Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l7/c16 - Revision history

Edward Ockham: /* Chapter 16 */

2015-02-21T22:54:56Z

Chapter 16

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	==Chapter 16==		==Chapter 16==
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			\|φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν δοκουσῶν εἶναι οὐσιῶν αἱ πλεῖσται δυνάμεις εἰσί, τά τε μόρια τῶν ζῴων (οὐθὲν γὰρ κεχωρισμένον αὐτῶν ἐστίν: ὅταν δὲ χωρισθῇ, καὶ τότε ὄντα ὡς ὕλη πάντα) καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ: οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἕν ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον σωρός, πρὶν ἢ πεφθῇ καὶ γένηταί τι [10] ἐξ αὐτῶν ἕν. μάλιστα δ᾽ ἄν τις τὰ τῶν ἐμψύχων ὑπολάβοι μόρια καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάρεγγυς ἄμφω γίγνεσθαι, ὄντα καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει, τῷ ἀρχὰς ἔχειν κινήσεως ἀπό τινος ἐν ταῖς καμπαῖς: διὸ ἔνια ζῷα διαιρούμενα ζῇ. ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως δυνάμει πάντ᾽ ἔσται, ὅταν ᾖ ἓν καὶ [15] συνεχὲς φύσει, ἀλλὰ μὴ βίᾳ ἢ συμφύσει: τὸ γὰρ τοιοῦτον πήρωσις.

	\|<span id=jp677></span> ''Manifestum est autem'' quod substantiarum esse {{a\|bk1040b5\|↵}} existimatarum plurime potestate sunt, et ipse partes animalium; {{p\|164}} nihil enim separatum ipsorum est. Quando autem separata fuerint, tunc entia ut materia omnia, terra, ignis et aer. Nihil enim ipsorum unum est, nisi ut cumulus, antequam {{a\|bk1040b10\|↵}} digeratur et fiat aliquid ex ipsis unum. Maxime autem utique aliquis animatorum suspicabitur partes et eas quae animae propinque ambas fieri, entes et actu et potentia, eo quod principia habeant motus ab aliquo in iuncturis; propter quod quaedam animalia divisa vivunt. Sed tamen potentia omnia {{a\|bk1040b15\|↵}} erunt, quando fuerit unum et continuum natura, sed non vi aut complantatione; tale namque est orbatio.		\|<span id=jp677></span> ''Manifestum est autem'' quod substantiarum esse {{a\|bk1040b5\|↵}} existimatarum plurime potestate sunt, et ipse partes animalium; {{p\|164}} nihil enim separatum ipsorum est. Quando autem separata fuerint, tunc entia ut materia omnia, terra, ignis et aer. Nihil enim ipsorum unum est, nisi ut cumulus, antequam {{a\|bk1040b10\|↵}} digeratur et fiat aliquid ex ipsis unum. Maxime autem utique aliquis animatorum suspicabitur partes et eas quae animae propinque ambas fieri, entes et actu et potentia, eo quod principia habeant motus ab aliquo in iuncturis; propter quod quaedam animalia divisa vivunt. Sed tamen potentia omnia {{a\|bk1040b15\|↵}} erunt, quando fuerit unum et continuum natura, sed non vi aut complantatione; tale namque est orbatio.

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			\|ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἓν λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς μία, καὶ ὧν μία ἀριθμῷ ἓν ἀριθμῷ, φανερὸν ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ἓν οὔτε τὸ ὂν ἐνδέχεται οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ στοιχείῳ εἶναι ἢ ἀρχῇ: ἀλλὰ [20] ζητοῦμεν τίς οὖν ἡ ἀρχή, ἵνα εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀναγάγωμεν. μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐσία τὸ ὂν καὶ ἓν ἢ ἥ τε ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον,

	\|<span id=jp678></span> ''Quoniam vero unum dicitur'' sicut et ens, et substantia unius una, et quorum una numero unum numero, palam quia nec unum nec ens contingit substantium esse rerum, sicut neque {{a\|bk1040b20\|↵}} elemento esse aut principio; sed quaerimus quid igitur principium, ut ad notius reducamus. Magis igitur horum substantia est ens et unum quam principium et elementum et causa;		\|<span id=jp678></span> ''Quoniam vero unum dicitur'' sicut et ens, et substantia unius una, et quorum una numero unum numero, palam quia nec unum nec ens contingit substantium esse rerum, sicut neque {{a\|bk1040b20\|↵}} elemento esse aut principio; sed quaerimus quid igitur principium, ut ad notius reducamus. Magis igitur horum substantia est ens et unum quam principium et elementum et causa;

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			\|οὔπω δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα, εἴπερ μηδ᾽ ἄλλο κοινὸν μηδὲν οὐσία: οὐδενὶ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ἡ οὐσία ἀλλ᾽ ἢ αὑτῇ τε καὶ τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, οὗ ἐστὶν οὐσία.

	\|<span id=jp679></span> ''sed nec'' ista, si nec aliud commune nihil substantia. Nulli namque inest substantia sed huic et habenti ipsam, cuius est substantia.		\|<span id=jp679></span> ''sed nec'' ista, si nec aliud commune nihil substantia. Nulli namque inest substantia sed huic et habenti ipsam, cuius est substantia.

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			\|[25] ἔτι τὸ ἓν πολλαχῇ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἅμα, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἅμα πολλαχῇ ὑπάρχει: ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπάρχει παρὰ τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα χωρίς.

	\|<span id=jp680></span> {{a\|bk1040b25\|↵}} ''Amplius quod'' unum apud multa non utique erit simul, quod autem commune simul apud multa existit; quare palam quia nullum universalium existit praeter singularia separatim.		\|<span id=jp680></span> {{a\|bk1040b25\|↵}} ''Amplius quod'' unum apud multa non utique erit simul, quod autem commune simul apud multa existit; quare palam quia nullum universalium existit praeter singularia separatim.

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			\|ἀλλ᾽ οἱ τὰ εἴδη λέγοντες τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς λέγουσι χωρίζοντες αὐτά, εἴπερ οὐσίαι εἰσί, τῇ δ᾽ οὐκ ὀρθῶς, ὅτι τὸ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν εἶδος [30] λέγουσιν. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἀποδοῦναι τίνες αἱ τοιαῦται οὐσίαι αἱ ἄφθαρτοι παρὰ τὰς καθ᾽ ἕκαστα καὶ αἰσθητάς: ποιοῦσιν οὖν τὰς αὐτὰς τῷ εἴδει τοῖς φθαρτοῖς (ταύτας γὰρ ἴσμεν), αὐτοάνθρωπον καὶ αὐτόϊππον, προστιθέντες τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὸ ῥῆμα τὸ "αὐτό". καίτοι κἂν εἰ μὴ ἑωράκειμεν τὰ ἄστρα, [1041α] [1] οὐδὲν ἂν ἧττον, οἶμαι, ἦσαν οὐσίαι ἀΐδιοι παρ᾽ ἃς ἡμεῖς ᾔδειμεν: ὥστε καὶ νῦν εἰ μὴ ἔχομεν τίνες εἰσίν, ἀλλ᾽ εἶναί γέ τινας ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔτε τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὐσία οὔτ᾽ ἐστὶν οὐσία [5] οὐδεμία ἐξ οὐσιῶν, δῆλον.

	\|<span id=jp681></span> ''Sed species'' dicentes hic quidem dicunt recte separantes eas, si substantiae sunt, illic autem non recte, quia unam in multis {{p\|165}} speciem dicunt. Causa vero quia non habent reddere quae tales {{a\|bk1040b30\|↵}} substantiae incorruptibiles praeter singulares et sensibiles. Ergo faciunt easdem specie corruptibilibus (has enim scimus) auto-hominem et autoequum, addentes sensibilibus verbum auto. Quamvis utique si non videremus astra, non minus, existimo, {{a\|bk1041a1\|↵}} forent substantiae sempiternae praeter eas quas nos videremus; quare et nunc si non habemus quae sunt, tamen esse quasdam forsan est necessarium. Quod quidem igitur neque universaliter dictorum nihil substantia nec est substantia neque una {{a\|bk1041a5\|↵}} ex substantiis manifestum.		\|<span id=jp681></span> ''Sed species'' dicentes hic quidem dicunt recte separantes eas, si substantiae sunt, illic autem non recte, quia unam in multis {{p\|165}} speciem dicunt. Causa vero quia non habent reddere quae tales {{a\|bk1040b30\|↵}} substantiae incorruptibiles praeter singulares et sensibiles. Ergo faciunt easdem specie corruptibilibus (has enim scimus) auto-hominem et autoequum, addentes sensibilibus verbum auto. Quamvis utique si non videremus astra, non minus, existimo, {{a\|bk1041a1\|↵}} forent substantiae sempiternae praeter eas quas nos videremus; quare et nunc si non habemus quae sunt, tamen esse quasdam forsan est necessarium. Quod quidem igitur neque universaliter dictorum nihil substantia nec est substantia neque una {{a\|bk1041a5\|↵}} ex substantiis manifestum.

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2014-03-13T11:31:52Z

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← Older revision		Revision as of 06:31, 13 March 2014
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	\|<span id=jp677></span> ''Manifestum est autem'' quod substantiarum esse {{bk\|~~1040b5~~}} existimatarum plurime potestate sunt, et ipse partes animalium; {{p\|164}} nihil enim separatum ipsorum est. Quando autem separata fuerint, tunc entia ut materia omnia, terra, ignis et aer. Nihil enim ipsorum unum est, nisi ut cumulus, antequam {{bk\|~~1040b10~~}} digeratur et fiat aliquid ex ipsis unum. Maxime autem utique aliquis animatorum suspicabitur partes et eas quae animae propinque ambas fieri, entes et actu et potentia, eo quod principia habeant motus ab aliquo in iuncturis; propter quod quaedam animalia divisa vivunt. Sed tamen potentia omnia {{bk\|~~1040b15~~}} erunt, quando fuerit unum et continuum natura, sed non vi aut complantatione; tale namque est orbatio.		\|<span id=jp677></span> ''Manifestum est autem'' quod substantiarum esse {{a\|bk1040b5\|↵}} existimatarum plurime potestate sunt, et ipse partes animalium; {{p\|164}} nihil enim separatum ipsorum est. Quando autem separata fuerint, tunc entia ut materia omnia, terra, ignis et aer. Nihil enim ipsorum unum est, nisi ut cumulus, antequam {{a\|bk1040b10\|↵}} digeratur et fiat aliquid ex ipsis unum. Maxime autem utique aliquis animatorum suspicabitur partes et eas quae animae propinque ambas fieri, entes et actu et potentia, eo quod principia habeant motus ab aliquo in iuncturis; propter quod quaedam animalia divisa vivunt. Sed tamen potentia omnia {{a\|bk1040b15\|↵}} erunt, quando fuerit unum et continuum natura, sed non vi aut complantatione; tale namque est orbatio.

	\|<span id=c16></span>'''Chapter 16'''. Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only potencies, – both the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately; and when they are separated, then too they exist, all of them, merely as matter) and earth and fire and air; for none of them is a unity, but as it were a mere heap, till they are worked up and some unity is made out of them. One might most readily suppose the parts of living things and the parts of the soul nearly related to them to turn out to be both, i.e. existent in complete reality as well as in potency, because they have sources of movement in something in their joints; for which reason some animals live when divided. Yet all the parts must exist only potentially, when they are one and continuous by nature, – not by force or by growing into one, for such a phenomenon is an abnormality.		\|<span id=c16></span>'''Chapter 16'''. Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only potencies, – both the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately; and when they are separated, then too they exist, all of them, merely as matter) and earth and fire and air; for none of them is a unity, but as it were a mere heap, till they are worked up and some unity is made out of them. One might most readily suppose the parts of living things and the parts of the soul nearly related to them to turn out to be both, i.e. existent in complete reality as well as in potency, because they have sources of movement in something in their joints; for which reason some animals live when divided. Yet all the parts must exist only potentially, when they are one and continuous by nature, – not by force or by growing into one, for such a phenomenon is an abnormality.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|<span id=jp678></span> ''Quoniam vero unum dicitur'' sicut et ens, et substantia unius una, et quorum una numero unum numero, palam quia nec unum nec ens contingit substantium esse rerum, sicut neque {{bk\|~~1040b20~~}} elemento esse aut principio; sed quaerimus quid igitur principium, ut ad notius reducamus. Magis igitur horum substantia est ens et unum quam principium et elementum et causa;		\|<span id=jp678></span> ''Quoniam vero unum dicitur'' sicut et ens, et substantia unius una, et quorum una numero unum numero, palam quia nec unum nec ens contingit substantium esse rerum, sicut neque {{a\|bk1040b20\|↵}} elemento esse aut principio; sed quaerimus quid igitur principium, ut ad notius reducamus. Magis igitur horum substantia est ens et unum quam principium et elementum et causa;

	\| Since the term ‘unity’ is used like the term ‘being’, and the substance of that which is one is one, and things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one, evidently neither unity nor being can be the substance of things, just as being an element or a principle cannot be the substance, but we ask what, then, the principle is, that we may reduce the thing to something more knowable. Now of these concepts ‘being’ and ‘unity’ are more substantial than ‘principle’ or ‘element’ or ‘cause’,		\| Since the term ‘unity’ is used like the term ‘being’, and the substance of that which is one is one, and things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one, evidently neither unity nor being can be the substance of things, just as being an element or a principle cannot be the substance, but we ask what, then, the principle is, that we may reduce the thing to something more knowable. Now of these concepts ‘being’ and ‘unity’ are more substantial than ‘principle’ or ‘element’ or ‘cause’,
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	\|<span id=jp680></span> {{bk\|~~1040b25~~}} ''Amplius quod'' unum apud multa non utique erit simul, quod autem commune simul apud multa existit; quare palam quia nullum universalium existit praeter singularia separatim.		\|<span id=jp680></span> {{a\|bk1040b25\|↵}} ''Amplius quod'' unum apud multa non utique erit simul, quod autem commune simul apud multa existit; quare palam quia nullum universalium existit praeter singularia separatim.

	\|Further, that which is one cannot be in many places at the same time, but that which is common is present in many places at the same time; so that clearly no universal exists apart from its individuals.		\|Further, that which is one cannot be in many places at the same time, but that which is common is present in many places at the same time; so that clearly no universal exists apart from its individuals.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|<span id=jp681></span> ''Sed species'' dicentes hic quidem dicunt recte separantes eas, si substantiae sunt, illic autem non recte, quia unam in multis {{p\|165}} speciem dicunt. Causa vero quia non habent reddere quae tales {{bk\|~~1040b30~~}} substantiae incorruptibiles praeter singulares et sensibiles. Ergo faciunt easdem specie corruptibilibus (has enim scimus) auto-hominem et autoequum, addentes sensibilibus verbum auto. Quamvis utique si non videremus astra, non minus, existimo, {{bk\|~~1041a1~~}} forent substantiae sempiternae praeter eas quas nos videremus; quare et nunc si non habemus quae sunt, tamen esse quasdam forsan est necessarium. Quod quidem igitur neque universaliter dictorum nihil substantia nec est substantia neque una {{bk\|~~1041a5~~}} ex substantiis manifestum.		\|<span id=jp681></span> ''Sed species'' dicentes hic quidem dicunt recte separantes eas, si substantiae sunt, illic autem non recte, quia unam in multis {{p\|165}} speciem dicunt. Causa vero quia non habent reddere quae tales {{a\|bk1040b30\|↵}} substantiae incorruptibiles praeter singulares et sensibiles. Ergo faciunt easdem specie corruptibilibus (has enim scimus) auto-hominem et autoequum, addentes sensibilibus verbum auto. Quamvis utique si non videremus astra, non minus, existimo, {{a\|bk1041a1\|↵}} forent substantiae sempiternae praeter eas quas nos videremus; quare et nunc si non habemus quae sunt, tamen esse quasdam forsan est necessarium. Quod quidem igitur neque universaliter dictorum nihil substantia nec est substantia neque una {{a\|bk1041a5\|↵}} ex substantiis manifestum.

	\| But those who say the Forms exist, in one respect are right, in giving the Forms separate existence, if they are substances; but in another respect they are not right, because they say the one over many is a Form. The reason for their doing this is that they cannot declare what are the substances of this sort, the imperishable substances which exist apart from the individual and sensible substances. They make them, then, the same in kind as the perishable things (for this kind of substance we know)—’man-himself’ and ‘horse-itself’, adding to the sensible things the word [41a] ‘itself’. Yet even if we had not seen the stars, none the less, I suppose, would they have been eternal substances apart from those which we knew; so that now also if we do not know what non-sensible substances there are, yet it is doubtless necessary that there should he some. – Clearly, then, no universal term is the name of a substance, and no substance is composed of substances.		\| But those who say the Forms exist, in one respect are right, in giving the Forms separate existence, if they are substances; but in another respect they are not right, because they say the one over many is a Form. The reason for their doing this is that they cannot declare what are the substances of this sort, the imperishable substances which exist apart from the individual and sensible substances. They make them, then, the same in kind as the perishable things (for this kind of substance we know)—’man-himself’ and ‘horse-itself’, adding to the sensible things the word [41a] ‘itself’. Yet even if we had not seen the stars, none the less, I suppose, would they have been eternal substances apart from those which we knew; so that now also if we do not know what non-sensible substances there are, yet it is doubtless necessary that there should he some. – Clearly, then, no universal term is the name of a substance, and no substance is composed of substances.

Edward Ockham: Created page with "==Chapter 16== {| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=45%|Latin !valign = top width=55%|English |- valign = top | ''Manifestum est autem'' quod subs..."

2014-03-09T16:54:04Z

Created page with "==Chapter 16== {| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=45%|Latin !valign = top width=55%|English |- valign = top | ''Manifestum est autem'' quod subs..."

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==Chapter 16==
{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
| ''Manifestum est autem'' quod substantiarum esse {{bk|1040b5}} existimatarum plurime potestate sunt, et ipse partes animalium; {{p|164}} nihil enim separatum ipsorum est. Quando autem separata fuerint, tunc entia ut materia omnia, terra, ignis et aer. Nihil enim ipsorum unum est, nisi ut cumulus, antequam {{bk|1040b10}} digeratur et fiat aliquid ex ipsis unum. Maxime autem utique aliquis animatorum suspicabitur partes et eas quae animae propinque ambas fieri, entes et actu et potentia, eo quod principia habeant motus ab aliquo in iuncturis; propter quod quaedam animalia divisa vivunt. Sed tamen potentia omnia {{bk|1040b15}} erunt, quando fuerit unum et continuum natura, sed non vi aut complantatione; tale namque est orbatio.

|'''Chapter 16'''. Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only potencies, – both the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately; and when they are separated, then too they exist, all of them, merely as matter) and earth and fire and air; for none of them is a unity, but as it were a mere heap, till they are worked up and some unity is made out of them. One might most readily suppose the parts of living things and the parts of the soul nearly related to them to turn out to be both, i.e. existent in complete reality as well as in potency, because they have sources of movement in something in their joints; for which reason some animals live when divided. Yet all the parts must exist only potentially, when they are one and continuous by nature, – not by force or by growing into one, for such a phenomenon is an abnormality.

|- valign = top
| ''Quoniam vero unum dicitur'' sicut et ens, et substantia unius una, et quorum una numero unum numero, palam quia nec unum nec ens contingit substantium esse rerum, sicut neque {{bk|1040b20}} elemento esse aut principio; sed quaerimus quid igitur principium, ut ad notius reducamus. Magis igitur horum substantia est ens et unum quam principium et elementum et causa;

| Since the term ‘unity’ is used like the term ‘being’, and the substance of that which is one is one, and things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one, evidently neither unity nor being can be the substance of things, just as being an element or a principle cannot be the substance, but we ask what, then, the principle is, that we may reduce the thing to something more knowable. Now of these concepts ‘being’ and ‘unity’ are more substantial than ‘principle’ or ‘element’ or ‘cause’,

|- valign = top
| ''sed nec'' ista, si nec aliud commune nihil substantia. Nulli namque inest substantia sed huic et habenti ipsam, cuius est substantia.

|but not even the former are substance, since in general nothing that is common is substance; for substance does not belong to anything but to itself and to that which has it, of which it is the substance.

|- valign = top
| {{bk|1040b25}} ''Amplius quod'' unum apud multa non utique erit simul, quod autem commune simul apud multa existit; quare palam quia nullum universalium existit praeter singularia separatim.

|Further, that which is one cannot be in many places at the same time, but that which is common is present in many places at the same time; so that clearly no universal exists apart from its individuals.

|- valign = top
| ''Sed species'' dicentes hic quidem dicunt recte separantes eas, si substantiae sunt, illic autem non recte, quia unam in multis {{p|165}} speciem dicunt. Causa vero quia non habent reddere quae tales {{bk|1040b30}} substantiae incorruptibiles praeter singulares et sensibiles. Ergo faciunt easdem specie corruptibilibus (has enim scimus) auto-hominem et autoequum, addentes sensibilibus verbum auto. Quamvis utique si non videremus astra, non minus, existimo, {{bk|1041a1}} forent substantiae sempiternae praeter eas quas nos videremus; quare et nunc si non habemus quae sunt, tamen esse quasdam forsan est necessarium. Quod quidem igitur neque universaliter dictorum nihil substantia nec est substantia neque una {{bk|1041a5}} ex substantiis manifestum.

| But those who say the Forms exist, in one respect are right, in giving the Forms separate existence, if they are substances; but in another respect they are not right, because they say the one over many is a Form. The reason for their doing this is that they cannot declare what are the substances of this sort, the imperishable substances which exist apart from the individual and sensible substances. They make them, then, the same in kind as the perishable things (for this kind of substance we know)—’man-himself’ and ‘horse-itself’, adding to the sensible things the word [41a] ‘itself’. Yet even if we had not seen the stars, none the less, I suppose, would they have been eternal substances apart from those which we knew; so that now also if we do not know what non-sensible substances there are, yet it is doubtless necessary that there should he some. – Clearly, then, no universal term is the name of a substance, and no substance is composed of substances.

|}
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==Notes==
{{reflist}}
</noinclude>