Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l9/c1 - Revision history

Edward Ockham: /* Chapter 1 */

2015-02-21T22:58:25Z

Chapter 1

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	==Chapter 1==		==Chapter 1==
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	\|METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER NONUS		\|METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER NONUS


	\|Aristotle ''Metaphysics'' Book 9 (Θ)		\|Aristotle ''Metaphysics'' Book 9 (Θ)

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			\|[1045β] [27] περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ πρώτως ὄντος καὶ πρὸς ὃ πᾶσαι αἱ ἄλλαι κατηγορίαι τοῦ ὄντος ἀναφέρονται εἴρηται, περὶ τῆς οὐσίας (κατὰ γὰρ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον λέγεται τἆλλα [30] ὄντα, τό τε ποσὸν καὶ τὸ ποιὸν καὶ τἆλλα τὰ οὕτω λεγόμενα: πάντα γὰρ ἕξει τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις): ἐπεὶ δὲ λέγεται τὸ ὂν τὸ μὲν τὸ τὶ ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν καὶ ἐντελέχειαν καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔργον, διορίσωμεν καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως [35] καὶ ἐντελεχείας, καὶ πρῶτον περὶ δυνάμεως ἣ λέγεται μὲν μάλιστα κυρίως, οὐ μὴν χρησιμωτάτη γέ ἐστι πρὸς ὃ βουλόμεθα νῦν: [1046α] [1] ἐπὶ πλέον γάρ ἐστιν ἡ δύναμις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῶν μόνον λεγομένων κατὰ κίνησιν.

	\|{{p\|179}} <span id=c1></span>De primo quidem igitur ente et ad quod omnes aliae cathegorie entis referuntur dictum est, de substantia. Nam secundum substantiae rationem dicuntur alia entia: quantitas, {{a\|bk1045b30\|↵}} qualitas et alia sic dicta; omnia namque rationem habebunt substantiae, ut diximus in primis sermonibus. Quoniam vero dicitur ens hoc quidem eo quod quid aut qualitas aut quantitas, aliud secundum potentiam et actum et secundum opus, determinabimus et de potentia et actu. Et primum de potentia {{a\|bk1045b35\|↵}} quae dicitur quidem maxime proprie, non tamen utilis est ad quod volumus nunc. In plus enim est potentia et actus {{a\|bk1046a1\|↵}} eorum quae dicuntur secundum motum solum. Sed cum dixerimus de hac, in determinationibus de actu ostendemus et de aliis.		\|{{p\|179}} <span id=c1></span>De primo quidem igitur ente et ad quod omnes aliae cathegorie entis referuntur dictum est, de substantia. Nam secundum substantiae rationem dicuntur alia entia: quantitas, {{a\|bk1045b30\|↵}} qualitas et alia sic dicta; omnia namque rationem habebunt substantiae, ut diximus in primis sermonibus. Quoniam vero dicitur ens hoc quidem eo quod quid aut qualitas aut quantitas, aliud secundum potentiam et actum et secundum opus, determinabimus et de potentia et actu. Et primum de potentia {{a\|bk1045b35\|↵}} quae dicitur quidem maxime proprie, non tamen utilis est ad quod volumus nunc. In plus enim est potentia et actus {{a\|bk1046a1\|↵}} eorum quae dicuntur secundum motum solum. Sed cum dixerimus de hac, in determinationibus de actu ostendemus et de aliis.

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			\|ἀλλ᾽ εἰπόντες περὶ ταύτης, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς ἐνεργείας διορισμοῖς δηλώσομεν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν λέγεται [5] πολλαχῶς ἡ δύναμις καὶ τὸ δύνασθαι, διώρισται ἡμῖν ἐν ἄλλοις: τούτων δ᾽ ὅσαι μὲν ὁμωνύμως λέγονται δυνάμεις ἀφείσθωσαν (ἔνιαι γὰρ ὁμοιότητί τινι λέγονται, καθάπερ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ δυνατὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγομεν τῷ εἶναί πως ἢ μὴ εἶναι), ὅσαι δὲ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ εἶδος, πᾶσαι ἀρχαί [10] τινές εἰσι, καὶ πρὸς πρώτην μίαν λέγονται, ἥ ἐστιν ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παθεῖν ἐστὶ δύναμις, ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο: ἡ δ᾽ ἕξις ἀπαθείας τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο ὑπ᾽ ἀρχῆς [15] μεταβλητικῆς. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστι πᾶσι τοῖς ὅροις ὁ τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως λόγος. πάλιν δ᾽ αὗται δυνάμεις λέγονται ἢ τοῦ μόνον ποιῆσαι ἢ [τοῦ] παθεῖν ἢ τοῦ καλῶς, ὥστε καὶ ἐν τοῖς τούτων λόγοις ἐνυπάρχουσί πως οἱ τῶν προτέρων δυνάμεων λόγοι.

	\|Quod quidem igitur dicitur multipliciter potentia et posse, {{a\|bk1046a5\|↵}} determinatum est nobis in aliis. Harum autem quaecumque quidem equivoce dicuntur potentie praetermittantur. Quaedam enim similitudine quadam dicuntur, quemadmodum in geometria et possibilia et impossibilia dicimus eo quod aliquo modo {{p\|180}} sunt aut non sunt. Quaecumque autem ad eandem speciem, {{a\|bk1046a10\|↵}} omnes principia quaedam sunt, et ad primum unum dicuntur, quod est principium transmutationis in alio in quantum aliud est. Nam haec quidem patiendi potentia est, quae in ipso patiente principium mutationis passive ab alio in quantum aliud est. Haec autem habitus impassibilitatis eius quae in deterius et cor{{a\|bk1046a15\|↵}}ruptionis ab alio in quantum * aliud a principio transmutativo. In hiis enim inest omnibus terminis prime potentie ratio. Iterum autem hae potentie dicuntur aut solum faciendi aut patiendi aut ipsius bene; quare in harum rationibus insunt aliqualiter priorum rationes potentiarum.		\|Quod quidem igitur dicitur multipliciter potentia et posse, {{a\|bk1046a5\|↵}} determinatum est nobis in aliis. Harum autem quaecumque quidem equivoce dicuntur potentie praetermittantur. Quaedam enim similitudine quadam dicuntur, quemadmodum in geometria et possibilia et impossibilia dicimus eo quod aliquo modo {{p\|180}} sunt aut non sunt. Quaecumque autem ad eandem speciem, {{a\|bk1046a10\|↵}} omnes principia quaedam sunt, et ad primum unum dicuntur, quod est principium transmutationis in alio in quantum aliud est. Nam haec quidem patiendi potentia est, quae in ipso patiente principium mutationis passive ab alio in quantum aliud est. Haec autem habitus impassibilitatis eius quae in deterius et cor{{a\|bk1046a15\|↵}}ruptionis ab alio in quantum * aliud a principio transmutativo. In hiis enim inest omnibus terminis prime potentie ratio. Iterum autem hae potentie dicuntur aut solum faciendi aut patiendi aut ipsius bene; quare in harum rationibus insunt aliqualiter priorum rationes potentiarum.

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			\|φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ἔστι μὲν ὡς μία δύναμις [20] τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (δυνατὸν γάρ ἐστι καὶ τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸ δύναμιν τοῦ παθεῖν καὶ τῷ ἄλλο ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ), ἔστι δὲ ὡς ἄλλη. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι (διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἔχειν τινὰ ἀρχήν, καὶ εἶναι καὶ τὴν ὕλην ἀρχήν τινα, πάσχει τὸ πάσχον, καὶ ἄλλο ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου: τὸ λιπαρὸν μὲν [25] γὰρ καυστὸν τὸ δ᾽ ὑπεῖκον ὡδὶ θλαστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν καὶ ἡ οἰκοδομική, ἡ μὲν ἐν τῷ θερμαντικῷ ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομικῷ: διὸ ᾗ συμπέφυκεν, οὐθὲν πάσχει αὐτὸ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ: ἓν γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἄλλο.

	\|{{a\|bk1046a20\|↵}} Palam igitur quia est quidem ut una potentia faciendi et patiendi; nam possibile est et habere ipsum potentiam patiendi et eo quod aliud ab ipso. Est autem ut alia. Haec quidem enim * in patiente; propter habere enim quoddam principium, et esse * materiam principium quoddam, patitur {{a\|bk1046a25\|↵}} patiens, et aliud ab alio. Crassum enim combustibile est, cedens autem sic impressibile, similiter autem et in aliis. Haec autem in faciente; ut calor et edificativa, haec quidem in calefactivo, haec autem in edificativo. Quapropter in quantum simul natum est, nihil patitur ipsum a se ipso; unum {{a\|bk1046a30\|↵}} enim et non aliud.		\|{{a\|bk1046a20\|↵}} Palam igitur quia est quidem ut una potentia faciendi et patiendi; nam possibile est et habere ipsum potentiam patiendi et eo quod aliud ab ipso. Est autem ut alia. Haec quidem enim * in patiente; propter habere enim quoddam principium, et esse * materiam principium quoddam, patitur {{a\|bk1046a25\|↵}} patiens, et aliud ab alio. Crassum enim combustibile est, cedens autem sic impressibile, similiter autem et in aliis. Haec autem in faciente; ut calor et edificativa, haec quidem in calefactivo, haec autem in edificativo. Quapropter in quantum simul natum est, nihil patitur ipsum a se ipso; unum {{a\|bk1046a30\|↵}} enim et non aliud.

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			\|καὶ ἡ ἀδυναμία καὶ τὸ ἀδύνατον [30] ἡ τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει ἐναντία στέρησίς ἐστιν, ὥστε τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσα δύναμις ἀδυναμίᾳ. ἡ δὲ στέρησις λέγεται πολλαχῶς: καὶ γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχον καὶ τὸ πεφυκὸς ἂν μὴ ἔχῃ, ἢ ὅλως ἢ ὅτε πέφυκεν, καὶ ἢ ὡδί, οἷον παντελῶς, ἢ κἂν ὁπωσοῦν. ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων δέ, ἂν πεφυκότα [35] ἔχειν μὴ ἔχῃ βίᾳ, ἐστερῆσθαι ταῦτα λέγομεν.

	\|Et impotentia et impossibile et quae tali potentie contraria est privatio; quare eiusdem et secundum idem omnis potentia * impotentia. Privatio autem dicitur multipliciter. Et enim non habens et aptum natum si non habet, aut omnino aut quando aptum natum est, et aut sic, puta perfecte, vel saltem quomodocumque. In quibusdam vero, si {{a\|bk1046a35\|↵}} apta nata habere non habeant vi, privata esse haec dicimus.		\|Et impotentia et impossibile et quae tali potentie contraria est privatio; quare eiusdem et secundum idem omnis potentia * impotentia. Privatio autem dicitur multipliciter. Et enim non habens et aptum natum si non habet, aut omnino aut quando aptum natum est, et aut sic, puta perfecte, vel saltem quomodocumque. In quibusdam vero, si {{a\|bk1046a35\|↵}} apta nata habere non habeant vi, privata esse haec dicimus.

	\|<span id=jp745></span>And ''impotence'' and ''impotent'' stand for the privation which is contrary to potency of this sort, so that every potency belongs to the same subject and refers to the same process as a corresponding impotence. Privation has several senses; for it means (1) that which has not a certain quality and (2) that which might naturally have it but has not it, either (a) in general or (b) when it might naturally have it, and either (a) in some particular way, e.g. when it has not it completely, or (b) when it has not it at all. And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality lose it by violence, we say they have suffered privation.		\|<span id=jp745></span>And ''impotence'' and ''impotent'' stand for the privation which is contrary to potency of this sort, so that every potency belongs to the same subject and refers to the same process as a corresponding impotence. Privation has several senses; for it means (1) that which has not a certain quality and (2) that which might naturally have it but has not it, either (a) in general or (b) when it might naturally have it, and either (a) in some particular way, e.g. when it has not it completely, or (b) when it has not it at all. And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality lose it by violence, we say they have suffered privation.

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Edward Ockham: Text replace - "{{bk\|(.*)}}" to "{{a|bk$1|↵}}"

2014-03-13T11:33:52Z

Text replace - "{{bk\|(.*)}}" to "{{a|bk$1|↵}}"

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	\|{{p\|179}} <span id=c1></span>De primo quidem igitur ente et ad quod omnes aliae cathegorie entis referuntur dictum est, de substantia. Nam secundum substantiae rationem dicuntur alia entia: quantitas, {{bk\|~~1045b30~~}} qualitas et alia sic dicta; omnia namque rationem habebunt substantiae, ut diximus in primis sermonibus. Quoniam vero dicitur ens hoc quidem eo quod quid aut qualitas aut quantitas, aliud secundum potentiam et actum et secundum opus, determinabimus et de potentia et actu. Et primum de potentia {{bk\|~~1045b35~~}} quae dicitur quidem maxime proprie, non tamen utilis est ad quod volumus nunc. In plus enim est potentia et actus {{bk\|~~1046a1~~}} eorum quae dicuntur secundum motum solum. Sed cum dixerimus de hac, in determinationibus de actu ostendemus et de aliis.		\|{{p\|179}} <span id=c1></span>De primo quidem igitur ente et ad quod omnes aliae cathegorie entis referuntur dictum est, de substantia. Nam secundum substantiae rationem dicuntur alia entia: quantitas, {{a\|bk1045b30\|↵}} qualitas et alia sic dicta; omnia namque rationem habebunt substantiae, ut diximus in primis sermonibus. Quoniam vero dicitur ens hoc quidem eo quod quid aut qualitas aut quantitas, aliud secundum potentiam et actum et secundum opus, determinabimus et de potentia et actu. Et primum de potentia {{a\|bk1045b35\|↵}} quae dicitur quidem maxime proprie, non tamen utilis est ad quod volumus nunc. In plus enim est potentia et actus {{a\|bk1046a1\|↵}} eorum quae dicuntur secundum motum solum. Sed cum dixerimus de hac, in determinationibus de actu ostendemus et de aliis.

	\|'''Chapter 1'''. <span id=jp742></span>WE have treated of that which is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred-i.e. of substance. For it is in virtue of the concept of substance that the others also are said to be-quantity and quality and the like; for all will be found to involve the concept of substance, as we said in the first part of our work. And since ''being'' is in one way divided into individual thing, quality, and quantity, and is in another way distinguished in respect of potency and complete reality, and of function, let us now add a discussion of potency and complete reality. And first let us explain potency in the strictest sense, which is, how['''46a''']ever, not the most useful for our present purpose. For potency and actuality extend beyond the cases that involve a reference to motion. But when we have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our discussions of actuality _ explain the other kinds of potency as well.		\|'''Chapter 1'''. <span id=jp742></span>WE have treated of that which is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred-i.e. of substance. For it is in virtue of the concept of substance that the others also are said to be-quantity and quality and the like; for all will be found to involve the concept of substance, as we said in the first part of our work. And since ''being'' is in one way divided into individual thing, quality, and quantity, and is in another way distinguished in respect of potency and complete reality, and of function, let us now add a discussion of potency and complete reality. And first let us explain potency in the strictest sense, which is, how['''46a''']ever, not the most useful for our present purpose. For potency and actuality extend beyond the cases that involve a reference to motion. But when we have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our discussions of actuality _ explain the other kinds of potency as well.

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	\|Quod quidem igitur dicitur multipliciter potentia et posse, {{bk\|~~1046a5~~}} determinatum est nobis in aliis. Harum autem quaecumque quidem equivoce dicuntur potentie praetermittantur. Quaedam enim similitudine quadam dicuntur, quemadmodum in geometria et possibilia et impossibilia dicimus eo quod aliquo modo {{p\|180}} sunt aut non sunt. Quaecumque autem ad eandem speciem, {{bk\|~~1046a10~~}} omnes principia quaedam sunt, et ad primum unum dicuntur, quod est principium transmutationis in alio in quantum aliud est. Nam haec quidem patiendi potentia est, quae in ipso patiente principium mutationis passive ab alio in quantum aliud est. Haec autem habitus impassibilitatis eius quae in deterius et cor{{bk\|~~1046a15~~}}ruptionis ab alio in quantum * aliud a principio transmutativo. In hiis enim inest omnibus terminis prime potentie ratio. Iterum autem hae potentie dicuntur aut solum faciendi aut patiendi aut ipsius bene; quare in harum rationibus insunt aliqualiter priorum rationes potentiarum.		\|Quod quidem igitur dicitur multipliciter potentia et posse, {{a\|bk1046a5\|↵}} determinatum est nobis in aliis. Harum autem quaecumque quidem equivoce dicuntur potentie praetermittantur. Quaedam enim similitudine quadam dicuntur, quemadmodum in geometria et possibilia et impossibilia dicimus eo quod aliquo modo {{p\|180}} sunt aut non sunt. Quaecumque autem ad eandem speciem, {{a\|bk1046a10\|↵}} omnes principia quaedam sunt, et ad primum unum dicuntur, quod est principium transmutationis in alio in quantum aliud est. Nam haec quidem patiendi potentia est, quae in ipso patiente principium mutationis passive ab alio in quantum aliud est. Haec autem habitus impassibilitatis eius quae in deterius et cor{{a\|bk1046a15\|↵}}ruptionis ab alio in quantum * aliud a principio transmutativo. In hiis enim inest omnibus terminis prime potentie ratio. Iterum autem hae potentie dicuntur aut solum faciendi aut patiendi aut ipsius bene; quare in harum rationibus insunt aliqualiter priorum rationes potentiarum.

	\|<span id=jp743></span>We have pointed out elsewhere that ''potency'' and the word ''can'' have several senses. Of these we may neglect all the potencies that are so called by an equivocation. For some are called so by analogy, as in geometry we say one thing is or is not a ''power'' of another by virtue of the presence or absence of some relation between them. But all potencies that conform to the same type are originative sources of some kind, and are called potencies in reference to one primary kind of potency, which is an originative source of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other. For one kind is a potency of being acted on, i.e. the originative source, in the very thing acted on, of its being passively changed by another thing or by itself qua other; and another kind is a state of insusceptibility to change for the worse and to destruction by another thing or by the thing itself qua other by virtue of an originative source of change. In all these definitions is implied the formula if potency in the primary sense.-And again these so-called potencies are potencies either of merely acting or being acted on, or of acting or being acted on well, so that even in the formulae of the latter the formulae of the prior kinds of potency are somehow implied.		\|<span id=jp743></span>We have pointed out elsewhere that ''potency'' and the word ''can'' have several senses. Of these we may neglect all the potencies that are so called by an equivocation. For some are called so by analogy, as in geometry we say one thing is or is not a ''power'' of another by virtue of the presence or absence of some relation between them. But all potencies that conform to the same type are originative sources of some kind, and are called potencies in reference to one primary kind of potency, which is an originative source of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other. For one kind is a potency of being acted on, i.e. the originative source, in the very thing acted on, of its being passively changed by another thing or by itself qua other; and another kind is a state of insusceptibility to change for the worse and to destruction by another thing or by the thing itself qua other by virtue of an originative source of change. In all these definitions is implied the formula if potency in the primary sense.-And again these so-called potencies are potencies either of merely acting or being acted on, or of acting or being acted on well, so that even in the formulae of the latter the formulae of the prior kinds of potency are somehow implied.

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	\|{{bk\|~~1046a20~~}} Palam igitur quia est quidem ut una potentia faciendi et patiendi; nam possibile est et habere ipsum potentiam patiendi et eo quod aliud ab ipso. Est autem ut alia. Haec quidem enim * in patiente; propter habere enim quoddam principium, et esse * materiam principium quoddam, patitur {{bk\|~~1046a25~~}} patiens, et aliud ab alio. Crassum enim combustibile est, cedens autem sic impressibile, similiter autem et in aliis. Haec autem in faciente; ut calor et edificativa, haec quidem in calefactivo, haec autem in edificativo. Quapropter in quantum simul natum est, nihil patitur ipsum a se ipso; unum {{bk\|~~1046a30~~}} enim et non aliud.		\|{{a\|bk1046a20\|↵}} Palam igitur quia est quidem ut una potentia faciendi et patiendi; nam possibile est et habere ipsum potentiam patiendi et eo quod aliud ab ipso. Est autem ut alia. Haec quidem enim * in patiente; propter habere enim quoddam principium, et esse * materiam principium quoddam, patitur {{a\|bk1046a25\|↵}} patiens, et aliud ab alio. Crassum enim combustibile est, cedens autem sic impressibile, similiter autem et in aliis. Haec autem in faciente; ut calor et edificativa, haec quidem in calefactivo, haec autem in edificativo. Quapropter in quantum simul natum est, nihil patitur ipsum a se ipso; unum {{a\|bk1046a30\|↵}} enim et non aliud.

	\|<span id=jp744></span>Obviously, then, in a sense the potency of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be ''capable'' either because it can itself be acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), but in a sense the potencies are different. For the one is in the thing acted on; it is because it contains a certain originative source, and because even the matter is an originative source, that the thing acted on is acted on, and one thing by one, another by another; for that which is oily can be burnt, and that which yields in a particular way can be crushed; and similarly in all other cases. But the other potency is in the agent, e.g. heat and the art of building are present, one in that which can produce heat and the other in the man who can build. And so, in so far as a thing is an organic unity, it cannot be acted on by itself; for it is one and not two different things.		\|<span id=jp744></span>Obviously, then, in a sense the potency of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be ''capable'' either because it can itself be acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), but in a sense the potencies are different. For the one is in the thing acted on; it is because it contains a certain originative source, and because even the matter is an originative source, that the thing acted on is acted on, and one thing by one, another by another; for that which is oily can be burnt, and that which yields in a particular way can be crushed; and similarly in all other cases. But the other potency is in the agent, e.g. heat and the art of building are present, one in that which can produce heat and the other in the man who can build. And so, in so far as a thing is an organic unity, it cannot be acted on by itself; for it is one and not two different things.

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	\|Et impotentia et impossibile et quae tali potentie contraria est privatio; quare eiusdem et secundum idem omnis potentia * impotentia. Privatio autem dicitur multipliciter. Et enim non habens et aptum natum si non habet, aut omnino aut quando aptum natum est, et aut sic, puta perfecte, vel saltem quomodocumque. In quibusdam vero, si {{bk\|~~1046a35~~}} apta nata habere non habeant vi, privata esse haec dicimus.		\|Et impotentia et impossibile et quae tali potentie contraria est privatio; quare eiusdem et secundum idem omnis potentia * impotentia. Privatio autem dicitur multipliciter. Et enim non habens et aptum natum si non habet, aut omnino aut quando aptum natum est, et aut sic, puta perfecte, vel saltem quomodocumque. In quibusdam vero, si {{a\|bk1046a35\|↵}} apta nata habere non habeant vi, privata esse haec dicimus.

	\|<span id=jp745></span>And ''impotence'' and ''impotent'' stand for the privation which is contrary to potency of this sort, so that every potency belongs to the same subject and refers to the same process as a corresponding impotence. Privation has several senses; for it means (1) that which has not a certain quality and (2) that which might naturally have it but has not it, either (a) in general or (b) when it might naturally have it, and either (a) in some particular way, e.g. when it has not it completely, or (b) when it has not it at all. And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality lose it by violence, we say they have suffered privation.		\|<span id=jp745></span>And ''impotence'' and ''impotent'' stand for the privation which is contrary to potency of this sort, so that every potency belongs to the same subject and refers to the same process as a corresponding impotence. Privation has several senses; for it means (1) that which has not a certain quality and (2) that which might naturally have it but has not it, either (a) in general or (b) when it might naturally have it, and either (a) in some particular way, e.g. when it has not it completely, or (b) when it has not it at all. And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality lose it by violence, we say they have suffered privation.

Edward Ockham: /* Chapter 1 */

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Chapter 1

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	\|Et impotentia et impossibile et quae tali potentie contraria est privatio; quare eiusdem et secundum idem omnis potentia * impotentia. Privatio autem dicitur multipliciter. Et enim non habens et aptum natum si non habet, 45 aut omnino aut quando aptum natum est, et aut sic, puta perfecte, vel saltem quomodocumque. In quibusdam vero, si {{bk\|1046a35}} apta nata habere non habeant vi, privata esse haec dicimus.		\|Et impotentia et impossibile et quae tali potentie contraria est privatio; quare eiusdem et secundum idem omnis potentia * impotentia. Privatio autem dicitur multipliciter. Et enim non habens et aptum natum si non habet, aut omnino aut quando aptum natum est, et aut sic, puta perfecte, vel saltem quomodocumque. In quibusdam vero, si {{bk\|1046a35}} apta nata habere non habeant vi, privata esse haec dicimus.

	\|<span id=jp745></span>And ''impotence'' and ''impotent'' stand for the privation which is contrary to potency of this sort, so that every potency belongs to the same subject and refers to the same process as a corresponding impotence. Privation has several senses; for it means (1) that which has not a certain quality and (2) that which might naturally have it but has not it, either (a) in general or (b) when it might naturally have it, and either (a) in some particular way, e.g. when it has not it completely, or (b) when it has not it at all. And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality lose it by violence, we say they have suffered privation.		\|<span id=jp745></span>And ''impotence'' and ''impotent'' stand for the privation which is contrary to potency of this sort, so that every potency belongs to the same subject and refers to the same process as a corresponding impotence. Privation has several senses; for it means (1) that which has not a certain quality and (2) that which might naturally have it but has not it, either (a) in general or (b) when it might naturally have it, and either (a) in some particular way, e.g. when it has not it completely, or (b) when it has not it at all. And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality lose it by violence, we say they have suffered privation.

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	==Notes==		==Notes==
	{{reflist}}		{{reflist}}
	</noinclude>		</noinclude>

Edward Ockham: Created page with "==Chapter 1== {| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=45%|Latin !valign = top width=55%|English |- valign = top |METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER NONUS |Aristotle ''Metaph..."

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Created page with "==Chapter 1== {| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=45%|Latin !valign = top width=55%|English |- valign = top |METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER NONUS |Aristotle ''Metaph..."

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==Chapter 1==
{| border=1 cellpadding=10
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|METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER NONUS

|Aristotle ''Metaphysics'' Book 9 (Θ)

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|{{p|179}} De primo quidem igitur ente et ad quod omnes aliae cathegorie entis referuntur dictum est, de substantia. Nam secundum substantiae rationem dicuntur alia entia: quantitas, {{bk|1045b30}} qualitas et alia sic dicta; omnia namque rationem habebunt substantiae, ut diximus in primis sermonibus. Quoniam vero dicitur ens hoc quidem eo quod quid aut qualitas aut quantitas, aliud secundum potentiam et actum et secundum opus, determinabimus et de potentia et actu. Et primum de potentia {{bk|1045b35}} quae dicitur quidem maxime proprie, non tamen utilis est ad quod volumus nunc. In plus enim est potentia et actus {{bk|1046a1}} eorum quae dicuntur secundum motum solum. Sed cum dixerimus de hac, in determinationibus de actu ostendemus et de aliis.

|'''Chapter 1'''. WE have treated of that which is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred-i.e. of substance. For it is in virtue of the concept of substance that the others also are said to be-quantity and quality and the like; for all will be found to involve the concept of substance, as we said in the first part of our work. And since ''being'' is in one way divided into individual thing, quality, and quantity, and is in another way distinguished in respect of potency and complete reality, and of function, let us now add a discussion of potency and complete reality. And first let us explain potency in the strictest sense, which is, how['''46a''']ever, not the most useful for our present purpose. For potency and actuality extend beyond the cases that involve a reference to motion. But when we have spoken of this first kind, we shall in our discussions of actuality _ explain the other kinds of potency as well.

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|Quod quidem igitur dicitur multipliciter potentia et posse, {{bk|1046a5}} determinatum est nobis in aliis. Harum autem quaecumque quidem equivoce dicuntur potentie praetermittantur. Quaedam enim similitudine quadam dicuntur, quemadmodum in geometria et possibilia et impossibilia dicimus eo quod aliquo modo {{p|180}} sunt aut non sunt. Quaecumque autem ad eandem speciem, {{bk|1046a10}} omnes principia quaedam sunt, et ad primum unum dicuntur, quod est principium transmutationis in alio in quantum aliud est. Nam haec quidem patiendi potentia est, quae in ipso patiente principium mutationis passive ab alio in quantum aliud est. Haec autem habitus impassibilitatis eius quae in deterius et cor{{bk|1046a15}}ruptionis ab alio in quantum * aliud a principio transmutativo. In hiis enim inest omnibus terminis prime potentie ratio. Iterum autem hae potentie dicuntur aut solum faciendi aut patiendi aut ipsius bene; quare in harum rationibus insunt aliqualiter priorum rationes potentiarum.

|We have pointed out elsewhere that ''potency'' and the word ''can'' have several senses. Of these we may neglect all the potencies that are so called by an equivocation. For some are called so by analogy, as in geometry we say one thing is or is not a ''power'' of another by virtue of the presence or absence of some relation between them. But all potencies that conform to the same type are originative sources of some kind, and are called potencies in reference to one primary kind of potency, which is an originative source of change in another thing or in the thing itself qua other. For one kind is a potency of being acted on, i.e. the originative source, in the very thing acted on, of its being passively changed by another thing or by itself qua other; and another kind is a state of insusceptibility to change for the worse and to destruction by another thing or by the thing itself qua other by virtue of an originative source of change. In all these definitions is implied the formula if potency in the primary sense.-And again these so-called potencies are potencies either of merely acting or being acted on, or of acting or being acted on well, so that even in the formulae of the latter the formulae of the prior kinds of potency are somehow implied.

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|{{bk|1046a20}} Palam igitur quia est quidem ut una potentia faciendi et patiendi; nam possibile est et habere ipsum potentiam patiendi et eo quod aliud ab ipso. Est autem ut alia. Haec quidem enim * in patiente; propter habere enim quoddam principium, et esse * materiam principium quoddam, patitur {{bk|1046a25}} patiens, et aliud ab alio. Crassum enim combustibile est, cedens autem sic impressibile, similiter autem et in aliis. Haec autem in faciente; ut calor et edificativa, haec quidem in calefactivo, haec autem in edificativo. Quapropter in quantum simul natum est, nihil patitur ipsum a se ipso; unum {{bk|1046a30}} enim et non aliud.

|Obviously, then, in a sense the potency of acting and of being acted on is one (for a thing may be ''capable'' either because it can itself be acted on or because something else can be acted on by it), but in a sense the potencies are different. For the one is in the thing acted on; it is because it contains a certain originative source, and because even the matter is an originative source, that the thing acted on is acted on, and one thing by one, another by another; for that which is oily can be burnt, and that which yields in a particular way can be crushed; and similarly in all other cases. But the other potency is in the agent, e.g. heat and the art of building are present, one in that which can produce heat and the other in the man who can build. And so, in so far as a thing is an organic unity, it cannot be acted on by itself; for it is one and not two different things.

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|Et impotentia et impossibile et quae tali potentie contraria est privatio; quare eiusdem et secundum idem omnis potentia * impotentia. Privatio autem dicitur multipliciter. Et enim non habens et aptum natum si non habet, 45 aut omnino aut quando aptum natum est, et aut sic, puta perfecte, vel saltem quomodocumque. In quibusdam vero, si {{bk|1046a35}} apta nata habere non habeant vi, privata esse haec dicimus.

|And ''impotence'' and ''impotent'' stand for the privation which is contrary to potency of this sort, so that every potency belongs to the same subject and refers to the same process as a corresponding impotence. Privation has several senses; for it means (1) that which has not a certain quality and (2) that which might naturally have it but has not it, either (a) in general or (b) when it might naturally have it, and either (a) in some particular way, e.g. when it has not it completely, or (b) when it has not it at all. And in certain cases if things which naturally have a quality lose it by violence, we say they have suffered privation.

|}<noinclude>
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
</noinclude>