Edward Ockham: /* Lecture 17 */

2014-03-10T19:48:40Z

Lecture 17

← Older revision		Revision as of 14:48, 10 March 2014
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	\|{{a\|lib7l17n1\|lib. 7 l. 17 n. 1}} Philosophus in principio huius septimi promiserat se tractaturum de substantia rerum sensibilium quae est quod quid erat esse, quam logice notificavit ostendens, quod ea quae per se praedicantur, pertinent ad quod quid est, ex quo nondum erat manifestum quid sit substantia, quae est quod quid erat esse. Hanc autem substantiam Platonici dicebant esse universalia, quae sunt species separatae: quod Aristoteles supra immediate reprobavit. Unde relinquebatur, quod ipse philosophus ostenderet quid secundum rem sit substantia, quae est quod quid erat esse. Et ad hoc etiam ostendendum praemittit, quod substantia, quae est quod quid erat esse, se habet ut principium et causa, quae est intentio huius capituli. Dividitur ergo in partes duas. In prima dicit de quo est intentio. In secunda prosequitur suam intentionem, ibi, quaeritur autem ipsum propter quid. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quo ostensum est, quod nihil universaliter dictorum est substantia, ut Platonici posuerant, dicamus quid secundum veritatem oportet dicere substantiam, scilicet quae est quod quid erat esse, et quale quid sit haec substantia: utrum scilicet sit forma, vel materia, vel aliquid huiusmodi: et hoc inquam dicamus interponentes vel dicentes quasi aliud principium ab eo principio logico, per quod ingressi sumus in principio septimi ad inquisitionem praedictae substantiae. Forsitan enim ex his, quae dicentur circa quidditates rerum sensibilium, erit palam de illa substantia, quae est separata a sensibilibus substantiis. Quamvis enim substantiae separatae non sint eiusdem speciei cum substantiis sensibilibus, ut Platonici posuerunt, tamen cognitio istarum substantiarum sensibilium est via ad cognoscendum praedictas substantias separatas. Subiungit autem quid sit illud principium aliud per quod ad propositam quaestionem ingrediendum est, dicens quod hinc procedendum est ad ostendendum quid sit praedicta substantia, quod sciamus quod in ipsa substantia est principium quoddam, et causa quaedam.		\|{{a\|lib7l17n1\|lib. 7 l. 17 n. 1}} Philosophus in principio huius septimi promiserat se tractaturum de substantia rerum sensibilium quae est quod quid erat esse, quam logice notificavit ostendens, quod ea quae per se praedicantur, pertinent ad quod quid est, ex quo nondum erat manifestum quid sit substantia, quae est quod quid erat esse. Hanc autem substantiam Platonici dicebant esse universalia, quae sunt species separatae: quod Aristoteles supra immediate reprobavit. Unde relinquebatur, quod ipse philosophus ostenderet quid secundum rem sit substantia, quae est quod quid erat esse. Et ad hoc etiam ostendendum praemittit, quod substantia, quae est quod quid erat esse, se habet ut principium et causa, quae est intentio huius capituli. Dividitur ergo in partes duas. In prima dicit de quo est intentio. In secunda prosequitur suam intentionem, ibi, quaeritur autem ipsum propter quid. Dicit ergo primo, quod ex quo ostensum est, quod nihil universaliter dictorum est substantia, ut Platonici posuerant, dicamus quid secundum veritatem oportet dicere substantiam, scilicet quae est quod quid erat esse, et quale quid sit haec substantia: utrum scilicet sit forma, vel materia, vel aliquid huiusmodi: et hoc inquam dicamus interponentes vel dicentes quasi aliud principium ab eo principio logico, per quod ingressi sumus in principio septimi ad inquisitionem praedictae substantiae. Forsitan enim ex his, quae dicentur circa quidditates rerum sensibilium, erit palam de illa substantia, quae est separata a sensibilibus substantiis. Quamvis enim substantiae separatae non sint eiusdem speciei cum substantiis sensibilibus, ut Platonici posuerunt, tamen cognitio istarum substantiarum sensibilium est via ad cognoscendum praedictas substantias separatas. Subiungit autem quid sit illud principium aliud per quod ad propositam quaestionem ingrediendum est, dicens quod hinc procedendum est ad ostendendum quid sit praedicta substantia, quod sciamus quod in ipsa substantia est principium quoddam, et causa quaedam.

	\|1648. At the beginning of this seventh book the Philosopher had promised that he would treat of the substance of sensible things in the sense of their essence, which he has explained from the viewpoint of logic by showing that those attributes which are predicated essentially pertain to the whatness of a thing, since it was not yet evident what it is that constitutes substance in the sense of essence. Now the Platonists said that this substance is the universals, which are separate Forms. But this doctrine Aristotle rejected immediately above. Hence it remained for him to show what substance in the sense of essence really is. And in order to do this he also sets down as a premise that substance in the sense of essence has the character of a principle and cause. nis is the purpose of this chapter. Hence it is divided into two parts. In the first [[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7#jp691\|(691)]]C 1648) he explains what his aim is. In the second (683:C 1649) he proceeds to carry out his aim (“Now the why”). He accordingly says, first ([[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7#jp682\|682]]), that, since it has been shown that no universal predicate is a substance, as the Platonists claimed, let us state what the real truth of the matter is about substance, viz., that which is essence, “and what kind of thing” this substance is, i.e., whether it is form or matter or something of this kind. He says “Let us state this,” as if we were introducing or announcing a starting point different from the dialectical one with which we began in the beginning of this seventh book to investigate the above-mentioned substance; for perhaps from the things which are to be said about the quiddities of sensible substances it will also be possible to understand that kind of substance which is separate from sensible substances. For even though separate substances are not of the same species as sensible ones, as the Platonists claimed, still a knowledge of these sensible substances is the road by which we reach a knowledge of those separate substances. And he adds what that other starting point is from which one must enter upon the proposed investigation. He says that one must proceed from this starting point in order to show what the above-mentioned kind of substance is, so that we may understand that in substance itself there is a principle and cause.		\|1648. At the beginning of this seventh book the Philosopher had promised that he would treat of the substance of sensible things in the sense of their essence, which he has explained from the viewpoint of logic by showing that those attributes which are predicated essentially pertain to the whatness of a thing, since it was not yet evident what it is that constitutes substance in the sense of essence. Now the Platonists said that this substance is the universals, which are separate Forms. But this doctrine Aristotle rejected immediately above. Hence it remained for him to show what substance in the sense of essence really is. And in order to do this he also sets down as a premise that substance in the sense of essence has the character of a principle and cause. nis is the purpose of this chapter. Hence it is divided into two parts. In the first [[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7#jp691\|(691)]]C 1648) he explains what his aim is. In the second ([[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7#jp683\|683]]:C 1649) he proceeds to carry out his aim (“Now the why”). He accordingly says, first ([[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7#jp682\|682]]), that, since it has been shown that no universal predicate is a substance, as the Platonists claimed, let us state what the real truth of the matter is about substance, viz., that which is essence, “and what kind of thing” this substance is, i.e., whether it is form or matter or something of this kind. He says “Let us state this,” as if we were introducing or announcing a starting point different from the dialectical one with which we began in the beginning of this seventh book to investigate the above-mentioned substance; for perhaps from the things which are to be said about the quiddities of sensible substances it will also be possible to understand that kind of substance which is separate from sensible substances. For even though separate substances are not of the same species as sensible ones, as the Platonists claimed, still a knowledge of these sensible substances is the road by which we reach a knowledge of those separate substances. And he adds what that other starting point is from which one must enter upon the proposed investigation. He says that one must proceed from this starting point in order to show what the above-mentioned kind of substance is, so that we may understand that in substance itself there is a principle and cause.

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2014-03-10T19:45:39Z

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Edward Ockham: /* Lecture 17 */

Edward Ockham: Created page with " ==Lecture 17== {| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=45%|Latin !valign = top width=55%|English |- valign = top |{{a|lib7l17n1|lib. 7 l. 17 n. 1}} Philosophus in princip..."