Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c4 - Revision history

Edward Ockham at 13:12, 21 February 2015

2015-02-21T13:12:33Z

Edward Ockham: Text replace - "{{bk\|(.*)}}" to "{{a|bk$1|↵}}"

2014-03-13T11:25:29Z

Text replace - "{{bk\|(.*)}}" to "{{a|bk$1|↵}}"

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	\|Suspicabitur autem utique aliquis Esiodum primum quesivisse huiusmodi, et utique si quis alius amorem aut desiderium in existentibus quasi principium posuisset, ut Parmeni{{bk\|~~984b25~~}}des; et enim hic temptans monstrare universi generationem, “primum quidem” ait		\|Suspicabitur autem utique aliquis Esiodum primum quesivisse huiusmodi, et utique si quis alius amorem aut desiderium in existentibus quasi principium posuisset, ut Parmeni{{a\|bk984b25\|↵}}des; et enim hic temptans monstrare universi generationem, “primum quidem” ait

	\|<span id=c4></span> '''Chapter 4'''. <span id="jp49"></span> One might suspect that Hesiod was the first to look for such a thing-or some one else who put love or desire among existing things as a principle, as Parmenides, too, does; for he, in constructing the genesis of the universe, says:—		\|<span id=c4></span> '''Chapter 4'''. <span id="jp49"></span> One might suspect that Hesiod was the first to look for such a thing-or some one else who put love or desire among existing things as a principle, as Parmenides, too, does; for he, in constructing the genesis of the universe, says:—
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	\|quasi necessarium sit in existentibus esse causam quae {{bk\|~~984b30~~}} {{p\|22}} res ipsas moveat et congreget. Hns quidem igitur quomodo oporteat distribuere de hoc quis * primus, liceat iudicare posterius. Quoniam vero contraria bonis inesse videbantur in {{bk\|~~985a1~~}} natura, et non solum ordinatio et bonum sed inordinatio et turpe, et plura * mala melioribus et praua bonis, sic alius aliquis amorem induxit et litem, singula singulorum causam horum. {{bk\|~~985a5~~}} si quis enim assequatur et accipiat ad intellectum et non ad quae balbutit dicens Empedocles, inveniet amorem quidem causam esse agathorum, litem vero malorum. Quare si quis dixerit quodam modo rdicere et primum dicere Empedoclem bonum et malum principia, forsan bene dicet, si bonorum {{bk\|~~985a10~~}} omnium ei bonum est causa et malorum malum.		\|quasi necessarium sit in existentibus esse causam quae {{a\|bk984b30\|↵}} {{p\|22}} res ipsas moveat et congreget. Hns quidem igitur quomodo oporteat distribuere de hoc quis * primus, liceat iudicare posterius. Quoniam vero contraria bonis inesse videbantur in {{a\|bk985a1\|↵}} natura, et non solum ordinatio et bonum sed inordinatio et turpe, et plura * mala melioribus et praua bonis, sic alius aliquis amorem induxit et litem, singula singulorum causam horum. {{a\|bk985a5\|↵}} si quis enim assequatur et accipiat ad intellectum et non ad quae balbutit dicens Empedocles, inveniet amorem quidem causam esse agathorum, litem vero malorum. Quare si quis dixerit quodam modo rdicere et primum dicere Empedoclem bonum et malum principia, forsan bene dicet, si bonorum {{a\|bk985a10\|↵}} omnium ei bonum est causa et malorum malum.

	\|which implies that among existing things there must be from the first a cause which will move things and bring them together. How these thinkers should be arranged with regard to priority of discovery let us be allowed to decide later; <span id="jp50"></span> but since the contraries of the various forms of good were also perceived to be present in nature-not only order and the beautiful, but also disorder and the ugly, and ['''85a'''] bad things in greater number than good, and ignoble things than beautiful-therefore another thinker introduced friendship and strife, each of the two the cause of one of these two sets of qualities. For if we were to follow out the view of Empedocles, and interpret it according to its meaning and not to its lisping expression, we should find that friendship is the cause of good things, and strife of bad. Therefore, if we said that Empedocles in a sense both mentions, and is the first to mention, the bad and the good as principles, we should perhaps be right, since the cause of all goods is the good itself.		\|which implies that among existing things there must be from the first a cause which will move things and bring them together. How these thinkers should be arranged with regard to priority of discovery let us be allowed to decide later; <span id="jp50"></span> but since the contraries of the various forms of good were also perceived to be present in nature-not only order and the beautiful, but also disorder and the ugly, and ['''85a'''] bad things in greater number than good, and ignoble things than beautiful-therefore another thinker introduced friendship and strife, each of the two the cause of one of these two sets of qualities. For if we were to follow out the view of Empedocles, and interpret it according to its meaning and not to its lisping expression, we should find that friendship is the cause of good things, and strife of bad. Therefore, if we said that Empedocles in a sense both mentions, and is the first to mention, the bad and the good as principles, we should perhaps be right, since the cause of all goods is the good itself.

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	\|Isti quidem igitur, sicut diximus, et usque ad hoc duas causas tetigerunt quas in phisicis determinavimus, materiamque et id unde motus, obscure quidem et non manifeste sed qualiter in {{bk\|~~985a15~~}} bellis ineruditi faciunt; et enim illi circumducti saepe bonas plagas faciunt, at nec illi ex scientia nec isti sunt assimilati scientibus dicere quod dicunt; hiis etenim fere usi videntur nihil nisi parum.		\|Isti quidem igitur, sicut diximus, et usque ad hoc duas causas tetigerunt quas in phisicis determinavimus, materiamque et id unde motus, obscure quidem et non manifeste sed qualiter in {{a\|bk985a15\|↵}} bellis ineruditi faciunt; et enim illi circumducti saepe bonas plagas faciunt, at nec illi ex scientia nec isti sunt assimilati scientibus dicere quod dicunt; hiis etenim fere usi videntur nihil nisi parum.

	\|<span id="jp51"></span> These thinkers, as we say, evidently grasped, and to this extent, two of the causes which we distinguished in our work on nature-the matter and the source of the movement-vaguely, however, and with no clearness, but as untrained men behave in fights; for they go round their opponents and often strike fine blows, but they do not fight on scientific principles, and so too these thinkers do not seem to know what they say; for it is evident that, as a rule, they make no use of their causes except to a small extent.		\|<span id="jp51"></span> These thinkers, as we say, evidently grasped, and to this extent, two of the causes which we distinguished in our work on nature-the matter and the source of the movement-vaguely, however, and with no clearness, but as untrained men behave in fights; for they go round their opponents and often strike fine blows, but they do not fight on scientific principles, and so too these thinkers do not seem to know what they say; for it is evident that, as a rule, they make no use of their causes except to a small extent.

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	\|Anaxagoras enim artificialiter ad mundi generatio{{bk\|~~985a20~~}}nem utitur intellectu. Nam quando dubitat qua causa ex necessitate est, tunc attrahit ipsum, in aliis vero omnia magis causatur eorum quae fiunt quam intellectum.		\|Anaxagoras enim artificialiter ad mundi generatio{{a\|bk985a20\|↵}}nem utitur intellectu. Nam quando dubitat qua causa ex necessitate est, tunc attrahit ipsum, in aliis vero omnia magis causatur eorum quae fiunt quam intellectum.

	\|<span id="jp52"></span> For Anaxagoras uses reason as a deus ex machina for the making of the world, and when he is at a loss to tell from what cause something necessarily is, then he drags reason in, but in all other cases ascribes events to anything rather than to reason.		\|<span id="jp52"></span> For Anaxagoras uses reason as a deus ex machina for the making of the world, and when he is at a loss to tell from what cause something necessarily is, then he drags reason in, but in all other cases ascribes events to anything rather than to reason.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Et Empedocles plus quidem hoc utitur causis, sed tamen nec sufficienter, nec in hiis invenit quod confessum est. Multis igitur in locis apud {{bk\|~~985a25~~}} ipsum amor disgregat, lis autem congregat. Nam cum in elementa quidem ipsum omne a lite distrahitur, tunc ignis in unum et aliorum elementorum singula concernuntur; cum {{p\|23}} autem iterum in unum ab amore conveniunt, necesse rursum ut ex singulis particule secernantur.		\|Et Empedocles plus quidem hoc utitur causis, sed tamen nec sufficienter, nec in hiis invenit quod confessum est. Multis igitur in locis apud {{a\|bk985a25\|↵}} ipsum amor disgregat, lis autem congregat. Nam cum in elementa quidem ipsum omne a lite distrahitur, tunc ignis in unum et aliorum elementorum singula concernuntur; cum {{p\|23}} autem iterum in unum ab amore conveniunt, necesse rursum ut ex singulis particule secernantur.

	\|<span id="jp53"></span> And Empedocles, though he uses the causes to a greater extent than this, neither does so sufficiently nor attains consistency in their use. At least, in many cases he makes love segregate things, and strife aggregate them. For whenever the universe is dissolved into its elements by strife, fire is aggregated into one, and so is each of the other elements; but whenever again under the influence of love they come together into one, the parts must again be segregated out of each element.		\|<span id="jp53"></span> And Empedocles, though he uses the causes to a greater extent than this, neither does so sufficiently nor attains consistency in their use. At least, in many cases he makes love segregate things, and strife aggregate them. For whenever the universe is dissolved into its elements by strife, fire is aggregated into one, and so is each of the other elements; but whenever again under the influence of love they come together into one, the parts must again be segregated out of each element.

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	\|Empedocles quidem igitur praeter priores primus hanc cau{{bk\|~~985a30~~}}sam dividens induxit, non unum faciens motus principium sed diversa et contraria. Amplius autem quae in materie specie dicuntur elementa quatuor primus dixit; non tamen utitur quatuor sed ut duobus existentibus solis, igne quidem secun{{bk\|~~985b1~~}}dum se, oppositis vero quasi una natura: terra et aere et aqua. Sumet autem utique aliquis id speculans ex versibus.		\|Empedocles quidem igitur praeter priores primus hanc cau{{a\|bk985a30\|↵}}sam dividens induxit, non unum faciens motus principium sed diversa et contraria. Amplius autem quae in materie specie dicuntur elementa quatuor primus dixit; non tamen utitur quatuor sed ut duobus existentibus solis, igne quidem secun{{a\|bk985b1\|↵}}dum se, oppositis vero quasi una natura: terra et aere et aqua. Sumet autem utique aliquis id speculans ex versibus.

	\|<span id="jp54"></span> Empedocles, then, in contrast with his precessors, was the first to introduce the dividing of this cause, not positing one source of movement, but different and contrary sources. Again, he was the first to speak of four material elements; yet he does not use four, but treats them as two only; [ '''85b'''] he treats fire by itself, and its opposite-earth, air, and water-as one kind of thing. We may learn this by study of his verses.		\|<span id="jp54"></span> Empedocles, then, in contrast with his precessors, was the first to introduce the dividing of this cause, not positing one source of movement, but different and contrary sources. Again, he was the first to speak of four material elements; yet he does not use four, but treats them as two only; [ '''85b'''] he treats fire by itself, and its opposite-earth, air, and water-as one kind of thing. We may learn this by study of his verses.
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	\|''Leucippus vero'' et collega eius Democritus elementa qui{{bk\|~~985b5~~}}dem plenum et inane dicunt esse, dicentes velut hoc quidem ens illud vero non ens, horum autem plenum quidem et solidum ens, inane vero non ens; propter quod et nihil magis ens non ente esse dicunt, quia nec inane corpore. Causas autem entium haec ut materiam.		\|''Leucippus vero'' et collega eius Democritus elementa qui{{a\|bk985b5\|↵}}dem plenum et inane dicunt esse, dicentes velut hoc quidem ens illud vero non ens, horum autem plenum quidem et solidum ens, inane vero non ens; propter quod et nihil magis ens non ente esse dicunt, quia nec inane corpore. Causas autem entium haec ut materiam.

	\|<span id="jp55"></span> Leucippus and his associate Democritus say that the full and the empty are the elements, calling the one being and the other non-being-the full and solid being being, the empty non-being (whence they say being no more is than non-being, because the solid no more is than the empty); and they make these the material causes of things.		\|<span id="jp55"></span> Leucippus and his associate Democritus say that the full and the empty are the elements, calling the one being and the other non-being-the full and solid being being, the empty non-being (whence they say being no more is than non-being, because the solid no more is than the empty); and they make these the material causes of things.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|''Et quemadmodum qui unum'' faciunt {{bk\|~~985b10~~}} subiectam substantiam alia passionibus eius generant, rarum et spissum principia passionum ponentes, eodem modo et hii differentias causas aliorum esse dicunt. Has vero tres dicunt esse: figuram * et ordinem et positionem. Differre enim aiunt {{bk\|~~985b15~~}} ens rismo et diathigi et tropi solum; horum autem rismos figura est et diathigi ordo et tropi positio. Differt enim a ab n figura, an autem a na ordine, z autem ab n positione. De motu vero, unde aut quomodo inest existentibus, et hii aliis {{bk\|~~985b20~~}} consimiliter negligenter dimiserunt.		\|''Et quemadmodum qui unum'' faciunt {{a\|bk985b10\|↵}} subiectam substantiam alia passionibus eius generant, rarum et spissum principia passionum ponentes, eodem modo et hii differentias causas aliorum esse dicunt. Has vero tres dicunt esse: figuram * et ordinem et positionem. Differre enim aiunt {{a\|bk985b15\|↵}} ens rismo et diathigi et tropi solum; horum autem rismos figura est et diathigi ordo et tropi positio. Differt enim a ab n figura, an autem a na ordine, z autem ab n positione. De motu vero, unde aut quomodo inest existentibus, et hii aliis {{a\|bk985b20\|↵}} consimiliter negligenter dimiserunt.

	\|<span id="jp56"></span> And as those who make the underlying substance one generate all other things by its modifications, supposing the rare and the dense to be the sources of the modifications, in the same way these philosophers say the differences in the elements are the causes of all other qualities. These differences, they say, are three-shape and order and position. For they say the real is differentiated only by ‘rhythm and ‘inter-contact’ and ‘turning’; and of these rhythm is shape, inter-contact is order, and turning is position; for A differs from N in shape, AN from NA in order, M from W in position. The question of movement-whence or how it is to belong to things – these thinkers, like the others, lazily neglected.		\|<span id="jp56"></span> And as those who make the underlying substance one generate all other things by its modifications, supposing the rare and the dense to be the sources of the modifications, in the same way these philosophers say the differences in the elements are the causes of all other qualities. These differences, they say, are three-shape and order and position. For they say the real is differentiated only by ‘rhythm and ‘inter-contact’ and ‘turning’; and of these rhythm is shape, inter-contact is order, and turning is position; for A differs from N in shape, AN from NA in order, M from W in position. The question of movement-whence or how it is to belong to things – these thinkers, like the others, lazily neglected.

Edward Ockham at 16:20, 9 March 2014

2014-03-09T16:20:56Z

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==Chapter 4==
{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|Suspicabitur autem utique aliquis Esiodum primum quesivisse huiusmodi, et utique si quis alius amorem aut desiderium in existentibus quasi principium posuisset, ut Parmeni{{bk|984b25}}des; et enim hic temptans monstrare universi generationem, “primum quidem” ait

| '''Chapter 4'''. One might suspect that Hesiod was the first to look for such a thing-or some one else who put love or desire among existing things as a principle, as Parmenides, too, does; for he, in constructing the genesis of the universe, says:—

|- valign = top
|“deorum amorem fore providentem omnibus”. Esiodus vero “omnium primum chaos fuisse, deinde terram latam et amorem, qui omnia condecet immortalia”,

|Love first of all the Gods she planned.
And Hesiod says:—
 First of all things was chaos made, and then
 Broad-breasted earth...
 And love, ‘mid all the gods pre-eminent,

|- valign = top
|quasi necessarium sit in existentibus esse causam quae {{bk|984b30}} {{p|22}} res ipsas moveat et congreget. Hns quidem igitur quomodo oporteat distribuere de hoc quis * primus, liceat iudicare posterius. Quoniam vero contraria bonis inesse videbantur in {{bk|985a1}} natura, et non solum ordinatio et bonum sed inordinatio et turpe, et plura * mala melioribus et praua bonis, sic alius aliquis amorem induxit et litem, singula singulorum causam horum. {{bk|985a5}} si quis enim assequatur et accipiat ad intellectum et non ad quae balbutit dicens Empedocles, inveniet amorem quidem causam esse agathorum, litem vero malorum. Quare si quis dixerit quodam modo rdicere et primum dicere Empedoclem bonum et malum principia, forsan bene dicet, si bonorum {{bk|985a10}} omnium ei bonum est causa et malorum malum.

|which implies that among existing things there must be from the first a cause which will move things and bring them together. How these thinkers should be arranged with regard to priority of discovery let us be allowed to decide later; but since the contraries of the various forms of good were also perceived to be present in nature-not only order and the beautiful, but also disorder and the ugly, and ['''85a'''] bad things in greater number than good, and ignoble things than beautiful-therefore another thinker introduced friendship and strife, each of the two the cause of one of these two sets of qualities. For if we were to follow out the view of Empedocles, and interpret it according to its meaning and not to its lisping expression, we should find that friendship is the cause of good things, and strife of bad. Therefore, if we said that Empedocles in a sense both mentions, and is the first to mention, the bad and the good as principles, we should perhaps be right, since the cause of all goods is the good itself.

|- valign = top
|Isti quidem igitur, sicut diximus, et usque ad hoc duas causas tetigerunt quas in phisicis determinavimus, materiamque et id unde motus, obscure quidem et non manifeste sed qualiter in {{bk|985a15}} bellis ineruditi faciunt; et enim illi circumducti saepe bonas plagas faciunt, at nec illi ex scientia nec isti sunt assimilati scientibus dicere quod dicunt; hiis etenim fere usi videntur nihil nisi parum.

| These thinkers, as we say, evidently grasped, and to this extent, two of the causes which we distinguished in our work on nature-the matter and the source of the movement-vaguely, however, and with no clearness, but as untrained men behave in fights; for they go round their opponents and often strike fine blows, but they do not fight on scientific principles, and so too these thinkers do not seem to know what they say; for it is evident that, as a rule, they make no use of their causes except to a small extent.

|- valign = top
|Anaxagoras enim artificialiter ad mundi generatio{{bk|985a20}}nem utitur intellectu. Nam quando dubitat qua causa ex necessitate est, tunc attrahit ipsum, in aliis vero omnia magis causatur eorum quae fiunt quam intellectum.

| For Anaxagoras uses reason as a deus ex machina for the making of the world, and when he is at a loss to tell from what cause something necessarily is, then he drags reason in, but in all other cases ascribes events to anything rather than to reason.

|- valign = top
|Et Empedocles plus quidem hoc utitur causis, sed tamen nec sufficienter, nec in hiis invenit quod confessum est. Multis igitur in locis apud {{bk|985a25}} ipsum amor disgregat, lis autem congregat. Nam cum in elementa quidem ipsum omne a lite distrahitur, tunc ignis in unum et aliorum elementorum singula concernuntur; cum {{p|23}} autem iterum in unum ab amore conveniunt, necesse rursum ut ex singulis particule secernantur.

| And Empedocles, though he uses the causes to a greater extent than this, neither does so sufficiently nor attains consistency in their use. At least, in many cases he makes love segregate things, and strife aggregate them. For whenever the universe is dissolved into its elements by strife, fire is aggregated into one, and so is each of the other elements; but whenever again under the influence of love they come together into one, the parts must again be segregated out of each element.

|- valign = top
|Empedocles quidem igitur praeter priores primus hanc cau{{bk|985a30}}sam dividens induxit, non unum faciens motus principium sed diversa et contraria. Amplius autem quae in materie specie dicuntur elementa quatuor primus dixit; non tamen utitur quatuor sed ut duobus existentibus solis, igne quidem secun{{bk|985b1}}dum se, oppositis vero quasi una natura: terra et aere et aqua. Sumet autem utique aliquis id speculans ex versibus.

| Empedocles, then, in contrast with his precessors, was the first to introduce the dividing of this cause, not positing one source of movement, but different and contrary sources. Again, he was the first to speak of four material elements; yet he does not use four, but treats them as two only; [ '''85b'''] he treats fire by itself, and its opposite-earth, air, and water-as one kind of thing. We may learn this by study of his verses.

|- valign = top
|Hic quidem igitur, sicut diximus, sic * et tot dixit principia.

|This philosopher then, as we say, has spoken of the principles in this way, and made them of this number.

|- valign = top
|''Leucippus vero'' et collega eius Democritus elementa qui{{bk|985b5}}dem plenum et inane dicunt esse, dicentes velut hoc quidem ens illud vero non ens, horum autem plenum quidem et solidum ens, inane vero non ens; propter quod et nihil magis ens non ente esse dicunt, quia nec inane corpore. Causas autem entium haec ut materiam.

| Leucippus and his associate Democritus say that the full and the empty are the elements, calling the one being and the other non-being-the full and solid being being, the empty non-being (whence they say being no more is than non-being, because the solid no more is than the empty); and they make these the material causes of things.

|- valign = top
|''Et quemadmodum qui unum'' faciunt {{bk|985b10}} subiectam substantiam alia passionibus eius generant, rarum et spissum principia passionum ponentes, eodem modo et hii differentias causas aliorum esse dicunt. Has vero tres dicunt esse: figuram * et ordinem et positionem. Differre enim aiunt {{bk|985b15}} ens rismo et diathigi et tropi solum; horum autem rismos figura est et diathigi ordo et tropi positio. Differt enim a ab n figura, an autem a na ordine, z autem ab n positione. De motu vero, unde aut quomodo inest existentibus, et hii aliis {{bk|985b20}} consimiliter negligenter dimiserunt.

| And as those who make the underlying substance one generate all other things by its modifications, supposing the rare and the dense to be the sources of the modifications, in the same way these philosophers say the differences in the elements are the causes of all other qualities. These differences, they say, are three-shape and order and position. For they say the real is differentiated only by ‘rhythm and ‘inter-contact’ and ‘turning’; and of these rhythm is shape, inter-contact is order, and turning is position; for A differs from N in shape, AN from NA in order, M from W in position. The question of movement-whence or how it is to belong to things – these thinkers, like the others, lazily neglected.

|- valign = top
|De duabus quidem igitur causis, ut diximus, in tantum videtur quesitum esse prius.

|Regarding the two causes, then, as we say, the inquiry seems to have been pushed thus far by the early philosophers.

|}
<noinclude>
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
</noinclude>