Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l6/c2

Chapter 2

Greek	Latin	English
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεὶ τὸ ὂν τὸ ἁπλῶς λεγόμενον λέγεται πολλαχῶς, ὧν ἓν μὲν ἦν τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ [35] ὡς ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ὡς τὸ ψεῦδος, παρὰ ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ σχήματα τῆς κατηγορίας (οἷον τὸ μὲν τί, τὸ δὲ ποιόν, τὸ δὲ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ πού, τὸ δὲ ποτέ, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο σημαίνει τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον), [1026β] [1] ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα πάντα τὸ δυνάμει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ:	Sed quoniam ens simpliciter dictum dicitur multipliciter, quorum unum quidem erat quod secundum accidens, et aliud quod ut verum et non ens ut falsum, praeter haec autem sunt ↵ figure cathegorie (ut quid, quale, quantum, ubi, quando, et si quid aliud significat hoc modo), amplius praeter haec omnia quod ↵ * potestate et actu:	Chapter 2. But since the unqualified term being has several meanings, of which one was seen to be the accidental, and another the true ( non-being being the false), while besides these there are the figures of predication (e.g. the what , quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which being [26b] may have), and again besides all these there is that which is potentially or actually:
ἐπεὶ δὴ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν, πρῶτον περὶ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεκτέον, ὅτι οὐδεμία ἐστὶ περὶ αὐτὸ θεωρία. σημεῖον δέ: οὐδεμιᾷ γὰρ ἐπιστήμῃ ἐπιμελὲς [5] περὶ αὐτοῦ οὔτε πρακτικῇ οὔτε ποιητικῇ οὔτε θεωρητικῇ. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ποιῶν οἰκίαν ποιεῖ ὅσα συμβαίνει ἅμα τῇ οἰκίᾳ γιγνομένῃ (ἄπειρα γάρ ἐστιν: τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἡδεῖαν τοῖς δὲ βλαβερὰν τοῖς δ᾽ ὠφέλιμον οὐθὲν εἶναι κωλύει τὴν ποιηθεῖσαν, καὶ ἑτέραν ὡς εἰπεῖν πάντων τῶν ὄντων: ὧν οὐθενός [10] ἐστιν ἡ οἰκοδομικὴ ποιητική), τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον οὐδ᾽ ὁ γεωμέτρης θεωρεῖ τὰ οὕτω συμβεβηκότα τοῖς σχήμασιν, οὐδ᾽ εἰ ἕτερόν ἐστι τρίγωνον καὶ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχον.	quoniam itaque multipliciter dicitur ens, primum de eo quod secundum accidens est dicendum, quia nulla est circa id speculatio. Signum autem: nulla enim scientia studiosa est de eo, neque activa neque factiva nec theorica. ↵ non enim faciens domum facit quaecumque accidunt simul ƿ domui facte; infinita enim sunt: hiis quidem enim voluptuosam illis autem nocivam aliis autem utilem nihil esse prohibet factam, et alteram ut est dicere ab omnibus entibus; quorum ↵ nullius est edificativa factiva. Eodem vero modo nec geometer speculatur sic accidentia figuris, nec si alterum est trigonum et trigonum duos rectos habens.	since being has many meanings, we must say regarding the accidental, that there can be no scientific treatment of it. This is confirmed by the fact that no science practical, productive, or theoretical troubles itself about it. For on the one hand he who produces a house does not produce all the attributes that come into being along with the house; for these are innumerable; the house that has been made may quite well be pleasant for some people, hurtful for some, and useful to others, and different – to put it shortly from all things that are; and the science of building does not aim at producing any of these attributes. And in the same way the geometer does not consider the attributes which attach thus to figures, nor whether triangle is different from triangle whose angles are equal to two right angles.
καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εὐλόγως συμπίπτει: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὄνομά τι μόνον τὸ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν.	Et hoc rationabiliter concidit; quemadmodum enim nomine solum accidens est.	And this happens naturally enough; for the accidental is practically a mere name.
διὸ Πλάτων τρόπον τινὰ οὐ κακῶς τὴν σοφιστικὴν [15] περὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν ἔταξεν. εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν λόγοι περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς εἰπεῖν μάλιστα πάντων, πότερον ἕτερον ἢ ταὐτὸν μουσικὸν καὶ γραμματικόν, καὶ μουσικὸς Κορίσκος καὶ Κορίσκος, καὶ εἰ πᾶν ὃ ἂν ᾖ, μὴ ἀεὶ δέ, γέγονεν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ μουσικὸς ὢν γραμματικὸς γέγονε, καὶ γραμματικὸς [20] ὢν μουσικός, καὶ ὅσοι δὴ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων εἰσίν: φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐγγύς τι τοῦ μὴ ὄντος.	Unde ↵ Plato modo quodam non male sophisticam circa non ens ordinavit. Sunt enim sophistarum rationes circa accidens ut est dicere maxime omnium: utrum diversum an idem musicum et gramaticum, et musicus Coriscus et Coriscus, et si omne quod est et non semper, factum est, quare si musicus ens gra↵maticus est factus, et gramaticus ens * musicus, et quaecumque aliae rationum tales sunt; videtur enim accidens propinquum quid non enti.	And so Plato was in a sense not wrong in ranking sophistic as dealing with that which is not. For the arguments of the sophists deal, we may say, above all with the accidental; e.g. the question whether musical and lettered are different or the same, and whether musical Coriscus and Coriscus are the same, and whether "everything which is, but is not eternal, has come to be", with the paradoxical conclusion that if one who was musical has come to be lettered, he must also have been lettered and have come to be musical, and all the other arguments of this sort; the accidental is obviously akin to non-being.
δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων λόγων: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλον τρόπον ὄντων ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τῶν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὐκ ἔστιν.	Palam autem et ex huiusmodi rationibus: nam alio modo entium generatio est et corruptio, eorum vero quae sunt secundum accidens non est.	And this is clear also from arguments such as the following: things which are in another sense come into being and pass out of being by a process, but things which are accidentally do not.
ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως λεκτέον ἔτι περὶ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος [25] ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἐνδέχεται, τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτοῦ καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν ἔστιν: ἅμα γὰρ δῆλον ἴσως ἔσται καὶ διὰ τί ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ.	At tamen dicendum est ↵ amplius de accidente in quantum contingit, quae eius natura et propter quam causam est; simul enim forsan palam erit et quare eius non est scientia.	But still we must, as far as we can, say further, regarding the accidental, what its nature is and from what cause it proceeds; for it will perhaps at the same time become clear why there is no science of it.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, οὐ τῆς κατὰ τὸ βίαιον λεγομένης ἀλλ᾽ ἣν λέγομεν τῷ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἄλλως, τὰ δ᾽ [30] ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδ᾽ ἀεί, ὡς δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, αὕτη ἀρχὴ καὶ αὕτη αἰτία ἐστὶ τοῦ εἶναι τὸ συμβεβηκός:	Quoniam igitur sunt in entibus haec quidem semper similiter se habentia et ex necessitate, * non secundum vim dicta sed ↵ quam dicimus in non contingere aliter, illa vero ex necessitate quidem non sunt nec semper, sed quasi secundum magis, hoc principium et haec causa est eius quod est accidens esse;	Since, among things which are, some are always in the same state and are of necessity (not necessity in the sense of compulsion but that which we assert of things because they cannot be otherwise), and some are not of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the principle and this the cause of the existence of the accidental;
ὃ γὰρ [32] ἂν ᾖ μήτ᾽ ἀεὶ μήθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τοῦτό φαμεν συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι. οἷον ἐπὶ κυνὶ ἂν χειμὼν γένηται καὶ ψῦχος, τοῦτο συμβῆναί φαμεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἂν πνῖγος καὶ ἀλέα, ὅτι [35] τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ δ᾽ οὔ. καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον λευκὸν εἶναι συμβέβηκεν (οὔτε γὰρ ἀεὶ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ), ζῷον δ᾽ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. καὶ τὸ ὑγιάζειν δὲ τὸν οἰκοδόμον συμβεβηκός, [1027α] [1] ὅτι οὐ πέφυκε τοῦτο ποιεῖν οἰκοδόμος ἀλλὰ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ συνέβη ἰατρὸν εἶναι τὸν οἰκοδόμον. καὶ ὀψοποιὸς ἡδονῆς στοχαζόμενος ποιήσειεν ἄν τι ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ τὴν ὀψοποιητικήν: διὸ συνέβη, φαμέν, καὶ [5] ἔστιν ὡς ποιεῖ, ἁπλῶς δ᾽ οὔ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων [ἐνίοτε] δυνάμεις εἰσὶν αἱ ποιητικαί, τῶν δ᾽ οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ δύναμις ὡρισμένη: τῶν γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄντων ἢ γιγνομένων καὶ τὸ αἴτιόν ἐστι κατὰ συμβεβηκός.	quod enim nec semper nec quasi secundum magis est, hoc dicimus accidens esse. Ut * sub cane si fuerit hyemps et frigus, hoc ↵ accidere dicimus, sed non si estuatio et calor, quia hoc * quidem semper aut * secundum magis illud vero non. Et hominem album esse accidit (nec enim semper nec secundum ƿ magis), animal vero non secundum accidens. Et edificatorem sanitatem facere accidens, quia non est natus hoc facere edifi↵cator sed medicus, sed accidit medicum esse edificatorem. Et coquus voluptatem * coniectans faciet utique alicui salubre, sed non secundum pulmentariam; quapropter accidens dicimus, et est ut facit, simpliciter autem non. Aliorum enim ↵ aliae quandoque potentie factive sunt, horum vero nulla ars nec potentia determinata; nam secundum accidens entium aut factorum causa est secundum accidens.	for that which is neither always nor for the most part, we call accidental. For instance, if in the dog-days there is wintry and cold weather, we say this is an accident, but not if there is sultry heat, because the latter is always or for the most part so, but not the former. And it is an accident that a man is pale (for this is neither always nor for the most part so), but it is not by accident that he is an animal. And [27a] that the builder produces health is an accident, because it is the nature not of the builder but of the doctor to do this, – but the builder happened to be a doctor. Again, a confectioner, aiming at giving pleasure, may make something wholesome, but not in virtue of the confectioner's art; and therefore we say it was an accident , and while there is a sense in which he makes it, in the unqualified sense he does not. For to other things answer faculties productive of them, but to accidental results there corresponds no determinate art nor faculty; for of things which are or come to be by accident, the cause also is accidental.
ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντα ἐστὶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἀεὶ ἢ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα, ἀλλὰ τὰ [10] πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὄν: οἷον οὔτ᾽ ἀεὶ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὁ λευκὸς μουσικός ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ δὲ γίγνεταί ποτε, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔσται (εἰ δὲ μή, πάντ᾽ ἔσται ἐξ ἀνάγκης): ὥστε ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰτία ἡ ἐνδεχομένη παρὰ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἄλλως τοῦ συμβεβηκότος. [15] ἀρχὴν δὲ τηνδὶ ληπτέον, πότερον οὐδέν ἐστιν οὔτ᾽ αἰεὶ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἢ τοῦτο ἀδύνατον; ἔστιν ἄρα τι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὁπότερ᾽ ἔτυχε καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. ἀλλὰ πότερον τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τὸ δ᾽ ἀεὶ οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει, ἢ ἔστιν ἄττα ἀΐδια; περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων ὕστερον σκεπτέον,	Quare quoniam quidem non omnia sunt ex necessitate et semper aut entia aut quae fiunt, sed plurima secundum magis, necesse esse quod secun↵dum accidens est ens; ut nec semper nec secundum magis albus musicus est, quoniam vero fit aliquando, secundum accidens erit (si autem non, omnia erunt ex necessitate). Quare materia erit causa contingens praeter quod * ut in pluribus aliter accidentis. Principium autem hoc oportet sumere, utrum nihil ↵ est nec semper nec secundum magis, aut hoc impossibile. Est igitur aliquid praeter haec quod utcumque contingit et secundum accidens. Sed utrum hoc quod * ut in pluribus et quod semper nulli insunt, aut * sunt quaedam sempiterna? De hiis quidem igitur posterius perscrutandum est.	Therefore, since not all things either are or come to be of necessity and always, but, the majority of things are for the most part, the accidental must exist; for instance a pale man is not always nor for the most part musical, but since this sometimes happens, it must be accidental (if not, everything will be of necessity). The matter, therefore, which is capable of being otherwise than as it usually is, must be the cause of the accidental. And we must take as our starting-point the question whether there is nothing that is neither always nor for the most part. Surely this is impossible. There is, then, besides these something which is fortuitous and accidental. But while the usual exists, can nothing be said to be always, or are there eternal things? This must be considered later,
ὅτι δ᾽ [20] ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ συμβεβηκότος φανερόν: ἐπιστήμη μὲν γὰρ πᾶσα ἢ τοῦ ἀεὶ ἢ τοῦ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ—πῶς γὰρ ἢ μαθήσεται ἢ διδάξει ἄλλον; δεῖ γὰρ ὡρίσθαι ἢ τῷ ἀεὶ ἢ τῷ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἷον ὅτι ὠφέλιμον τὸ μελίκρατον τῷ πυρέττοντι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ—τὸ δὲ παρὰ τοῦτο οὐχ ἕξει λέγειν, [25] πότε οὔ, οἷον νουμηνίᾳ: ἢ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ τῇ νουμηνίᾳ: τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκός ἐστι παρὰ ταῦτα. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ, εἴρηται.	Quod autem scien↵tia non est accidentis, palam; scientia namque omnis aut est eius quod est semper aut eius quod secundum magis — Etenim quomodo docebitur aut docebit alium? Oportet enim diffiniri aut per semper aut per magis, ut quia utile mellicratum febricitanti ut secundum magis. Quod autem * praeter hoc non habebit dicere quando *, puta noua luna; aut enim semper aut ut ↵ in pluribus et quod noua luna; accidens autem est praeter haec. Quid quidem igitur est accidens et propter quam causam et quia scientia non est eius, dictum est.	but that there is no science of the accidental is obvious; for all science is either of that which is always or of that which is for the most part. (For how else is one to learn or to teach another? The thing must be determined as occurring either always or for the most part, e.g. that honey-water is useful for a patient in a fever is true for the most part.) But that which is contrary to the usual law science will be unable to state, i.e. when the thing does not happen, e.g. on the day of new moon ; for even that which happens on the day of new moon happens then either always or for the most part; but the accidental is contrary to such laws. We have stated, then, what the accidental is, and from what cause it arises, and that there is no science which deals with it.