View source for Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l12/c5

==Chapter 5==
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|ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν χωριστὰ τὰ δ᾽ οὐ χωριστά, οὐσίαι ἐκεῖνα. [1071α] [1] καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντων αἴτια ταὐτά, ὅτι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἄνευ οὐκ ἔστι τὰ πάθη καὶ αἱ κινήσεις.

|<span id=c5></span>''Quoniam autem'' sunt haec quidem separabilia haec autem {{ln|bk1071a1}} inseparabilia, substantiae ille *. Et propter hoc omnium cause haec, quia sine substantiis non sunt passiones et motus. 

|'''Chapter 5'''. <span id=jp1050></span>Some things can exist apart and some cannot, and it is ['''71a'''] the former that are substances. And therefore all things have the same causes, because, without substances, modifications and movements do not exist. 

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|ἔπειτα ἔσται ταῦτα ψυχὴ ἴσως καὶ σῶμα, ἢ νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις καὶ σῶμα.

|''Deinde erunt'' haec anima forsan et corpus, aut intellectus et appetitus et corpus.

|<span id=jp1051></span>Further, these causes will probably be soul and body, or reason and desire and body.  

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|ἔτι δ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον τῷ ἀνάλογον ἀρχαὶ αἱ αὐταί, οἷον ἐνέργεια [5] καὶ δύναμις: ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῦτα ἄλλα τε ἄλλοις καὶ ἄλλως. ἐν ἐνίοις μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ ἔστιν ὁτὲ δὲ δυνάμει, οἷον οἶνος ἢ σὰρξ ἢ ἄνθρωπος (πίπτει δὲ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς τὰ εἰρημένα αἴτια: ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν γὰρ τὸ εἶδος, ἐὰν ᾖ χωριστόν, καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν στέρησις δέ, οἷον [10] σκότος ἢ κάμνον, δυνάμει δὲ ἡ ὕλη: τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ δυνάμενον γίγνεσθαι ἄμφω): ἄλλως δ᾽ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει διαφέρει ὧν μὴ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ ὕλη, ὧν <ἐνίων> οὐκ ἔστι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερον, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου αἴτιον τά τε στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆ ὡς ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἴδιον εἶδος, καὶ ἔτι τι [15] ἄλλο ἔξω οἷον ὁ πατήρ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος, οὔτε ὕλη ὄντα οὔτ᾽ εἶδος οὔτε στέρησις οὔτε ὁμοειδὲς ἀλλὰ κινοῦντα.

|''Amplius autem alio modo'' proportionaliter principia {{ln|bk1071a5}} eadem, ut actus et potentia; sed et haec aliaque aliis et aliter. In quibusdam quidem enim idem quandoque actu est quandoque potentia, ut vinum aut caro aut homo. Cadunt autem et haec in dictas causas. Actus quidem enim species, si sit sepa{{ln|bk1071a10}}rabilis, et quod ex ambobus, privatio vero, ut puta tenebre aut laborans; potentia autem materia; hoc enim est quod potest fieri ambo. Aliter autem actu et potestate differunt quorum non est eadem materia, quorum non est eadem species sed altera. Quemadmodum hominis causa elementa, ignis et {{ln|bk1071a15}} terra ut materia et species propria; et si quid aliud extra ut pater; et praeter haec sol et obliquus circulus, neque materia entia neque species neque privatio neque conforme sed moventia.

|<span id=jp1052></span>And in yet another way, analogically identical things are principles, i.e. actuality and potency; but these also are not only different for different things but also apply in different ways to them. For in some cases the same thing exists at one time actually and at another potentially, e.g. wine or flesh or man does so. (And these too fall under the above-named causes. For the form exists actually, if it can exist apart, and so does the complex of form and matter, and the privation, e.g. darkness or disease; but the matter exists potentially; for this is that which can become qualified either by the form or by the privation.) But the distinction of actuality and potentiality applies in another way to cases where the matter of cause and of effect is not the same, in some of which cases the form is not the same but different; e.g. the cause of man is (1) the elements in man (viz. fire and earth as matter, and the peculiar form), and further (2) something else outside, i.e. the father, and (3) besides these the sun and its oblique course, which are neither matter nor form nor privation of man nor of the same species with him, but moving causes. 

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|ἔτι δὲ ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅτι τὰ μὲν καθόλου ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ. πάντων δὴ πρῶται ἀρχαὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ πρῶτον τοδὶ καὶ ἄλλο ὃ δυνάμει. ἐκεῖνα μὲν [20] οὖν τὰ καθόλου οὐκ ἔστιν: ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον: ἄνθρωπος μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπου καθόλου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ Πηλεὺς Ἀχιλλέως σοῦ δὲ ὁ πατήρ, καὶ τοδὶ τὸ Β τουδὶ τοῦ ΒΑ, ὅλως δὲ τὸ Β τοῦ ἁπλῶς ΒΑ. ἔπειτα, εἰ δὴ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν, ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλων [25] αἴτια καὶ στοιχεῖα, ὥσπερ ἐλέχθη, τῶν μὴ ἐν ταὐτῷ γένει, χρωμάτων ψόφων οὐσιῶν ποσότητος, πλὴν τῷ ἀνάλογον: καὶ τῶν ἐν ταὐτῷ εἴδει ἕτερα, οὐκ εἴδει ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἄλλο, ἥ τε σὴ ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ κινῆσαν καὶ ἡ ἐμή, τῷ καθόλου δὲ λόγῳ ταὐτά.

|{{p|253}}''Adhuc autem videre'' oportet quia haec quidem universaliter est dicere, haec autem non. Omnium etiam prima principia quod actu * primum hoc et aliud quod potentia. Illa quidem {{ln|bk1071a20}} igitur quae universalia non sunt; principium enim singularium singulare. Homo quidem enim hominis universaliter, sed non est nullus, verum Pileus Achillis, tui vero pater, et hoc ''b'' huius ''ba'', totaliter vero ''b'' simpliciter ''ba''. Deinde iam quae substantiarum; aliae autem aliorum cause et elementa, sicut dictum est, {{ln|bk1071a25}} eorum quae non in eodem * genere, colorum et sonorum, substantiarum, quantitatis, praeterquam proportionaliter; et eorum quae sunt in eadem specie diversa, non specie sed quia singularium aliud, tua materia et species et movens et mea, universali autem ratione eadem *.

|<span id=jp1053></span>Further, one must observe that some causes can be expressed in universal terms, and some cannot. The proximate principles of all things are the ''this'' which is proximate in actuality, and another which is proximate in potentiality. The universal causes, then, of which we spoke do not exist. For it is the individual that is the originative principle of the individuals. For while man is the originative principle of man universally, there is no universal man, but Peleus is the originative principle of Achilles, and your father of you, and this particular b of this particular ba, though b in general is the originative principle of ba taken without qualification.  Further, if the causes of substances are the causes of all things, yet different things have different causes and elements, as was said; the causes of things that are not in the same class, e.g. of colours and sounds, of substances and quantities, are different except in an analogical sense; and those of things in the same species are different, not in species, but in the sense that the causes of different individuals are different, your matter and form and moving cause being different from mine, while in their universal definition they are the same. 

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|τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν [30] τίνες ἀρχαὶ ἢ στοιχεῖα τῶν οὐσιῶν καὶ πρός τι καὶ ποιῶν, πότερον αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, δῆλον ὅτι πολλαχῶς γε λεγομένων ἔστιν ἑκάστου, διαιρεθέντων δὲ οὐ ταὐτὰ ἀλλ᾽ ἕτερα, πλὴν ὡδὶ καὶ πάντων, ὡδὶ μὲν ταὐτὰ ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον, ὅτι ὕλη, εἶδος, στέρησις, τὸ κινοῦν, καὶ ὡδὶ τὰ τῶν οὐσιῶν [35] αἴτια ὡς αἴτια πάντων, ὅτι ἀναιρεῖται ἀναιρουμένων: ἔτι τὸ πρῶτον ἐντελεχείᾳ: ὡδὶ δὲ ἕτερα πρῶτα ὅσα τὰ ἐναντία ἃ μήτε ὡς γένη λέγεται μήτε πολλαχῶς λέγεται: καὶ ἔτι αἱ ὗλαι. [1071β] [1] τίνες μὲν οὖν αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν καὶ πόσαι, καὶ πῶς αἱ αὐταὶ καὶ πῶς ἕτεραι, εἴρηται.

|''Quaerere vero'' quae principia aut elementa substantiarum et {{ln|bk1071a30}} ad aliquid et qualitatum, utrum eadem aut diversa, palam quia multipliciter dictorum sunt uniuscuiusque. Divisorum vero non eadem sed altera, praeterquam sic et omnium. Sic quidem eadem aut eo quod proportionaliter, quia materia, species, privatio, movens; et sic substantiarum cause ut cause omnium, {{ln|bk1071a35}} quia destruuntur destructis. Amplius quod primum entelechia. {{p|254}} Sic autem altera prima *: quaecumque contraria quae nec ut {{ln|bk1071b1}} genera dicuntur nec multipliciter dicuntur; et adhuc * materie. Quae quidem igitur principia sensibilium et quot, et quomodo eadem et quomodo altera, dictum est.

|<span id=jp1054></span>And if we inquire what are the principles or elements of substances and relations and qualities-whether they are the same or different-clearly when the names of the causes are used in several senses the causes of each are the same, but when the senses are distinguished the causes are not the same but different, except that in the following senses the causes of all are the same. They are (1) the same or analogous in this sense, that matter, form, privation, and the moving cause are common to all things; and (2) the causes of substances may be treated as causes of all things in this sense, that when substances are removed all things are removed; further, (3) that which is first in respect of complete reality is the cause of all things. But in another sense there are different first causes, viz. all the contraries which are neither generic nor ambiguous terms; and, further, the matters of different things ['''71b'''] are different. We have stated, then, what are the principles of sensible things and how many they are, and in what sense they are the same and in what sense different.  

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==Notes==
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