Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 10 - Revision history

Ragnarr49 at 13:08, 26 April 2025

2025-04-26T13:08:50Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 08:08, 26 April 2025
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	\|\|Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `iste est pater; iste non fuit pater; igitur iste est mutatus', `iste est similis; iste non erit similis; ergo iste mutabitur', et sic de multis aliis. Est autem sciendum quod iste modus fallaciae figurae dictionis numquam habet locum quando accipiuntur duae praemissae mere categoricae et mere de inesse et mere de praesenti, dispositae vocaliter in modo et figura.		\|\|Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `iste est pater; iste non fuit pater; igitur iste est mutatus', `iste est similis; iste non erit similis; ergo iste mutabitur', et sic de multis aliis. Est autem sciendum quod iste modus fallaciae figurae dictionis numquam habet locum quando accipiuntur duae praemissae mere categoricae et mere de inesse et mere de praesenti, dispositae vocaliter in modo et figura.

	\|\|Whence here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `This one is a father; he was not a father; therefore he has changed', 'this thing is similar; this thing will not be similar; therefore this thing will be changed', and so about many others. It must be known, however, that this mode of illusory figure of speech never takes place when two premises are taken that are purely categorical and purely ~~about being~~ and purely about the present, arranged verbally in manner and form.		\|\|Whence here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `This one is a father; he was not a father; therefore he has changed', 'this thing is similar; this thing will not be similar; therefore this thing will be changed', and so about many others. It must be known, however, that this mode of illusory figure of speech never takes place when two premises are taken that are purely categorical and purely assertoric and purely about the present, arranged verbally in manner and form.

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	\|\|Creditur enim propter similitudinem dictionum quod consimiliter contingit arguere ex istis terminis sicut ex illis, et tunc fiet deceptio per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Est autem primo sciendum quod non semper quando arguitur ex terminis diversorum praedicamentorum est fallacia figurae dictionis, quia universaliter quando praemissae sunt mere de inesse et de praesenti et categoricae et in recto, et dispositae in modo et in figura, non est fallacia figurae dictionis, qualescumque sint termini.		\|\|Creditur enim propter similitudinem dictionum quod consimiliter contingit arguere ex istis terminis sicut ex illis, et tunc fiet deceptio per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Est autem primo sciendum quod non semper quando arguitur ex terminis diversorum praedicamentorum est fallacia figurae dictionis, quia universaliter quando praemissae sunt mere de inesse et de praesenti et categoricae et in recto, et dispositae in modo et in figura, non est fallacia figurae dictionis, qualescumque sint termini.

	\|\|For it is believed, because of the similarity of the wordings, that it is possible to argue similarly from these terms as from those, and then there will be deception through the fallacy of the figure of speech. But first of all it must be known that there is not always a fallacy of figure of speech when it is argued from the terms of different categories, because universally when premises are merely ~~of inherence~~ and of the present and categorical and correct, and arranged in manner and figure, there is no fallacy of figure of speech, whatever the terms may be.		\|\|For it is believed, because of the similarity of the wordings, that it is possible to argue similarly from these terms as from those, and then there will be deception through the fallacy of the figure of speech. But first of all it must be known that there is not always a fallacy of figure of speech when it is argued from the terms of different categories, because universally when premises are merely assertoric and of the present and categorical and correct, and arranged in manner and figure, there is no fallacy of figure of speech, whatever the terms may be.

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	\|\|Pro quo sciendum quod quando distributivum substantiae ponitur in propositione mere de praesenti et mere de inesse, non refert quodcumque accipere sub in minore. Et ideo talis modus arguendi valet `quidquid emis, comedis; carnes crudas emis; igitur carnes crudas comedis', `quidquid est substantia corporea, est quantitas; corpus Christi est substantia corporea; igitur corpus Christi est quantitas', et sic de aliis. Ita tamen quod in minore non accipiatur aliqua determinatio compositionis quae non accipiebatur in maiore et simul cum hoc quod non commutetur unus numerus in alium numerum, quia si alterum illorum fiat, accidet fallacia figurae dictionis, sicut ostendetur.		\|\|Pro quo sciendum quod quando distributivum substantiae ponitur in propositione mere de praesenti et mere de inesse, non refert quodcumque accipere sub in minore. Et ideo talis modus arguendi valet `quidquid emis, comedis; carnes crudas emis; igitur carnes crudas comedis', `quidquid est substantia corporea, est quantitas; corpus Christi est substantia corporea; igitur corpus Christi est quantitas', et sic de aliis. Ita tamen quod in minore non accipiatur aliqua determinatio compositionis quae non accipiebatur in maiore et simul cum hoc quod non commutetur unus numerus in alium numerum, quia si alterum illorum fiat, accidet fallacia figurae dictionis, sicut ostendetur.

	\|\|For which reason it should be known that when the distributive of substance is placed in a proposition merely of the present and merely ~~of being~~, it does not matter if one takes anything under the minor. And therefore this method of reasoning is valid: `whatsoever you buy, you eat; you buy raw meat; therefore eat raw meat', `whatsoever is a corporeal substance is a quantity; the body of Christ is a corporeal substance; therefore, the body of Christ is a quantity', and so of the others. Nevertheless, in the minor, no determination of composition is accepted which was not accepted in the major, and at the same time that one number is not changed into another number, because if one of them becomes another, a fallacy of the figure of speech will occur, as will be shown.		\|\|For which reason it should be known that when the distributive of substance is placed in a proposition merely of the present and merely assertoric, it does not matter if one takes anything under the minor. And therefore this method of reasoning is valid: `whatsoever you buy, you eat; you buy raw meat; therefore eat raw meat', `whatsoever is a corporeal substance is a quantity; the body of Christ is a corporeal substance; therefore, the body of Christ is a quantity', and so of the others. Nevertheless, in the minor, no determination of composition is accepted which was not accepted in the major, and at the same time that one number is not changed into another number, because if one of them becomes another, a fallacy of the figure of speech will occur, as will be shown.

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	\|\|Unde pluribus modis, quando non accipiuntur praemissae dispositae in modo et in figura nec aequivalentes talibus, accidit fallacia figurae dictionis: vel sumendo aliud nomen quam per quod respondetur ad quaestionem factam per `quid est' de re una; quandoque enim hoc accidit arguendo ex propositionibus de praesenti, quandoque ex propositionibus de praeterito vel de futuro, quandoque ex propositionibus de modo. Si arguatur ex propositionibus de praesenti et de inesse, hoc potest contingere vel addendo aliquam determinationem per quam potest, partialiter saltem, responderi ad quaestionem factam per aliud interrogativum de re una quam per `quid est'. Sicut si arguatur `quidquid currit est corpus; homo velociter currit; igitur homo velociter est corpus', quia in minore additur `velociter', per quod respondetur aliquo modo ad aliam quaestionem quam ad quaestionem factam per `quid est', ideo est fallacia figurae dictionis. Et tamen si poneretur haec determinatio `realiter', esset bonum argumentum, sic arguendo		\|\|Unde pluribus modis, quando non accipiuntur praemissae dispositae in modo et in figura nec aequivalentes talibus, accidit fallacia figurae dictionis: vel sumendo aliud nomen quam per quod respondetur ad quaestionem factam per `quid est' de re una; quandoque enim hoc accidit arguendo ex propositionibus de praesenti, quandoque ex propositionibus de praeterito vel de futuro, quandoque ex propositionibus de modo. Si arguatur ex propositionibus de praesenti et de inesse, hoc potest contingere vel addendo aliquam determinationem per quam potest, partialiter saltem, responderi ad quaestionem factam per aliud interrogativum de re una quam per `quid est'. Sicut si arguatur `quidquid currit est corpus; homo velociter currit; igitur homo velociter est corpus', quia in minore additur `velociter', per quod respondetur aliquo modo ad aliam quaestionem quam ad quaestionem factam per `quid est', ideo est fallacia figurae dictionis. Et tamen si poneretur haec determinatio `realiter', esset bonum argumentum, sic arguendo

	\|\|Hence, in several ways, when the premises arranged in mode and form are not accepted, nor are they equivalent to such, the fallacy of the figure of speech occurs: either by taking a different name than that by which the question made by `what is?' about one thing is answered; for sometimes this happens by arguing from propositions about the present, sometimes from propositions about the past or the future, sometimes from propositions of a mode. If it is argued from propositions about the present and ~~about being~~, this can happen either by adding some determination by which it is possible, at least partially, to answer the question made by another interrogative about the same thing than by `what is?'. Just as if it were argued that anything that moves is a body; a man runs fast; Therefore, man is quickly a body, because in the minor is added `quickly', by which it is answered in some way to a different question than to the question posed by 'what is?', therefore there is a fallacy of the figure of speech. And yet, if this determination were to be posited `really', it would be a good argument, arguing in this way:		\|\|Hence, in several ways, when the premises arranged in mode and form are not accepted, nor are they equivalent to such, the fallacy of the figure of speech occurs: either by taking a different name than that by which the question made by `what is?' about one thing is answered; for sometimes this happens by arguing from propositions about the present, sometimes from propositions about the past or the future, sometimes from propositions of a mode. If it is argued from propositions about the present and assertoric, this can happen either by adding some determination by which it is possible, at least partially, to answer the question made by another interrogative about the same thing than by `what is?'. Just as if it were argued that anything that moves is a body; a man runs fast; Therefore, man is quickly a body, because in the minor is added `quickly', by which it is answered in some way to a different question than to the question posed by 'what is?', therefore there is a fallacy of the figure of speech. And yet, if this determination were to be posited `really', it would be a good argument, arguing in this way:

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	\|\|Dicendum est ergo quod talis discursus est bonus ex propositionibus mere de inesse et mere de praesenti. Sed iste discursus non valet `Coriscus potest esse alter a Corisco musico; Coriscus est Coriscus musicus; igitur Coriscus potest esse alter a se'; et tamen si loco istius termini `Coriscus musicus' poneretur aliquod pronomen demonstrativum vel relativum vel nomen proprium esset discursus bonus.		\|\|Dicendum est ergo quod talis discursus est bonus ex propositionibus mere de inesse et mere de praesenti. Sed iste discursus non valet `Coriscus potest esse alter a Corisco musico; Coriscus est Coriscus musicus; igitur Coriscus potest esse alter a se'; et tamen si loco istius termini `Coriscus musicus' poneretur aliquod pronomen demonstrativum vel relativum vel nomen proprium esset discursus bonus.

	\|\|It must be said, then, that such a discourse is good from propositions purely ~~about existence~~ and ~~merely~~ about the present. But this argument does not hold: `Coriscus may be different from Coriscus the musician; Coriscus is Coriscus the musician; therefore Coriscus can be another from himself'; and yet if instead of this term `Coriscus the musician' some demonstrative or relative pronoun or proper noun were put, the discussion would be good.		\|\|It must be said, then, that such a discourse is good from propositions purely assertoric and only about the present. But this argument does not hold: `Coriscus may be different from Coriscus the musician; Coriscus is Coriscus the musician; therefore Coriscus can be another from himself'; and yet if instead of this term `Coriscus the musician' some demonstrative or relative pronoun or proper noun were put, the discussion would be good.

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Ragnarr49 at 20:03, 6 April 2025

2025-04-06T20:03:21Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 15:03, 6 April 2025
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	\|\|Penes istum modum peccant talia sophismata `quandocumque aliqua sunt idem realiter, ubicumque aliquid est unum illorum, ibi illud est reliquum illorum; sed substantia corporis Christi et substantia corporis Christi habens partem distantem a parte sunt idem realiter, et corpus Christi est in sacramento Altaris substantia corporis Christi; igitur corpus Christi est in sacramento Altaris habens partem distantem a parte', quia si loco istius termini `substantia corporis Christi habens partem distantem a parte' poneretur nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrans illam rem quae est substantia corporis Christi habens partem distantem a parte, esset bonum argumentum. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `haec substantia est substantia habens partem distantem a parte; haec res est substantia in sacramento Altaris; ergo haec res est substantia habens partem distantem a parte in sacramento Altaris'. Et tamen si in conclusione poneretur loco istius termini `substantia habens partem distantem a parte' nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum, esset bonum argumentum. Et propter hoc est ibi fallacia figurae dictionis penes modum alium prius positum. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quando aliqua sunt idem realiter, unum non potest esse sine reliquo; sed Sortes et simile sunt idem realiter; ergo Sortes non potest esse nisi simile sit', quia si loco istius termini `simile' poneretur nomen proprium illius similis vel pronomen demonstrans ipsum simile, esset bonum argumentum. Similiter in talibus est fallacia figurae dictionis `mobile quando exsistet, potest non esse motus, igitur motus realiter distinguitur a mobili'. Similiter hic `ipsa substantia exsistente potest non esse quanta, igitur substantia distinguitur realiter a quantitate'. Similiter hic, secundum principia Aristotelis, `substantia, quamvis non desinat esse, potest non esse quantitas, ergo substantia non est eadem realiter quantitati'; `albedo, quamvis non desinat esse, potest non esse similitudo, igitur albedo non est eadem res cum similitudine'.		\|\|Penes istum modum peccant talia sophismata `quandocumque aliqua sunt idem realiter, ubicumque aliquid est unum illorum, ibi illud est reliquum illorum; sed substantia corporis Christi et substantia corporis Christi habens partem distantem a parte sunt idem realiter, et corpus Christi est in sacramento Altaris substantia corporis Christi; igitur corpus Christi est in sacramento Altaris habens partem distantem a parte', quia si loco istius termini `substantia corporis Christi habens partem distantem a parte' poneretur nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrans illam rem quae est substantia corporis Christi habens partem distantem a parte, esset bonum argumentum. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `haec substantia est substantia habens partem distantem a parte; haec res est substantia in sacramento Altaris; ergo haec res est substantia habens partem distantem a parte in sacramento Altaris'. Et tamen si in conclusione poneretur loco istius termini `substantia habens partem distantem a parte' nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum, esset bonum argumentum. Et propter hoc est ibi fallacia figurae dictionis penes modum alium prius positum. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quando aliqua sunt idem realiter, unum non potest esse sine reliquo; sed Sortes et simile sunt idem realiter; ergo Sortes non potest esse nisi simile sit', quia si loco istius termini `simile' poneretur nomen proprium illius similis vel pronomen demonstrans ipsum simile, esset bonum argumentum. Similiter in talibus est fallacia figurae dictionis `mobile quando exsistet, potest non esse motus, igitur motus realiter distinguitur a mobili'. Similiter hic `ipsa substantia exsistente potest non esse quanta, igitur substantia distinguitur realiter a quantitate'. Similiter hic, secundum principia Aristotelis, `substantia, quamvis non desinat esse, potest non esse quantitas, ergo substantia non est eadem realiter quantitati'; `albedo, quamvis non desinat esse, potest non esse similitudo, igitur albedo non est eadem res cum similitudine'.

	\|\|It is in this way that such sophists err: whenever some things are really the same, wherever one of them is, there is the rest of them; but the substance of the body of Christ and the substance of the body of Christ having a part distant from that part are really the same, and the body of Christ in the sacrament of the Altar is the substance of the body of Christ; therefore the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the Altar having a part distant from a part, because if instead of this term 'the substance of Christ's body having a part distant from a part' a proper noun or a pronoun was put, showing that thing which is the substance of the body of Christ having a part distant from the part, it would be a good argument. Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `this substance is a substance having a part distant from a part; this thing is the substance in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore this thing is a substance having a part distant from the part in the sacrament of the Altar'. And yet if, in the conclusion, a proper noun or a demonstrative pronoun were put instead of the term `a substance having a part distant from a part,' it would be a good argument. And for this reason there is a fallacy of the figure of speech, according to another mode previously set forth. Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `when some things are really the same, one cannot exist without the rest; but Socrates and the like are really the same thing; therefore ~~there~~ Socrates cannot be unless he is similar', because if instead of this term 'similar' a proper noun or a pronoun indicating what is similar were put, it would be a good argument. Similarly, in such cases there is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `when a mobile thing exists, it may not be moving, therefore movement is really distinguished from mobile'. Similarly, here `substance itself in existence may not be quantitative, therefore substance is really distinguished from quantity'. Similarly here, according to Aristotle's principles, 'substance, although it does not cease to be, may not be quantity, therefore substance is not really the same as quantity'; `whiteness, although it does not cease to be, may not be likeness, therefore whiteness is not the same thing as likeness.'		\|\|It is in this way that such sophists err: whenever some things are really the same, wherever one of them is, there are the rest of them; but the substance of the body of Christ and the substance of the body of Christ having a part distant from that part are really the same, and the body of Christ in the sacrament of the Altar is the substance of the body of Christ; therefore the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the Altar having a part distant from a part, because if instead of this term `the substance of Christ's body having a part distant from a part' a proper noun or a pronoun was put, showing that thing which is the substance of the body of Christ having a part distant from the part, it would be a good argument. Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `this substance is a substance having a part distant from a part; this thing is the substance in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore this thing is a substance having a part distant from the part in the sacrament of the Altar'. And yet if, in the conclusion, a proper noun or a demonstrative pronoun were put instead of the term `a substance having a part distant from a part,' it would be a good argument. And for this reason there is a fallacy of the figure of speech, according to another mode previously set forth. Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `when some things are really the same, one cannot exist without the rest; but Socrates and the like are really the same thing; therefore Socrates cannot be unless he is similar', because if instead of this term 'similar' a proper noun or a pronoun indicating what is similar were put, it would be a good argument. Similarly, in such cases there is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `when a mobile thing exists, it may not be moving, therefore movement is really distinguished from a mobile thing'. Similarly, here `substance itself in existence may not be quantitative, therefore substance is really distinguished from quantity'. Similarly here, according to Aristotle's principles, `substance, although it does not cease to be, may not be quantity, therefore substance is not really the same as quantity'; `whiteness, although it does not cease to be, may not be likeness, therefore whiteness is not the same thing as likeness.'

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	\|\|Sed altera praemissarum tunc erit falsa. Et causa quare unus modus arguendi tenet et non alius, est quia `quantum' potest esse substantia quando ipsa substantia non erit quanta, sicut `album' erit Sortes quando Sortes non erit albus. Ponatur quod Sortes sit modo albus et quod fiet niger cras: tunc haec est vera `album cras erit Sortes' et haec falsa `Sortes cras erit albus'. Et ista est causa quare tenet unus modus arguendi et non alius. Et unde oritur ista causa? Dicendum est quod oritur ex hoc quod alium modum significandi habet hoc nomen `Sortes' et hoc nomen `album', quia `album' significat Sortem in recto quando Sortes est albus et significat in obliquo albedinem quae potest destrui Sorte manente.		\|\|Sed altera praemissarum tunc erit falsa. Et causa quare unus modus arguendi tenet et non alius, est quia `quantum' potest esse substantia quando ipsa substantia non erit quanta, sicut `album' erit Sortes quando Sortes non erit albus. Ponatur quod Sortes sit modo albus et quod fiet niger cras: tunc haec est vera `album cras erit Sortes' et haec falsa `Sortes cras erit albus'. Et ista est causa quare tenet unus modus arguendi et non alius. Et unde oritur ista causa? Dicendum est quod oritur ex hoc quod alium modum significandi habet hoc nomen `Sortes' et hoc nomen `album', quia `album' significat Sortem in recto quando Sortes est albus et significat in obliquo albedinem quae potest destrui Sorte manente.

	\|\|But the second of the premises will then be false. And the reason why one way of reasoning holds and not another is because a substance can be `quantum' when the substance itself will not be quantitative, just as a white thing will be Socrates when Socrates will not be white. It is supposed that Socrates is only white and that he will become black tomorrow: then this is true: `A white thing ~~tomorrow~~ will be Socrates' and this is false: `Socrates will be white tomorrow'. And this is the reason why one way of reasoning holds and not another. And where does this cause arise? It must be said that it arises from the fact that this name `Socrates' and this name `white' have a different meaning, because `white'' signifies Socrates directly when Socrates is white and it signifies in the oblique the whiteness which can be destroyed although Socrates remains.		\|\|But the second of the premises will then be false. And the reason why one way of reasoning holds and not another is because a substance can be a quantum when the substance itself will not be quantitative, just as a white thing will be Socrates when Socrates will not be white. It is supposed that Socrates is only white and that he will become black tomorrow: then this is true: `A white thing will be Socrates tomorrow' and this is false: `Socrates will be white tomorrow'. And this is the reason why one way of reasoning holds and not another. And where does this cause arise? It must be said that it arises from the fact that this name `Socrates' and this name `white' have a different meaning, because `white'' signifies Socrates directly when Socrates is white and it signifies in the oblique the whiteness which can be destroyed although Socrates remains.

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	\|\|Hoc tamen semper servandum est quod quandocumque praemissae sunt dispositae in modo et in figura, secundum regulas quae datae sunt in principio istius tractatus de syllogismis tam uniformibus quam mixtis, numquam est fallacia figurae dictionis.		\|\|Hoc tamen semper servandum est quod quandocumque praemissae sunt dispositae in modo et in figura, secundum regulas quae datae sunt in principio istius tractatus de syllogismis tam uniformibus quam mixtis, numquam est fallacia figurae dictionis.

	\|\|This, however, must always be observed, that whenever the ~~premisses~~ are arranged in a manner and in a figure, according to the rules given at the beginning of this treatise on both uniform and mixed syllogisms, there is never a fallacy of figure of speech.		\|\|This, however, must always be observed, that whenever the premises are arranged in a manner and in a figure, according to the rules given at the beginning of this treatise on both uniform and mixed syllogisms, there is never a fallacy of figure of speech.
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Ragnarr49 at 19:25, 6 April 2025

2025-04-06T19:25:26Z

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Ragnarr49 at 01:38, 6 April 2025

2025-04-06T01:38:01Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 20:38, 5 April 2025
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	\|\|Verbi gratia si arguatur sic `quidquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti; carnes crudas heri emisti; igitur carnes crudas hodie comedisti' resolvenda est maior in istam sibi aequivalentem `omne heri emptum fuit hodie comestum a te' et minor in istam aequivalentem sibi `carnes crudae fuerunt heri emptae' et conclusio in istam sibi aequivalentem `carnes crudae fuerunt hodie comestae a te'. Et subiectis in omnibus istis acceptis pro his quae fuerunt, tenet syllogismus. Sed si subiectum conclusionis sumatur pro his quae sunt, non valet, sed est tam fallacia accidentis quam fallacia figurae dictionis.		\|\|Verbi gratia si arguatur sic `quidquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti; carnes crudas heri emisti; igitur carnes crudas hodie comedisti' resolvenda est maior in istam sibi aequivalentem `omne heri emptum fuit hodie comestum a te' et minor in istam aequivalentem sibi `carnes crudae fuerunt heri emptae' et conclusio in istam sibi aequivalentem `carnes crudae fuerunt hodie comestae a te'. Et subiectis in omnibus istis acceptis pro his quae fuerunt, tenet syllogismus. Sed si subiectum conclusionis sumatur pro his quae sunt, non valet, sed est tam fallacia accidentis quam fallacia figurae dictionis.

	\|\|For example, if it is argued that `whatever you bought yesterday, you ate today; You bought raw meat yesterday; therefore you have eaten raw meat today' is to be resolved into the major equivalent of 'everything bought yesterday was eaten by you today' and the minor into its equivalent 'raw meat was bought yesterday' and the conclusion into its equivalent 'raw meat was eaten by you today'. And the syllogism holds that the subjects in all these are taken for what they were. But if the subject of the conclusion is taken for what it is, it does not hold, but is as much a fallacy of accident as a fallacy of figure of speech.		\|\|For example, if it is argued that `whatever you bought yesterday, you ate today; You bought raw meat yesterday; therefore you have eaten raw meat today' is to be resolved into the major equivalent of `everything bought yesterday was eaten by you today' and the minor into its equivalent `raw meat was bought yesterday' and the conclusion into its equivalent `raw meat was eaten by you today'. And the syllogism holds that the subjects in all these are taken for what they were. But if the subject of the conclusion is taken for what it is, it does not hold, but is as much a fallacy of accident as a fallacy of figure of speech.

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	\|\|Si autem ponatur assumptum a parte praedicati, semper est fallacia figurae dictionis. Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti; tu emisti heri carnes crudas; ergo hodie comedisti carnes crudas'.		\|\|Si autem ponatur assumptum a parte praedicati, semper est fallacia figurae dictionis. Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti; tu emisti heri carnes crudas; ergo hodie comedisti carnes crudas'.

	\|\|But if the thing assumed is ~~placeded~~ on the part of the predicate, there is always a fallacy of the figure of speech. Hence here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever you bought yesterday, you ate today; yesterday you bought raw meat; therefore today you have eaten raw meat'.		\|\|But if the thing assumed is placed on the part of the predicate, there is always a fallacy of the figure of speech. Hence here is a fallacy of the figure of speech: `whatever you bought yesterday, you ate today; yesterday you bought raw meat; therefore, today you have eaten raw meat'.

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	\|\|Et multo magis erit fallacia figurae dictionis si maior sit de praesenti et minor de praeterito vel de futuro. Propter quod hic est fallacia figurae dictionis, secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, `quidquid fuit heri, est hodie; Sortes fuit heri bicubitalis quantitatis; igitur Sortes est hodie bicubitalis quantitatis'.		\|\|Et multo magis erit fallacia figurae dictionis si maior sit de praesenti et minor de praeterito vel de futuro. Propter quod hic est fallacia figurae dictionis, secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, `quidquid fuit heri, est hodie; Sortes fuit heri bicubitalis quantitatis; igitur Sortes est hodie bicubitalis quantitatis'.

	\|\|And the fallacy of the figure of speech will be much greater if it is more about the present and less about the past or the future. Because of this here is ~~the~~ fallacy of the figure of speech, according to that opinion which posits that quantity is not a different thing from substance and quality, `whatever was yesterday is today; ~~Yesterday~~ Socrates was two cubits in size; ~~Therefore~~ Socrates is today two cubits in size.		\|\|And the fallacy of the figure of speech will be much greater if it is more about the present and less about the past or the future. Because of this, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, according to that opinion which posits that quantity is not a different thing from substance and quality, `whatever was yesterday is today; yesterday Socrates was two cubits in size; therefore Socrates is today two cubits in size.

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	\|\|Et similiter hic `quidquid fuit, est; haec albedo fuit color; igitur haec albedo est color'. Et tamen secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quantitatem non esse aliam rem a substantia et qualitate hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; haec substantia fuit quantitas; ergo haec substantia adhuc est quantitas'.		\|\|Et similiter hic `quidquid fuit, est; haec albedo fuit color; igitur haec albedo est color'. Et tamen secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quantitatem non esse aliam rem a substantia et qualitate hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; haec substantia fuit quantitas; ergo haec substantia adhuc est quantitas'.

	\|\|And likewise here, `whatever was, is; this color was white; Therefore, this white is a color.' And yet according to that opinion which posits that quantity is not a different thing from substance and quality, here is ~~the~~ fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever was, still is; this substance was quantity; therefore this substance is still a quantity'.		\|\|And likewise here, `whatever was, is; this color was white; Therefore, this white is a color.' And yet according to that opinion which posits that quantity is not a different thing from substance and quality, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever was, still is; this substance was a quantity; therefore, this substance is still a quantity'.

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	\|\|Sed hic est bonum argumentum `quandocumque aliquid fuit substantia, tunc fuit quantitas; haec substantia fuit substantia; ergo haec substantia fuit quantitas'. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid est, fuit prius; a est simul cum b; igitur a fuit prius simul cum b'.		\|\|Sed hic est bonum argumentum `quandocumque aliquid fuit substantia, tunc fuit quantitas; haec substantia fuit substantia; ergo haec substantia fuit quantitas'. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid est, fuit prius; a est simul cum b; igitur a fuit prius simul cum b'.

	\|\|But here is a good argument: whenever there was a substance, then there was a quantity; this substance was substance; therefore this substance was quantity. Similarly here is ~~the~~ fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever is, was before; a is together with b; Therefore, a was first at the same time as b'.		\|\|But here is a good argument: `whenever there was a substance, then there was a quantity; this substance was substance; therefore, this substance was quantity`. Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever is, was before; a is together with b; Therefore, a was first at the same time as b'.

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	\|\|Similiter est hic fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; hoc corpus fuit coniunctum illi corpori; igitur hoc corpus est adhuc coniunctum illi corpori'.		\|\|Similiter est hic fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; hoc corpus fuit coniunctum illi corpori; igitur hoc corpus est adhuc coniunctum illi corpori'.

	\|\|Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `Whatever was, is still. this body was joined to that body; therefore this body is still joined to that body.'		\|\|Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `Whatever was, is still; this body was joined to that body; therefore, this body is still joined to that body.'

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	\|\|Et tamen hic est bonum argumentum `quidquid fuit, est; albedo fuit; igitur albedo est'. Et sicut dictum est de propositionibus de praeterito, ita, proportionaliter, dicendum est de propositionibus de futuro.		\|\|Et tamen hic est bonum argumentum `quidquid fuit, est; albedo fuit; igitur albedo est'. Et sicut dictum est de propositionibus de praeterito, ita, proportionaliter, dicendum est de propositionibus de futuro.

	\|\|And yet here is a good argument, `whatever was, is; ~~he was white~~; therefore ~~he is albedo~~'. And as it was said of propositions concerning the past, so, proportionally, it must be said of propositions concerning the future.		\|\|And yet here is a good argument, `whatever was, is; whiteness existed; therefore, whiteness exists'. And as it was said of propositions concerning the past, so, proportionally, it must be said of propositions concerning the future.

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	\|\|Unde hic non est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid Deus potest facere mediante causa secunda etc.; sed omnem actum meritorium potest Deus facere mediante causa secunda; igitur omnem actum meritorium potest Deus facere se solo', quia conclusio est vera si praemissae sunt verae, sive subiectum accipiatur pro his quae sunt sive pro his quae possunt esse.		\|\|Unde hic non est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid Deus potest facere mediante causa secunda etc.; sed omnem actum meritorium potest Deus facere mediante causa secunda; igitur omnem actum meritorium potest Deus facere se solo', quia conclusio est vera si praemissae sunt verae, sive subiectum accipiatur pro his quae sunt sive pro his quae possunt esse.

	\|\|Hence there is no fallacy here in the figure of speech, `whatever God can do by means of a second cause, etc. but God can do every meritorious act by means of a second cause; therefore God alone can do every meritorious act', because the conclusion is true if the premises are true, whether the subject is taken for what is or for what may be.		\|\|Hence there is no fallacy here of the figure of speech, `whatever God can do by means of a second cause, etc. but God can do every meritorious act by means of a second cause; therefore God alone can do every meritorious act', because the conclusion is true if the premises are true, whether the subject is taken for what is or for what may be.

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Ragnarr49 at 00:42, 6 April 2025

2025-04-06T00:42:00Z

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Ragnarr49 at 23:51, 5 April 2025

2025-04-05T23:51:48Z

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Ragnarr49 at 21:12, 5 April 2025

2025-04-05T21:12:04Z

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Ragnarr49 at 15:40, 5 April 2025

2025-04-05T15:40:48Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 10:40, 5 April 2025
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	\|\|CAP. 10. DE FALLACIA FIGURAE DICTIONIS.		\|\|CAP. 10. DE FALLACIA FIGURAE DICTIONIS.

	\|\|Chapter 10. On the fallacy "figure of speech".		\|\|Chapter 10. On the fallacy of 'figure of speech'.

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	\|\|Post fallacias in dictione, iuxta quas sunt aliquae orationes multiplices, dicendum est de fallacia figurae dictionis, quae non oritur ex alicuius orationis multiplicitate, sed oritur magis ex aliquarum dictionum similitudine.		\|\|Post fallacias in dictione, iuxta quas sunt aliquae orationes multiplices, dicendum est de fallacia figurae dictionis, quae non oritur ex alicuius orationis multiplicitate, sed oritur magis ex aliquarum dictionum similitudine.

	\|\|After fallacies in diction, according to which some speeches are multiple, we must speak of fallacies of figure of speech, which does not arise from the multiplicity of any speech, but arises rather from the similarity of some ~~speeches~~.		\|\|After fallacies in diction, according to which some speeches are multiple, we must speak of fallacies of figure of speech, which does not arise from the multiplicity of any speech, but arises rather from the similarity of some wordings.

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	\|\|Ita quod fallacia figurae dictionis est deceptio proveniens ex aliqua similitudine dictionis, ita quod causa apparentiae est similitudo dictionis ad dictionem et causa non-exsistentiae est diversitas significatorum vel modorum significandi vel accidentium grammaticalium dictionum.		\|\|Ita quod fallacia figurae dictionis est deceptio proveniens ex aliqua similitudine dictionis, ita quod causa apparentiae est similitudo dictionis ad dictionem et causa non-exsistentiae est diversitas significatorum vel modorum significandi vel accidentium grammaticalium dictionum.

	\|\|So that the fallacy of the figure of speech is a deception resulting from some similarity of ~~speech~~, so that the cause of appearance is the similarity of ~~speech~~ to ~~speech~~ and the cause of non-existence is the diversity of meanings or ways of signifying or grammatical accidents of speech.		\|\|So that the fallacy of the figure of speech is a deception resulting from some similarity of wording, so that the cause of appearance is the similarity of statement to statement and the cause of non-existence is the diversity of meanings or ways of signifying or grammatical accidents of speech.

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	\|\|Et accipio hic `significata' largissime. Unde generalis modus solvendi paralogismos penes istam fallaciam est ostendere aliquam diversitatem inter significata vel modos significandi vel accidentia dictionum propter quam non valet argumentum. Ista enim fallacia semper ex hoc accidit quod quia aliquis modus arguendi tenet in aliquibus dictionibus creditur ex hoc quod talis modus arguendi valeat in aliis consimilibus dictionibus, in quibus tamen non valet propter hoc quod illae dictiones diversae, quamvis videantur similes, habent diversa significata, large accipiendo significata, vel diversum modum significandi vel diversa accidentia grammaticalia.		\|\|Et accipio hic `significata' largissime. Unde generalis modus solvendi paralogismos penes istam fallaciam est ostendere aliquam diversitatem inter significata vel modos significandi vel accidentia dictionum propter quam non valet argumentum. Ista enim fallacia semper ex hoc accidit quod quia aliquis modus arguendi tenet in aliquibus dictionibus creditur ex hoc quod talis modus arguendi valeat in aliis consimilibus dictionibus, in quibus tamen non valet propter hoc quod illae dictiones diversae, quamvis videantur similes, habent diversa significata, large accipiendo significata, vel diversum modum significandi vel diversa accidentia grammaticalia.

	\|\|And I take `significant' here very liberally. Hence the general method of resolving paralogisms involving this fallacy is to show some difference between the signifieds, or modes of signification, or accidents of speech, because of which the argument is invalid. For this fallacy always occurs from the fact that because a certain method of reasoning holds in some expressions it is believed from this fact that such a method of reasoning is valid in other similar expressions, in which it is not valid because those different expressions, although they seem similar, have different meanings, broadly ~~understood meanings~~, or a different mode of meaning or different grammatical accidents.		\|\|And I take `significant' here very liberally. Hence the general method of resolving paralogisms involving this fallacy is to show some difference between the signifieds, or modes of signification, or accidents of speech, because of which the argument is invalid. For this fallacy always occurs from the fact that because a certain method of reasoning holds in some expressions it is believed from this fact that such a method of reasoning is valid in other similar expressions, in which it is not valid because those different expressions, although they seem similar, have different meanings, understanding meanings broadly, or a different mode of meaning or different grammatical accidents.

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	\|\|Verbi gratia: videmus enim quod iste syllogismus est bonus `omnis substantia corporea est colorata; capra est substantia corporea; igitur capra est colorata', ita quod nulla est variatio inter praedicatum maioris et praedicatum conclusionis.		\|\|Verbi gratia: videmus enim quod iste syllogismus est bonus `omnis substantia corporea est colorata; capra est substantia corporea; igitur capra est colorata', ita quod nulla est variatio inter praedicatum maioris et praedicatum conclusionis.

	\|\|For example: for we see that this syllogism is good: every corporeal substance is colored; A goat is a corporeal substance; therefore the goat is colored', so that there is no variation between the predicate of the major and the predicate of the conclusion.		\|\|For example: for we see that this syllogism is good: `every corporeal substance is colored; A goat is a corporeal substance; therefore the goat is colored', so that there is no variation between the predicate of the major and the predicate of the conclusion.

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	\|\|Unde generaliter quandocumque est fallacia figurae dictionis, contingit invenire consimilem modum arguendi bonum ex aliis terminis, et hoc propter diversitatem accidentium grammaticalium vel modorum significandi vel propter diversitatem significatorum, largissime accipiendo `significata'.		\|\|Unde generaliter quandocumque est fallacia figurae dictionis, contingit invenire consimilem modum arguendi bonum ex aliis terminis, et hoc propter diversitatem accidentium grammaticalium vel modorum significandi vel propter diversitatem significatorum, largissime accipiendo `significata'.

	\|\|Hence, in general, whenever there is a fallacy of a figure of speech, it is possible to find a similar way of arguing ~~the good~~ from other terms, and this because of the diversity of grammatical accidents or ways of signifying, or because of the diversity of ~~signifieds~~, taking ~~the~~ signified very broadly.		\|\|Hence, in general, whenever there is a fallacy of a figure of speech, it is possible to find a similar way of arguing well from other terms, and this because of the diversity of grammatical accidents or ways of signifying, or because of the diversity of things signified, taking signified very broadly.

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	\|\|'calefactum patitur, igitur visum patitur'. Et universaliter quando dictiones habent eadem accidentia grammaticalia et eosdem modos significandi, et propter hoc quod habent consimiles terminationes et consimiles modos significandi creditur quod illud commune praedicabile quod verificatur de uno verificetur de reliquo, et tamen propter hoc quod significant diversa non est sic, sed est fallacia figurae dictionis.		\|\|'calefactum patitur, igitur visum patitur'. Et universaliter quando dictiones habent eadem accidentia grammaticalia et eosdem modos significandi, et propter hoc quod habent consimiles terminationes et consimiles modos significandi creditur quod illud commune praedicabile quod verificatur de uno verificetur de reliquo, et tamen propter hoc quod significant diversa non est sic, sed est fallacia figurae dictionis.

	\|\|'heated is experienced, therefore sight is experienced'. And universally, when expressions have the same grammatical accidents and the same ways of signifying, and because they have similar endings and similar ways of signifying, it is believed that the common predicate which is verified of one is verified of the other, and yet because of the fact that the signifiers are different, it is not so, but is a fallacy of the figure of speech.		\|\|`heated is experienced, therefore sight is experienced'. And universally, when expressions have the same grammatical accidents and the same ways of signifying, and because they have similar endings and similar ways of signifying, it is believed that the common predicate which is verified of one is verified of the other, and yet because of the fact that the signifiers are different, it is not so, but is a fallacy of the figure of speech.

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	\|\|Et talis sic credens, nesciens naturam significatorum per istos terminos vel nesciens quid et quomodo significant, decipitur per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Si enim credat quod sicut `calefactum' significat illud quod patitur, et in quo est calor, in recto et illud a quo patitur in obliquo, sic `visum' significet illud in quo est visio in recto et illud a quo est visio in obliquo, decipitur.		\|\|Et talis sic credens, nesciens naturam significatorum per istos terminos vel nesciens quid et quomodo significant, decipitur per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Si enim credat quod sicut `calefactum' significat illud quod patitur, et in quo est calor, in recto et illud a quo patitur in obliquo, sic `visum' significet illud in quo est visio in recto et illud a quo est visio in obliquo, decipitur.

	\|\|And such a person believing in this way, not knowing the nature of what is signified by these terms or not knowing what and how they mean, is deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech. For if he believes that just as 'heated' signifies that which is experienced, and in which there is heat, ~~directly~~ and that from which it is experienced in the oblique, so 'sight' signifies that in which the vision is directly and that from which the vision is in the oblique, he is deceived.		\|\|And such a person believing in this way, not knowing the nature of what is signified by these terms or not knowing what and how they mean, is deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech. For if he believes that just as 'heated' signifies that which is experienced, and in which there is heat, in the nominative case and that from which it is experienced in the oblique, so 'sight' signifies that in which the vision is directly and that from which the vision is in the oblique, he is deceived.

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	\|\|Nec tamen iste modus est ex diversitate modorum significandi aliquarum dictionum, ex hoc scilicet quod una dictio habet unum modum significandi, et alia dictio non habet illum modum significandi, sed est ex diversitate significatorum.		\|\|Nec tamen iste modus est ex diversitate modorum significandi aliquarum dictionum, ex hoc scilicet quod una dictio habet unum modum significandi, et alia dictio non habet illum modum significandi, sed est ex diversitate significatorum.

	\|\|And yet this mode is not due to the diversity of the modes of signifying certain expressions, namely, from the fact that one expression has one mode of signifying, and another expression does not have that mode of signifying, but it is due to the diversity of ~~signifieds~~.		\|\|And yet this mode is not due to the diversity of the modes of signifying certain expressions, namely, from the fact that one expression has one mode of signifying, and another expression does not have that mode of signifying, but it is due to the diversity of the things signified.

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Ragnarr49 at 23:19, 2 March 2025

2025-03-02T23:19:19Z

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Ragnarr49 at 22:36, 2 March 2025

2025-03-02T22:36:53Z

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← Older revision		Revision as of 20:38, 5 April 2025
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	\|\|Verbi gratia si arguatur sic `quidquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti; carnes crudas heri emisti; igitur carnes crudas hodie comedisti' resolvenda est maior in istam sibi aequivalentem `omne heri emptum fuit hodie comestum a te' et minor in istam aequivalentem sibi `carnes crudae fuerunt heri emptae' et conclusio in istam sibi aequivalentem `carnes crudae fuerunt hodie comestae a te'. Et subiectis in omnibus istis acceptis pro his quae fuerunt, tenet syllogismus. Sed si subiectum conclusionis sumatur pro his quae sunt, non valet, sed est tam fallacia accidentis quam fallacia figurae dictionis.		\|\|Verbi gratia si arguatur sic `quidquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti; carnes crudas heri emisti; igitur carnes crudas hodie comedisti' resolvenda est maior in istam sibi aequivalentem `omne heri emptum fuit hodie comestum a te' et minor in istam aequivalentem sibi `carnes crudae fuerunt heri emptae' et conclusio in istam sibi aequivalentem `carnes crudae fuerunt hodie comestae a te'. Et subiectis in omnibus istis acceptis pro his quae fuerunt, tenet syllogismus. Sed si subiectum conclusionis sumatur pro his quae sunt, non valet, sed est tam fallacia accidentis quam fallacia figurae dictionis.

	\|\|For example, if it is argued that `whatever you bought yesterday, you ate today; You bought raw meat yesterday; therefore you have eaten raw meat today' is to be resolved into the major equivalent of 'everything bought yesterday was eaten by you today' and the minor into its equivalent 'raw meat was bought yesterday' and the conclusion into its equivalent 'raw meat was eaten by you today'. And the syllogism holds that the subjects in all these are taken for what they were. But if the subject of the conclusion is taken for what it is, it does not hold, but is as much a fallacy of accident as a fallacy of figure of speech.		\|\|For example, if it is argued that `whatever you bought yesterday, you ate today; You bought raw meat yesterday; therefore you have eaten raw meat today' is to be resolved into the major equivalent of `everything bought yesterday was eaten by you today' and the minor into its equivalent `raw meat was bought yesterday' and the conclusion into its equivalent `raw meat was eaten by you today'. And the syllogism holds that the subjects in all these are taken for what they were. But if the subject of the conclusion is taken for what it is, it does not hold, but is as much a fallacy of accident as a fallacy of figure of speech.

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	\|\|Si autem ponatur assumptum a parte praedicati, semper est fallacia figurae dictionis. Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti; tu emisti heri carnes crudas; ergo hodie comedisti carnes crudas'.		\|\|Si autem ponatur assumptum a parte praedicati, semper est fallacia figurae dictionis. Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti; tu emisti heri carnes crudas; ergo hodie comedisti carnes crudas'.

	\|\|But if the thing assumed is ~~placeded~~ on the part of the predicate, there is always a fallacy of the figure of speech. Hence here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever you bought yesterday, you ate today; yesterday you bought raw meat; therefore today you have eaten raw meat'.		\|\|But if the thing assumed is placed on the part of the predicate, there is always a fallacy of the figure of speech. Hence here is a fallacy of the figure of speech: `whatever you bought yesterday, you ate today; yesterday you bought raw meat; therefore, today you have eaten raw meat'.

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	\|\|Et multo magis erit fallacia figurae dictionis si maior sit de praesenti et minor de praeterito vel de futuro. Propter quod hic est fallacia figurae dictionis, secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, `quidquid fuit heri, est hodie; Sortes fuit heri bicubitalis quantitatis; igitur Sortes est hodie bicubitalis quantitatis'.		\|\|Et multo magis erit fallacia figurae dictionis si maior sit de praesenti et minor de praeterito vel de futuro. Propter quod hic est fallacia figurae dictionis, secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, `quidquid fuit heri, est hodie; Sortes fuit heri bicubitalis quantitatis; igitur Sortes est hodie bicubitalis quantitatis'.

	\|\|And the fallacy of the figure of speech will be much greater if it is more about the present and less about the past or the future. Because of this here is ~~the~~ fallacy of the figure of speech, according to that opinion which posits that quantity is not a different thing from substance and quality, `whatever was yesterday is today; ~~Yesterday~~ Socrates was two cubits in size; ~~Therefore~~ Socrates is today two cubits in size.		\|\|And the fallacy of the figure of speech will be much greater if it is more about the present and less about the past or the future. Because of this, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, according to that opinion which posits that quantity is not a different thing from substance and quality, `whatever was yesterday is today; yesterday Socrates was two cubits in size; therefore Socrates is today two cubits in size.

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	\|\|Et similiter hic `quidquid fuit, est; haec albedo fuit color; igitur haec albedo est color'. Et tamen secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quantitatem non esse aliam rem a substantia et qualitate hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; haec substantia fuit quantitas; ergo haec substantia adhuc est quantitas'.		\|\|Et similiter hic `quidquid fuit, est; haec albedo fuit color; igitur haec albedo est color'. Et tamen secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quantitatem non esse aliam rem a substantia et qualitate hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; haec substantia fuit quantitas; ergo haec substantia adhuc est quantitas'.

	\|\|And likewise here, `whatever was, is; this color was white; Therefore, this white is a color.' And yet according to that opinion which posits that quantity is not a different thing from substance and quality, here is ~~the~~ fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever was, still is; this substance was quantity; therefore this substance is still a quantity'.		\|\|And likewise here, `whatever was, is; this color was white; Therefore, this white is a color.' And yet according to that opinion which posits that quantity is not a different thing from substance and quality, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever was, still is; this substance was a quantity; therefore, this substance is still a quantity'.

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	\|\|Sed hic est bonum argumentum `quandocumque aliquid fuit substantia, tunc fuit quantitas; haec substantia fuit substantia; ergo haec substantia fuit quantitas'. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid est, fuit prius; a est simul cum b; igitur a fuit prius simul cum b'.		\|\|Sed hic est bonum argumentum `quandocumque aliquid fuit substantia, tunc fuit quantitas; haec substantia fuit substantia; ergo haec substantia fuit quantitas'. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid est, fuit prius; a est simul cum b; igitur a fuit prius simul cum b'.

	\|\|But here is a good argument: whenever there was a substance, then there was a quantity; this substance was substance; therefore this substance was quantity. Similarly here is ~~the~~ fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever is, was before; a is together with b; Therefore, a was first at the same time as b'.		\|\|But here is a good argument: `whenever there was a substance, then there was a quantity; this substance was substance; therefore, this substance was quantity`. Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever is, was before; a is together with b; Therefore, a was first at the same time as b'.

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	\|\|Similiter est hic fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; hoc corpus fuit coniunctum illi corpori; igitur hoc corpus est adhuc coniunctum illi corpori'.		\|\|Similiter est hic fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; hoc corpus fuit coniunctum illi corpori; igitur hoc corpus est adhuc coniunctum illi corpori'.

	\|\|Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `Whatever was, is still. this body was joined to that body; therefore this body is still joined to that body.'		\|\|Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `Whatever was, is still; this body was joined to that body; therefore, this body is still joined to that body.'

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	\|\|Et tamen hic est bonum argumentum `quidquid fuit, est; albedo fuit; igitur albedo est'. Et sicut dictum est de propositionibus de praeterito, ita, proportionaliter, dicendum est de propositionibus de futuro.		\|\|Et tamen hic est bonum argumentum `quidquid fuit, est; albedo fuit; igitur albedo est'. Et sicut dictum est de propositionibus de praeterito, ita, proportionaliter, dicendum est de propositionibus de futuro.

	\|\|And yet here is a good argument, `whatever was, is; ~~he was white~~; therefore ~~he is albedo~~'. And as it was said of propositions concerning the past, so, proportionally, it must be said of propositions concerning the future.		\|\|And yet here is a good argument, `whatever was, is; whiteness existed; therefore, whiteness exists'. And as it was said of propositions concerning the past, so, proportionally, it must be said of propositions concerning the future.

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	\|\|Unde hic non est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid Deus potest facere mediante causa secunda etc.; sed omnem actum meritorium potest Deus facere mediante causa secunda; igitur omnem actum meritorium potest Deus facere se solo', quia conclusio est vera si praemissae sunt verae, sive subiectum accipiatur pro his quae sunt sive pro his quae possunt esse.		\|\|Unde hic non est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid Deus potest facere mediante causa secunda etc.; sed omnem actum meritorium potest Deus facere mediante causa secunda; igitur omnem actum meritorium potest Deus facere se solo', quia conclusio est vera si praemissae sunt verae, sive subiectum accipiatur pro his quae sunt sive pro his quae possunt esse.

	\|\|Hence there is no fallacy here in the figure of speech, `whatever God can do by means of a second cause, etc. but God can do every meritorious act by means of a second cause; therefore God alone can do every meritorious act', because the conclusion is true if the premises are true, whether the subject is taken for what is or for what may be.		\|\|Hence there is no fallacy here of the figure of speech, `whatever God can do by means of a second cause, etc. but God can do every meritorious act by means of a second cause; therefore God alone can do every meritorious act', because the conclusion is true if the premises are true, whether the subject is taken for what is or for what may be.

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	\|\|CAP. 10. DE FALLACIA FIGURAE DICTIONIS.		\|\|CAP. 10. DE FALLACIA FIGURAE DICTIONIS.

	\|\|Chapter 10. On the fallacy "figure of speech".		\|\|Chapter 10. On the fallacy of 'figure of speech'.

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	\|\|Post fallacias in dictione, iuxta quas sunt aliquae orationes multiplices, dicendum est de fallacia figurae dictionis, quae non oritur ex alicuius orationis multiplicitate, sed oritur magis ex aliquarum dictionum similitudine.		\|\|Post fallacias in dictione, iuxta quas sunt aliquae orationes multiplices, dicendum est de fallacia figurae dictionis, quae non oritur ex alicuius orationis multiplicitate, sed oritur magis ex aliquarum dictionum similitudine.

	\|\|After fallacies in diction, according to which some speeches are multiple, we must speak of fallacies of figure of speech, which does not arise from the multiplicity of any speech, but arises rather from the similarity of some ~~speeches~~.		\|\|After fallacies in diction, according to which some speeches are multiple, we must speak of fallacies of figure of speech, which does not arise from the multiplicity of any speech, but arises rather from the similarity of some wordings.

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	\|\|Ita quod fallacia figurae dictionis est deceptio proveniens ex aliqua similitudine dictionis, ita quod causa apparentiae est similitudo dictionis ad dictionem et causa non-exsistentiae est diversitas significatorum vel modorum significandi vel accidentium grammaticalium dictionum.		\|\|Ita quod fallacia figurae dictionis est deceptio proveniens ex aliqua similitudine dictionis, ita quod causa apparentiae est similitudo dictionis ad dictionem et causa non-exsistentiae est diversitas significatorum vel modorum significandi vel accidentium grammaticalium dictionum.

	\|\|So that the fallacy of the figure of speech is a deception resulting from some similarity of ~~speech~~, so that the cause of appearance is the similarity of ~~speech~~ to ~~speech~~ and the cause of non-existence is the diversity of meanings or ways of signifying or grammatical accidents of speech.		\|\|So that the fallacy of the figure of speech is a deception resulting from some similarity of wording, so that the cause of appearance is the similarity of statement to statement and the cause of non-existence is the diversity of meanings or ways of signifying or grammatical accidents of speech.

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	\|\|Et accipio hic `significata' largissime. Unde generalis modus solvendi paralogismos penes istam fallaciam est ostendere aliquam diversitatem inter significata vel modos significandi vel accidentia dictionum propter quam non valet argumentum. Ista enim fallacia semper ex hoc accidit quod quia aliquis modus arguendi tenet in aliquibus dictionibus creditur ex hoc quod talis modus arguendi valeat in aliis consimilibus dictionibus, in quibus tamen non valet propter hoc quod illae dictiones diversae, quamvis videantur similes, habent diversa significata, large accipiendo significata, vel diversum modum significandi vel diversa accidentia grammaticalia.		\|\|Et accipio hic `significata' largissime. Unde generalis modus solvendi paralogismos penes istam fallaciam est ostendere aliquam diversitatem inter significata vel modos significandi vel accidentia dictionum propter quam non valet argumentum. Ista enim fallacia semper ex hoc accidit quod quia aliquis modus arguendi tenet in aliquibus dictionibus creditur ex hoc quod talis modus arguendi valeat in aliis consimilibus dictionibus, in quibus tamen non valet propter hoc quod illae dictiones diversae, quamvis videantur similes, habent diversa significata, large accipiendo significata, vel diversum modum significandi vel diversa accidentia grammaticalia.

	\|\|And I take `significant' here very liberally. Hence the general method of resolving paralogisms involving this fallacy is to show some difference between the signifieds, or modes of signification, or accidents of speech, because of which the argument is invalid. For this fallacy always occurs from the fact that because a certain method of reasoning holds in some expressions it is believed from this fact that such a method of reasoning is valid in other similar expressions, in which it is not valid because those different expressions, although they seem similar, have different meanings, broadly ~~understood meanings~~, or a different mode of meaning or different grammatical accidents.		\|\|And I take `significant' here very liberally. Hence the general method of resolving paralogisms involving this fallacy is to show some difference between the signifieds, or modes of signification, or accidents of speech, because of which the argument is invalid. For this fallacy always occurs from the fact that because a certain method of reasoning holds in some expressions it is believed from this fact that such a method of reasoning is valid in other similar expressions, in which it is not valid because those different expressions, although they seem similar, have different meanings, understanding meanings broadly, or a different mode of meaning or different grammatical accidents.

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	\|\|Verbi gratia: videmus enim quod iste syllogismus est bonus `omnis substantia corporea est colorata; capra est substantia corporea; igitur capra est colorata', ita quod nulla est variatio inter praedicatum maioris et praedicatum conclusionis.		\|\|Verbi gratia: videmus enim quod iste syllogismus est bonus `omnis substantia corporea est colorata; capra est substantia corporea; igitur capra est colorata', ita quod nulla est variatio inter praedicatum maioris et praedicatum conclusionis.

	\|\|For example: for we see that this syllogism is good: every corporeal substance is colored; A goat is a corporeal substance; therefore the goat is colored', so that there is no variation between the predicate of the major and the predicate of the conclusion.		\|\|For example: for we see that this syllogism is good: `every corporeal substance is colored; A goat is a corporeal substance; therefore the goat is colored', so that there is no variation between the predicate of the major and the predicate of the conclusion.

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	\|\|Unde generaliter quandocumque est fallacia figurae dictionis, contingit invenire consimilem modum arguendi bonum ex aliis terminis, et hoc propter diversitatem accidentium grammaticalium vel modorum significandi vel propter diversitatem significatorum, largissime accipiendo `significata'.		\|\|Unde generaliter quandocumque est fallacia figurae dictionis, contingit invenire consimilem modum arguendi bonum ex aliis terminis, et hoc propter diversitatem accidentium grammaticalium vel modorum significandi vel propter diversitatem significatorum, largissime accipiendo `significata'.

	\|\|Hence, in general, whenever there is a fallacy of a figure of speech, it is possible to find a similar way of arguing ~~the good~~ from other terms, and this because of the diversity of grammatical accidents or ways of signifying, or because of the diversity of ~~signifieds~~, taking ~~the~~ signified very broadly.		\|\|Hence, in general, whenever there is a fallacy of a figure of speech, it is possible to find a similar way of arguing well from other terms, and this because of the diversity of grammatical accidents or ways of signifying, or because of the diversity of things signified, taking signified very broadly.

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	\|\|'calefactum patitur, igitur visum patitur'. Et universaliter quando dictiones habent eadem accidentia grammaticalia et eosdem modos significandi, et propter hoc quod habent consimiles terminationes et consimiles modos significandi creditur quod illud commune praedicabile quod verificatur de uno verificetur de reliquo, et tamen propter hoc quod significant diversa non est sic, sed est fallacia figurae dictionis.		\|\|'calefactum patitur, igitur visum patitur'. Et universaliter quando dictiones habent eadem accidentia grammaticalia et eosdem modos significandi, et propter hoc quod habent consimiles terminationes et consimiles modos significandi creditur quod illud commune praedicabile quod verificatur de uno verificetur de reliquo, et tamen propter hoc quod significant diversa non est sic, sed est fallacia figurae dictionis.

	\|\|'heated is experienced, therefore sight is experienced'. And universally, when expressions have the same grammatical accidents and the same ways of signifying, and because they have similar endings and similar ways of signifying, it is believed that the common predicate which is verified of one is verified of the other, and yet because of the fact that the signifiers are different, it is not so, but is a fallacy of the figure of speech.		\|\|`heated is experienced, therefore sight is experienced'. And universally, when expressions have the same grammatical accidents and the same ways of signifying, and because they have similar endings and similar ways of signifying, it is believed that the common predicate which is verified of one is verified of the other, and yet because of the fact that the signifiers are different, it is not so, but is a fallacy of the figure of speech.

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	\|\|Et talis sic credens, nesciens naturam significatorum per istos terminos vel nesciens quid et quomodo significant, decipitur per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Si enim credat quod sicut `calefactum' significat illud quod patitur, et in quo est calor, in recto et illud a quo patitur in obliquo, sic `visum' significet illud in quo est visio in recto et illud a quo est visio in obliquo, decipitur.		\|\|Et talis sic credens, nesciens naturam significatorum per istos terminos vel nesciens quid et quomodo significant, decipitur per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Si enim credat quod sicut `calefactum' significat illud quod patitur, et in quo est calor, in recto et illud a quo patitur in obliquo, sic `visum' significet illud in quo est visio in recto et illud a quo est visio in obliquo, decipitur.

	\|\|And such a person believing in this way, not knowing the nature of what is signified by these terms or not knowing what and how they mean, is deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech. For if he believes that just as 'heated' signifies that which is experienced, and in which there is heat, ~~directly~~ and that from which it is experienced in the oblique, so 'sight' signifies that in which the vision is directly and that from which the vision is in the oblique, he is deceived.		\|\|And such a person believing in this way, not knowing the nature of what is signified by these terms or not knowing what and how they mean, is deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech. For if he believes that just as 'heated' signifies that which is experienced, and in which there is heat, in the nominative case and that from which it is experienced in the oblique, so 'sight' signifies that in which the vision is directly and that from which the vision is in the oblique, he is deceived.

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	\|\|Nec tamen iste modus est ex diversitate modorum significandi aliquarum dictionum, ex hoc scilicet quod una dictio habet unum modum significandi, et alia dictio non habet illum modum significandi, sed est ex diversitate significatorum.		\|\|Nec tamen iste modus est ex diversitate modorum significandi aliquarum dictionum, ex hoc scilicet quod una dictio habet unum modum significandi, et alia dictio non habet illum modum significandi, sed est ex diversitate significatorum.

	\|\|And yet this mode is not due to the diversity of the modes of signifying certain expressions, namely, from the fact that one expression has one mode of signifying, and another expression does not have that mode of signifying, but it is due to the diversity of ~~signifieds~~.		\|\|And yet this mode is not due to the diversity of the modes of signifying certain expressions, namely, from the fact that one expression has one mode of signifying, and another expression does not have that mode of signifying, but it is due to the diversity of the things signified.

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