Se habere - Revision history

Edward Ockham at 07:37, 26 August 2026

2026-08-26T07:37:02Z

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	\|Tertio manifestat idem per quoddam exemplum vulgaris proverbii, ibi quare si concludens ex praemissis, quod ex quo unusquisque potest cognoscere de veritate, licet x parum, ita ''se habere'' videtur in cognitione veritatis, sicut proverbialiter dicitur: in foribus, idest in ianuis domorum, quis delinquet?		\|Tertio manifestat idem per quoddam exemplum vulgaris proverbii, ibi quare si concludens ex praemissis, quod ex quo unusquisque potest cognoscere de veritate, licet parum, ita ''se habere'' videtur in cognitione veritatis, sicut proverbialiter dicitur: in foribus, idest in ianuis domorum, quis delinquet?

	\|Third, he shows that the same thing is true by citing a common proverb. He concludes from the foregoing that since anyone can attain some knowledge of the truth, even though it be little, ''the situation'' in the case of knowledge is like the one that we speak of in the proverb “Who will miss a door?” i.e., the outer door of a house.		\|Third, he shows that the same thing is true by citing a common proverb. He concludes from the foregoing that since anyone can attain some knowledge of the truth, even though it be little, ''the situation'' in the case of knowledge is like the one that we speak of in the proverb “Who will miss a door?” i.e., the outer door of a house.

Edward Ockham at 07:36, 26 August 2026

2026-08-26T07:36:42Z

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	\|Tertio manifestat idem per quoddam exemplum vulgaris proverbii, ibi quare si concludens ex praemissis, quod ex quo unusquisque potest cognoscere de veritate, licet parum, ita ''se habere'' videtur in cognitione veritatis, sicut proverbialiter dicitur: in foribus, idest in ianuis domorum, quis delinquet?		\|Tertio manifestat idem per quoddam exemplum vulgaris proverbii, ibi quare si concludens ex praemissis, quod ex quo unusquisque potest cognoscere de veritate, licet x parum, ita ''se habere'' videtur in cognitione veritatis, sicut proverbialiter dicitur: in foribus, idest in ianuis domorum, quis delinquet?

	\|Third, he shows that the same thing is true by citing a common proverb. He concludes from the foregoing that since anyone can attain some knowledge of the truth, even though it be little, ''the situation'' in the case of knowledge is like the one that we speak of in the proverb “Who will miss a door?” i.e., the outer door of a house.		\|Third, he shows that the same thing is true by citing a common proverb. He concludes from the foregoing that since anyone can attain some knowledge of the truth, even though it be little, ''the situation'' in the case of knowledge is like the one that we speak of in the proverb “Who will miss a door?” i.e., the outer door of a house.

Edward Ockham at 15:48, 28 October 2018

2018-10-28T15:48:21Z

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			[[File:Mulu-lang-cave.jpg\|thumb\|right\|260px\|''Sicut enim nicticoracum oculi ad lucem diei '''se habent''', sic et anime nostre intellectus ad ea quae sunt omnium nature manifestissima''."For as the eyes of bats '''are''' to the blaze of day, so is the reason in our soul to the things which are by nature most evident of all"]]
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	{\| border=1 cellpadding=10		{\| border=1 cellpadding=10
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Edward Ockham at 15:39, 28 October 2018

2018-10-28T15:39:40Z

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	\|Cum enim ita sit, quod ea, quae sunt aliis causa essendi, sint maxime vera, sequitur quod unumquodque sicut ''se habet'' ad hoc quod sit, ita etiam ''se habet'' ad hoc quod habeat veritatem.<ref>Aristot., Metaph. 2.1.993b30-31</ref>Ea enim, quorum esse non semper eodem modo ''se habet'', nec veritas eorum semper manet. Et ea quorum esse habet causam, etiam veritatis causam habent.		\|Cum enim ita sit, quod ea, quae sunt aliis causa essendi, sint maxime vera, sequitur quod unumquodque sicut ''se habet'' ad hoc quod sit, ita etiam ''se habet'' ad hoc quod habeat veritatem.<ref>Aristot., Metaph. 2.1.993b30-31 ὥσθ᾽ ἕκαστον ὡς ἔχει τοῦ εἶναι, οὕτω καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας</ref>Ea enim, quorum esse non semper eodem modo ''se habet'', nec veritas eorum semper manet. Et ea quorum esse habet causam, etiam veritatis causam habent.

	\|Since those things which cause the being of other things are true in the highest degree, it follows that each thing ''is true insofar as'' it is a being<ref> A very ‘free’ translation. Literally: ‘just as each thing stands/is related to what is/exists [sit], so also it stands/is related to what has truth.</ref>; for things which do not always have being in the same way do not always ''have truth'' in the same way, and those which have a cause of their being also have a cause of their truth.		\|Since those things which cause the being of other things are true in the highest degree, it follows that each thing ''is true insofar as'' it is a being<ref> A very ‘free’ translation. Literally: ‘just as each thing stands/is related to what is/exists [sit], so also it stands/is related to what has truth.</ref>; for things which do not always have being in the same way do not always ''have truth'' in the same way, and those which have a cause of their being also have a cause of their truth.

Edward Ockham at 15:30, 28 October 2018

2018-10-28T15:30:10Z

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	\|Cum enim ita sit, quod ea, quae sunt aliis causa essendi, sint maxime vera, sequitur quod unumquodque sicut ''se habet'' ad hoc quod sit, ita etiam ''se habet'' ad hoc quod habeat veritatem. Ea enim, quorum esse non semper eodem modo ''se habet'', nec veritas eorum semper manet. Et ea quorum esse habet causam, etiam veritatis causam habent.		\|Cum enim ita sit, quod ea, quae sunt aliis causa essendi, sint maxime vera, sequitur quod unumquodque sicut ''se habet'' ad hoc quod sit, ita etiam ''se habet'' ad hoc quod habeat veritatem.<ref>Aristot., Metaph. 2.1.993b30-31</ref>Ea enim, quorum esse non semper eodem modo ''se habet'', nec veritas eorum semper manet. Et ea quorum esse habet causam, etiam veritatis causam habent.

	\|Since those things which cause the being of other things are true in the highest degree, it follows that each thing ''is true insofar as'' it is a being<ref> A very ‘free’ translation. Literally: ‘just as each thing stands/is related to what exists [sit], so also it stands/is related to what has truth.</ref>; for things which do not always have being in the same way do not always ''have truth'' in the same way, and those which have a cause of their being also have a cause of their truth.		\|Since those things which cause the being of other things are true in the highest degree, it follows that each thing ''is true insofar as'' it is a being<ref> A very ‘free’ translation. Literally: ‘just as each thing stands/is related to what is/exists [sit], so also it stands/is related to what has truth.</ref>; for things which do not always have being in the same way do not always ''have truth'' in the same way, and those which have a cause of their being also have a cause of their truth.

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	\|unumquodque autem sic ''se habet'' ad esse sicut ad veritatem<ref> ~~This is a standard formula~~</ref>		\|unumquodque autem sic ''se habet'' ad esse sicut ad veritatem<ref>Aristot., Metaph. 2.1.993b30-31</ref>

	\|but each thing is disposed to existence as it is to truth		\|but each thing is disposed to existence as it is to truth

Edward Ockham: Created page with "{| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=45%|Latin !valign = top width=55%|English |- valign = top |Aquinas http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/meta..."

2018-10-28T15:22:52Z

Created page with "{| border=1 cellpadding=10 !valign = top width=45%|Latin !valign = top width=55%|English |- valign = top |Aquinas<ref> http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/meta..."

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{| border=1 cellpadding=10
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|Aquinas<ref> http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/metaphysics/liber2 (Dominican transl)</ref>

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|Tertio manifestat idem per quoddam exemplum vulgaris proverbii, ibi quare si concludens ex praemissis, quod ex quo unusquisque potest cognoscere de veritate, licet parum, ita ''se habere'' videtur in cognitione veritatis, sicut proverbialiter dicitur: in foribus, idest in ianuis domorum, quis delinquet?

|Third, he shows that the same thing is true by citing a common proverb. He concludes from the foregoing that since anyone can attain some knowledge of the truth, even though it be little, ''the situation'' in the case of knowledge is like the one that we speak of in the proverb “Who will miss a door?” i.e., the outer door of a house.

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|Ex quo contingit, quod intellectus animae nostrae hoc modo se habet ad entia immaterialia, quae inter omnia sunt maxime manifesta secundum suam naturam, sicut ''se habent'' oculi nycticoracum ad lucem diei, quam videre non possunt, quamvis videant obscura.

|From this it follows that our soul’s intellectual power is related to those immaterial beings, which are by nature the most knowable of all, ''as'' the eyes of owls ''are'' to the light of day, which they cannot see because their power of vision is weak, although they do see dimly lighted things.

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|Postquam philosophus ostendit qualiter ''se habet'' homo ad considerationem veritatis, hic ostendit quod cognitio veritatis maxime ad philosophiam primam pertineat.

|Having shown how man ''is disposed'' for the study of truth, the Philosopher now shows that the knowledge of truth belongs pre-eminently to first philosophy.

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|Sed finis practicae est opus, quia etsi practici, hoc est operativi, intendant cognoscere veritatem, quomodo ''se habeat'' in aliquibus rebus, non tamen quaerunt eam tamquam ultimum finem.

|But the end of practical knowledge is action, because, even though “practical men,” i.e., men of action, attempt to understand the truth ''as it belongs'' to certain things, they do not seek this as an ultimate end ..

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|Nomen autem veritatis non est proprium alicui speciei, sed ''se habet'' communiter ad omnia entia.

|Now the term truth is not proper to one class of beings only, but ''is applied'' universally to all beings.

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|Cum enim ita sit, quod ea, quae sunt aliis causa essendi, sint maxime vera, sequitur quod unumquodque sicut ''se habet'' ad hoc quod sit, ita etiam ''se habet'' ad hoc quod habeat veritatem. Ea enim, quorum esse non semper eodem modo ''se habet'', nec veritas eorum semper manet. Et ea quorum esse habet causam, etiam veritatis causam habent.

|Since those things which cause the being of other things are true in the highest degree, it follows that each thing ''is true insofar as'' it is a being<ref> A very ‘free’ translation. Literally: ‘just as each thing stands/is related to what exists [sit], so also it stands/is related to what has truth.</ref>; for things which do not always have being in the same way do not always ''have truth'' in the same way, and those which have a cause of their being also have a cause of their truth.

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|Et sic dicimus, quod ex puero fit vir, vel quod ex addiscente fit sciens, quia addiscens ''se habet'' ut in fieri ad scientem. In alio autem modo, quo dicimus ex aere fieri aquam, unum extremorum non ''se habet'' ut via vel medium ad alterum, sicut fieri ad factum esse

|Now this is the sense in which we say that a man comes from a boy, or a man of science from a learner, because a learner ''is'' one who is becoming a man of science. But in the other sense, i.e., the one in which we say that water comes from fire, one of the limits of the change is not ''related to'' the other as a passage or intermediate, as generation is to being …

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|Illud enim ex quo dicimus aliquid fieri, sicut ex puero virum, ''se habet'' ut medium inter duo extrema

|For the thing from which we say something else comes as a man comes from a boy ''has the position'' of an intermediary between two limits

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|Scotus<ref> http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Duns_Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio_I/D2/P2Q4H, transl Peter Simpson</ref>

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|Quia si est immutabilis, ergo immutabiliter ''se habet'' ad illud ad quod immediate ''se habet''; ergo illud aliud est immutabile. Probatio consequentiae primae: immutabile, quod est ex se primum agens, non potest diversimode ''se habere'' ad effectum suum, quia si quandoque agat, quandoque non, hoc videtur esse ex mutatione sui; non enim hoc potest poni propter approximationem novam passivi vel propter amotionem impedimentorum, quia actio primi agentis non requirit ista. - Probatio secundae consequentiae: ad quodcumque necessarium ''se habet'' necessario, illud est necessarium.

|Because if he is immutable then he ''is disposed'' immutably to that to which he is immediately ''disposed''; therefore that other thing is immutable. Proof of the first consequence: an immutable thing, which is of itself the first agent, cannot be diversely ''disposed'' to its effect, because if it sometimes acts and sometimes does not, this seems to be from a change in itself; for this change cannot be posited as because of a new proximity of the passive thing or because of the removal of impediments, because the action of the first agent does not require these. - Proof of the second consequence: to whatever a necessary thing is necessarily ''disposed'', that is itself necessary.

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|Ponitur quod decem modis potest aliquid ''se habere'' ad esse

|It is posited [by Henry] that in ten ways can something ''be disposed'' to existence

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|unumquodque autem sic ''se habet'' ad esse sicut ad veritatem<ref> This is a standard formula</ref>

|but each thing is disposed to existence as it is to truth

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|Aristoteles posuit, et similiter Avicenna, Deum necessario ''sese habere'' ad alia extra se, et ex hoc sequitur quod quodlibet aliud necessario ''se habet'' ad ipsum

|Aristotle posited, and Avicenna likewise, that God is necessarily ''disposed'' to other things outside himself, and from this it follows that some other thing is necessarily ''disposed'' to God

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|Deus necessario se habet ad quidlibet quod est extra se

|God is necessarily disposed to something that is outside himself

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|I D2<ref> Simpson</ref>

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|Intellectus enim postquam est conversus ad illa ad quae conversus est ''se habet'' ut potentiale quoddam et purum possibile

|For the intellect, after it has turned itself back to the things to which it has been turned back, ''possesses itself'' as a certain potential and pure possible

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|Voluntas autem postquam conversa est ad quae conversa est ''se habet'' ut activum quoddam

|the will, after it has turned itself back to what it has turned itself back to, ''is related'' as a certain active thing

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|necessario ''se habet'' ad productiones illarum, contingenter autem ''se habet'' principium producendi creaturas ad ipsas creaturas<ref> I D20 Simpson</ref>

|it is necessarily ''related'' to the production of them, but the principle of producing creatures is contingently ''related'' to the creatures themselves

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|Ockham

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|Unde quando aliquae res sic se habent quod possunt sibi succedere in eodem subiecto<ref> I.36 Buckner</ref>

|Hence, when some things are related that they can succeed each other in the same subject

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|Sic ''se habent'' 'visus' et 'caecitas'

|‘Sight’ and ‘blindness’ ''are related'' in this way

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|sicut ''se habent'' 'iustus' et 'iustitia', 'album' et 'albedo' et consimilia<ref> I.5 Buckner</ref>

|‘Just’ and ‘justice’, ‘white’ and ‘whiteness’, and suchlike ''are related'' in this way

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|nam tales res quandoque ''se habent'' sicut causa et effectus

|For such things ''are'' sometimes ''related'' as cause and effect

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|Ordinatio (Peter King)

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|tamen possumus habere notitiam alicuius ficti quod aequaliter ''se habet'' ad omnes homines<ref> I D2 Q8</ref>

|nevertheless, we can have a notion of some fiction that is equally ''related'' to all men

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|Et ita ordo praedicamentalis substantiae est unum compositum seu aggregatum ex multis qualitatibus naturaliter ''se habentibus'' secundum superius et inferius

|Thus the categorial order of Substance is a composite or aggregate of many qualities naturally ''related'' as higher and lower

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|si universale esset substantia et aliquid esset sibi additum, oporteret quod ''se haberent'' sicut actus et potentia<ref> Ibid Q7</ref>

|if the universal were substance and something were added to it, it would be necessary that ''they be related'' as act and potency

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|omni illi ad quod illud informans vel extrinsecum ''se habet'' uniformiter illi tale denominans aequaliter conveniet

|the denominating [factor] equally agrees to all to which the informing or extrinsic [thing] ''is related'' uniformly.

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|ita quod unum quod est in re ex se aliter ''se habet'' ad esse universale quam aliud

|such that one [thing] in the world ''is related'' to universal being differently from another

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|Summa (Longeway)

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|scientia propter quid habetur per aliam scientiam, quo modo ''se habent'' ad invicem scientia subalternans et scientia subalternata<ref> III-2.21</ref>

|knowledge why it is so is had through another science, the two ''being related'' to one another in the same way as a subalternating science and a subaltern science

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|Istae autem duae definitiones serrae --- si sint definitiones; quia exempla ponimus, non ut ita sint, sed ut sentiant qui addiscunt --- sic ''se habent'' quod quidquid significatur per definitionem secundam, significatur etiam per definitionem primam, quamvis generalius<ref> III-2.33</ref>

|Now these two definitions of saw — if they are definitions, for we posit the example, not as something which is so, but as something that students might think to be so—-these two definitions ''are related'', because whatever is signified by the second definition is signified also by the first definition

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|Et quia tactum est de esse exsistere, aliquantulum disgrediendo considerandum est qualiter esse exsistere ''se habet'' ad rem: utrum scilicet essentia rei et esse rei sint duo extra animam, distincta inter se.<ref> III-2.27</ref>

|And since being of existence (esse existentiae) has been touched on, turning aside for a little bit, we ought to consider how existence ''is related'' to a reality, that is, whether the essence of a reality and the being of the reality are two things distinct from one another outside the soul.

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==Notes==
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