Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l2/c3

Chapter 3

Latin	English
Contingunt autem auditiones secundum consuetudines entibus; nam ut consuevimus ita dignamur dici. Et quae praeter ↵ ea non similia videntur, sed propter inconsuetudinem minus nota et magis extranea; nam consuetum notius.	Chapter 3. The effect which lectures produce on a hearer depends on his habits; for we demand the language we are [95a] accustomed to, and that which is different from this seems not in keeping but somewhat unintelligible and foreign because of its unwontedness. For it is the customary that is intelligible.
Quantam vero vim habeat quod consuetum est leges ostendunt, in quibus fabularia et puerilia magis quidem valent cognitione de eis ↵ propter consuetudinem.	The force of habit is shown by the laws, in which the legendary and childish elements prevail over our knowledge about them, owing to habit.
Alii ergo [vero], si non mathematicae quis dicit, non recipiunt dicentes. Alii, si non exemplariter. Et hii testem induci dignantur poetam. Et illi quidem omnia certe; hiis vero flebilis est certitudo aut propter impotentiam complec↵tendi aut propter micrologiam. Habet enim aliquid quod certum est tale, ut quemadmodum in symbolis et rationibus non liberum esse quibusdam videtur.	Thus some people do not listen to a speaker unless he speaks mathematically, others unless he gives instances, while others expect him to cite a poet as witness. And some want to have everything done accurately, while others are annoyed by accuracy, either because they cannot follow the connexion of thought or because they regard it as pettifoggery. For accuracy has something of this character, so that as in trade so in argument some people think it mean.
Propter quod oportet erudiri quomodo singula sunt recipienda, et absurdum est simul quaerere scientiam et modum scientie; est autem neutrum facile accipere.	Hence one must be already trained to know how to take each sort of argument, since it is absurd to seek at the same time knowledge and the way of attaining knowledge; and it is not easy to get even one of the two.
Acribologia vero mathematica non in omnibus est expe↵tenda, sed in non habentibus materiam. Propter quod non naturalis est modus; omnis enim forsan natura materiam habet. Ideoque primum perscrutandum quid est natura. Ita namque et de quibus est phisica, manifestum erit; et si unius scientie aut plurium est causas et principia considerare. ↵	The minute accuracy of mathematics is not to be demanded in all cases, but only in the case of things which have no matter. Hence method is not that of natural science; for presumably the whole of nature has matter. Hence we must inquire first what nature is: for thus we shall also see what natural science treats of (and whether it belongs to one science or to more to investigate the causes and the principles of things).