Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l3/c4 - Revision history

Edward Ockham: /* Chapter 4 */

2018-10-28T15:34:57Z

Chapter 4

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	\|πάντων δὲ καὶ θεωρῆσαι χαλεπώτατον καὶ πρὸς τὸ [5] γνῶναι τἀληθὲς ἀναγκαιότατον πότερόν ποτε τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων εἰσί, καὶ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὂν τὸ μὲν ἓν τὸ δὲ ὄν ἐστιν, ἢ δεῖ ζητεῖν τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ὡς ὑποκειμένης ἄλλης φύσεως~~. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνως οἱ δ᾽ οὕτως οἴονται τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν~~.		\|πάντων δὲ καὶ θεωρῆσαι χαλεπώτατον καὶ πρὸς τὸ [5] γνῶναι τἀληθὲς ἀναγκαιότατον πότερόν ποτε τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν οὐσίαι τῶν ὄντων εἰσί, καὶ ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν οὐχ ἕτερόν τι ὂν τὸ μὲν ἓν τὸ δὲ ὄν ἐστιν, ἢ δεῖ ζητεῖν τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ἓν ὡς ὑποκειμένης ἄλλης φύσεως.

	\|Omnium autem ad considerandum difficillimum et ad cognoscendum veritatem maxime necessarium est, utrum unum {{a\|bk1001a5\|↵}} {{p\|62}} et ens substantiae existentium sunt, et utrumque ipsorum non alterum aliquid ens, hoc quidem unum hoc autem ens est, aut oportet quaerere quid est ipsum ens et unum quasi subiecta alia natura.		\|Omnium autem ad considerandum difficillimum et ad cognoscendum veritatem maxime necessarium est, utrum unum {{a\|bk1001a5\|↵}} {{p\|62}} et ens substantiae existentium sunt, et utrumque ipsorum non alterum aliquid ens, hoc quidem unum hoc autem ens est, aut oportet quaerere quid est ipsum ens et unum quasi subiecta alia natura.
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	\|Πλάτων [10] μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι οὐχ ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι, ὡς οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ ὄντι: οἱ δὲ περὶ φύσεως, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὡς εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀνάγων λέγει ὅ τι τὸ ἕν ἐστιν: δόξειε γὰρ ἂν λέγειν τοῦτο τὴν φιλίαν εἶναι (αἰτία [15] γοῦν ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ ἓν εἶναι πᾶσιν), ἕτεροι δὲ πῦρ, οἱ δ᾽ ἀέρα φασὶν εἶναι τὸ ἓν τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐξ οὗ τὰ ὄντα εἶναί τε καὶ γεγονέναι. ὣς δ᾽ αὔτως καὶ οἱ πλείω τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέμενοι: ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τούτοις τοσαῦτα λέγειν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὂν ὅσας περ ἀρχὰς εἶναί φασιν.		\|οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνως οἱ δ᾽ οὕτως οἴονται τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν. Πλάτων [10] μὲν γὰρ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι οὐχ ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὂν οὐδὲ τὸ ἓν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι, ὡς οὔσης τῆς οὐσίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνὶ εἶναι καὶ ὄντι: οἱ δὲ περὶ φύσεως, οἷον Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὡς εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀνάγων λέγει ὅ τι τὸ ἕν ἐστιν: δόξειε γὰρ ἂν λέγειν τοῦτο τὴν φιλίαν εἶναι (αἰτία [15] γοῦν ἐστὶν αὕτη τοῦ ἓν εἶναι πᾶσιν), ἕτεροι δὲ πῦρ, οἱ δ᾽ ἀέρα φασὶν εἶναι τὸ ἓν τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐξ οὗ τὰ ὄντα εἶναί τε καὶ γεγονέναι. ὣς δ᾽ αὔτως καὶ οἱ πλείω τὰ στοιχεῖα τιθέμενοι: ἀνάγκη γὰρ καὶ τούτοις τοσαῦτα λέγειν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὂν ὅσας περ ἀρχὰς εἶναί φασιν.

	\|Hii namque illo modo illi hoc modo putant natu{{a\|bk1001a10\|↵}}ram se habere. Plato namque et pytagorici non aliud aliquid ens nec unum sed hoc ipsorum naturam esse, quasi existente substantia * ipsum unum esse et ens aliquid. Alii vero de natura, ut Empedocles ut ad notius reducens dicit quia unum ens est; videbitur enim utique dicere hoc amorem esse; causa {{a\|bk1001a15\|↵}} namque est hic unum omnibus esse. Alii vero ignem, alii aerem dicunt esse unum hoc et ens, ex quo entia esse et facta esse. Similiter et qui plura ponunt elementa; necesse namque et hiis tot dicere ens et unum quot principia dicunt esse.		\|Hii namque illo modo illi hoc modo putant natu{{a\|bk1001a10\|↵}}ram se habere. Plato namque et pytagorici non aliud aliquid ens nec unum sed hoc ipsorum naturam esse, quasi existente substantia * ipsum unum esse et ens aliquid. Alii vero de natura, ut Empedocles ut ad notius reducens dicit quia unum ens est; videbitur enim utique dicere hoc amorem esse; causa {{a\|bk1001a15\|↵}} namque est hic unum omnibus esse. Alii vero ignem, alii aerem dicunt esse unum hoc et ens, ex quo entia esse et facta esse. Similiter et qui plura ponunt elementa; necesse namque et hiis tot dicere ens et unum quot principia dicunt esse.

Edward Ockham at 22:22, 21 February 2015

2015-02-21T22:22:32Z

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Edward Ockham: /* Chapter 4 */

2015-02-21T22:22:00Z

Chapter 4

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2014-03-13T11:26:44Z

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Edward Ockham at 16:24, 9 March 2014

2014-03-09T16:24:39Z

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==Chapter 4==
{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|Est autem habita hiis dubitatio et omnium difficillima {{bk|999a25}} et ad considerandum maxime necessaria, de qua ratio nunc extitit.

|'''Chapter 4'''. (8) There is a difficulty connected with these, the hardest of all and the most necessary to examine, and of this the discussion now awaits us.

|- valign = top
|Nam si non est aliquid praeter singularia, singularia vero infinita, infinitorum quomodo contingit accipere scientiam? Nam in quantum unum aliquid et idem et in quantum universale aliquid est, in tantum omnia cognoscimus.

|If, on the one hand, there is nothing apart from individual things, and the individuals are infinite in number, how then is it possible to get knowledge of the infinite individuals? For all things that we come to know, we come to know in so far as they have some unity and identity, and in so far as some attribute belongs to them universally.

|- valign = top
|{{bk|999a30}} At vero si hoc est necesse et oportet aliquid esse praeter singularia, necesse utique erit genera esse praeter singularia, aut ujtima aut prima; hoc autem quia impossibile nunc dubitavimus.

|But if this is necessary, and there must be something apart from the individuals, it will be necessary that the genera exist apart from the individuals, either the lowest or the highest genera; but we found by discussion just now that this is impossible.

|- valign = top
|Amplius autem si quam maxime est aliquid praeter simul totum quando predicatur aliquid de materia, utrum, si est * aliquid, praeter omnia oportet aliquid esse, aut praeter quaedam {{bk|999b1}} esse et praeter quaedam non esse, aut praeter nihil?

|Further, if we admit in the fullest sense that something exists apart from the concrete thing, whenever something is predicated of the matter, must there, if there is something apart, be something apart from each set of individuals, ['''99b'''] or from some and not from others, or from none?

|- valign = top
|Si quidem igitur nihil est praeter singularia, nil utique erit intellectuale sed omnia sensibilia et scientia nullius, nisi quis dicat esse sensum scientiam.

|(A) If there is nothing apart from individuals, there will be no object of thought, but all things will be objects of sense, and there will not be knowledge of anything, unless we say that sensation is knowledge.

|- valign = top
|— Amplius autem nec sempiternum est aliquid {{bk|999b5}} nec immobile; nam sensibilia omnia corrumpuntur et in motu sunt.

|Further, nothing will be eternal or unmovable; for all perceptible things perish and are in movement.

|- valign = top
|At vero si sempiternum nihil est, nec generationem esse possibile est; necesse est enim aliquid esse quod fit et ex quo fit et horum ultimum ingenitum, si stat et ex non ente generari impossibile.

|But if there is nothing eternal, neither can there be a process of coming to be; for there must be something that comes to be, i.e. from which something comes to be, and the ultimate term in this series cannot have come to be, since the series has a limit and since nothing can come to be out of that which is not.

|- valign = top
|Amplius autem, cum sit generatio et motus, {{bk|999b10}} finem esse est necesse; motus enim nullus est infinitus sed omnis est finis, generarique non possibile quod impossibile est * factum esse; quod autem est generatum est esse necesse quando primum factum est.

|Further, if generation and movement exist there must also be a limit; for no movement is infinite, but every movement has an end, and that which is incapable of completing its coming to be cannot be in process of coming to be; and that which has completed its coming to be must he as soon as it has come to be.

|- valign = top
|Amplius autem si materia est quia est ingenita, multo rationabilius est esse substantiam, * {{p|59}} quando illa fit esse; nam si nec haec erit nec illa, nihil {{bk|999b15}} erit omnino. Sed si hoc est impossibile, necesse est aliquid esse praeter sinolon: formam et speciem.

|Further, since the matter exists, because it is ungenerated, it is a fortiori reasonable that the substance or essence, that which the matter is at any time coming to be, should exist; for if neither essence nor matter is to be, nothing will be at all, and since this is impossible there must be something besides the concrete thing, viz. the shape or form.

|- valign = top
|Sed si hoc iterum quis ponit, dubitatio in quibus hoc ponet et in quibus non. Nam quod in omnibus non sit possibile, manifestum; non enim utique ponemus domum aliquam praeter domos aliquas.

|But again (B) if we are to suppose this, it is hard to say in which cases we are to suppose it and in which not. For evidently it is not possible to suppose it in all cases; we could not suppose that there is a house besides the particular houses.

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|Ad haec autem utrum substantia una erit {{bk|999b20}} omnium, ut hominum? Sed inconveniens est; non enim unum omnia quorum substantia una. Sed multa et differentia?

|-Besides this, will the substance of all the individuals, e.g. of all men, be one? This is paradoxical, for all the things whose substance is one are one. But are the substances many and different?

|- valign = top
|Sed et hoc extra rationem.

|This also is unreasonable.

|- valign = top
|Simul autem et quomodo fit materia horum singulum et est sinolon ambo haec?

|-At the same time, how does the matter become each of the individuals, and how is the concrete thing these two elements?'''

|- valign = top
|Amplius autem et de principiis et hoc dubitabit aliquis.Nam {{bk|999b25}} si specie sunt unum, nihil erit numero unum, nec * iterum unum ipsum et ens. Et scire quomodo erit, si non aliquid erit unum in omnibus?

|(9) Again, one might ask the following question also about the first principles. If they are one in kind only, nothing will be numerically one, not even unity-itself and being-itself; and how will knowing exist, if there is not to be something common to a whole set of individuals?'''

|- valign = top
|At vero si numero unum et unum quodlibet principiorum, et non quemadmodum in sensibilibus alia aliorum (ut in hac sillaba specie eadem existente et principia specie eadem; et enim {{bk|999b30}} haec sunt numero diversa), si autem non ita sed quae sunt existentium numero unum sunt, non erit praeter elementa nihil aliud. Nam * numero unum aut singulare dicere nihil differt. Sic enim dicimus singulare: numero unum; universale vero {{bk|1000a1}} quod in hiis est. Sicut igitur si quae vocis unum numero essent elementa determinata, tot omnes litteras esse necesse esset quot elementa, non existentibus quidem duobus eisdem nec pluribus.

|But if there is a common element which is numerically one, and each of the principles is one, and the principles are not as in the case of perceptible things different for different things (e.g. since this particular syllable is the same in kind whenever it occurs, the elements it are also the same in kind; only in kind, for these also, like the syllable, are numerically different in different contexts),-if it is not like this but the principles of things are numerically one, there will be nothing else besides the elements (for there is no difference of meaning between ''numerically one'' and ''individual'' ; for this is just what we mean by the individual-the numerically one, and by the universal we ['''00a'''] mean that which is predicable of the individuals). Therefore it will be just as if the elements of articulate sound were limited in number; all the language in the world would be confined to the ABC, since there could not be two or more letters of the same kind.

|- valign = top
|Non minor autem dubitatio modernis et prioribus relinqui{{bk|1000a5}}tur, utrum eadem corruptibilium et incorruptibilium sunt principia aut diversa.

|(10) One difficulty which is as great as any has been neglected both by modern philosophers and by their predecessors-whether the principles of perishable and those of imperishable things are the same or different.

|- valign = top
|Nam si eadem sunt, quomodo haec quidem incorruptibilia illa vero corruptibilia, et propter quam causam?

|If they are the same, how are some things perishable and others imperishable, and for what reason?

|- valign = top
|{{p|60}} Qui quidem igitur circa Esyodum et omnes quicumque theo{{bk|1000a10}}logi * solum ad ipsos persuasionem curaverunt, nos autem neglexerunt. Deos enim facientes principia et ex deis esse facta, quae non gustaverunt nectar * et manna mortalia facta esse dicunt.

|The school of Hesiod and all the theologians thought only of what was plausible to themselves, and had no regard to us. For, asserting the first principles to be gods and born of gods, they say that the beings which did not taste of nectar and ambrosia became mortal;

|- valign = top
|Palam quod haec nomina sibi nota dicentes; equi{{bk|1000a15}}dem de allatione harum causarum super nos dixerunt. Nam si gratia voluptatis ipsa tangunt, non est causa existendi nectar et manna. Si vero existendi, quomodo erunt sempiterni cibo egentes?

|and clearly they are using words which are familiar to themselves, yet what they have said about the very application of these causes is above our comprehension. For if the gods taste of nectar and ambrosia for their pleasure, these are in no wise the causes of their existence; and if they taste them to maintain their existence, how can gods who need food be eternal?

|- valign = top
|Sed de fabulose sophizantibus non est dignum cum {{bk|1000a20}} studio intendere;

|-But into the subtleties of the mythologists it is not worth our while to inquire seriously;

|- valign = top
|a dicentibus vero per demonstrationem oportet sciscitari interrogantes quare ex eisdem existentia haec quidem sempiterna secundum naturam sunt, illa vero corrumpuntur existentium. Quoniam autem nec causam dicunt nec rationabile est sic habere, palam quod nec eadem principia nec cause ipsorum erunt.

|those, however, who use the language of proof we must cross-examine and ask why, after all, things which consist of the same elements are, some of them, eternal in nature, while others perish. Since these philosophers mention no cause, and it is unreasonable that things should be as they say, evidently the principles or causes of things cannot be the same.

|- valign = top
|{{bk|1000a25}} Et enim quem existimabit utique aliquis dicere maxime ipsi confesse, Empedocles *, et hic idem passus est. Ponit enim principium quoddam causam corruptionis odium,

|Even the man whom one might suppose to speak most ['''00a 25''']consistently-Empedocles, even he has made the same mistake; for he maintains that strife is a principle that causes destruction,

|- valign = top
|videbitur * nihil minus et hoc generare extra unum; nam omnia ex hoc alia sunt praeter deum. Dicit ergo: “ex quibus omnia et quae{{bk|1000a30}}cumque erant et quaecumque erunt, et arbores pullulaverunt et viri et femine, bestieque et vultures et aqua nutriti pisces, {{bk|1000b1}} et dei longevi”.

|but even strife would seem no less to produce everything, except the One; for all things excepting God proceed from strife. At least he says: 
From which all that was and is and will be hereafter 
Trees, and men and women, took their growth, 
And beasts and birds and water-nourished fish, 
And long-aged gods.

|- valign = top
|Et praeter haec palam quia si non esset in rebus, essent unum omnia, ut ait; nam quando convenerunt, tunc “ ultimum stabat odium”.

|The implication is evident even apart from these words; ['''00b'''] for if strife had not been present in things, all things would have been one, according to him; for when they have come together, "then strife stood outermost".

|- valign = top
|Propter quod et accidit ipsi felicissimum deum minus prudentem esse aliis; non enim cognoscit {{bk|1000b5}} elementa omnia; nam odium non habet, notitia vero similis {{p|61}} simili. “Terram namque”, ait, “per terram cognovimus, et per aquam aquam, et per affectum affectum, et adhuc odium per odium difficile”.

|Hence it also follows on his theory that God most blessed is less wise than all others; for he does not know all the elements; for he has in him no strife, and knowledge is of the like by the like. "For by earth", he says, 
we see earth, by water water, 
By ether godlike ether, by fire wasting fire, 
Love by love, and strife by gloomy strife. 

|- valign = top
|Sed unde ratio, hoc etiam palam quia accidit ei odium non magis corruptionis quam existendi causam.

| But-and this is the point we started from this at least is evident, that on his theory it follows that strife is as much the cause of existence as of destruction.

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|{{bk|1000b10}} similiter autem nec amor existendi; colligens enim in unum corrumpit alia.

|And similarly love is not specially the cause of existence; for in collecting things into the One it destroys all other things.

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|Simul quoque ipsius transmutationis causam nullam dicit, nisi quia sic aptum natum fuit:

|And at the same time Empedocles mentions no cause of the change itself, except that things are so by nature.

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|“alias itaque magnum odium in membris nutritum est, et ad honorem inten{{bk|1000b15}}debat perfecto tempore, qui mutabilis dissolvit sacramentum”.

|But when strife at last waxed great in the limbs of the Sphere, 
And sprang to assert its rights as the time was fulfilled 
Which is fixed for them in turn by a mighty oath. 

|- valign = top
|Quasi necessarium ens transmutari; causam vero necessitatis nullam ostendit. At tamen tantum solum dicit confesse; non enim existentium haec quidem corruptibilia illa vero incorruptibilia facit, sed omnia corruptibilia praeter elementa. Dicta vero {{bk|1000b20}} nunc dubitatio est cur haec quidem illa vero non, si ex eisdem sunt.

|This implies that change was necessary; but he shows no cause of the necessity. But yet so far at least he alone speaks consistently; for he does not make some things perishable and others imperishable, but makes all perishable except the elements. The difficulty we are speaking of now is, why some things are perishable and others are not, if they consist of the same principles.

|- valign = top
|Quod quidem igitur non utique erunt eadem principia, tot dicta sint. Si vero diversa principia, una quidem dubitatio utrum incorruptibilia et haec erunt aut corruptibilia. Nam si corruptibilia, manifestum quia necessarium et ea ex aliquibus esse; {{bk|1000b25}} omnia enim corrumpuntur in ea ex quibus sunt. Quare contingit principiorum alia principia esse priora. Hoc autem impossibile, sive stet sive in infmitum vadat. — Amplius autem quomodo erunt ipsa corruptibilia, si destruentur principia? Si vero incorruptibilia, cur ex hiis quidem incorruptibilibus existentibus {{bk|1000b30}} corruptibilia erunt, ex diversis vero incorruptibilia? Hoc enim non rationabile est, sed aut impossibile aut multa ratione eget.

|Let this suffice as proof of the fact that the principles cannot be the same. But if there are different principles, one difficulty is whether these also will be imperishable or perishable. For if they are perishable, evidently these also must consist of certain elements (for all things that perish, perish by being resolved into the elements of which they consist); so that it follows that prior to the principles there are other principles. But this is impossible, whether the process has a limit or proceeds to infinity. Further, how will perishable things exist, if their principles are to be annulled? But if the principles are imperishable, why will things composed of some imperishable principles be perishable, while those composed of the others are imperishable? This is not probable, but is either impossible or needs much proof.

|- valign = top
|Amplius autem nec conatus est aliquis diversa dicere, sed {{bk|1001a1}} eadem omnium dicunt principia. Verum primum dubitatum corrodunt tamquam hoc parvum aliquid accipientes.

|Further, no one has even tried to maintain different principles; they maintain the same principles for all things. ['''01a'''] But they swallow the difficulty we stated first as if they took it to be something trifling.

|- valign = top
|Omnium autem ad considerandum difficillimum et ad cognoscendum veritatem maxime necessarium est, utrum unum {{bk|1001a5}} {{p|62}} et ens substantiae existentium sunt, et utrumque ipsorum non alterum aliquid ens, hoc quidem unum hoc autem ens est, aut oportet quaerere quid est ipsum ens et unum quasi subiecta alia natura.

| (11) The inquiry that is both the hardest of all and the most necessary for knowledge of the truth is whether being and unity are the substances of things, and whether each of them, without being anything else, is being or unity respectively, or we must inquire what being and unity are, with the implication that they have some other underlying nature.

|- valign = top
|Hii namque illo modo illi hoc modo putant natu{{bk|1001a10}}ram se habere. Plato namque et pytagorici non aliud aliquid ens nec unum sed hoc ipsorum naturam esse, quasi existente substantia * ipsum unum esse et ens aliquid. Alii vero de natura, ut Empedocles ut ad notius reducens dicit quia unum ens est; videbitur enim utique dicere hoc amorem esse; causa {{bk|1001a15}} namque est hic unum omnibus esse. Alii vero ignem, alii aerem dicunt esse unum hoc et ens, ex quo entia esse et facta esse. Similiter et qui plura ponunt elementa; necesse namque et hiis tot dicere ens et unum quot principia dicunt esse.

|For some people think they are of the former, others think they are of the latter character. Plato and the Pythagoreans thought being and unity were nothing else, but this was their nature, their essence being just unity and being. But the natural philosophers take a different line; e.g. Empedocles-as though reducing to something more intelligible-says what unity is; for he would seem to say it is love: at least, this is for all things the cause of their being one. Others say this unity and being, of which things consist and have been made, is fire, and others say it is air. A similar view is expressed by those who make the elements more than one; for these also must say that unity and being are precisely all the things which they say are principles.

|- valign = top
|{{bk|1001a20}} Accidit autem, si quidem quis non ponit esse quandam substantiam unum et ens, nec aliorum esse universalium nullum; haec namque universalia sunt maxime omnium. Si vero non est aliquid unum ipsum neque ipsum ens, neque aliorum aliquid erit praeter ea quae dicta sunt singularia. Amplius autem non {{bk|1000a25}} existente unius substantia, palam quia nec numerus erit quasi natura aliqua ab existentibus separata; numerus enim unitates, unitas vero quod vere unum aliquid est.

|(A) If we do not suppose unity and being to be substances, it follows that none of the other universals is a substance; for these are most universal of all, and if there is no unity itself or being-itself, there will scarcely be in any other case anything apart from what are called the individuals. Further, if unity is not a substance, evidently number also will not exist as an entity separate from the individual things; for number is units, and the unit is precisely a certain kind of one.

|- valign = top
|Si autem aliquid est ipsum unum et ens, necesse est substantiam ipsorum esse ens et unum; non enim aliquid aliud universaliter predicatur sed haec ipsa.

|But (B) if there is a unity-itself and a being itself, unity and being must be their substance; for it is not something else that is predicated universally of the things that are and are one, but just unity and being.

|- valign = top
|{{bk|1001a30}} At vero si erit aliquid ens ipsum et ipsum unum, multa erit dubitatio quomodo erit diversum aliquid praeter haec. Dico autem quomodo erunt uno plura entia. Quod enim diversum est ab ente non est; quare secundum Parmenidis rationem acci{{p|63}}dere est necesse unum omnia esse entia et hoc esse ens.

|But if there is to be a being-itself and a unity-itself, there is much difficulty in seeing how there will be anything else besides these,-I mean, how things will be more than one in number. For what is different from being does not exist, so that it necessarily follows, according to the argument of Parmenides, that all things that are are one and this is being.

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|Utrobi{{bk|1001b1}}quae vero difficile; sive namque non sit unum substantia sive sit ipsum unum, substantiam esse numerum est impossibile. Si quidem igitur non sit, dictum est prius propter quod; si autem fuerit, eadem est dubitatio et de ente. Ex aliquo namque et praeter ens erit ipsum aliud unum. Nihil enim esse est {{bk|1001b5}} necesse; omnia autem entia aut unum aut multa quorum * unum unumquodque.

| ['''01b'''] There are objections to both views. For whether unity is not a substance or there is a unity-itself, number cannot be a substance. We have already said why this result follows if unity is not a substance; and if it is, the same difficulty arises as arose with regard to being. For whence is there to be another one besides unity-itself? It must be not-one; but all things are either one or many, and of the many each is one.

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|Amplius si indivisibile est ipsum unum, secundum Zenonis dignitatem nihil utique erit. Quod enim nec additum nec ablatum facit maius nec minus, non ait esse hoc existentium, tamquam palam quod existente magnitudine ipso ente. Et {{bk|1001b10}} si magnitudo, corporalis; hoc enim omnino ens, alia vero aliqualiter quidem addita facient maius, aliqualiter autem nihil, ut superficies et linea, punctum vero et unitas nullatenus.

| Further, if unity-itself is indivisible, according to Zeno's postulate it will be nothing. For that which neither when added makes a thing greater nor when subtracted makes it less, he asserts to have no being, evidently assuming that whatever has being is a spatial magnitude. And if it is a magnitude, it is corporeal; for the corporeal has being in every dimension, while the other objects of mathematics, e.g. a plane or a line, added in one way will increase what they are added to, but in another way will not do so, and a point or a unit does so in no way.

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|Sed quoniam hic speculatur onerose et non contingit esse indivisibile, ut et sic ad illum aliqua habeatur responsio: {{bk|1001b15}} maius enim non faciet sed plus additum tale.

|But, since his theory is of a low order, and an indivisible thing can exist in such a way as to have a defence even against him (for the indivisible when added will make the number, though not the size, greater),

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|Sed quomodo ex uno tali aut pluribus erit magnitudo? Simile namque est et lineam ex punctis esse dicere.

|-yet how can a magnitude proceed from one such indivisible or from many? It is like saying that the line is made out of points.

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|At vero et si quis ita putat ut factus sit, ut quidam {{bk|1001b20}} dicunt, ex uno ipso et alio non uno aliquo numerus, nihil minus est quaerendum quare et quomodo quandoque quidem numerus quandoque autem magnitudo erit quod factum est, si non unum inequalitas et eadem natura erat. Nec enim quomodo ex uno et hac nec quomodo ex numero aliquo et hac {{bk|1001b25}} fient utique magnitudines, palam.

| But even if one supposes the case to be such that, as some say, number proceeds from unity-itself and something else which is not one, none the less we must inquire why and how the product will be sometimes a number and sometimes a magnitude, if the not-one was inequality and was the same principle in either case. For it is not evident how magnitudes could proceed either from the one and this principle, or from some number and this principle.

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==Notes==
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