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	<title>Talk:Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 1 - Revision history</title>
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		<title>Edward Ockham: Created page with &quot;Aristotle &#039;&#039;Topics&#039;&#039; I.  Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. (a) It is a &#039;demo...&quot;</title>
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		<updated>2011-07-12T14:29:04Z</updated>

		<summary type="html">&lt;p&gt;Created page with &amp;quot;Aristotle &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Topics&amp;#039;&amp;#039; I.  Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. (a) It is a &amp;#039;demo...&amp;quot;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&lt;b&gt;New page&lt;/b&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div&gt;Aristotle &amp;#039;&amp;#039;Topics&amp;#039;&amp;#039; I.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;br /&gt;
Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down,&lt;br /&gt;
something other than these necessarily comes about through them. (a)&lt;br /&gt;
It is a &amp;#039;demonstration&amp;#039;, when the premisses from which the reasoning&lt;br /&gt;
starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them&lt;br /&gt;
has originally come through premisses which are primary and true:&lt;br /&gt;
(b) reasoning, on the other hand, is &amp;#039;dialectical&amp;#039;, if it reasons&lt;br /&gt;
from opinions that are generally accepted. Things are &amp;#039;true&amp;#039; and &amp;#039;primary&amp;#039;&lt;br /&gt;
which are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves:&lt;br /&gt;
for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to&lt;br /&gt;
ask any further for the why and wherefore of them; each of the first&lt;br /&gt;
principles should command belief in and by itself. On the other hand,&lt;br /&gt;
those opinions are &amp;#039;generally accepted&amp;#039; which are accepted by every&lt;br /&gt;
one or by the majority or by the philosophers-i.e. by all, or by the&lt;br /&gt;
majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them.&lt;/div&gt;</summary>
		<author><name>Edward Ockham</name></author>
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