Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l10/c9 - Revision history

Edward Ockham: /* Chapter 9 */

2015-02-21T23:04:29Z

Chapter 9

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	==Chapter 9==		==Chapter 9==
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			\|ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις διὰ τί γυνὴ ἀνδρὸς οὐκ εἴδει διαφέρει, [30] ἐναντίου τοῦ θήλεος καὶ τοῦ ἄρρενος ὄντος τῆς δὲ διαφορᾶς ἐναντιώσεως, οὐδὲ ζῷον θῆλυ καὶ ἄρρεν ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει: καίτοι καθ᾽ αὑτὸ τοῦ ζῴου αὕτη ἡ διαφορὰ καὶ οὐχ ὡς λευκότης ἢ μελανία ἀλλ᾽ ᾗ ζῷον καὶ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν ὑπάρχει. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ ἀπορία αὕτη σχεδὸν ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ διὰ [35] τί ἡ μὲν ποιεῖ τῷ εἴδει ἕτερα ἐναντίωσις ἡ δ᾽ οὔ, οἷον τὸ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ πτερωτόν, λευκότης δὲ καὶ μελανία οὔ.

	\|{{p\|215}} <span id=c9></span>Dubitabit autem utique aliquis quare femina a viro non specie differt, contrario feminino et masculino existente, diffe {{a\|bk1058a30\|↵}}rentia autem contrarietate. Neque animal masculinum et femininum diversum est specie, quamvis secundum se animalis haec sit differentia et non ut albedo aut nigredo sed in quantum animal femininum et masculinum inest. Est autem dubitatio haec fere eadem et quare haec quidem contrarietas facit {{a\|bk1058a35\|↵}} specie diversa haec autem non, ut ambulativum et volativum, sed albedo et nigredo non.		\|{{p\|215}} <span id=c9></span>Dubitabit autem utique aliquis quare femina a viro non specie differt, contrario feminino et masculino existente, diffe {{a\|bk1058a30\|↵}}rentia autem contrarietate. Neque animal masculinum et femininum diversum est specie, quamvis secundum se animalis haec sit differentia et non ut albedo aut nigredo sed in quantum animal femininum et masculinum inest. Est autem dubitatio haec fere eadem et quare haec quidem contrarietas facit {{a\|bk1058a35\|↵}} specie diversa haec autem non, ut ambulativum et volativum, sed albedo et nigredo non.

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			\|ἢ ὅτι τὰ μὲν οἰκεῖα πάθη τοῦ γένους τὰ δ᾽ ἧττον; καὶ ἐπειδή ἐστι τὸ μὲν λόγος τὸ δ᾽ ὕλη, [1058β] [1] ὅσαι μὲν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ εἰσὶν ἐναντιότητες εἴδει ποιοῦσι διαφοράν, ὅσαι δ᾽ ἐν τῷ συνειλημμένῳ τῇ ὕλῃ οὐ ποιοῦσιν. διὸ ἀνθρώπου λευκότης οὐ ποιεῖ οὐδὲ μελανία, οὐδὲ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἔστι διαφορὰ κατ᾽ εἶδος πρὸς [5] μέλανα ἄνθρωπον, οὐδ᾽ ἂν ὄνομα ἓν τεθῇ. ὡς ὕλη γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, οὐ ποιεῖ δὲ διαφορὰν ἡ ὕλη: οὐδ᾽ ἀνθρώπου γὰρ εἴδη εἰσὶν οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τοῦτο, καίτοι ἕτεραι αἱ σάρκες καὶ τὰ ὀστᾶ ἐξ ὧν ὅδε καὶ ὅδε: ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον ἕτερον μέν, εἴδει δ᾽ οὐχ ἕτερον, ὅτι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐναντίωσις. τοῦτο δ᾽ [10] ἐστὶ τὸ ἔσχατον ἄτομον: ὁ δὲ Καλλίας ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος μετὰ τῆς ὕλης: καὶ ὁ λευκὸς δὴ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι Καλλίας λευκός: κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. οὐδὲ χαλκοῦς δὴ κύκλος καὶ ξύλινος: οὐδὲ τρίγωνον χαλκοῦν καὶ κύκλος ξύλινος, οὐ διὰ τὴν ὕλην εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ [15] ἔνεστιν ἐναντίωσις. πότερον δ᾽ ἡ ὕλη οὐ ποιεῖ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει, οὖσά πως ἑτέρα, ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ποιεῖ; διὰ τί γὰρ ὁδὶ ὁ ἵππος τουδὶ <τοῦ> ἀνθρώπου ἕτερος τῷ εἴδει; καίτοι σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ οἱ λόγοι αὐτῶν. ἢ ὅτι ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐναντίωσις; καὶ γὰρ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ μέλανος ἵππου, καὶ ἔστι γε [20] εἴδει, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ μὲν λευκὸς ὁ δὲ μέλας, ἐπεὶ καὶ εἰ ἄμφω λευκὰ ἦν, ὅμως ἂν ἦν εἴδει ἕτερα.

	\|Aut quia haec quidem sunt propriae passiones generis illa vero minus. Quoniam * est hoc quidem ratio hoc autem materia, {{a\|bk1058b1\|↵}} quaecumque quidem in ratione sunt contrarietates specie faciunt differentiam, quae vero in concepto cum materia non faciunt. Quapropter hominis albedo non facit nec nigredo, nec albi hominis est differentia secundum speciem ad nigrum hominem, {{a\|bk1058b5\|↵}} nec si nomen imponatur. Ut materia enim homo, non facit autem differentiam materia; non enim hominis species sunt homines propter hoc, quamvis diverse * carnes et ossa ex quibus hic et hic. Sed simul totum diversum quidem, specie vero non diversum, quia in ratione non est contrarietas. Hoc autem est ultimum individuum. Callias vero est ratio cum mate{{a\|bk1058b10\|↵}}ria; et albus itaque homo, quia Callias albus; secundum accidens ergo homo albus. Nec ereus itaque circulus et ligneus; nec triangulus ereus et circulus ligneus non propter materiam {{p\|216}} {{a\|bk1058b15\|↵}} specie differunt, sed quia in ratione inest contrarietas. Vtrum autem materia non facit diversa specie, ens aliqualiter, aut est ut facit? Propter quid enim hic equus ab hoc homine diversus est specie? Equidem rationes ipsorum * cum materia. Aut quia est in ratione contrarietas. Et enim albi hominis {{a\|bk1058b20\|↵}} et nigri equi diversitas est specie, sed non in quantum hic albus et ille niger; quoniam et si ambo albi essent, tamen essent specie diversa.		\|Aut quia haec quidem sunt propriae passiones generis illa vero minus. Quoniam * est hoc quidem ratio hoc autem materia, {{a\|bk1058b1\|↵}} quaecumque quidem in ratione sunt contrarietates specie faciunt differentiam, quae vero in concepto cum materia non faciunt. Quapropter hominis albedo non facit nec nigredo, nec albi hominis est differentia secundum speciem ad nigrum hominem, {{a\|bk1058b5\|↵}} nec si nomen imponatur. Ut materia enim homo, non facit autem differentiam materia; non enim hominis species sunt homines propter hoc, quamvis diverse * carnes et ossa ex quibus hic et hic. Sed simul totum diversum quidem, specie vero non diversum, quia in ratione non est contrarietas. Hoc autem est ultimum individuum. Callias vero est ratio cum mate{{a\|bk1058b10\|↵}}ria; et albus itaque homo, quia Callias albus; secundum accidens ergo homo albus. Nec ereus itaque circulus et ligneus; nec triangulus ereus et circulus ligneus non propter materiam {{p\|216}} {{a\|bk1058b15\|↵}} specie differunt, sed quia in ratione inest contrarietas. Vtrum autem materia non facit diversa specie, ens aliqualiter, aut est ut facit? Propter quid enim hic equus ab hoc homine diversus est specie? Equidem rationes ipsorum * cum materia. Aut quia est in ratione contrarietas. Et enim albi hominis {{a\|bk1058b20\|↵}} et nigri equi diversitas est specie, sed non in quantum hic albus et ille niger; quoniam et si ambo albi essent, tamen essent specie diversa.

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			\|τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν καὶ θῆλυ τοῦ ζῴου οἰκεῖα μὲν πάθη, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ καὶ τῷ σώματι, διὸ τὸ αὐτὸ σπέρμα θῆλυ ἢ ἄρρεν γίγνεται παθόν τι πάθος.

	\|Masculinum vero et femina animalis proprie sunt passiones, sed non secundum substantiam, verum in materia et corpore. Propter quod idem sperma femina aut masculum fit patiens passionem aliquam.		\|Masculinum vero et femina animalis proprie sunt passiones, sed non secundum substantiam, verum in materia et corpore. Propter quod idem sperma femina aut masculum fit patiens passionem aliquam.

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			\|τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ τῷ εἴδει ἕτερον [25] εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τί τὰ μὲν διαφέρει εἴδει τὰ δ᾽ οὔ, εἴρηται.

	\|{{a\|bk1058b25\|↵}} Quid quidem igitur est esse diversum specie, et quare alia differunt specie * alia non, dictum est.		\|{{a\|bk1058b25\|↵}} Quid quidem igitur est esse diversum specie, et quare alia differunt specie * alia non, dictum est.

	\|<span id=jp894></span>We have stated, then, what it is to be other in species, and why some things differ in species and others do not. 10		\|<span id=jp894></span>We have stated, then, what it is to be other in species, and why some things differ in species and others do not.

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	\|<span id=c10></span> Quoniam vero contraria * diversa specie, * corruptibile autem et incorruptibile contraria (privatio enim est impotentia determinata), necesse diversum esse genere corruptibile et incorruptibile.

	\|<span id=jp895></span>Since contraries are other in form, and the perishable and the imperishable are contraries (for privation is a determinate incapacity), the perishable and the imperishable must be different in kind.

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	\|{{a\|bk1058b30\|↵}} Nunc ergo diximus de hiis universalibus nominibus, ut autem videbitur non necesse esse quodcumque incorruptibile et corruptibile diversa specie esse, quemadmodum neque album et nigrum, idem enim contingit esse, et simul, si fuerit universalium, quemadmodum homo erit utique et albus et niger, {{a\|bk1058b35\|↵}} et singularium; erit enim, non simul, idem * albus et niger. * equidem album contrarium nigro.

	\|<span id=jp896></span>Now so far we have spoken of the general terms themselves, so that it might be thought not to be necessary that every imperishable thing should be different from every perishable thing in form, just as not every pale thing is different in form from every dark thing. For the same thing can be both, and even at the same time if it is a universal (e.g. man can be both pale and dark), and if it is an individual it can still be both; for the same man can be, though not at the same time, pale and dark. Yet pale is contrary to dark.

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	\|{{p\|217}} Sed contrariorum haec quidem secundum accidens insunt quibusdam, ut quae nunc dicta sunt et alia multa, haec autem impossibile, quorum est et corruptibile et incorruptibile. {{a\|bk1059a1\|↵}} nihil enim est corruptibile secundum accidens. Nam accidens contingit non existere, et corruptibile ex necessitate existentium est quibus inest; aut erit idem et unum corruptibile et incorrup{{a\|bk1059a5\|↵}}tibile, si contingit non existere * ipsi corruptibile. Aut * substantiam igitur aut in substantia necesse est inesse corruptibile unicuique corruptibilium. Eadem vero ratio et de incorruptibili *; ex necessitate enim existentium ambo sunt. In quantum igitur et secundum quod primum hoc quidem corruptibile hoc autem incorruptibile, habet oppositionem, unde necesse {{a\|bk1059a10\|↵}} genere esse diversa.

	\|<span id=jp897></span>But while some contraries belong to certain things by accident (e.g. both those now mentioned and many others), others cannot, and among these are ''perishable'' and ['''59a'''] ''imperishable'' . For nothing is by accident perishable. For what is accidental is capable of not being present, but perishableness is one of the attributes that belong of necessity to the things to which they belong; or else one and the same thing may be perishable and imperishable, if perishableness is capable of not belonging to it. Perishableness then must either be the essence or be present in the essence of each perishable thing. The same account holds good for imperishableness also; for both are attributes which are present of necessity. The characteristics, then, in respect of which and in direct consequence of which one thing is perishable and another imperishable, are opposite, so that the things must be different in kind.

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	\|Palam igitur quod non contingit esse species tales quales dicunt quidam; erit enim homo hic quidem corruptibilis hic autem incorruptibilis. Equidem specie eadem dicuntur esse species ipsis quibusdam et non equivoca. Diversa vero genere plus distant quam quae specie.

	\|<span id=jp898></span>Evidently, then, there cannot be Forms such as some maintain, for then one man would be perishable and another imperishable. Yet the Forms are said to be the same in form with the individuals and not merely to have the same name; but things which differ in kind are farther apart than those which differ in form.

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Edward Ockham: Text replace - "{{bk\|(.*)}}" to "{{a|bk$1|↵}}"

2014-03-13T11:26:11Z

Text replace - "{{bk\|(.*)}}" to "{{a|bk$1|↵}}"

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	\|{{p\|215}} <span id=c9></span>Dubitabit autem utique aliquis quare femina a viro non specie differt, contrario feminino et masculino existente, diffe {{bk\|~~1058a30~~}}rentia autem contrarietate. Neque animal masculinum et femininum diversum est specie, quamvis secundum se animalis haec sit differentia et non ut albedo aut nigredo sed in quantum animal femininum et masculinum inest. Est autem dubitatio haec fere eadem et quare haec quidem contrarietas facit {{bk\|~~1058a35~~}} specie diversa haec autem non, ut ambulativum et volativum, sed albedo et nigredo non.		\|{{p\|215}} <span id=c9></span>Dubitabit autem utique aliquis quare femina a viro non specie differt, contrario feminino et masculino existente, diffe {{a\|bk1058a30\|↵}}rentia autem contrarietate. Neque animal masculinum et femininum diversum est specie, quamvis secundum se animalis haec sit differentia et non ut albedo aut nigredo sed in quantum animal femininum et masculinum inest. Est autem dubitatio haec fere eadem et quare haec quidem contrarietas facit {{a\|bk1058a35\|↵}} specie diversa haec autem non, ut ambulativum et volativum, sed albedo et nigredo non.

	\|'''Chapter 9'''. <span id=jp891></span>One might raise the question, why woman does not differ from man in species, when female and male are contrary and their difference is a contrariety; and why a female and a male animal are not different in species, though this difference belongs to animal in virtue of its own nature, and not as paleness or darkness does; both ''female'' and ''male'' belong to it qua animal. This question is almost the same as the other, why one contrariety makes things different in species and another does not, e.g. ''with feet'' and ''with wings'' do, but paleness and darkness do not.		\|'''Chapter 9'''. <span id=jp891></span>One might raise the question, why woman does not differ from man in species, when female and male are contrary and their difference is a contrariety; and why a female and a male animal are not different in species, though this difference belongs to animal in virtue of its own nature, and not as paleness or darkness does; both ''female'' and ''male'' belong to it qua animal. This question is almost the same as the other, why one contrariety makes things different in species and another does not, e.g. ''with feet'' and ''with wings'' do, but paleness and darkness do not.

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	\|Aut quia haec quidem sunt propriae passiones generis illa vero minus. Quoniam * est hoc quidem ratio hoc autem materia, {{bk\|~~1058b1~~}} quaecumque quidem in ratione sunt contrarietates specie faciunt differentiam, quae vero in concepto cum materia non faciunt. Quapropter hominis albedo non facit nec nigredo, nec albi hominis est differentia secundum speciem ad nigrum hominem, {{bk\|~~1058b5~~}} nec si nomen imponatur. Ut materia enim homo, non facit autem differentiam materia; non enim hominis species sunt homines propter hoc, quamvis diverse * carnes et ossa ex quibus hic et hic. Sed simul totum diversum quidem, specie vero non diversum, quia in ratione non est contrarietas. Hoc autem est ultimum individuum. Callias vero est ratio cum mate{{bk\|~~1058b10~~}}ria; et albus itaque homo, quia Callias albus; secundum accidens ergo homo albus. Nec ereus itaque circulus et ligneus; nec triangulus ereus et circulus ligneus non propter materiam {{p\|216}} {{bk\|~~1058b15~~}} specie differunt, sed quia in ratione inest contrarietas. Vtrum autem materia non facit diversa specie, ens aliqualiter, aut est ut facit? Propter quid enim hic equus ab hoc homine diversus est specie? Equidem rationes ipsorum * cum materia. Aut quia est in ratione contrarietas. Et enim albi hominis {{bk\|~~1058b20~~}} et nigri equi diversitas est specie, sed non in quantum hic albus et ille niger; quoniam et si ambo albi essent, tamen essent specie diversa.		\|Aut quia haec quidem sunt propriae passiones generis illa vero minus. Quoniam * est hoc quidem ratio hoc autem materia, {{a\|bk1058b1\|↵}} quaecumque quidem in ratione sunt contrarietates specie faciunt differentiam, quae vero in concepto cum materia non faciunt. Quapropter hominis albedo non facit nec nigredo, nec albi hominis est differentia secundum speciem ad nigrum hominem, {{a\|bk1058b5\|↵}} nec si nomen imponatur. Ut materia enim homo, non facit autem differentiam materia; non enim hominis species sunt homines propter hoc, quamvis diverse * carnes et ossa ex quibus hic et hic. Sed simul totum diversum quidem, specie vero non diversum, quia in ratione non est contrarietas. Hoc autem est ultimum individuum. Callias vero est ratio cum mate{{a\|bk1058b10\|↵}}ria; et albus itaque homo, quia Callias albus; secundum accidens ergo homo albus. Nec ereus itaque circulus et ligneus; nec triangulus ereus et circulus ligneus non propter materiam {{p\|216}} {{a\|bk1058b15\|↵}} specie differunt, sed quia in ratione inest contrarietas. Vtrum autem materia non facit diversa specie, ens aliqualiter, aut est ut facit? Propter quid enim hic equus ab hoc homine diversus est specie? Equidem rationes ipsorum * cum materia. Aut quia est in ratione contrarietas. Et enim albi hominis {{a\|bk1058b20\|↵}} et nigri equi diversitas est specie, sed non in quantum hic albus et ille niger; quoniam et si ambo albi essent, tamen essent specie diversa.

	\|<span id=jp892></span>Perhaps it is because the former are modifications peculiar to the genus, and the latter are less so. And since one ['''58b'''] element is definition and one is matter, contrarieties which are in the definition make a difference in species, but those which are in the thing taken as including its matter do not make one. And so paleness in a man, or darkness, does not make one, nor is there a difference in species between the pale man and the dark man, not even if each of them be denoted by one word. For man is here being considered on his material side, and matter does not create a difference; for it does not make individual men species of man, though the flesh and the bones of which this man and that man consist are other. The concrete thing is other, but not other in species, because in the definition there is no contrariety. This is the ultimate indivisible kind. Callias is definition + matter, the pale man, then, is so also, because it is the individual Callias that is pale; man, then, is pale only incidentally. Neither do a brazen and a wooden circle, then, differ in species; and if a brazen triangle and a wooden circle differ in species, it is not because of the matter, but because there is a contrariety in the definition. But does the matter not make things other in species, when it is other in a certain way, or is there a sense in which it does? For why is this horse other than this man in species, although their matter is included with their definitions? Doubtless because there is a contrariety in the definition. For while there is a contrariety also between pale man and dark horse, and it is a contrariety in species, it does not depend on the paleness of the one and the darkness of the other, since even if both had been pale, yet they would have been other in species.		\|<span id=jp892></span>Perhaps it is because the former are modifications peculiar to the genus, and the latter are less so. And since one ['''58b'''] element is definition and one is matter, contrarieties which are in the definition make a difference in species, but those which are in the thing taken as including its matter do not make one. And so paleness in a man, or darkness, does not make one, nor is there a difference in species between the pale man and the dark man, not even if each of them be denoted by one word. For man is here being considered on his material side, and matter does not create a difference; for it does not make individual men species of man, though the flesh and the bones of which this man and that man consist are other. The concrete thing is other, but not other in species, because in the definition there is no contrariety. This is the ultimate indivisible kind. Callias is definition + matter, the pale man, then, is so also, because it is the individual Callias that is pale; man, then, is pale only incidentally. Neither do a brazen and a wooden circle, then, differ in species; and if a brazen triangle and a wooden circle differ in species, it is not because of the matter, but because there is a contrariety in the definition. But does the matter not make things other in species, when it is other in a certain way, or is there a sense in which it does? For why is this horse other than this man in species, although their matter is included with their definitions? Doubtless because there is a contrariety in the definition. For while there is a contrariety also between pale man and dark horse, and it is a contrariety in species, it does not depend on the paleness of the one and the darkness of the other, since even if both had been pale, yet they would have been other in species.
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	\|{{bk\|~~1058b25~~}} Quid quidem igitur est esse diversum specie, et quare alia differunt specie * alia non, dictum est.		\|{{a\|bk1058b25\|↵}} Quid quidem igitur est esse diversum specie, et quare alia differunt specie * alia non, dictum est.

	\|<span id=jp894></span>We have stated, then, what it is to be other in species, and why some things differ in species and others do not. 10		\|<span id=jp894></span>We have stated, then, what it is to be other in species, and why some things differ in species and others do not. 10
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	\|{{bk\|~~1058b30~~}} Nunc ergo diximus de hiis universalibus nominibus, ut autem videbitur non necesse esse quodcumque incorruptibile et corruptibile diversa specie esse, quemadmodum neque album et nigrum, idem enim contingit esse, et simul, si fuerit universalium, quemadmodum homo erit utique et albus et niger, {{bk\|~~1058b35~~}} et singularium; erit enim, non simul, idem * albus et niger. * equidem album contrarium nigro.		\|{{a\|bk1058b30\|↵}} Nunc ergo diximus de hiis universalibus nominibus, ut autem videbitur non necesse esse quodcumque incorruptibile et corruptibile diversa specie esse, quemadmodum neque album et nigrum, idem enim contingit esse, et simul, si fuerit universalium, quemadmodum homo erit utique et albus et niger, {{a\|bk1058b35\|↵}} et singularium; erit enim, non simul, idem * albus et niger. * equidem album contrarium nigro.

	\|<span id=jp896></span>Now so far we have spoken of the general terms themselves, so that it might be thought not to be necessary that every imperishable thing should be different from every perishable thing in form, just as not every pale thing is different in form from every dark thing. For the same thing can be both, and even at the same time if it is a universal (e.g. man can be both pale and dark), and if it is an individual it can still be both; for the same man can be, though not at the same time, pale and dark. Yet pale is contrary to dark.		\|<span id=jp896></span>Now so far we have spoken of the general terms themselves, so that it might be thought not to be necessary that every imperishable thing should be different from every perishable thing in form, just as not every pale thing is different in form from every dark thing. For the same thing can be both, and even at the same time if it is a universal (e.g. man can be both pale and dark), and if it is an individual it can still be both; for the same man can be, though not at the same time, pale and dark. Yet pale is contrary to dark.

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	\|{{p\|217}} Sed contrariorum haec quidem secundum accidens insunt quibusdam, ut quae nunc dicta sunt et alia multa, haec autem impossibile, quorum est et corruptibile et incorruptibile. {{bk\|~~1059a1~~}} nihil enim est corruptibile secundum accidens. Nam accidens contingit non existere, et corruptibile ex necessitate existentium est quibus inest; aut erit idem et unum corruptibile et incorrup{{bk\|~~1059a5~~}}tibile, si contingit non existere * ipsi corruptibile. Aut * substantiam igitur aut in substantia necesse est inesse corruptibile unicuique corruptibilium. Eadem vero ratio et de incorruptibili *; ex necessitate enim existentium ambo sunt. In quantum igitur et secundum quod primum hoc quidem corruptibile hoc autem incorruptibile, habet oppositionem, unde necesse {{bk\|~~1059a10~~}} genere esse diversa.		\|{{p\|217}} Sed contrariorum haec quidem secundum accidens insunt quibusdam, ut quae nunc dicta sunt et alia multa, haec autem impossibile, quorum est et corruptibile et incorruptibile. {{a\|bk1059a1\|↵}} nihil enim est corruptibile secundum accidens. Nam accidens contingit non existere, et corruptibile ex necessitate existentium est quibus inest; aut erit idem et unum corruptibile et incorrup{{a\|bk1059a5\|↵}}tibile, si contingit non existere * ipsi corruptibile. Aut * substantiam igitur aut in substantia necesse est inesse corruptibile unicuique corruptibilium. Eadem vero ratio et de incorruptibili *; ex necessitate enim existentium ambo sunt. In quantum igitur et secundum quod primum hoc quidem corruptibile hoc autem incorruptibile, habet oppositionem, unde necesse {{a\|bk1059a10\|↵}} genere esse diversa.

	\|<span id=jp897></span>But while some contraries belong to certain things by accident (e.g. both those now mentioned and many others), others cannot, and among these are ''perishable'' and ['''59a'''] ''imperishable'' . For nothing is by accident perishable. For what is accidental is capable of not being present, but perishableness is one of the attributes that belong of necessity to the things to which they belong; or else one and the same thing may be perishable and imperishable, if perishableness is capable of not belonging to it. Perishableness then must either be the essence or be present in the essence of each perishable thing. The same account holds good for imperishableness also; for both are attributes which are present of necessity. The characteristics, then, in respect of which and in direct consequence of which one thing is perishable and another imperishable, are opposite, so that the things must be different in kind.		\|<span id=jp897></span>But while some contraries belong to certain things by accident (e.g. both those now mentioned and many others), others cannot, and among these are ''perishable'' and ['''59a'''] ''imperishable'' . For nothing is by accident perishable. For what is accidental is capable of not being present, but perishableness is one of the attributes that belong of necessity to the things to which they belong; or else one and the same thing may be perishable and imperishable, if perishableness is capable of not belonging to it. Perishableness then must either be the essence or be present in the essence of each perishable thing. The same account holds good for imperishableness also; for both are attributes which are present of necessity. The characteristics, then, in respect of which and in direct consequence of which one thing is perishable and another imperishable, are opposite, so that the things must be different in kind.

Edward Ockham: Created page with "==Chapter 9== {| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=45%|Latin !valign = top width=55%|English |- valign = top |{{p|215}} Dubitabit autem utique aliqui..."

2014-03-11T21:45:10Z

Created page with "==Chapter 9== {| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=45%|Latin !valign = top width=55%|English |- valign = top |{{p|215}} Dubitabit autem utique aliqui..."

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==Chapter 9==
{| border=1 cellpadding=10
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|{{p|215}} Dubitabit autem utique aliquis quare femina a viro non specie differt, contrario feminino et masculino existente, diffe {{bk|1058a30}}rentia autem contrarietate. Neque animal masculinum et femininum diversum est specie, quamvis secundum se animalis haec sit differentia et non ut albedo aut nigredo sed in quantum animal femininum et masculinum inest. Est autem dubitatio haec fere eadem et quare haec quidem contrarietas facit {{bk|1058a35}} specie diversa haec autem non, ut ambulativum et volativum, sed albedo et nigredo non.

|'''Chapter 9'''. One might raise the question, why woman does not differ from man in species, when female and male are contrary and their difference is a contrariety; and why a female and a male animal are not different in species, though this difference belongs to animal in virtue of its own nature, and not as paleness or darkness does; both ''female'' and ''male'' belong to it qua animal. This question is almost the same as the other, why one contrariety makes things different in species and another does not, e.g. ''with feet'' and ''with wings'' do, but paleness and darkness do not.

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|Aut quia haec quidem sunt propriae passiones generis illa vero minus. Quoniam * est hoc quidem ratio hoc autem materia, {{bk|1058b1}} quaecumque quidem in ratione sunt contrarietates specie faciunt differentiam, quae vero in concepto cum materia non faciunt. Quapropter hominis albedo non facit nec nigredo, nec albi hominis est differentia secundum speciem ad nigrum hominem, {{bk|1058b5}} nec si nomen imponatur. Ut materia enim homo, non facit autem differentiam materia; non enim hominis species sunt homines propter hoc, quamvis diverse * carnes et ossa ex quibus hic et hic. Sed simul totum diversum quidem, specie vero non diversum, quia in ratione non est contrarietas. Hoc autem est ultimum individuum. Callias vero est ratio cum mate{{bk|1058b10}}ria; et albus itaque homo, quia Callias albus; secundum accidens ergo homo albus. Nec ereus itaque circulus et ligneus; nec triangulus ereus et circulus ligneus non propter materiam {{p|216}} {{bk|1058b15}} specie differunt, sed quia in ratione inest contrarietas. Vtrum autem materia non facit diversa specie, ens aliqualiter, aut est ut facit? Propter quid enim hic equus ab hoc homine diversus est specie? Equidem rationes ipsorum * cum materia. Aut quia est in ratione contrarietas. Et enim albi hominis {{bk|1058b20}} et nigri equi diversitas est specie, sed non in quantum hic albus et ille niger; quoniam et si ambo albi essent, tamen essent specie diversa.

|Perhaps it is because the former are modifications peculiar to the genus, and the latter are less so. And since one ['''58b'''] element is definition and one is matter, contrarieties which are in the definition make a difference in species, but those which are in the thing taken as including its matter do not make one. And so paleness in a man, or darkness, does not make one, nor is there a difference in species between the pale man and the dark man, not even if each of them be denoted by one word. For man is here being considered on his material side, and matter does not create a difference; for it does not make individual men species of man, though the flesh and the bones of which this man and that man consist are other. The concrete thing is other, but not other in species, because in the definition there is no contrariety. This is the ultimate indivisible kind. Callias is definition + matter, the pale man, then, is so also, because it is the individual Callias that is pale; man, then, is pale only incidentally. Neither do a brazen and a wooden circle, then, differ in species; and if a brazen triangle and a wooden circle differ in species, it is not because of the matter, but because there is a contrariety in the definition. But does the matter not make things other in species, when it is other in a certain way, or is there a sense in which it does? For why is this horse other than this man in species, although their matter is included with their definitions? Doubtless because there is a contrariety in the definition. For while there is a contrariety also between pale man and dark horse, and it is a contrariety in species, it does not depend on the paleness of the one and the darkness of the other, since even if both had been pale, yet they would have been other in species.

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|Masculinum vero et femina animalis proprie sunt passiones, sed non secundum substantiam, verum in materia et corpore. Propter quod idem sperma femina aut masculum fit patiens passionem aliquam.

|But male and female, while they are modifications peculiar to ''animal'' , are so not in virtue of its essence but in the matter, ie. the body. This is why the same seed becomes female or male by being acted on in a certain way.

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|{{bk|1058b25}} Quid quidem igitur est esse diversum specie, et quare alia differunt specie * alia non, dictum est.

|We have stated, then, what it is to be other in species, and why some things differ in species and others do not. 10

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| Quoniam vero contraria * diversa specie, * corruptibile autem et incorruptibile contraria (privatio enim est impotentia determinata), necesse diversum esse genere corruptibile et incorruptibile.

|Since contraries are other in form, and the perishable and the imperishable are contraries (for privation is a determinate incapacity), the perishable and the imperishable must be different in kind.

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|{{bk|1058b30}} Nunc ergo diximus de hiis universalibus nominibus, ut autem videbitur non necesse esse quodcumque incorruptibile et corruptibile diversa specie esse, quemadmodum neque album et nigrum, idem enim contingit esse, et simul, si fuerit universalium, quemadmodum homo erit utique et albus et niger, {{bk|1058b35}} et singularium; erit enim, non simul, idem * albus et niger. * equidem album contrarium nigro.

|Now so far we have spoken of the general terms themselves, so that it might be thought not to be necessary that every imperishable thing should be different from every perishable thing in form, just as not every pale thing is different in form from every dark thing. For the same thing can be both, and even at the same time if it is a universal (e.g. man can be both pale and dark), and if it is an individual it can still be both; for the same man can be, though not at the same time, pale and dark. Yet pale is contrary to dark.

|- valign = top
|{{p|217}} Sed contrariorum haec quidem secundum accidens insunt quibusdam, ut quae nunc dicta sunt et alia multa, haec autem impossibile, quorum est et corruptibile et incorruptibile. {{bk|1059a1}} nihil enim est corruptibile secundum accidens. Nam accidens contingit non existere, et corruptibile ex necessitate existentium est quibus inest; aut erit idem et unum corruptibile et incorrup{{bk|1059a5}}tibile, si contingit non existere * ipsi corruptibile. Aut * substantiam igitur aut in substantia necesse est inesse corruptibile unicuique corruptibilium. Eadem vero ratio et de incorruptibili *; ex necessitate enim existentium ambo sunt. In quantum igitur et secundum quod primum hoc quidem corruptibile hoc autem incorruptibile, habet oppositionem, unde necesse {{bk|1059a10}} genere esse diversa.

|But while some contraries belong to certain things by accident (e.g. both those now mentioned and many others), others cannot, and among these are ''perishable'' and ['''59a'''] ''imperishable'' . For nothing is by accident perishable. For what is accidental is capable of not being present, but perishableness is one of the attributes that belong of necessity to the things to which they belong; or else one and the same thing may be perishable and imperishable, if perishableness is capable of not belonging to it. Perishableness then must either be the essence or be present in the essence of each perishable thing. The same account holds good for imperishableness also; for both are attributes which are present of necessity. The characteristics, then, in respect of which and in direct consequence of which one thing is perishable and another imperishable, are opposite, so that the things must be different in kind.

|- valign = top
|Palam igitur quod non contingit esse species tales quales dicunt quidam; erit enim homo hic quidem corruptibilis hic autem incorruptibilis. Equidem specie eadem dicuntur esse species ipsis quibusdam et non equivoca. Diversa vero genere plus distant quam quae specie.

|Evidently, then, there cannot be Forms such as some maintain, for then one man would be perishable and another imperishable. Yet the Forms are said to be the same in form with the individuals and not merely to have the same name; but things which differ in kind are farther apart than those which differ in form.

|}

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}
</noinclude>