Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l5/c29 - Revision history

Edward Ockham: /* Chapter 29 False */

2015-02-21T22:47:51Z

Chapter 29 False

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:47, 21 February 2015
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	==Chapter 29 False==		==Chapter 29 False==
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			\|τὸ ψεῦδος λέγεται ἄλλον μὲν τρόπον ὡς πρᾶγμα ψεῦδος, καὶ τούτου τὸ μὲν τῷ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι συντεθῆναι (ὥσπερ λέγεται τὸ τὴν διάμετρον εἶναι [20] σύμμετρον ἢ τὸ σὲ καθῆσθαι: τούτων γὰρ ψεῦδος τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ δὲ ποτέ: οὕτω γὰρ οὐκ ὄντα ταῦτα), τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἔστι μὲν ὄντα, πέφυκε μέντοι φαίνεσθαι ἢ μὴ οἷά ἐστιν ἢ ἃ μὴ ἔστιν (οἷον ἡ σκιαγραφία καὶ τὰ ἐνύπνια: ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστι μέν τι, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὧν ἐμποιεῖ τὴν φαντασίαν): πράγματα [25] μὲν οὖν ψευδῆ οὕτω λέγεται, ἢ τῷ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὰ ἢ τῷ τὴν ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν φαντασίαν μὴ ὄντος εἶναι:

	\|<span id=c29></span>Falsum dicitur uno modo ut res falsa, et huius hoc quidem per non componi aut per impossibile esse componi, sicut {{a\|bk1024b20\|↵}} dicitur dyametrum esse commensurabilem aut te sedere; horum enim falsum hoc quidem semper illud vero quandoque; sic enim non * entia haec. Alia vero quae sunt quidem entia, et apta nata sunt * videri aut non qualia sunt aut quae non sunt, ut scyagraphia et sompnia; haec namque sunt aliquid qui{{a\|bk1024b25\|↵}}dem, sed non quorum faciunt phantasiam. Res ergo false sic dicuntur, aut quia non sunt ipse aut quia ab eis phantasia non entis est.		\|<span id=c29></span>Falsum dicitur uno modo ut res falsa, et huius hoc quidem per non componi aut per impossibile esse componi, sicut {{a\|bk1024b20\|↵}} dicitur dyametrum esse commensurabilem aut te sedere; horum enim falsum hoc quidem semper illud vero quandoque; sic enim non * entia haec. Alia vero quae sunt quidem entia, et apta nata sunt * videri aut non qualia sunt aut quae non sunt, ut scyagraphia et sompnia; haec namque sunt aliquid qui{{a\|bk1024b25\|↵}}dem, sed non quorum faciunt phantasiam. Res ergo false sic dicuntur, aut quia non sunt ipse aut quia ab eis phantasia non entis est.

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			\|λόγος δὲ ψευδὴς ὁ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ᾗ ψευδής, διὸ πᾶς λόγος ψευδὴς ἑτέρου ἢ οὗ ἐστὶν ἀληθής, οἷον ὁ τοῦ κύκλου ψευδὴς τριγώνου. ἑκάστου δὲ λόγος ἔστι μὲν ὡς εἷς, ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς [30] πολλοί, ἐπεὶ ταὐτό πως αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ πεπονθός, οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης μουσικός (ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς λόγος οὐθενός ἐστιν ἁπλῶς λόγος): διὸ Ἀντισθένης ᾤετο εὐήθως μηθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ, ἓν ἐφ᾽ ἑνός: ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. ἔστι [35] δ᾽ ἕκαστον λέγειν οὐ μόνον τῷ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἑτέρου, ψευδῶς μὲν καὶ παντελῶς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς καὶ ἀληθῶς, ὥσπερ τὰ ὀκτὼ διπλάσια τῷ τῆς δυάδος λόγῳ. [1025α] [1] τὰ μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγεται ψευδῆ,

	\|Ratio vero falsa quae est non entium, in quantum falsa; unde omnis ratio falsa alterius quam * cuius est vera, ut quae circuli falsa trigoni. Cuiuslibet autem ratio est quidem ut {{a\|bk1024b30\|↵}} una, quae * eius quod quid erat esse, est autem ut multe, quoniam idem aliqualiter ipsum * et ipsum passum, ut Socrates et Socrates musicus. Falsa autem ratio nullius est simpliciter ratio. Quapropter antistenes opinatus est fatue nihil dici {{p\|123}} dignatus nisi propria ratione, unum in uno; ex quibus accidit non esse contradicere, fere autem neque mentiri. Est autem {{a\|bk1024b35\|↵}} unumquodque dicere non solum sua ratione sed et ea quae alterius, falso quidem et omnino, est autem ut et vere, sicut {{a\|bk1025a1\|↵}} octo dupla dualitatis ratione.		\|Ratio vero falsa quae est non entium, in quantum falsa; unde omnis ratio falsa alterius quam * cuius est vera, ut quae circuli falsa trigoni. Cuiuslibet autem ratio est quidem ut {{a\|bk1024b30\|↵}} una, quae * eius quod quid erat esse, est autem ut multe, quoniam idem aliqualiter ipsum * et ipsum passum, ut Socrates et Socrates musicus. Falsa autem ratio nullius est simpliciter ratio. Quapropter antistenes opinatus est fatue nihil dici {{p\|123}} dignatus nisi propria ratione, unum in uno; ex quibus accidit non esse contradicere, fere autem neque mentiri. Est autem {{a\|bk1024b35\|↵}} unumquodque dicere non solum sua ratione sed et ea quae alterius, falso quidem et omnino, est autem ut et vere, sicut {{a\|bk1025a1\|↵}} octo dupla dualitatis ratione.

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			\|ἄνθρωπος δὲ ψευδὴς ὁ εὐχερὴς καὶ προαιρετικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, μὴ δι᾽ ἕτερόν τι ἀλλὰ δι᾽ αὐτό, καὶ ὁ ἄλλοις ἐμποιητικὸς τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, [5] ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ πράγματά φαμεν ψευδῆ εἶναι ὅσα ἐμποιεῖ φαντασίαν ψευδῆ.

	\|Haec quidem igitur ita dicuntur falsa. Homo autem falsus qui promptus et electivus talium rationum, non propter aliud aliquid sed propter id ipsum, et qui aliis talium factor rationum, sicut res dicimus esse falsas {{a\|bk1025a5\|↵}} quaecumque falsam faciunt phantasiam.		\|Haec quidem igitur ita dicuntur falsa. Homo autem falsus qui promptus et electivus talium rationum, non propter aliud aliquid sed propter id ipsum, et qui aliis talium factor rationum, sicut res dicimus esse falsas {{a\|bk1025a5\|↵}} quaecumque falsam faciunt phantasiam.

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			\|διὸ ὁ ἐν τῷ Ἱππίᾳ λόγος παρακρούεται ὡς ὁ αὐτὸς ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής. τὸν δυνάμενον γὰρ ψεύσασθαι λαμβάνει ψευδῆ (οὗτος δ᾽ ὁ εἰδὼς καὶ ὁ φρόνιμος):

	\|Quare et in Ippia oratio refutatur ut eadem vera et falsa. Potentem enim mentiri accipit falsum, hic autem sciens et prudens.		\|Quare et in Ippia oratio refutatur ut eadem vera et falsa. Potentem enim mentiri accipit falsum, hic autem sciens et prudens.

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			\|ἔτι τὸν ἑκόντα φαῦλον βελτίω. τοῦτο δὲ ψεῦδος [10] λαμβάνει διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς—ὁ γὰρ ἑκὼν χωλαίνων τοῦ ἄκοντος κρείττων—τὸ χωλαίνειν τὸ μιμεῖσθαι λέγων, ἐπεὶ εἴ γε χωλὸς ἑκών, χείρων ἴσως, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἤθους, καὶ οὗτος.

	\|Amplius volentem prava meliorem. Hoc autem falsum accipit per inductionem; nam {{a\|bk1025a10\|↵}} voluntarius claudicans non voluntario * melior, claudicare imitari dicens; quoniam si claudus voluntarius, deterior forsan, sicut in more et hoc.		\|Amplius volentem prava meliorem. Hoc autem falsum accipit per inductionem; nam {{a\|bk1025a10\|↵}} voluntarius claudicans non voluntario * melior, claudicare imitari dicens; quoniam si claudus voluntarius, deterior forsan, sicut in more et hoc.

	\|<span id=jp530></span> For it assumes that he is false who can deceive (i.e. the man who knows and is wise); and further that he who is willingly bad is better. This is a false result of induction – for a man who limps willingly is better than one who does so unwillingly – by ''limping'' Plato means ''mimicking a limp'' , for if the man were lame willingly, he would presumably be worse in this case as in the corresponding case of moral character.		\|<span id=jp530></span> For it assumes that he is false who can deceive (i.e. the man who knows and is wise); and further that he who is willingly bad is better. This is a false result of induction – for a man who limps willingly is better than one who does so unwillingly – by ''limping'' Plato means ''mimicking a limp'' , for if the man were lame willingly, he would presumably be worse in this case as in the corresponding case of moral character.

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	==Notes==		==Notes==
	{{reflist}}		{{reflist}}</noinclude>
	</noinclude>

Edward Ockham: Text replace - "{{bk\|(.*)}}" to "{{a|bk$1|↵}}"

2014-03-13T11:28:32Z

Text replace - "{{bk\|(.*)}}" to "{{a|bk$1|↵}}"

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:28, 13 March 2014
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	\|<span id=c29></span>Falsum dicitur uno modo ut res falsa, et huius hoc quidem per non componi aut per impossibile esse componi, sicut {{bk\|~~1024b20~~}} dicitur dyametrum esse commensurabilem aut te sedere; horum enim falsum hoc quidem semper illud vero quandoque; sic enim non * entia haec. Alia vero quae sunt quidem entia, et apta nata sunt * videri aut non qualia sunt aut quae non sunt, ut scyagraphia et sompnia; haec namque sunt aliquid qui{{bk\|~~1024b25~~}}dem, sed non quorum faciunt phantasiam. Res ergo false sic dicuntur, aut quia non sunt ipse aut quia ab eis phantasia non entis est.		\|<span id=c29></span>Falsum dicitur uno modo ut res falsa, et huius hoc quidem per non componi aut per impossibile esse componi, sicut {{a\|bk1024b20\|↵}} dicitur dyametrum esse commensurabilem aut te sedere; horum enim falsum hoc quidem semper illud vero quandoque; sic enim non * entia haec. Alia vero quae sunt quidem entia, et apta nata sunt * videri aut non qualia sunt aut quae non sunt, ut scyagraphia et sompnia; haec namque sunt aliquid qui{{a\|bk1024b25\|↵}}dem, sed non quorum faciunt phantasiam. Res ergo false sic dicuntur, aut quia non sunt ipse aut quia ab eis phantasia non entis est.

	\|'''Chapter 29.''' <span id=jp526></span> ''The false'' means (1) that which is false as a thing, and that (a) because it is not put together or cannot be put together, e.g. ''that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side'' or ''that you are sitting'' ; for one of these is false always, and the other sometimes; it is in these two senses that they are non-existent. (b) There are things which exist, but whose nature it is to appear either not to be such as they are or to be things that do not exist, e.g. a sketch or a dream; for these are something, but are not the things the appearance of which they produce in us. We call things false in this way, then, – either because they themselves do not exist, or because the appearance which results from them is that of something that does not exist.		\|'''Chapter 29.''' <span id=jp526></span> ''The false'' means (1) that which is false as a thing, and that (a) because it is not put together or cannot be put together, e.g. ''that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side'' or ''that you are sitting'' ; for one of these is false always, and the other sometimes; it is in these two senses that they are non-existent. (b) There are things which exist, but whose nature it is to appear either not to be such as they are or to be things that do not exist, e.g. a sketch or a dream; for these are something, but are not the things the appearance of which they produce in us. We call things false in this way, then, – either because they themselves do not exist, or because the appearance which results from them is that of something that does not exist.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Ratio vero falsa quae est non entium, in quantum falsa; unde omnis ratio falsa alterius quam * cuius est vera, ut quae circuli falsa trigoni. Cuiuslibet autem ratio est quidem ut {{bk\|~~1024b30~~}} una, quae * eius quod quid erat esse, est autem ut multe, quoniam idem aliqualiter ipsum * et ipsum passum, ut Socrates et Socrates musicus. Falsa autem ratio nullius est simpliciter ratio. Quapropter antistenes opinatus est fatue nihil dici {{p\|123}} dignatus nisi propria ratione, unum in uno; ex quibus accidit non esse contradicere, fere autem neque mentiri. Est autem {{bk\|~~1024b35~~}} unumquodque dicere non solum sua ratione sed et ea quae alterius, falso quidem et omnino, est autem ut et vere, sicut {{bk\|~~1025a1~~}} octo dupla dualitatis ratione.		\|Ratio vero falsa quae est non entium, in quantum falsa; unde omnis ratio falsa alterius quam * cuius est vera, ut quae circuli falsa trigoni. Cuiuslibet autem ratio est quidem ut {{a\|bk1024b30\|↵}} una, quae * eius quod quid erat esse, est autem ut multe, quoniam idem aliqualiter ipsum * et ipsum passum, ut Socrates et Socrates musicus. Falsa autem ratio nullius est simpliciter ratio. Quapropter antistenes opinatus est fatue nihil dici {{p\|123}} dignatus nisi propria ratione, unum in uno; ex quibus accidit non esse contradicere, fere autem neque mentiri. Est autem {{a\|bk1024b35\|↵}} unumquodque dicere non solum sua ratione sed et ea quae alterius, falso quidem et omnino, est autem ut et vere, sicut {{a\|bk1025a1\|↵}} octo dupla dualitatis ratione.

	\|<span id=jp527></span> (2) A false account is the account of non-existent objects, in so far as it is false. Hence every account is false when applied to something other than that of which it is true; e.g. the account of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. In a sense there is one account of each thing, i.e. the account of its essence, but in a sense there are many, since the thing itself and the thing itself with an attribute are in a sense the same, e.g. Socrates and musical Socrates (a false account is not the account of anything, except in a qualified sense). Hence Antisthenes was too simple-minded when he claimed that nothing could be described except by the account proper to it, – one predicate to one subject; from which the conclusion used to be drawn that there could be no contradiction, and almost that there could be no error. But it is possible to describe each thing not only by the account of itself, but also by that of something else. This may be done altogether falsely indeed, but there is also a way in which it may be done truly; e.g. eight may be described as a double number by the use of the definition of two.		\|<span id=jp527></span> (2) A false account is the account of non-existent objects, in so far as it is false. Hence every account is false when applied to something other than that of which it is true; e.g. the account of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. In a sense there is one account of each thing, i.e. the account of its essence, but in a sense there are many, since the thing itself and the thing itself with an attribute are in a sense the same, e.g. Socrates and musical Socrates (a false account is not the account of anything, except in a qualified sense). Hence Antisthenes was too simple-minded when he claimed that nothing could be described except by the account proper to it, – one predicate to one subject; from which the conclusion used to be drawn that there could be no contradiction, and almost that there could be no error. But it is possible to describe each thing not only by the account of itself, but also by that of something else. This may be done altogether falsely indeed, but there is also a way in which it may be done truly; e.g. eight may be described as a double number by the use of the definition of two.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Haec quidem igitur ita dicuntur falsa. Homo autem falsus qui promptus et electivus talium rationum, non propter aliud aliquid sed propter id ipsum, et qui aliis talium factor rationum, sicut res dicimus esse falsas {{bk\|~~1025a5~~}} quaecumque falsam faciunt phantasiam.		\|Haec quidem igitur ita dicuntur falsa. Homo autem falsus qui promptus et electivus talium rationum, non propter aliud aliquid sed propter id ipsum, et qui aliis talium factor rationum, sicut res dicimus esse falsas {{a\|bk1025a5\|↵}} quaecumque falsam faciunt phantasiam.

	\|<span id=jp528></span> ['''25a'''] These things, then, are called false in these senses, but (3) a false man is one who is ready at and fond of such accounts, not for any other reason but for their own sake, and one who is good at impressing such accounts on other people, just as we say things are which produce a false appearance.		\|<span id=jp528></span> ['''25a'''] These things, then, are called false in these senses, but (3) a false man is one who is ready at and fond of such accounts, not for any other reason but for their own sake, and one who is good at impressing such accounts on other people, just as we say things are which produce a false appearance.
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	\|Amplius volentem prava meliorem. Hoc autem falsum accipit per inductionem; nam {{bk\|~~1025a10~~}} voluntarius claudicans non voluntario * melior, claudicare imitari dicens; quoniam si claudus voluntarius, deterior forsan, sicut in more et hoc.		\|Amplius volentem prava meliorem. Hoc autem falsum accipit per inductionem; nam {{a\|bk1025a10\|↵}} voluntarius claudicans non voluntario * melior, claudicare imitari dicens; quoniam si claudus voluntarius, deterior forsan, sicut in more et hoc.

	\|<span id=jp530></span> For it assumes that he is false who can deceive (i.e. the man who knows and is wise); and further that he who is willingly bad is better. This is a false result of induction – for a man who limps willingly is better than one who does so unwillingly – by ''limping'' Plato means ''mimicking a limp'' , for if the man were lame willingly, he would presumably be worse in this case as in the corresponding case of moral character.		\|<span id=jp530></span> For it assumes that he is false who can deceive (i.e. the man who knows and is wise); and further that he who is willingly bad is better. This is a false result of induction – for a man who limps willingly is better than one who does so unwillingly – by ''limping'' Plato means ''mimicking a limp'' , for if the man were lame willingly, he would presumably be worse in this case as in the corresponding case of moral character.

Edward Ockham at 16:30, 9 March 2014

2014-03-09T16:30:15Z

New page

==Chapter 29 False==
{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|Falsum dicitur uno modo ut res falsa, et huius hoc quidem per non componi aut per impossibile esse componi, sicut {{bk|1024b20}} dicitur dyametrum esse commensurabilem aut te sedere; horum enim falsum hoc quidem semper illud vero quandoque; sic enim non * entia haec. Alia vero quae sunt quidem entia, et apta nata sunt * videri aut non qualia sunt aut quae non sunt, ut scyagraphia et sompnia; haec namque sunt aliquid qui{{bk|1024b25}}dem, sed non quorum faciunt phantasiam. Res ergo false sic dicuntur, aut quia non sunt ipse aut quia ab eis phantasia non entis est.

|'''Chapter 29.''' ''The false'' means (1) that which is false as a thing, and that (a) because it is not put together or cannot be put together, e.g. ''that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side'' or ''that you are sitting'' ; for one of these is false always, and the other sometimes; it is in these two senses that they are non-existent. (b) There are things which exist, but whose nature it is to appear either not to be such as they are or to be things that do not exist, e.g. a sketch or a dream; for these are something, but are not the things the appearance of which they produce in us. We call things false in this way, then, – either because they themselves do not exist, or because the appearance which results from them is that of something that does not exist.

|- valign = top
|Ratio vero falsa quae est non entium, in quantum falsa; unde omnis ratio falsa alterius quam * cuius est vera, ut quae circuli falsa trigoni. Cuiuslibet autem ratio est quidem ut {{bk|1024b30}} una, quae * eius quod quid erat esse, est autem ut multe, quoniam idem aliqualiter ipsum * et ipsum passum, ut Socrates et Socrates musicus. Falsa autem ratio nullius est simpliciter ratio. Quapropter antistenes opinatus est fatue nihil dici {{p|123}} dignatus nisi propria ratione, unum in uno; ex quibus accidit non esse contradicere, fere autem neque mentiri. Est autem {{bk|1024b35}} unumquodque dicere non solum sua ratione sed et ea quae alterius, falso quidem et omnino, est autem ut et vere, sicut {{bk|1025a1}} octo dupla dualitatis ratione.

| (2) A false account is the account of non-existent objects, in so far as it is false. Hence every account is false when applied to something other than that of which it is true; e.g. the account of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. In a sense there is one account of each thing, i.e. the account of its essence, but in a sense there are many, since the thing itself and the thing itself with an attribute are in a sense the same, e.g. Socrates and musical Socrates (a false account is not the account of anything, except in a qualified sense). Hence Antisthenes was too simple-minded when he claimed that nothing could be described except by the account proper to it, – one predicate to one subject; from which the conclusion used to be drawn that there could be no contradiction, and almost that there could be no error. But it is possible to describe each thing not only by the account of itself, but also by that of something else. This may be done altogether falsely indeed, but there is also a way in which it may be done truly; e.g. eight may be described as a double number by the use of the definition of two.

|- valign = top
|Haec quidem igitur ita dicuntur falsa. Homo autem falsus qui promptus et electivus talium rationum, non propter aliud aliquid sed propter id ipsum, et qui aliis talium factor rationum, sicut res dicimus esse falsas {{bk|1025a5}} quaecumque falsam faciunt phantasiam.

| ['''25a'''] These things, then, are called false in these senses, but (3) a false man is one who is ready at and fond of such accounts, not for any other reason but for their own sake, and one who is good at impressing such accounts on other people, just as we say things are which produce a false appearance.

|- valign = top
|Quare et in Ippia oratio refutatur ut eadem vera et falsa. Potentem enim mentiri accipit falsum, hic autem sciens et prudens.

| This is why the proof in the Hippias that the same man is false and true is misleading.

|- valign = top
|Amplius volentem prava meliorem. Hoc autem falsum accipit per inductionem; nam {{bk|1025a10}} voluntarius claudicans non voluntario * melior, claudicare imitari dicens; quoniam si claudus voluntarius, deterior forsan, sicut in more et hoc.

| For it assumes that he is false who can deceive (i.e. the man who knows and is wise); and further that he who is willingly bad is better. This is a false result of induction – for a man who limps willingly is better than one who does so unwillingly – by ''limping'' Plato means ''mimicking a limp'' , for if the man were lame willingly, he would presumably be worse in this case as in the corresponding case of moral character.
|}
<noinclude>
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
</noinclude>