Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l3/c6

Chapter 6

Latin	English
Omnino vero dubitabit aliquis quare et oportet quaerere alia quaedam praeter sensibilia et intermedia, ut quas ponimus species.	Chapter 6. In general one might raise the question why after all, besides perceptible things and the intermediates, we have to look for another class of things, i.e. the Forms which we posit.
Nam si ideo, quia mathematica a presentibus in alio ↵ quodam differunt, in esse vero plura similis speciei nihil differunt. Quare non erunt ipsorum principia numero determinata, quemadmodum nec presentium litterarum numero quidem omnium non sunt principia determinata sed specie, si non lateat quis huius sillabe aut huius vocis, harum enim erunt ↵ et numero determinata. Similiter autem et in intermediis; infinita namque et illic * quae eiusdem speciei. Quare si non sunt praeter sensibilia et mathematica alia quaedam qualia dicunt species ipsas quidam, non erit una numero et specie substantia, nec principia entium numero erunt quanta aliqua sed specie. ↵ƿ Ergo si hoc est necessarium, et species necessarium est propter hoc esse. Et enim si non bene dearticulant dicentes, sed hoc est quod volunt, et necesse * haec ipsos dicere, quia specierum substantia quaedam unumquodque est et nihil secundum accidens.	If it is for this reason, because the objects of mathematics, while they differ from the things in this world in some other respect, differ not at all in that there are many of the same kind, so that their first principles cannot be limited in number (just as the elements of all the language in this sensible world are not limited in number, but in kind, unless one takes the elements of this individual syllable or of this individual articulate sound-whose elements will be limited even in number; so is it also in the case of the intermediates; for there also the members of the same kind are infinite in number), so that if there are not-besides perceptible and mathematical objects-others such as some maintain the Forms to be, there will be no substance which is one in number, but only in kind, nor will the first principles of things be determinate in number, but only in kind:-if then this must be so, the Forms also must therefore be held to exist. Even if those who support this view do not express it articulately, still this is what they mean, and they must be maintaining the Forms just because each of the Forms is a substance and none is by accident.
↵ At vero si ponimus species esse et * numero principia et non specie, diximus quae contingere necesse est impossibilia.	But if we are to suppose both that the Forms exist and that the principles are one in number, not in kind, we have mentioned the impossible results that necessarily follow.
Hiis autem affine est quaerere utrum potestate sunt elementa aut aliquo ajio modo.	(13) Closely connected with this is the question whether the elements exist potentially or in some other manner.
Nam si aliter aliqualiter, prius aliquid ↵ erit principiis aliud; prior enim * potestas causa illa, possibile autem non est necessarium illo modo omne se habere.	If in some other way, there will be something else prior to the first [03a] principles; for the potency is prior to the actual cause, and it is not necessary for everything potential to be actual.
Si vero potestate sunt elementa, nihil entium esse contingit. Nam pos↵sibile est esse et quod nondum * ens; fit enim non ens, nihil autem fit impossibilium esse.	-But if the elements exist potentially, it is possible that everything that is should not be. For even that which is not yet is capable of being; for that which is not comes to be, but nothing that is incapable of being comes to be.
Has igitur dubitationes necessarium est dubitare de principiis, et utrum universalia sint aut ut dicimus singularia.	(12) We must not only raise these questions about the first principles, but also ask whether they are universal or what we call individuals.
Nam si universalia, non erunt substantiae; nihil enim communium hoc aliquid significat sed tale *, substantia vero hoc aliquid ↵ est.	If they are universal, they will not be substances; for everything that is common indicates not a this but a such , but substance is a this .
Sed si est hoc aliquid et ponitur quod communiter predicatur, multa erit animalia Socrates, ipseque homo et animal, si significat singulum hoc aliquid et unum.	And if we are to be allowed to lay it down that a common predicate is a this and a single thing, Socrates will be several animals-himself and man and animal , if each of these indicates a this and a single thing.
Si igitur universalia sunt principia, haec contingunt.	If, then, the principles are universals, these universal. Therefore if there is to be results follow;
Si autem non universalia sed ↵ quasi singularia, non erunt scibilia; universales enim sunt omnium scientie. Quare erunt principia diversa priora principiis universaliter predicata, si futura est esse eorum scientia.	if they are not universals but of knowledge of the principles there must be the nature of individuals, they will not be other principles prior to them, namely those knowable; for the knowledge of anything is that are universally predicated of them.