Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4/c6

Chapter 6

Latin	English
Sunt autem quidam qui dubitant haec persuasorum et has rationes solum dicentium; quaerunt enim quis est qui iudi↵cat sanum et omnino circa singula recte iudicantem. Tales vero dubitationes similes sunt dubitationi utrum dormimus nunc aut vigilamus. Possunt autem omnes dubitationes tales idem. Omnium enim rationem hii dignificant esse; principium enim quaerunt, et hoc per demonstrationem accipere, quoniamque ↵ quod non persuasi sunt, manifesti sunt in actibus. Sed quod quidem diximus, hoc * ipsorum passio est: rationem enim quaerunt quorum non est ratio; demonstrationis enim principium non est demonstratio.	Chapter 6. There are, both among those who have these convictions and among those who merely profess these views, some who raise a difficulty by asking, who is to be the judge of the healthy man, and in general who is likely to judge rightly on each class of questions. But such inquiries are like puzzling over the question whether we are now asleep or awake. And all such questions have the same meaning. These people demand that a reason shall be given for everything; for they seek a starting-point, and they seek to get this by demonstration, while it is obvious from their actions that they have no conviction. But their mistake is what we have stated it to be; they seek a reason for things for which no reason can be given; for the starting-point of demonstration is not demonstration.
Hii quidem igitur facile utique hoc credent; est enim non difficile sumere.	These, then, might be easily persuaded of this truth, for it is not difficult to grasp;
In sermone autem ↵ vim solum quaerentes impossibile quaerunt; contraria namque dicere dignificant, statim contraria dicentes.	but those who seek merely compulsion in argument seek what is impossible; for they demand to be allowed to contradict themselves – a claim which contradicts itself from the very first.
Si autem non omnia sunt ad aliquid, sed quaedam sunt et ipsa secundum se, non utique erit omne quod apparet *; nam quod apparet alicui apparet. Quare qui dicit omnia quae appa↵rent esse vera, omnia quae sunt facit ad aliquid. Propter quod et * observandum vim in sermone quaerentibus, simul autem et sustinere sermonem dignificantibus; quod non quod apparet est, sed quod apparet cui apparet et quando apparet et in quantum et ut. Si autem sustineant quidem sermonem, non sic autem sustineant, accidet ipsis contraria cito ↵ dicere. Contingit enim eidem secundum visum quidem mel apparere, gustu vero non, et oculis duobus existentibus non eadem utrique visui, si sint dissimiles. Quoniam ad * dicentes ƿ ↵ propter olim dictas causas quod apparet verum esse, et propter hoc omnia similiter esse falsa et vera; neque enim omnibus eadem apparere contingit neque ipsi semper eadem, sed multotiens contraria secundum idem tempus (tactus enim duo dicit in digitorum variatione, visus autem unum): — Sed non quid ↵ eidem et secundum idem sensui et similiter et in eodem tempore; quare hoc utique erit verum. Sed forsan propter hoc * necesse dicere hiis qui non propter dubitationem sed orationis causa dicentibus: quod hoc non est verum sed huic verum.	-But if not all things are relative, but some are self-existent, not everything that appears will be true; for that which appears is apparent to some one; so that he who says all things that appear are true, makes all things relative. And, therefore, those who ask for an irresistible argument, and at the same time demand to be called to account for their views, must guard themselves by saying that the truth is not that what appears exists, but that what appears exists for him to whom it appears, and when, and to the sense to which, and under the conditions under which it appears. And if they give an account of their view, but do not give it in this way, they will soon find themselves contradicting themselves. For it is possible that the same thing may appear to be honey to the sight, but not to the taste, and that, since we have two eyes, things may not appear the same to each, if their sight is unlike. For to those who for the reasons named some time ago say that what appears is true, and therefore that all things are alike false and true, for things do not appear either the same to all men or always the same to the same man, but often have contrary appearances at the same time (for touch says there are two objects when we cross our fingers, while sight says there is one) – to these we shall say yes, but not to the same sense and in the same part of it and under the same conditions and at the same time, so that what appears will be with these [11b] qualifications true. But perhaps for this reason those who argue thus not because they feel a difficulty but for the sake of argument, should say that this is not true, but true for this man.
↵ Et sicut prius dictum est, necesse ad aliquid facere omnia et ad opinionem et sensum; quare nec factum est nec erit nihil nullo preopinante. Si vero factum est aut erit, palam quia non erunt omnia ad opinionem.	And as has been said before, they must make everything relative-relative to opinion and perception, so that nothing either has come to be or will be without some one's first thinking so. But if things have come to be or will be, evidently not all things will be relative to opinion.
Amplius si unum, ad unum aut ad determinatum; et si idem et dimidium et equale, sed ionbio non ad duplum equale. Ad opinans itaque si idem est homo et opinatum, non est homo opinans sed opinatum. Si vero unumquodque fuerit ad opinans, * infinita erit specie opinans.	-Again, if a thing is one, it is in relation to one thing or to a definite number of things; and if the same thing is both half and equal, it is not to the double that the equal is correlative. If, then, in relation to that which thinks, man and that which is thought are the same, man will not be that which thinks, but only that which is thought. And if each thing is to be relative to that which thinks, that which thinks will be relative to an infinity of specifically different things.
Quod quidem igitur firmissima * opinio omnium non esse ↵ simul veras oppositas dictiones, et quid accidit ita dicentibus, et quare ita dicunt, tot sint dicta.	Let this, then, suffice to show (1) that the most indisputable of all beliefs is that contradictory statements are not at the same time true, and (2) what consequences follow from the assertion that they are, and (3) why people do assert this.
Quoniam autem impossibile est contradictionem esse simul veram de eodem, palam quia nec contraria simul inesse eidem contingit. Contrariorum enim alterum est privatio non minus; substantiae autem privatio ↵ * negatio est ab aliquo determinato genere. Si igitur impossibile est simul affirmare et negare vere, impossibile * et contraria simul inesse, sed aut quo ambo, vel alterum quo, alterum vero simpliciter.	Now since it is impossible that contradictories should be at the same time true of the same thing, obviously contraries also cannot belong at the same time to the same thing. For of contraries, one is a privation no less than it is a contrary-and a privation of the essential nature; and privation is the denial of a predicate to a determinate genus. If, then, it is impossible to affirm and deny truly at the same time, it is also impossible that contraries should belong to a subject at the same time, unless both belong to it in particular relations, or one in a particular relation and one without qualification.