Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l8/c2

Chapter 2

Latin	English
Quoniam autem quae quidem ut subiecta et ut materia substantia confessa est, haec autem est quae potestate, reli↵quum eam quae ut actum substantiam sensibilium dicere quae est.	Chapter 2. Since the substance which exists as underlying and as matter is generally recognized, and this that which exists potentially, it remains for us to say what is the substance, in the sense of actuality, of sensible things.
Democritus quidem igitur tres differentias similis est exisƿtimanti esse; nam subiectum corpus, * materiam, unum et idem, differre autem aut rismo, quod est figura, aut tropi, ↵ quod est positio, aut dyatigi, quod est ordo.	Democritus seems to think there are three kinds of difference between things; the underlying body, the matter, is one and the same, but they differ either in rhythm, i.e. shape, or in turning, i.e. position, or in inter-contact, i.e. order.
Videntur autem multe differentie esse: ut alia quidem compositione dicuntur materiaei, sicut quaecumque * mixtura quemadmodum mellicratum, alia autem ligatione ut capitis ligatura, alia visco ut liber, alia clavo ut archa, alia in pluribus horum, alia positione ↵ ut liminare inferius et superius * (haec enim in poni aliqualiter differunt), alia tempore ut cena et prandium, alia loco ut spiritus, alia sensibilium passionibus ut duritie et mollitie, et spissitudine et raritate, et siccitate et humiditate. Et haec quidem ↵ horum quibusdam alia omnibus hiis, et omnino alia superhabundantia alia defectu.	But evidently there are many differences; for instance, some things are characterized by the mode of composition of their matter, e.g. the things formed by blending, such as honey-water; and others by being bound together, e.g. bundle; and others by being glued together, e.g. a book; and others by being nailed together, e.g. a casket; and others in more than one of these ways; and others by position, e.g. threshold and lintel (for these differ by being placed in a certain way); and others by time, e.g. dinner and breakfast; and others by place, e.g. the winds; and others by the affections proper to sensible things, e.g. hardness and softness, density and rarity, dryness and wetness; and some things by some of these qualities, others by them all, and in general some by excess and some by defect.
Quare palam quia et le est totiens dicitur; limes enim inferior est quia ita ponitur, et esse sic ipsum poni significat, et cristallum esse sic inspissari. Quorundam vero esse et omnibus hiis diffinietur, per haec quidem misceri, haec ↵ autem contemperari, illa vero ligari, alia inspissari, alia autem aliis differentiis uti, * sicut manus aut pes.	Clearly, then, the word is has just as many meanings; a thing is a threshold because it lies in such and such a position, and its being means its lying in that position, while being ice means having been solidified in such and such a way. And the being of some things will be defined by all these qualities, because some parts of them are mixed, others are blended, others are bound together, others are solidified, and others use the other differentiae; e.g. the hand or the foot requires such complex definition.
Sumenda igitur sunt genera differentiarum (hae namque erunt principia essendi), ut quae * in magis et minus aut spisso et raro et ↵ aliis talibus; omnia namque haec superhabundantia et defectus sunt. Si quid autem figura aut levitate aut asperitate, omnia ↵ recto et curvo. Hiis autem esse erit misceri, opposite vero non esse.	We must grasp, then, the kinds of differentiae (for these will be the principles of the being of things), e.g. the things characterized by the more and the less, or by the dense and the rare, and by other such qualities; for all these are forms of excess and defect. And anything that is characterized by shape or by smoothness and roughness is characterized by the straight and the curved. And for [43a] other things their being will mean their being mixed, and their not being will mean the opposite.
Palam itaque ex hiis quia si substantia causa essendi unumƿquodque, quod in hiis * quaerendum quae est causa essendi horum unumquodque. Substantia quidem igitur nihil horum nec combinatum, at tamen proportionale in quolibet. Et ut ↵ in substantiis quod de materia predicatur ipse actus, et in aliis diffinitionibus maxime. Ut si limen inferius oporteat diffiniri, lignum aut lapidem ita positum dicemus, et domum lateres et ligna sic posita (aut adhuc et quod cuius causa in quibusdam est). Si vero cristallum, aquam congelatam aut in↵spissatam ita; simphonia autem acuti et gravis commixtio talis; eodem quoque modo et in aliis.	It is clear, then, from these facts that, since its substance is the cause of each thing's being, we must seek in these differentiae what is the cause of the being of each of these things. Now none of these differentiae is substance, even when coupled with matter, yet it is what is analogous to substance in each case; and as in substances that which is predicated of the matter is the actuality itself, in all other definitions also it is what most resembles full actuality. E.g. if we had to define a threshold, we should say wood or stone in such and such a position , and a house we should define as bricks and timbers in such and such a position ,(or a purpose may exist as well in some cases), and if we had to define ice we should say water frozen or solidified in such and such a way , and harmony is such and such a blending of high and low ; and similarly in all other cases.
Palam itaque ex hiis quia actus alius alterius materiae et ratio; aliorum enim compositio, aliorum mixtio, aliorum aliud quid dictorum.	Obviously, then, the actuality or the formula is different when the matter is different; for in some cases it is the composition, in others the mixing, and in others some other of the attributes we have named.
Propter quod diffinientium hii quidem dicen↵tes quid est domus, quia lapides, lateres, ligna, potestate domum dicunt; materia namque haec. Illi vero vas protectivum pecuniarum et corporum aut aliquid aliud tale addentes, actum dicunt. Alii ambo ea componentes tertiam et eam quae ex hiis substantiam. Videtur enim quae quidem per differentias ratio speciei et actus esse, quae vero est ex inexistentibus materiae ↵ magis. Similiter autem et quos architas approbavit terminos; simul utriusque enim sunt. Ut quid est serenitas? Quies in aeris pluralitate; aer quidem materia, actus et substantia quies. Quid est tranquillitas? Maris equitas; subiectum quidem ut ↵ materia mare, actus autem et forma equitas.	And so, of the people who go in for defining, those who define a house as stones, bricks, and timbers are speaking of the potential house, for these are the matter; but those who propose a receptacle to shelter chattels and living beings , or something of the sort, speak of the actuality. Those who combine both of these speak of the third kind of substance, which is composed of matter and form (for the formula that gives the differentiae seems to be an account of the form or actuality, while that which gives the components is rather an account of the matter); and the same is true of the kind of definitions which Archytas used to accept; they are accounts of the combined form and matter. E.g. what is still weather? Absence of motion in a large expanse of air; air is the matter, and absence of motion is the actuality and substance. What is a calm? Smoothness of sea; the material substratum is the sea, and the actuality or shape is smoothness.
Palam itaque ex dictis quae sit sensibilis substantia et quomodo; haec quidem enim ut materia, illa vero ut forma quia actus, tertia autem quae ex hiis.	It is obvious then, from what has been said, what sensible substance is and how it exists-one kind of it as matter, another as form or actuality, while the third kind is that which is composed of these two.