se. Amplius si aptum natum et quando aptum natum est habere, non habet; caecitas enim privatio quaedam est, sed cecus non est secundum omnem etatem, sed in qua aptum natum est habere, si non habet. Similiter autem et in {{a|bk1022b30|↵}} quocumque fuerit et secundum quod et ad quod et ut, si non habet aptum natum. Amplius cuiusque per vim ablatio privatio dicitur. | ||
|'''Chapter 22.''' <span id=jp511></span> We speak of ''privation'' (1) if something has not one of the attributes which a thing might naturally have, even if this thing itself would not naturally have it; e.g. a plant is said to be ''deprived'' of eyes.(2) If, though either the thing itself or its genus would naturally have an attribute, it has it not; e.g. a blind man and a mole are in different senses ''deprived'' of sight; the latter in contrast with its genus, the former in contrast with his own normal nature.(3) If, though it would naturally have the attribute, and when it would naturally have it, it has it not; for blindness is a privation, but one is not ''blind'' at any and every age, but only if one has not sight at the age at which one would naturally have it. Similarly a thing is called blind if it has not sight in the medium in which, and in respect of the organ in respect of which, and with reference to the object with reference to which, and in the circumstances in which, it would naturally have it.(4) The violent taking away of anything is called privation. | |'''Chapter 22.''' <span id=jp511></span> We speak of ''privation'' (1) if something has not one of the attributes which a thing might naturally have, even if this thing itself would not naturally have it; e.g. a plant is said to be ''deprived'' of eyes.(2) If, though either the thing itself or its genus would naturally have an attribute, it has it not; e.g. a blind man and a mole are in different senses ''deprived'' of sight; the latter in contrast with its genus, the former in contrast with his own normal nature.(3) If, though it would naturally have the attribute, and when it would naturally have it, it has it not; for blindness is a privation, but one is not ''blind'' at any and every age, but only if one has not sight at the age at which one would naturally have it. Similarly a thing is called blind if it has not sight in the medium in which, and in respect of the organ in respect of which, and with reference to the object with reference to which, and in the circumstances in which, it would naturally have it.(4) The violent taking away of anything is called privation. | ||
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|Et quotiens autem ab eo quod a negationes dicuntur, totiens et privationes dicuntur; nam inequale non habere equalitatem aptum * natum dicitur, inuisibile vero et eo quod {{ | |Et quotiens autem ab eo quod a negationes dicuntur, totiens et privationes dicuntur; nam inequale non habere equalitatem aptum * natum dicitur, inuisibile vero et eo quod {{a|bk1022b35|↵}} omnino non habeat colorem et eo quod turpiter, et sine pede et eo quod non habeat omnino pedes et eo quod turpes. Amplius et eo quod parum habeat, ut non igneum; hoc autem {{a|bk1023a1|↵}} {{p|118}} est in prave aliquo modo habere. Amplius quod non facile aut non bene, ut insecabile non solum quia non secatur sed quia non facile aut quia non bene. Amplius omnino non {{a|bk1023a5|↵}} habere; cecus enim non dicitur monoculus sed qui in ambobus non habet visum. Propter quod non omnis bonus aut malus, aut iustus aut iniustus, sed et * medium. | ||
|<span id=jp512></span> Indeed there are just as many kinds of privations as there are of words with negative prefixes; for a thing is called unequal because it has not equality though it would naturally have it, and invisible either because it has no colour at all or because it has a poor colour, and apodous either because it has no feet at all or because it has imperfect feet. Again, a privative term may be used because the thing has ['''23a'''] little of the attribute (and this means having it in a sense imperfectly), e.g. ''kernel-less'' ; or because it has it not easily or not well (e.g. we call a thing uncuttable not only if it cannot be cut but also if it cannot be cut easily or well); or because it has not the attribute at all; for it is not the one-eyed man but he who is sightless in both eyes that is called blind. This is why not every man is ''good'' or ''bad'' , ''just'' or ''unjust'' , but there is also an intermediate state. | |<span id=jp512></span> Indeed there are just as many kinds of privations as there are of words with negative prefixes; for a thing is called unequal because it has not equality though it would naturally have it, and invisible either because it has no colour at all or because it has a poor colour, and apodous either because it has no feet at all or because it has imperfect feet. Again, a privative term may be used because the thing has ['''23a'''] little of the attribute (and this means having it in a sense imperfectly), e.g. ''kernel-less'' ; or because it has it not easily or not well (e.g. we call a thing uncuttable not only if it cannot be cut but also if it cannot be cut easily or well); or because it has not the attribute at all; for it is not the one-eyed man but he who is sightless in both eyes that is called blind. This is why not every man is ''good'' or ''bad'' , ''just'' or ''unjust'' , but there is also an intermediate state. | ||
Revision as of 06:28, 13 March 2014
Chapter 22 Privation
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| Privatio dicitur uno quidem modo, si non habet aliquid * natorum haberi, et si non ipsum sit aptum natum habere, ut oculis privari dicitur planta. Alio vero si aptum natum habere, aut ipsum aut genus, non habet, ut aliter homo cecus ↵ visu privari dicitur et talpa; hoc quidem secundum genus illud vero secundum se. Amplius si aptum natum et quando aptum natum est habere, non habet; caecitas enim privatio quaedam est, sed cecus non est secundum omnem etatem, sed in qua aptum natum est habere, si non habet. Similiter autem et in ↵ quocumque fuerit et secundum quod et ad quod et ut, si non habet aptum natum. Amplius cuiusque per vim ablatio privatio dicitur. | Chapter 22. We speak of privation (1) if something has not one of the attributes which a thing might naturally have, even if this thing itself would not naturally have it; e.g. a plant is said to be deprived of eyes.(2) If, though either the thing itself or its genus would naturally have an attribute, it has it not; e.g. a blind man and a mole are in different senses deprived of sight; the latter in contrast with its genus, the former in contrast with his own normal nature.(3) If, though it would naturally have the attribute, and when it would naturally have it, it has it not; for blindness is a privation, but one is not blind at any and every age, but only if one has not sight at the age at which one would naturally have it. Similarly a thing is called blind if it has not sight in the medium in which, and in respect of the organ in respect of which, and with reference to the object with reference to which, and in the circumstances in which, it would naturally have it.(4) The violent taking away of anything is called privation. |
| Et quotiens autem ab eo quod a negationes dicuntur, totiens et privationes dicuntur; nam inequale non habere equalitatem aptum * natum dicitur, inuisibile vero et eo quod ↵ omnino non habeat colorem et eo quod turpiter, et sine pede et eo quod non habeat omnino pedes et eo quod turpes. Amplius et eo quod parum habeat, ut non igneum; hoc autem ↵ ƿ est in prave aliquo modo habere. Amplius quod non facile aut non bene, ut insecabile non solum quia non secatur sed quia non facile aut quia non bene. Amplius omnino non ↵ habere; cecus enim non dicitur monoculus sed qui in ambobus non habet visum. Propter quod non omnis bonus aut malus, aut iustus aut iniustus, sed et * medium. | Indeed there are just as many kinds of privations as there are of words with negative prefixes; for a thing is called unequal because it has not equality though it would naturally have it, and invisible either because it has no colour at all or because it has a poor colour, and apodous either because it has no feet at all or because it has imperfect feet. Again, a privative term may be used because the thing has [23a] little of the attribute (and this means having it in a sense imperfectly), e.g. kernel-less ; or because it has it not easily or not well (e.g. we call a thing uncuttable not only if it cannot be cut but also if it cannot be cut easily or well); or because it has not the attribute at all; for it is not the one-eyed man but he who is sightless in both eyes that is called blind. This is why not every man is good or bad , just or unjust , but there is also an intermediate state. |
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