Edward Ockham: Created page with "==Chapter 36== {| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=33.33%|Greek !valign = top width=33.33%|Latin !valign = top width=33.33%|English |- valign = top | | |36 |- va..."

2021-04-17T15:48:23Z

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==Chapter 36==
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|{{a|bk48a40|48a40}} Τὸ δὲ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρῶτον τῶι μέσωι καὶ τοῦτο τῶι ἄκρωι οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν ὡς αἰεὶ κατηγορηθησομένων ἀλλή {{ln|bk48b1}} λων ἢ ὁμοίως τό τε πρῶτον τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦτο τοῦ ἐσχάτου. καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὑπάρχειν δ᾽ ὡσαύτως. ἀλλ᾽ ὁσαχῶς τὸ εἶναι λέγεται καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν αὐτὸ τοῦτο, τοσαυταχῶς οἴεσθαι χρὴ σημαίνειν καὶ τὸ ὑπάρχειν. οἷον ὅτι τῶν ἐναντίων ἔστι μία ἐπιστήμη. ἔστω γὰρ τὸ Α τὸ μίαν εἶναι ἐπιστήμην, τὰ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἐφ᾽ οὗ Β. τὸ δὴ Α τῶι Β ὑπάρχει οὐχ ὥστε τὰ ἐναντία [τὸ] μίαν εἶναι [αὐτῶν] ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν κατ᾽ αὐτῶν μίαν εἶναι αὐτῶν ἐπιστήμην.

|(0678B) Inesse autem primum medio, et hoc postremo non oportet sumere, ut praedicentur semper ad se invicem similiter, et primum de medio, et hoc de postremo, et in non inesse similiter, sed quoties dicitur esse et verum dicere, hoc toties arbitrari oportet significare et inesse. Ut quoniam contrariorum una est disciplina: sit enim A unam esse disciplinam, B autem contraria sibi invicem, A ergo inest B, non quoniam contraria unam esse eorum disciplinam, sed quoniam verum est dicere de ipsis unam esse eorum disciplinam. Accidit autem quandoque primum de medio dici, medium autem de tertio non dici, ut si sophia est disciplina, boni autem est sophia: conclusio, quoniam boni est disciplina, et non bonum quidem est disciplina, sophia autem est disciplina.

|That the first term belongs to the middle, and the middle to the extreme, must not be understood in the sense that they can always be predicated of one another or that the first term will be predicated of the middle in the same way as the middle is predicated of the last term. The same holds if the premisses are negative. But we must suppose the verb ‘to belong’ to have as many meanings as the senses in which the verb ‘to be’ is used, and in which the assertion that a thing ‘is’ may be said to be true. Take for example the statement that there is a single science of contraries. Let A stand for ‘there being a single science’, and B for things which are contrary to one another. Then A belongs to B, not in the sense that contraries are the fact of there being a single science of them, but in the sense that it is true to say of the contraries that there is a single science of them.

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|Συμβαίνει δ᾽ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου τὸ πρῶτον λέγεσθαι, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου μὴ λέγεσθαι, οἷον εἰ ἡ σοφία ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ ἐστὶν ἡ σοφία, συμπέρασμα ὅτι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη· τὸ μὲν δὴ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δὲ σοφία ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη. ὁτὲ δὲ τὸ μὲν μέσον ἐπὶ τοῦ τρίτου λέγεται, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου οὐ λέγεται, οἷον εἰ τοῦ ποιοῦ παντὸς ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ ἐναντίου, τὸ δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐναντίον καὶ ποιόν, συμπέρασμα μὲν ὅτι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ τὸ ποιὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ταῦτα.

|Quandoque autem medium quidem de tertio dicitur, primum autem de medio non dicitur, ut si qualis omnis est disciplina, aut contrarii. (0678C) Bonum autem est, et contrarium, et quale: conclusio quidem, quoniam boni est disciplina. Non est autem bonum disciplina, neque quale, neque contrarium, sed omnium disciplina. Non est autem bonum disciplina, neque conclusio secundum rectum, neque quale, neque contrarium, sed bonum haec.

|It happens sometimes that the first term is stated of the middle, but the middle is not stated of the third term, e.g. if wisdom is knowledge, and wisdom is of the good, the conclusion is that there is knowledge of the good. The good then is not knowledge, though wisdom is knowledge. Sometimes the middle term is stated of the third, but the first is not stated of the middle, e.g. if there is a science of everything that has a quality, or is a contrary, and the good both is a contrary and has a quality, the conclusion is that there is a science of the good, but the good is not science, nor is that which has a quality or is a contrary, though the good is both of these.

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|ἔστι δὲ μήτε τὸ πρῶτον κατὰ τοῦ μέσου μήτε τοῦτο κατὰ τοῦ τρίτου, τοῦ πρώτου κατὰ τοῦ τρίτου ὁτὲ μὲν λεγομένου ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ λεγομένου. οἷον εἰ οὗ ἐπιστήμη ἔστιν, ἔστι τούτου γένος, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, συμπέρασμα ὅτι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστι γένος· κατηγορεῖται δ᾽ οὐδὲν κατ᾽ οὐδενός. εἰ δ᾽ οὗ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, γένος ἐστὶ τοῦτο, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀγαθοῦ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη, συμπέρασμα ὅτι τἀγαθόν ἐστι γένος· κατὰ μὲν δὴ τοῦ ἄκρου κατηγορεῖται τὸ πρῶτον, κατ᾽ ἀλλήλων δ᾽ οὐ λέγεται.

|Est autem quandoque neque primum de medio, neque hoc de tertio, primo de tertio quandoque quidem dicto, quandoque autem non dicto. Ut si cuius est disciplina, huius est genus, boni autem est disciplina: conclusio, quoniam boni est genus. Praedicatur autem nullum de nullo, si autem cuius est disciplina, genus est hoc, boni autem est disciplina: conclusio, quoniam bonum est genus: ergo de extremo quidem praedicatur primum, de se autem invicem non dicuntur.

|Sometimes neither the first term is stated of the middle, nor the middle of the third, while the first is sometimes stated of the third, and sometimes not: e.g. if there is a genus of that of which there is a science, and if there is a science of the good, we conclude that there is a genus of the good. But nothing is predicated of anything. And if that of which there is a science is a genus, and if there is a science of the good, we conclude that the good is a genus. The first term then is predicated of the extreme, but in the premisses one thing is not stated of another.

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|Τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ληπτέον. οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ σημαίνει τὸ μὴ ὑπάρχειν τόδε τῶιδε μὴ εἶναι τόδε τόδε, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοτε τὸ μὴ εἶναι τόδε τοῦδε ἢ τόδε τῶιδε, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι κινήσεως κίνησις ἢ γενέσεως γένεσις, ἡδονῆς δ᾽ ἔστιν· οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ἡδονὴ γένεσις. ἢ πάλιν ὅτι γέλωτος μὲν ἔστι σημεῖον, σημείου δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι σημεῖον, ὥστ᾽ οὐ σημεῖον ὁ γέλως. ὁμοίως δὲ κἀν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐν ὅσοις ἀναιρεῖται τὸ πρόβλημα τῶι λέγεσθαί πως πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ γένος.

|(0678D) Eodem autem modo et non inesse sumendum, non enim semper significat non inesse hoc huic, non esse hoc, hoc; sed aliquando non esse hoc huius, aut hoc huic: ut quoniam non est motionis motus, aut generationis generatio, voluptatis autem est, non ergo voluptas generatio. Aut rursus quoniam risus est signum, signi autem non est signum, quare non est signum risus; similiter autem et in aliis, in quibus interimitur propositum, eo quod dicitur aliquo modo ad id genus.

|The same holds good where the relation is negative. For ‘that does not belong to this’ does not always mean that ‘this is not that’, but sometimes that ‘this is not of that’ or ‘for that’, e.g. ‘there is not a motion of a motion or a becoming of a becoming, but there is a becoming of pleasure: so pleasure is not a becoming.’ Or again it may be said that there is a sign of laughter, but there is not a sign of a sign, consequently laughter is not a sign. This holds in the other cases too, in which the thesis is refuted because the genus is asserted in a particular way, in relation to the terms of the thesis.

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|πάλιν ὅτι ὁ καιρὸς οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος δέων· θεῶι γὰρ καιρὸς μὲν ἔστι, χρόνος δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι δέων διὰ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι θεῶι ὠφέλιμον. ὅρους μὲν γὰρ θετέον καιρὸν καὶ χρόνον δέοντα καὶ θεόν, τὴν δὲ πρότασιν ληπτέον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος πτῶσιν. ἁπλῶς γὰρ τοῦτο λέγομεν κατὰ πάντων, ὅτι τοὺς μὲν ὅρους ἀεὶ θετέον κατὰ τὰς κλήσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἢ ἀγαθόν ἢ ἐναν {{ln|bk49a1}}τία, οὐκ ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἐναντίων, τὰς δὲ προτάσεις ληπτέον κατὰ τὰς ἑκάστου πτώσεις· ἢ γὰρ ὅτι τούτωι, οἷον τὸ ἴσον, ἢ ὅτι τούτου, οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον, ἢ ὅτι τοῦτο, οἷον τὸ τύπτον ἢ ὁρῶν, ἢ ὅτι οὗτος, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶιον, ἢ εἴ πως ἄλλως πίπτει τοὔνομα κατὰ τὴν πρότασιν.

|Rursus quoniam occasio non est tempus opportunum, Deo enim occasio quidem est, tempus autem opportunum non est, eo quod nihil sit Deo conferens. Terminos enim ponendum est occasionem, et tempus opportunum, et Deum. (0679A) Propositio autem sumenda secundum nominis casum, simpliciter enim hoc dicimus de omnibus, quoniam terminos quidem semper ponendum secundum declinationes nominum, ut homo, aut bonum, aut contraria, aut hominis, aut boni, aut contrariorum. Propositiones autem sumendum secundum cuiusque casus, aut enim quoniam huic ut aequale, aut quoniam huius ut duplum, aut quoniam hoc ut feriens, vel videns, aut quoniam hic ut homo, animal, aut si quolibet modo aliter cadit nomen secundum propositionem,

|Again take the inference ‘opportunity is not the right time: for opportunity belongs to God, but the right time does not, since nothing is useful to God’. We must take as terms opportunity-right time-God: but the premiss must be understood according to the case of the noun. For we state this universally without qualification, that the terms ought always to be stated in the nominative, e.g. man, good, contraries, not in oblique cases, e.g. of man, of a good, of contraries, but the premisses ought to be understood with reference to the cases of each term-either the dative, e.g. ‘equal to this’, or the genitive, e.g. ‘double of this’, or the accusative, e.g. ‘that which strikes or sees this’, or the nominative, e.g. ‘man is an animal’, or in whatever other way the word falls in the premiss.

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==Notes==
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Authors/Aristotle/priora/Liber 1/C36 - Revision history

Edward Ockham: Created page with "==Chapter 36== {| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=33.33%|Greek !valign = top width=33.33%|Latin !valign = top width=33.33%|English |- valign = top | | |36 |- va..."