Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4/c3

Chapter 3

Latin	English
Dicendum autem utrum unius aut diverse scientie de ↵ vocatis in mathematibus dignitatibus et de substantia.	Chapter 3. We must state whether it belongs to one or to different sciences to inquire into the truths which are in mathematics called axioms, and into substance.
Palam autem quia unius est et eius quae est philosophi quae de hiis perscrutatio.	Evidently, the inquiry into these also belongs to one science, and that the science of the philosopher;
Omnibus enim insunt existentibus, sed non generi alicui seorsum separatim ab aliis. Et utuntur omnes, quia entis sunt in quantum est ens; unumquodque autem genus ↵ * ens. In tantum vero utuntur in quantum eis sufficiens est; hoc autem est quantum continet genus de quo demonstrationes * ferunt. Quare quoniam manifestum quod in quantum sunt entia insunt omnibus (hoc enim eis est commune), de ente * in quantum est ens cognoscentis et de hiis est speculatio.	for these truths hold good for everything that is, and not for some special genus apart from others. And all men use them, because they are true of being qua being and each genus has being. But men use them just so far as to satisfy their purposes; that is, as far as the genus to which their demonstrations refer extends. Therefore since these truths clearly hold good for all things qua being (for this is what is common to them), to him who studies being qua being belongs the inquiry into these as well.
Unde ↵ nullus particulariter intendentium nititur dicere de eis aliquid, si vera aut non, nec geometra nec arismeticus.	And for this reason no one who is conducting a special inquiry tries to say anything about their truth or falsity,-neither the geometer nor the arithmetician.
Sed phisicorum quidam, merito hoc facientes; soli namque putantur de tota natura intendere et de ente. Sed quoniam est adhuc phisico aliquis superior (unum enim aliquod genus est entis natura), ↵ * universalis et circa primam substantiam theorizantis et de hiis utique erit perscrutatio. Est autem sophia quaedam phisica, sed non prima.	Some natural philosophers indeed have done so, and their procedure was intelligible enough; for they thought that they alone were inquiring about the whole of nature and about being. But since there is one kind of thinker who is above even the natural philosopher (for nature is only one particular genus of being), the discussion of these truths also will belong to him whose inquiry is universal and deals with [05b] primary substance. Physics also is a kind of Wisdom, but it is not the first kind.
Quaecumque vero conantur * dicentium quidam de veritate quo oportet modo recipere, propter ignorantiam analeticorum ↵ hoc faciunt. Oportet enim de hiis prescientes venire sed non audientes quaerere.	-And the attempts of some of those who discuss the terms on which truth should be accepted, are due to a want of training in logic; for they should know these things already when they come to a special study, and not be inquiring into them while they are listening to lectures on it.
Quod quidem igitur philosophi, et de omni substantia speculantis in quantum congruit, et de omnibus sillogisticis princiƿpiis est perscrutari, palam.	Evidently then it belongs to the philosopher, i.e. to him who is studying the nature of all substance, to inquire also into the principles of syllogism.
Congruit autem maxime cognoscentem circa unumquodque genus habere dicere firmissima rei ↵ principia, quare et de entibus in quantum sunt entia omnium firmissima. Est autem hic philosophus ipse.	But he who knows best about each genus must be able to state the most certain principles of his subject, so that he whose subject is existing things qua existing must be able to state the most certain principles of all things. This is the philosopher,
Firmissimum autem omnium principium est circa quod mentiri impossibile est; notissimum enim esse tale est necesse (nam circa ea quae ignorant decipiuntur omnes), et non condicionale. Quod enim ↵ necessarium habere quodcumque entium intelligentem, hoc non condicio; quod autem cognoscere est necessarium quodcumque cognoscentem, et venire habentem est necesse. Quod quidem igitur tale principium omnium est firmissimum, palam.	and the most certain principle of all is that regarding which it is impossible to be mistaken; for such a principle must be both the best known (for all men may be mistaken about things which they do not know), and non-hypothetical. For a principle which every one must have who understands anything that is, is not a hypothesis; and that which every one must know who knows anything, he must already have when he comes to a special study. Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all;
Quid vero sit illud, post haec dicamus. Idem enim simul inesse et non inesse eidem et secundum idem est impossibile; et quaecum↵quae alia determinaremus utique, sint determinata * ad logicas difficultates. Hoc autem omnium firmissimum est principiorum; habet enim dictam determinationem. Impossibile namque quemcumque idem existimare esse et non esse, * quemadmodum quidam putant dicere Eraclitum. Non enim est necesse, ↵ quae aliquis dicit, haec et existimare. Si vero non contingit simul inesse eidem contraria (addeterminata sint autem nobis et huic propositioni consueta), contraria vero * est opinio opinioni quae * contradictionis, palam quod impossibile simul exis↵timare eundem esse et non esse idem; simul enim habebit contrarias opiniones qui de hoc est mentitus. Quapropter omnes demonstrantes in hanc reducunt ultimam opinionem; natura namque principium et aliarum dignitatum hoc omnium.	which principle this is, let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect; we must presuppose, to guard against dialectical objections, any further qualifications which might be added. This, then, is the most certain of all principles, since it answers to the definition given above. For it is impossible for any one to believe the same thing to be and not to be, as some think Heraclitus says. For what a man says, he does not necessarily believe; and if it is impossible that contrary attributes should belong at the same time to the same subject (the usual qualifications must be presupposed in this premiss too), and if an opinion which contradicts another is contrary to it, obviously it is impossible for the same man at the same time to believe the same thing to be and not to be; for if a man were mistaken on this point he would have contrary opinions at the same time. It is for this reason that all who are carrying out a demonstration reduce it to this as an ultimate belief; for this is naturally the starting-point even for all the other axioms.