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==Chapter 34==
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|(PL 64 0677B) CAPUT XXXVI. De ecthesi terminorum.

|34

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|{{a|bk47b40|47b40}} πολλάκις δὲ διαψεύ {{ln|bk48a1}} δεσθαι συμπεσεῖται παρὰ τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἐκτίθεσθαι τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πρότασιν ὅρους, οἷον εἰ τὸ μὲν Α εἴη ὑγίεια, τὸ δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ὧι Β νόσος, ἐφ᾽ ὧι δὲ Γ ἄνθρωπος. ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ Α οὐδενὶ τῶι Β ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν (οὐδεμιᾶι γὰρ νόσωι ὑγίεια ὑπάρχει), καὶ πάλιν ὅτι τὸ Β παντὶ τῶι Γ ὑπάρχει (πᾶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος δεκτικὸς νόσου). δόξειεν ἂν οὖν συμβαίνειν μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπωι ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑγίειαν ὑπάρχειν. τούτου δ᾽ αἴτιον τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἐκκεῖσθαι τοὺς ὅρους κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἐπεὶ μεταληφθέντων τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός, οἷον ἀντὶ μὲν τῆς ὑγιείας εἰ τεθείη τὸ ὑγιαῖνον, ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς νόσου τὸ νοσοῦν. οὐ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τῶι νοσοῦντι τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὑπάρξαι. τούτου δὲ μὴ ληφθέντος οὐ γίνεται συλλογισμός, εἰ μὴ τοῦ ἐνδέχεσθαι· τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐκ ἀδύνατον· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ μηδενὶ ἀνθρώπωι ὑπάρχειν ὑγίειαν. πάλιν ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου σχήματος ὁμοίως ἔσται τὸ ψεῦδος· τὴν γὰρ ὑγίειαν νόσωι μὲν οὐδεμιᾶι ἀνθρώπωι δὲ παντὶ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν, ὥστ᾽ οὐδενὶ ἀνθρώπωι νόσον.

|(0677C) Frequenter autem mentiri evenit, eo quod non bene exponuntur secundum propositionem termini, ut si A quidem sit sanitas, B autem aegritudo, C vero homo, verum est enim dicere quoniam A nulli B contingit inesse, nulli enim aegritudini sapitas inest; et rursum quoniam B inest omni C, omnis enim homo susceptibilis est aegritudinis, videbitur ergo accidere nulli homini contingere sanitatem inesse. Huius autem causa est quod non bene exponuntur termini secundum locutionem, quoniam transsumptis quae iis sunt secundum habitudines, non erit syllogismus. Ut si pro sanitate quidem ponatur sanum, pro aegritudine autem aegrum, non enim verum est dicere quoniam non contingit aegrotanti inesse sanum esse, hoc autem non sumpto, non fit syllogismus, nisi contingentis. Hoc autem non impossibile, contingit enim nulli homini inesse sanitatem. Rursum in media figura similiter erit falsum. Nam sanitatem aegritudini quidem nulli, homini vero omni contingit inesse, quare nulli homini aegritudo.

|Men will frequently fall into fallacies through not setting out the terms of the premiss well, e.g. suppose A to be health, B disease, C man. It is true to say that A cannot belong to any B (for health belongs to no disease) and again that B belongs to every C (for every man is capable of disease). It would seem to follow that health cannot belong to any man. The reason for this is that the terms are not set out well in the statement, since if the things which are in the conditions are substituted, no syllogism can be made, e.g. if ‘healthy’ is substituted for ‘health’ and ‘diseased’ for ‘disease’. For it is not true to say that being healthy cannot belong to one who is diseased. But unless this is assumed no conclusion results, save in respect of possibility: but such a conclusion is not impossible: for it is possible that health should belong to no man. Again the fallacy may occur in a similar way in the middle figure: ‘it is not possible that health should belong to any disease, but it is possible that health should belong to every man, consequently it is not possible that disease should belong to any man’.

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|ἐν δὲ τῶι τρίτωι σχήματι κατὰ τὸ ἐνδέχεσθαι συμβαίνει τὸ ψεῦδος, καὶ γὰρ ὑγίειαν καὶ νόσον καὶ ἐπιστή μην καὶ ἄγνοιαν καὶ ὅλως τὰ ἐναντία τῶι αὐτῶι ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλήλοις δ᾽ ἀδύνατον. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀνομολογούμενον τοῖς προειρημένοις· ὅτε γὰρ τῶι αὐτῶι πλείω ἐνεδέχετο ὑπάρχειν, ἐνεδέχετο καὶ ἀλλήλοις.

|(0677D) In tertia autem figura secundum contingere accidit falsum, etenim sanitatem, et aegritudinem, et disciplinam, et ignorantiam, et omnino contraria omni eidem contingit inesse, sibi vero invicem impossibile, hoc autem confessum in praedictis. Cum enim eidem plura contingere inesse, contingebant et sibi invicem.

|In the third figure the fallacy results in reference to possibility. For health and diseae and knowledge and ignorance, and in general contraries, may possibly belong to the same thing, but cannot belong to one another. This is not in agreement with what was said before: for we stated that when several things could belong to the same thing, they could belong to one another.

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|Φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἐν ἅπασι τούτοις ἡ ἀπάτη γίνεται παρὰ τὴν τῶν ὅρων ἔκθεσιν· μεταληφθέντων γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἕξεις οὐδὲν γίνεται ψεῦδος. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατὰ τὰς τοιαύτας προτάσεις ἀεὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν ἀντὶ τῆς ἕξεως μεταληπτέον καὶ θετέον ὅρον.

|Manifestum igitur quoniam in omnibus his fallacia fit propter terminorum expositionem, transsumptis enim his quae sunt secundum habitudines, nihil fit falsum. Palam ergo quoniam secundum huiusmodi propositiones semper quod est secundum habitum, pro habitu sumendum et ponendum terminum.

|It is evident then that in all these cases the fallacy arises from the setting out of the terms: for if the things that are in the conditions are substituted, no fallacy arises. It is clear then that in such premisses what possesses the condition ought always to be substituted for the condition and taken as the term.

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==Notes==
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Authors/Aristotle/priora/Liber 1/C34 - Revision history

Edward Ockham: Created page with "==Chapter 34== {| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=33.33%|Greek !valign = top width=33.33%|Latin !valign = top width=33.33%|English |- valign = top | |(PL 64 0677B..."