Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l5/c11

Chapter 11 Prior, posterior

Latin	English
Priora et posteriora dicuntur quaedam quidem, tamquam ↵ existente aliquo primo et principio in unoquoque genere, quod propinquius principio cuidam determinato aut simpliciter et natura aut ad aliquid aut * ubi aut ab aliquibus;	Chapter 11. The words prior and posterior are applied (1) to some things (on the assumption that there is a first, i.e. a beginning, in each class) because they are nearer some beginning determined either absolutely and by nature, or by reference to something or in some place or by certain people;
ut haec quidem * secundum locum in existendo propinquius aut natura alicui loco determinato (ut medio aut ultimo) aut sicut evenit; quod ↵ vero remotius posterius.	e.g. things are prior in place because they are nearer either to some place determined by nature (e.g. the middle or the last place), or to some chance object; and that which is farther is posterior.
Alia secundum tempus; haec quidem enim eo quod remotiora a * nunc, ut in factis (priora namque troica medis, quia remotiora a * nunc), haec autem eo quod propinquius * nunc, ut in futuris (prius enim Nemia Pythion, quia propinquius nunc, * ipso nunc ut principio et primo usis).	Other things are prior in time; some by being farther from the present, i.e. in the case of past events (for the Trojan war is prior to the Persian, because it is farther from the present), others by being nearer the present, i.e. in the case of future events (for the Nemean games are prior to the Pythian, if we treat the present as beginning and first point, because they are nearer the present).
↵ Alia secundum motum; propinquius enim primo moventi est prius, ut puer viro; principium autem et hoc quoddam simpliƿciter *. Alia secundum potestatem; excedens enim potestate prius *, et quod * potentius; tale vero est cuius secundum preuoluntatem sequi est necesse alterum et posterius, ut non movente illo non moveatur et movente moveatur; et est ↵ prevoluntas principium.	Other things are prior in movement; for that which is nearer the first mover is prior (e.g. the boy is prior to the man); and the prime mover also is a beginning absolutely. Others are prior in power; for that which exceeds in power, i.e. the more powerful, is prior; and such is that according to whose will the other – i.e. the posterior – must follow, so that if the prior does not set it in motion the other does not move, and if it sets it in motion it does move; and here will is a beginning.
Alia secundum ordinem; haec autem sunt quaecumque ad aliquid unum determinatum distant secundum rationem, ut parastata tritostata prius et paraniti nitis; hic quidem enim qui summus hic autem quae media principium. Haec quidem igitur priora dicuntur hoc modo.	Others are prior in arrangement; these are the things that are placed at intervals in reference to some one definite thing according to some rule, e.g. in the chorus the second man is prior to the third, and in the lyre the second lowest string is prior to the lowest; for in the one case the leader and in the other the middle string is the beginning.
↵ Alio vero modo quod cognitione est prius ut et simpliciter prius. Horum autem aliter et quae secundum rationem et quae secundum sensum. Nam secundum rationem universalia priora, secundum autem sensum singularia.	These, then, are called prior in this sense, but (2) in another sense that which is prior for knowledge is treated as also absolutely prior; of these, the things that are prior in definition do not coincide with those that are prior in relation to perception. For in definition universals are prior, in relation to perception individuals.
Et secundum rationem accidens toto prius, ut musicum musico homine; non enim ↵ erit ratio tota sine parte; equidem non contingit musicum esse non existente aliquo musico.	And in definition also the accident is prior to the whole, e.g. musical to musical man , for the definition cannot exist as a whole without the part; yet musicalness cannot exist unless there is some one who is musical.
Amplius priora dicuntur priorum passiones, ut rectitudo levitate; hoc enim lineae secundum ↵ se passio est illud vero superficiei.	(3) The attributes of prior things are called prior, e.g. straightness is prior to smoothness; for one is an attribute of a line as such, and the other of a surface.
Haec quidem itaque sic dicuntur priora et posteriora.Alia vero secundum naturam et substantiam, quaecumque contingit esse sine aliis et illa non sine illis; qua divisione usus est Plato. Quoniam autem esse multipliciter, primum quidem ↵ subiectum prius, propter quod et substantia prius, deinde aliter quae * secundum potentiam et secundum actum; nam alia secundum potestatem priora sunt alia secundum actum, ut secundum potestatem quidem dimidietas toto et pars toto et materia substantia, secundum actum vero posterius; nam dis↵soluti secundum actum erunt.	[19a] Some things then are called prior and posterior in this sense, others (4) in respect of nature and substance, i.e. those which can be without other things, while the others cannot be without them, – a distinction which Plato used. (If we consider the various senses of being , firstly the subject is prior, so that substance is prior; secondly, according as potency or complete reality is taken into account, different things are prior, for some things are prior in respect of potency, others in respect of complete reality, e.g. in potency the half line is prior to the whole line, and the part to the whole, and the matter to the concrete substance, but in complete reality these are posterior; for it is only when the whole has been dissolved that they will exist in complete reality.)
Modo itaque quodam omnia prius et posterius dicta secundum haec dicuntur; haec quidem enim secundum generationem sine aliis esse contingit, ut totum partibus, haec autem secundum corruptionem, ut pars toto. Similiter autem et alia.	In a sense, therefore, all things that are called prior and posterior are so called with reference to this fourth sense; for some things can exist without others in respect of generation, e.g. the whole without the parts, and others in respect of dissolution, e.g. the part without the whole. And the same is true in all other cases.