Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4/c7

Chapter 7

Latin	English
At vero nec medium contradictionis nihil esse contingit, sed necessarium aut dicere aut negare unum de uno quodƿcumque. Palam autem primum quidem diffmientibus quid ↵ verum et * falsum. Dicere namque ens non esse aut hoc esse falsum *, ens autem esse et non ens non esse verum *; quare et dicens * esse aut non verum dicet aut mentietur; sed neque ens dicit non esse aut esse neque non ens,	Chapter 7. But on the other hand there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate. This is clear, in the first place, if we define what the true and the false are. To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true; so that he who says of anything that it is, or that it is not, will say either what is true or what is false; but neither what is nor what is not is said to be or not to be.
Amplius aut ↵ medium erit contradictionis quemadmodum pallidum albi et nigri, aut quemadmodum neutrum hominis et equi. Si quidem igitur sic, non permutabitur (nam ex non bono in * bonum permutatur aut ex hoc in non bonum); nunc autem semper videtur. Non est enim permutatio nisi in contraria et media. ↵ Si autem est medium, ** et sic utique erit aliqua in album 1012a1 non ex non albo generatio; nunc autem non videtur.	Again, the intermediate between the contradictories will be so either in the way in which grey is between black and white, or as that which is neither man nor horse is between man and horse. (a) If it were of the latter kind, it could not change into the extremes (for change is from not-good to good, or from good to not-good), but as a matter of fact when there is an intermediate it is always observed to change into the extremes. For there is no change except to opposites and to their intermediates. (b) But if it is really intermediate, in this way too there would have to be a change to white, which was not from not-white; but as it [12a] is, this is never seen.
Amplius omne intellectuale et intelligibile mens aut affirmat aut negat. Hoc autem ex diffinitione palam, cum verum dicit aut mentitur. Quando quidem sic componit dicens aut negans, verum dicit, quando autem * sic, mentitur.	Again, every object of understanding or reason the understanding either affirms or denies – this is obvious from the definition – whenever it says what is true or false. When it connects in one way by assertion or negation, it says what is true, and when it does so in another way, what is false.
Amplius ↵ praeter omnes oportet esse contradictiones, nisi orationis causa dicatur. Quare et nec verum dicet aliquis nec non verum dicet, et praeter ens et non ens erit, quare et praeter generationem et corruptionem transmutatio quaedam erit.	-Again, there must be an intermediate between all contradictories, if one is not arguing merely for the sake of argument; so that it will be possible for a man to say what is neither true nor untrue, and there will be a middle between that which is and that which is not, so that there will also be a kind of change intermediate between generation and destruction.
Amplius in quibuscumque generibus negatio contrarium infert, et in hiis erit, ↵ ut in numeris neque impar neque non impar numerus. Sed impossibile; ex diffinitione vero palam.	Again, in all classes in which the negation of an attribute involves the assertion of its contrary, even in these there will be an intermediate; for instance, in the sphere of numbers there will be number which is neither odd nor not-odd. But this is impossible, as is obvious from the definition.
Amplius in infinitum vadet; et non solum emyolia quae sunt erunt sed plura. Iterum enim est hoc negare ad dictionem et negationem, et hoc erit aliquid; nam substantia est quaedam ipsius alia.	Again, the process will go on ad infinitum, and the number of realities will be not only half as great again, but even greater. For again it will be possible to deny this intermediate with reference both to its assertion and to its negation, and this new term will be some definite thing; for its essence is something different.
Amplius ↵ quando interrogante si est album dicit quia non *, nihil aliud negavit quam ipsum esse; negatio vero est quod non esse.	Again, when a man, on being asked whether a thing is white, says no, he has denied nothing except that it is; and its not being is a negation.
Venit autem quibusdam haec opinio sicut et aliae inopinabiƿlium; quando enim soluere non possunt orationes contentiosas, ↵ annuentes orationi confirmant verum esse quod est sillogizatum. Hii quidem igitur propter talem causam dicunt, illi vero propter omnium rationem inquirere.	Some people have acquired this opinion as other paradoxical opinions have been acquired; when men cannot refute eristical arguments, they give in to the argument and agree that the conclusion is true. This, then, is why some express this view; others do so because they demand a reason for everything.
Principium autem ad hos omnes ex diffinitione. Diffinitio vero fit ex ipsos significare aliquid necessarium esse; ratio namque cuius nomen est signum diffinitio fit.	And the starting-point in dealing with all such people is definition. Now the definition rests on the necessity of their meaning something; for the form of words of which the word is a sign will be its definition.
↵ Videtur autem Eracliti quidem oratio, dicens omnia esse et non esse, omnia vera facere; quae vero est Anaxagore, esse aliquid medium contradictionis, quare omnia falsa. Nam quando miscentur, nec bonum nec non bonum est mixtum, quare nihil dicere verum.	-While the doctrine of Heraclitus, that all things are and are not, seems to make everything true, that of Anaxagoras, that there is an intermediate between the terms of a contradiction, seems to make everything false; for when things are mixed, the mixture is neither good nor not-good, so that one cannot say anything that is true.