Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l6/c1 - Revision history

Edward Ockham: /* Chapter 1 */

2015-02-21T22:48:48Z

Chapter 1

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	\|{{p\|125}} <span id=c1></span>Principia et causae quaeruntur entium, palam autem quod in quantum entia. Est enim aliqua causa sanitatis et convalescentiae, sunt etiam mathematicorum principia et elementa et {{bk\|~~1025b5~~}} causae, et totaliter omnis scientia intellectualis participans aliquid intellectus circa causas et principia est aut certiora aut simpliciora.		\|{{p\|125}} <span id=c1></span>Principia et causae quaeruntur entium, palam autem quod in quantum entia. Est enim aliqua causa sanitatis et convalescentiae, sunt etiam mathematicorum principia et elementa et {{a\|bk1025b5\|↵}} causae, et totaliter omnis scientia intellectualis participans aliquid intellectus circa causas et principia est aut certiora aut simpliciora.

	\|'''Chapter 1'''. <span id=jp532></span>WE are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being. For, while there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects of mathematics have first principles and elements and causes, and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning deals with causes and principles, more or less precise,		\|'''Chapter 1'''. <span id=jp532></span>WE are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being. For, while there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects of mathematics have first principles and elements and causes, and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning deals with causes and principles, more or less precise,

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	\|Sed omnes iste circa unum quid et genus aliquod circumscripte de hoc tractant, sed non de ente simpliciter nec in quantum est ens, nec de ipso quod quid est nullam {{bk\|~~1025b10~~}} rationem faciunt; sed ex hoc, aliae quidem sensu facientes ipsum manifestum aliae autem suppositionem accipientes quod quid est, sic que secundum se insunt generi circa quod sunt demonstrant aut magis necessarie aut infirmius. Quapropter palam quia non est demonstratio substantiae nec eius quod quid est ex tali inductione, sed quidam alius modus ostensionis. Simi{{bk\|~~1025b15~~}}liter autem nec si est aut non est genus circa quod versantur nihil dicunt, propter eiusdem rationis esse ipsum * quod quid est manifestum facere et si est hoc.		\|Sed omnes iste circa unum quid et genus aliquod circumscripte de hoc tractant, sed non de ente simpliciter nec in quantum est ens, nec de ipso quod quid est nullam {{a\|bk1025b10\|↵}} rationem faciunt; sed ex hoc, aliae quidem sensu facientes ipsum manifestum aliae autem suppositionem accipientes quod quid est, sic que secundum se insunt generi circa quod sunt demonstrant aut magis necessarie aut infirmius. Quapropter palam quia non est demonstratio substantiae nec eius quod quid est ex tali inductione, sed quidam alius modus ostensionis. Simi{{a\|bk1025b15\|↵}}liter autem nec si est aut non est genus circa quod versantur nihil dicunt, propter eiusdem rationis esse ipsum * quod quid est manifestum facere et si est hoc.

	\|<span id=jp533></span>all these sciences mark off some particular being – some genus, and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor qua being, nor do they offer any discussion of the essence of the things of which they treat; but starting from the essence – some making it plain to the senses, others assuming it as a hypothesis – they then demonstrate, more or less cogently, the essential attributes of the genus with which they deal. It is obvious, therefore, that such an induction yields no demonstration of substance or of the essence, but some other way of exhibiting it. And similarly the sciences omit the question whether the genus with which they deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs to the same kind of thinking to show what it is and that it is.		\|<span id=jp533></span>all these sciences mark off some particular being – some genus, and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor qua being, nor do they offer any discussion of the essence of the things of which they treat; but starting from the essence – some making it plain to the senses, others assuming it as a hypothesis – they then demonstrate, more or less cogently, the essential attributes of the genus with which they deal. It is obvious, therefore, that such an induction yields no demonstration of substance or of the essence, but some other way of exhibiting it. And similarly the sciences omit the question whether the genus with which they deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs to the same kind of thinking to show what it is and that it is.

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	\|''Quoniam vero phisica'' scientia est circa genus quoddam entis (nam circa talem est substantiam in qua est principium motus {{bk\|~~1025b20~~}} et status in ea), palam quia neque activa est neque factiva. Factivarum enim in faciente principium, aut intellectus aut {{p\|126}} ars aut potentia quaedam, activarum vero quae in agente prohe{{bk\|~~1025b25~~}}resis; idem enim agibile et eligibile. Quare si omnis scientia aut activa aut factiva aut theorica, phisica theorica quaedam est; sed theorica circa tale ens quod est possibile moveri, et circa substantiam quae secundum rationem ut secundum magis non separabilem solum.		\|''Quoniam vero phisica'' scientia est circa genus quoddam entis (nam circa talem est substantiam in qua est principium motus {{a\|bk1025b20\|↵}} et status in ea), palam quia neque activa est neque factiva. Factivarum enim in faciente principium, aut intellectus aut {{p\|126}} ars aut potentia quaedam, activarum vero quae in agente prohe{{a\|bk1025b25\|↵}}resis; idem enim agibile et eligibile. Quare si omnis scientia aut activa aut factiva aut theorica, phisica theorica quaedam est; sed theorica circa tale ens quod est possibile moveri, et circa substantiam quae secundum rationem ut secundum magis non separabilem solum.

	\|<span id=jp534></span>And since natural science, like other sciences, is in fact about one class of being, i.e. to that sort of substance which has the principle of its movement and rest present in itself, evidently it is neither practical nor productive. For in the case of things made the principle is in the maker – it is either reason or art or some faculty, while in the case of things done it is in the doer – viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed are the same. Therefore, if all thought is either practical or productive or theoretical, physics must be a theoretical science, but it will theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and about substance-as-defined for the most part only as not separable from matter.		\|<span id=jp534></span>And since natural science, like other sciences, is in fact about one class of being, i.e. to that sort of substance which has the principle of its movement and rest present in itself, evidently it is neither practical nor productive. For in the case of things made the principle is in the maker – it is either reason or art or some faculty, while in the case of things done it is in the doer – viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed are the same. Therefore, if all thought is either practical or productive or theoretical, physics must be a theoretical science, but it will theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and about substance-as-defined for the most part only as not separable from matter.

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	\|''Oportet autem quid erat esse'' et ratio{{bk\|~~1025b30~~}}nem quomodo est non latere, tamquam sine hoc quaerere nihil 30 facere sit. Diffinientium autem et ipsorum quid est haec quidem ita sunt ut simum illa vero ut concauum. Differunt autem haec quia simum quidem conceptum est cum materia (est enim simum * nasus concavus), concavitas vero sine materia sensi{{bk\|~~1026a1~~}}bili. Si igitur omnia phisica similiter simo dicuntur, ut nasus, oculus, facies, caro, os, totaliter animal, folium, radix, cortex, totaliter planta (nullius enim ipsorum sine motu ratio, sed semper habet materiam), palam quomodo oportet in phisicis {{bk\|~~1026a5~~}} ipsum quid est quaerere et diffinire. Ideoque et de anima quadam est speculari phisici, quaecumque non sine materia est. Ergo quia est phisica theorica, manifestum ex hiis.		\|''Oportet autem quid erat esse'' et ratio{{a\|bk1025b30\|↵}}nem quomodo est non latere, tamquam sine hoc quaerere nihil 30 facere sit. Diffinientium autem et ipsorum quid est haec quidem ita sunt ut simum illa vero ut concauum. Differunt autem haec quia simum quidem conceptum est cum materia (est enim simum * nasus concavus), concavitas vero sine materia sensi{{a\|bk1026a1\|↵}}bili. Si igitur omnia phisica similiter simo dicuntur, ut nasus, oculus, facies, caro, os, totaliter animal, folium, radix, cortex, totaliter planta (nullius enim ipsorum sine motu ratio, sed semper habet materiam), palam quomodo oportet in phisicis {{a\|bk1026a5\|↵}} ipsum quid est quaerere et diffinire. Ideoque et de anima quadam est speculari phisici, quaecumque non sine materia est. Ergo quia est phisica theorica, manifestum ex hiis.

	\|<span id=jp535></span>Now, we must not fail to notice the mode of being of the essence and of its definition, for, without this, inquiry is but idle. Of things defined, i.e. of ''whats'' , some are like ''snub'' , and some like ''concave'' . And these differ because ''snub'' is bound up with matter (for what is snub is a concave nose), while concavity is independent of perceptible matter. If then all natural things are a analogous ['''26a'''] to the snub in their nature; e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal; leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant (for none of these can be defined without reference to movement – they always have matter), it is clear how we must seek and define the ''what'' in the case of natural objects, and also that it belongs to the student of nature to study even soul in a certain sense, i.e. so much of it as is not independent of matter. That physics, then, is a theoretical science, is plain from these considerations.		\|<span id=jp535></span>Now, we must not fail to notice the mode of being of the essence and of its definition, for, without this, inquiry is but idle. Of things defined, i.e. of ''whats'' , some are like ''snub'' , and some like ''concave'' . And these differ because ''snub'' is bound up with matter (for what is snub is a concave nose), while concavity is independent of perceptible matter. If then all natural things are a analogous ['''26a'''] to the snub in their nature; e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal; leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant (for none of these can be defined without reference to movement – they always have matter), it is clear how we must seek and define the ''what'' in the case of natural objects, and also that it belongs to the student of nature to study even soul in a certain sense, i.e. so much of it as is not independent of matter. That physics, then, is a theoretical science, is plain from these considerations.

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	\|''Sed est et mathematica'' theorica . Sed si immobilium et separabilium est, nunc adhuc non manifestum; quia tamen quaedam mathematica in quantum immobilia et in quantum {{bk\|~~1026a10~~}} separabilia speculatur, palam.		\|''Sed est et mathematica'' theorica . Sed si immobilium et separabilium est, nunc adhuc non manifestum; quia tamen quaedam mathematica in quantum immobilia et in quantum {{a\|bk1026a10\|↵}} separabilia speculatur, palam.

	\|<span id=jp536></span>Mathematics also, however, is theoretical; but whether its objects are immovable and separable from matter, is not at present clear; still, it is clear that some mathematical theorems consider them qua immovable and qua separable from matter.		\|<span id=jp536></span>Mathematics also, however, is theoretical; but whether its objects are immovable and separable from matter, is not at present clear; still, it is clear that some mathematical theorems consider them qua immovable and qua separable from matter.

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	\|''Si vero'' est immobile aliquid et sempiternum et separabile, palam quia est theorice id nosse, non tamen phisice (nam de mobilibus quibusdam est phisica) nec mathematice, sed * prioris ambarum. Phisica namque circa inseparabilia quidem sed non immobilia, mathematice {{bk\|~~1026a15~~}} autem quaedam circa immobilia quidem sed inseparabilia forsan, verum quasi in materia; prima vero * circa separabilia et {{p\|127}} immobilia. Necesse vero omnes quidem causas sempiternas, et maxime has; hae namque causae manifestis sensibilium *.		\|''Si vero'' est immobile aliquid et sempiternum et separabile, palam quia est theorice id nosse, non tamen phisice (nam de mobilibus quibusdam est phisica) nec mathematice, sed * prioris ambarum. Phisica namque circa inseparabilia quidem sed non immobilia, mathematice {{a\|bk1026a15\|↵}} autem quaedam circa immobilia quidem sed inseparabilia forsan, verum quasi in materia; prima vero * circa separabilia et {{p\|127}} immobilia. Necesse vero omnes quidem causas sempiternas, et maxime has; hae namque causae manifestis sensibilium *.

	\|<span id=jp537></span>But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science, – not, however, to physics (for physics deals with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For physics deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which both exist separately and are immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but especially these; for they are the causes that operate on so much of the divine as appears to us.		\|<span id=jp537></span>But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science, – not, however, to physics (for physics deals with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For physics deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which both exist separately and are immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but especially these; for they are the causes that operate on so much of the divine as appears to us.
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	\|''Non enim'' immanifestum quia si alicubi divinum exis{{bk\|~~1026a20~~}}tit, in tali natura existit;		\|''Non enim'' immanifestum quia si alicubi divinum exis{{a\|bk1026a20\|↵}}tit, in tali natura existit;

	\|<span id=jp539></span>since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort.		\|<span id=jp539></span>since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort.
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	\|''Dubitabit enim'' [/autem] utique aliquis utrum prima philosophia sit universalis aut circa aliquod genus et naturam unam; non enim idem modus nec {{bk\|~~1026a25~~}} in mathematicis, quia geometria et astrologia circa aliquam naturam sunt, illa vero universaliter omnium est communis.		\|''Dubitabit enim'' [/autem] utique aliquis utrum prima philosophia sit universalis aut circa aliquod genus et naturam unam; non enim idem modus nec {{a\|bk1026a25\|↵}} in mathematicis, quia geometria et astrologia circa aliquam naturam sunt, illa vero universaliter omnium est communis.

	\|<span id=jp541></span>For one might raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect, – geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all.		\|<span id=jp541></span>For one might raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect, – geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all.

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	\|''Si'' quidem ''igitur'' non est aliqua altera substantia praeter natura consistentes, phisica utique erit prima scientia. Sed si est aliqua substantia immobilis, haec prior et philosophia {{bk\|~~1026a30~~}} prima, et universalis sic quia prima; et de ente in quantum ens huius utique erit speculari, et quae est et quae insunt in quantum ens.		\|''Si'' quidem ''igitur'' non est aliqua altera substantia praeter natura consistentes, phisica utique erit prima scientia. Sed si est aliqua substantia immobilis, haec prior et philosophia {{a\|bk1026a30\|↵}} prima, et universalis sic quia prima; et de ente in quantum ens huius utique erit speculari, et quae est et quae insunt in quantum ens.

	\|<span id=jp542></span>We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being – both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.		\|<span id=jp542></span>We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being – both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.

Edward Ockham: Created page with "==Chapter 1== {| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=45%|Latin !valign = top width=55%|English |- valign = top |METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER SEXTUS |Aristotle Metaphys..."

2014-03-09T16:40:22Z

Created page with "==Chapter 1== {| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=45%|Latin !valign = top width=55%|English |- valign = top |METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER SEXTUS |Aristotle Metaphys..."

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==Chapter 1==
{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|METHAPHISICE ARISTOTILIS LIBER SEXTUS

|Aristotle Metaphysics Book 6 (E)

|- valign = top
|{{p|125}} Principia et causae quaeruntur entium, palam autem quod in quantum entia. Est enim aliqua causa sanitatis et convalescentiae, sunt etiam mathematicorum principia et elementa et {{bk|1025b5}} causae, et totaliter omnis scientia intellectualis participans aliquid intellectus circa causas et principia est aut certiora aut simpliciora.

|'''Chapter 1'''. WE are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them qua being. For, while there is a cause of health and of good condition, and the objects of mathematics have first principles and elements and causes, and in general every science which is ratiocinative or at all involves reasoning deals with causes and principles, more or less precise,

|- valign = top
|Sed omnes iste circa unum quid et genus aliquod circumscripte de hoc tractant, sed non de ente simpliciter nec in quantum est ens, nec de ipso quod quid est nullam {{bk|1025b10}} rationem faciunt; sed ex hoc, aliae quidem sensu facientes ipsum manifestum aliae autem suppositionem accipientes quod quid est, sic que secundum se insunt generi circa quod sunt demonstrant aut magis necessarie aut infirmius. Quapropter palam quia non est demonstratio substantiae nec eius quod quid est ex tali inductione, sed quidam alius modus ostensionis. Simi{{bk|1025b15}}liter autem nec si est aut non est genus circa quod versantur nihil dicunt, propter eiusdem rationis esse ipsum * quod quid est manifestum facere et si est hoc.

|all these sciences mark off some particular being – some genus, and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor qua being, nor do they offer any discussion of the essence of the things of which they treat; but starting from the essence – some making it plain to the senses, others assuming it as a hypothesis – they then demonstrate, more or less cogently, the essential attributes of the genus with which they deal. It is obvious, therefore, that such an induction yields no demonstration of substance or of the essence, but some other way of exhibiting it. And similarly the sciences omit the question whether the genus with which they deal exists or does not exist, because it belongs to the same kind of thinking to show what it is and that it is.

|- valign = top
|''Quoniam vero phisica'' scientia est circa genus quoddam entis (nam circa talem est substantiam in qua est principium motus {{bk|1025b20}} et status in ea), palam quia neque activa est neque factiva. Factivarum enim in faciente principium, aut intellectus aut {{p|126}} ars aut potentia quaedam, activarum vero quae in agente prohe{{bk|1025b25}}resis; idem enim agibile et eligibile. Quare si omnis scientia aut activa aut factiva aut theorica, phisica theorica quaedam est; sed theorica circa tale ens quod est possibile moveri, et circa substantiam quae secundum rationem ut secundum magis non separabilem solum.

|And since natural science, like other sciences, is in fact about one class of being, i.e. to that sort of substance which has the principle of its movement and rest present in itself, evidently it is neither practical nor productive. For in the case of things made the principle is in the maker – it is either reason or art or some faculty, while in the case of things done it is in the doer – viz. will, for that which is done and that which is willed are the same. Therefore, if all thought is either practical or productive or theoretical, physics must be a theoretical science, but it will theorize about such being as admits of being moved, and about substance-as-defined for the most part only as not separable from matter.

|- valign = top
|''Oportet autem quid erat esse'' et ratio{{bk|1025b30}}nem quomodo est non latere, tamquam sine hoc quaerere nihil 30 facere sit. Diffinientium autem et ipsorum quid est haec quidem ita sunt ut simum illa vero ut concauum. Differunt autem haec quia simum quidem conceptum est cum materia (est enim simum * nasus concavus), concavitas vero sine materia sensi{{bk|1026a1}}bili. Si igitur omnia phisica similiter simo dicuntur, ut nasus, oculus, facies, caro, os, totaliter animal, folium, radix, cortex, totaliter planta (nullius enim ipsorum sine motu ratio, sed semper habet materiam), palam quomodo oportet in phisicis {{bk|1026a5}} ipsum quid est quaerere et diffinire. Ideoque et de anima quadam est speculari phisici, quaecumque non sine materia est. Ergo quia est phisica theorica, manifestum ex hiis.

|Now, we must not fail to notice the mode of being of the essence and of its definition, for, without this, inquiry is but idle. Of things defined, i.e. of ''whats'' , some are like ''snub'' , and some like ''concave'' . And these differ because ''snub'' is bound up with matter (for what is snub is a concave nose), while concavity is independent of perceptible matter. If then all natural things are a analogous ['''26a'''] to the snub in their nature; e.g. nose, eye, face, flesh, bone, and, in general, animal; leaf, root, bark, and, in general, plant (for none of these can be defined without reference to movement – they always have matter), it is clear how we must seek and define the ''what'' in the case of natural objects, and also that it belongs to the student of nature to study even soul in a certain sense, i.e. so much of it as is not independent of matter. That physics, then, is a theoretical science, is plain from these considerations.

|- valign = top
|''Sed est et mathematica'' theorica *. Sed si immobilium et separabilium est, nunc adhuc non manifestum; quia tamen quaedam mathematica in quantum * immobilia et in quantum {{bk|1026a10}} separabilia speculatur, palam.

|Mathematics also, however, is theoretical; but whether its objects are immovable and separable from matter, is not at present clear; still, it is clear that some mathematical theorems consider them qua immovable and qua separable from matter.

|- valign = top
|''Si vero'' est immobile aliquid et sempiternum et separabile, palam quia est theorice id nosse, non tamen phisice (nam de mobilibus quibusdam est phisica) nec mathematice, sed * prioris ambarum. Phisica namque circa inseparabilia quidem sed non immobilia, mathematice {{bk|1026a15}} autem quaedam circa immobilia quidem sed inseparabilia forsan, verum quasi in materia; prima vero * circa separabilia et {{p|127}} immobilia. Necesse vero omnes quidem causas sempiternas, et maxime has; hae namque causae manifestis sensibilium *.

|But if there is something which is eternal and immovable and separable, clearly the knowledge of it belongs to a theoretical science, – not, however, to physics (for physics deals with certain movable things) nor to mathematics, but to a science prior to both. For physics deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable but presumably do not exist separately, but as embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which both exist separately and are immovable. Now all causes must be eternal, but especially these; for they are the causes that operate on so much of the divine as appears to us.

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|''Quare tres'' erunt philosophiae theorice: mathematica, phisica, theologia.

|There must, then, be three theoretical philosophies, mathematics, physics, and what we may call theology,

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|''Non enim'' immanifestum quia si alicubi divinum exis{{bk|1026a20}}tit, in tali natura existit;

|since it is obvious that if the divine is present anywhere, it is present in things of this sort.

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|''et honorabilissimam'' scientiam oportet circa honorabilissimum genus esse. Ergo theorice aliis scientiis desiderabiliores sunt, haec autem theoricis.

|And the highest science must deal with the highest genus. Thus, while the theoretical sciences are more to be desired than the other sciences, this is more to be desired than the other theoretical sciences.

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|''Dubitabit enim'' [/autem] utique aliquis utrum prima philosophia sit universalis aut circa aliquod genus et naturam unam; non enim idem modus nec {{bk|1026a25}} in mathematicis, quia geometria et astrologia circa aliquam naturam sunt, illa vero universaliter omnium est communis.

|For one might raise the question whether first philosophy is universal, or deals with one genus, i.e. some one kind of being; for not even the mathematical sciences are all alike in this respect, – geometry and astronomy deal with a certain particular kind of thing, while universal mathematics applies alike to all.

|- valign = top
|''Si'' quidem ''igitur'' non est aliqua altera substantia praeter natura consistentes, phisica utique erit prima scientia. Sed si est aliqua substantia immobilis, haec prior et philosophia {{bk|1026a30}} prima, et universalis sic quia prima; et de ente in quantum ens huius utique erit speculari, et quae est et quae insunt in quantum ens.

|We answer that if there is no substance other than those which are formed by nature, natural science will be the first science; but if there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being qua being – both what it is and the attributes which belong to it qua being.

|}
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==Notes==
{{reflist}}
</noinclude>