Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 18 - Revision history

Ragnarr49 at 15:26, 30 March 2025

2025-03-30T15:26:29Z

Ragnarr49 at 13:36, 30 March 2025

2025-03-30T13:36:17Z

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	\|Similiter, quia veritas et falsitas possunt amitti ab opinione, ideo neutrum est genus vel differentia opinionis. Intelligendum est quod non vocatur hic `amitti' pro illo quod realiter perditur a re, sed vocatur hic `amitti' quando aliquid non vere praedicatur de aliquo, sicut prius.		\|Similiter, quia veritas et falsitas possunt amitti ab opinione, ideo neutrum est genus vel differentia opinionis. Intelligendum est quod non vocatur hic `amitti' pro illo quod realiter perditur a re, sed vocatur hic `amitti' quando aliquid non vere praedicatur de aliquo, sicut prius.
	\|Similarly, since truth and falsity can be lost from belief, therefore neither is a genus or difference of belief. It must be understood that it is not called `lost' here for what is really lost from the thing, but it is called `lost' when something is not really predicated of something, as before.		\|Similarly, since truth and falsity can be lost from belief, therefore neither is a genus or difference of belief. It must be understood that it is not called 'lost' here for what is really lost from the thing, but it is called 'lost' when something is not really predicated of something, as before.
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	\|Sicut materia, quando de non-formata fit formata dicitur amittere potentiam, non quia aliquam rem amittat realiter, --- nam nullam rem amittit, sed aliquid adquirit ---, sed dicitur amittere potentiam, quia non amplius est haec vera `materia est in potentia ad formam', quae tamen prius fuit vera.		\|Sicut materia, quando de non-formata fit formata dicitur amittere potentiam, non quia aliquam rem amittat realiter, --- nam nullam rem amittit, sed aliquid adquirit ---, sed dicitur amittere potentiam, quia non amplius est haec vera `materia est in potentia ad formam', quae tamen prius fuit vera.
	\|Just as matter, when it becomes formed from the unformed, it is said to lose potential, not because it really loses any thing, --- for it loses no thing, but acquires something ---, but it is said to lose potential, because this is no longer true, `matter is in the potential to form,'' which was nevertheless true before.		\|Just as matter, when it becomes formed from the unformed, it is said to lose potential, not because it really loses any thing, --- for it loses no thing, but acquires something ---, but it is said to lose potential, because this is no longer true, 'matter is in the potential to form,' which was nevertheless true before.
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	\|Et hoc non est propter amissionem realem alicuius rei, sed propter realem adquisitio{{p\|662}}nem alicuius rei, puta formae.		\|Et hoc non est propter amissionem realem alicuius rei, sed propter realem adquisitio{{p\|662}}nem alicuius rei, puta formae.
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	\|Similiter intelligenda est regula `re importata per subiectum non destructa'. Vigesima quinta regula est: si aliquid participat vel participare potest contrarium generis, non est species illius; sicut quia homo potest participare album, ideo nigrum non est genus hominis.		\|Similiter intelligenda est regula `re importata per subiectum non destructa'. Vigesima quinta regula est: si aliquid participat vel participare potest contrarium generis, non est species illius; sicut quia homo potest participare album, ideo nigrum non est genus hominis.
	\|In the same way, the rule is to be understood as `really implied by the subject that is not destroyed'. The twenty-fifth rule is: if something participates, or can participate, with the opposite kind, it is not a species of it; just as man can partake of white, therefore black is not the genus of man.		\|In the same way, the rule is to be understood as 'really implied by the subject that is not destroyed'. The twenty-fifth rule is: if something participates, or can participate, with the opposite kind, it is not a species of it; just as man can partake of white, therefore black is not the genus of man.
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	\|Notandum quod `participare' accipitur hic pro `recipere praedicationem alterius', quo modo dicitur quod semper subiectum participat praedicatum, quod non est aliud quam subiectum vere subici respectu praedicati.		\|Notandum quod `participare' accipitur hic pro `recipere praedicationem alterius', quo modo dicitur quod semper subiectum participat praedicatum, quod non est aliud quam subiectum vere subici respectu praedicati.
	\|It should be noted that `participating' is taken here to mean `receiving the predication of another', in which way it is said that the subject always participates in the predicate, which is nothing else than the subject truly subjected to the predicate.		\|It should be noted that 'participating' is taken here to mean 'receiving the predication of another', in which way it is said that the subject always participates in the predicate, which is nothing else than the subject truly subjected to the predicate.
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	\|Vigesima sexta regula est: quando aliquid potest competere speciei quod non potest competere alicui contento sub genere, non est species ipsius; sicut quia anima potest vivere et nullus numerus potest vivere, ideo numerus non est genus animae.		\|Vigesima sexta regula est: quando aliquid potest competere speciei quod non potest competere alicui contento sub genere, non est species ipsius; sicut quia anima potest vivere et nullus numerus potest vivere, ideo numerus non est genus animae.
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	\|Sicut quia albedo habet contrarium, scilicet nigredinem, et sonus non habet contrarium, ideo si nigredo non sit species soni, nec albedo est species soni. Trigesima prima regula est: quando tam genus quam species habent contrarium, si contrarium speciei sit sub contrario generis, ipsa species erit species illius generis.		\|Sicut quia albedo habet contrarium, scilicet nigredinem, et sonus non habet contrarium, ideo si nigredo non sit species soni, nec albedo est species soni. Trigesima prima regula est: quando tam genus quam species habent contrarium, si contrarium speciei sit sub contrario generis, ipsa species erit species illius generis.
	\|Just as whiteness has its opposite, namely blackness, and sound has no opposite, therefore if blackness is not a species of sound, neither is ~~albedo~~ a species of sound. The thirty-first rule is: when both genus and species have an opposite, if the opposite of the species is under the opposite of the genus, the species itself will be the species of that genus.		\|Just as whiteness has its opposite, namely blackness, and sound has no opposite, therefore if blackness is not a species of sound, neither is whiteness a species of sound. The thirty-first rule is: when both genus and species have an opposite, if the opposite of the species is under the opposite of the genus, the species itself will be the species of that genus.
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	\|Intelligendum est quod ista regula habet veritatem quando alterum contrariorum immediate continetur sub genere contrario et quando neutra contrarietas habet medium. Unde si una contrarietas habet medium et altera non, regula non habet locum; et ideo non sequitur `prodigalitas est species vitii, igitur illiberalitas est species virtutis', et hoc, quia virtus et vitium non habent medium; vel si habeant, saltem prodigalitas et illiberalitas		\|Intelligendum est quod ista regula habet veritatem quando alterum contrariorum immediate continetur sub genere contrario et quando neutra contrarietas habet medium. Unde si una contrarietas habet medium et altera non, regula non habet locum; et ideo non sequitur `prodigalitas est species vitii, igitur illiberalitas est species virtutis', et hoc, quia virtus et vitium non habent medium; vel si habeant, saltem prodigalitas et illiberalitas
	\|It must be understood that this rule is true when one of the opposites is immediately contained under the opposite genus, and when neither opposite has a mean. Hence if one contrariety has a mean and the other does not, the rule has no place; and therefore it does not follow that `prodigality is a species of vice, therefore illiberality is a species of virtue', and this because virtue and vice have no middle ground; or if they have, at least prodigality and illiberality		\|It must be understood that this rule is true when one of the opposites is immediately contained under the opposite genus, and when neither opposite has a mean. Hence if one contrariety has a mean and the other does not, the rule has no place; and therefore, it does not follow that 'prodigality is a species of vice, therefore illiberality is a species of virtue', and this because virtue and vice have no middle ground; or if they have, at least prodigality and illiberality
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	\|<non> habent medium.		\|<non> habent medium.
	\|have ~~<no>~~ middle ground,		\|have a middle ground,
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	\|Notandum etiam quod nullae species tales habent contrarietatem, stricte accipiendo contrarietatem, quando scilicet alterum contrariorum expellit reliquum et non compatitur ipsum, nam tales species non sunt nisi quaedam intentiones animae, quae ita compatiuntur se in anima sicut quaecumque aliae intentiones.		\|Notandum etiam quod nullae species tales habent contrarietatem, stricte accipiendo contrarietatem, quando scilicet alterum contrariorum expellit reliquum et non compatitur ipsum, nam tales species non sunt nisi quaedam intentiones animae, quae ita compatiuntur se in anima sicut quaecumque aliae intentiones.
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	\|'iuste est disciplinate', tamen ista consequentia est bona `iste iuste agit, igitur virtuose agit' et non e converso; et pro tanto dicitur `disciplinate' esse superius ad `iuste'. Et ideo regulae prius datae de praedicatione generis de specie et consimiles, intelligendae sunt quando genus natum est praedicari, quia videlicet est nomen, sive in conceptu sive in voce; quando autem non est nomen, non sunt regulae intelligendae de tali genere.		\|'iuste est disciplinate', tamen ista consequentia est bona `iste iuste agit, igitur virtuose agit' et non e converso; et pro tanto dicitur `disciplinate' esse superius ad `iuste'. Et ideo regulae prius datae de praedicatione generis de specie et consimiles, intelligendae sunt quando genus natum est praedicari, quia videlicet est nomen, sive in conceptu sive in voce; quando autem non est nomen, non sunt regulae intelligendae de tali genere.
	\|'justly is virtously', yet this consequence is good: 'he acts justly, therefore he acts virtuously' and not the other way around; and for this reason it is said that `virtuous' is superior to `just'. And therefore the rules previously given concerning the predication of a genus, of a species, and the like, are to be understood when a genus is made to be predicated, because it is clearly a name, whether in concept or verbally; but when there is no name, there are no rules to be understood about such a genus.		\|'justly is virtously', yet this consequence is good: 'he acts justly, therefore he acts virtuously' and not the other way around; and for this reason, it is said that 'virtuous' is superior to `just'. And therefore, the rules previously given concerning the predication of a genus, of a species, and the like, are to be understood when a genus is made to be predicated, because it is clearly a name, whether in concept or verbally; but when there is no name, there are no rules to be understood about such a genus.
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	\|Quadragesima prima regula est: demonstratis quatuor, et primo se habente ad secundum sicut tertium se habet ad quartum, si secundum sit genus primi, quartum erit genus tertii; sicut si homo se habet ad animal sicut albedo ad colorem, si animal sit genus hominis, color erit genus albedinis.		\|Quadragesima prima regula est: demonstratis quatuor, et primo se habente ad secundum sicut tertium se habet ad quartum, si secundum sit genus primi, quartum erit genus tertii; sicut si homo se habet ad animal sicut albedo ad colorem, si animal sit genus hominis, color erit genus albedinis.
	\|The fourty-first rule is: of four things demonstrated, and the first being related to the second as the third is related to the fourth, if the second is the genus of the first, the fourth will be the genus of the third; just as if man is to an animal as whiteness is to color, if an animal is the ~~type~~ of man, color will be the ~~type~~ of whiteness.		\|The fourty-first rule is: of four things demonstrated, and the first being related to the second as the third is related to the fourth, if the second is the genus of the first, the fourth will be the genus of the third; just as if man is to an animal as whiteness is to color, if an animal is the genus of man, color will be the genus of whiteness.
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	\|Ista regula est intelligenda quando similiter se habent secundum praedicationem et ordinem consequentiae, vel quando illa similitudo est causa quare unum illorum est genus alterius.		\|Ista regula est intelligenda quando similiter se habent secundum praedicationem et ordinem consequentiae, vel quando illa similitudo est causa quare unum illorum est genus alterius.

Ragnarr49 at 12:32, 30 March 2025

2025-03-30T12:32:06Z

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	\|Post haec videndum est quomodo construitur vel destruitur problema de genere. Et quia Aristoteles istam materiam diffuse tractavit, ideo per suas regulas est discurrendum.		\|Post haec videndum est quomodo construitur vel destruitur problema de genere. Et quia Aristoteles istam materiam diffuse tractavit, ideo per suas regulas est discurrendum.
	\|After this we must see how a problem of genera is constructed or ~~destructed~~. And since Aristotle treated this matter extensively, we must therefore run through his rules.		\|After this we must see how a problem of genera is constructed or decomposed. And since Aristotle treated this matter extensively, we must therefore run through his rules.
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	\|Est igitur prima regula talis: si praedicatum non praedicatur de subiecto universaliter Sumpto, illud praedicatum non est genus illius subiecti; sicut si haec non sit vera `omnis homo est lapis', lapis non est genus hominis.		\|Est igitur prima regula talis: si praedicatum non praedicatur de subiecto universaliter Sumpto, illud praedicatum non est genus illius subiecti; sicut si haec non sit vera `omnis homo est lapis', lapis non est genus hominis.

Ragnarr49 at 01:39, 30 March 2025

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Ragnarr49 at 00:40, 30 March 2025

2025-03-30T00:40:03Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 19:40, 29 March 2025
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	\|Sexta regula est: quando species assignata praedicatur de aliquo, sive sicut de suo contento sive non, de quo non praedicatur genus assignatum, tunc illud non est genus illius; sicut `opinabile' praedicatur de non-ente et nec ens nec scibile praedicatur de nonente, ideo nec ens nec scibile est genus opinabilis, quia de quocumque praedicatur species de eodem praedicatur genus.		\|Sexta regula est: quando species assignata praedicatur de aliquo, sive sicut de suo contento sive non, de quo non praedicatur genus assignatum, tunc illud non est genus illius; sicut `opinabile' praedicatur de non-ente et nec ens nec scibile praedicatur de nonente, ideo nec ens nec scibile est genus opinabilis, quia de quocumque praedicatur species de eodem praedicatur genus.
	\|The sixth rule is: when an assigned species is predicated of something, whether as to its content or not, of which the assigned genus is not predicated, then it is not its genus; just as `imaginable' is predicated of non-being, and neither being nor knowable is predicated of non-being, therefore neither being nor knowable is a conceivable genus, because whatever species is predicated of the same, genus is predicated of the same.		\|The sixth rule is: when an assigned species is predicated of something, whether as to its content or not, of which the assigned genus is not predicated, then it is not its genus; just as 'imaginable' is predicated of non-being, and neither being nor knowable is predicated of non-being, therefore neither being nor knowable is a conceivable genus, because whatever species is predicated of the same, genus is predicated of the same.
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	\|Quod est intelligendum quando in praedicatione exercita omnes termini supponunt personaliter et significative. Septima regula est: si species assignata non participat aliquam spe{{p\|655}}cierum assignatarum contentarum sub genere assignato, illud non est genus ipsius; sicut si voluptas nec est generatio nec corruptio, et sic de aliis speciebus motus, motus non est genus voluptatis.		\|Quod est intelligendum quando in praedicatione exercita omnes termini supponunt personaliter et significative. Septima regula est: si species assignata non participat aliquam spe{{p\|655}}cierum assignatarum contentarum sub genere assignato, illud non est genus ipsius; sicut si voluptas nec est generatio nec corruptio, et sic de aliis speciebus motus, motus non est genus voluptatis.
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	\|Notandum quod ista regula habet intelligi quando species assignata non immediate continetur sub genere. Unde homo non participat aliquam speciem animalis, et tamen animal est genus hominis; et hoc, quia homo immediate continetur sub animali.		\|Notandum quod ista regula habet intelligi quando species assignata non immediate continetur sub genere. Unde homo non participat aliquam speciem animalis, et tamen animal est genus hominis; et hoc, quia homo immediate continetur sub animali.
	\|It should be noted that this rule has to be understood when the assigned species is not immediately contained under the genus. Hence man does not partake of any species of animal, and yet animal is the genus of man; and this, because man is immediately contained under ~~the~~ animal.		\|It should be noted that this rule has to be understood when the assigned species is not immediately contained under the genus. Hence man does not partake of any species of animal, and yet animal is the genus of man; and this, because man is immediately contained under animal.
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	\|Notandum quod `participare' accipitur hic, sicut prius, pro subici cum signo universali respectu illius et non e converso, secundum modum ibi dictum. Octava regula est: si aliquid praedicetur de pluribus quam aliud, illud aliud non est genus illius; sicut quia opinabile praedicatur de pluribus quam ens, ideo ens non est genus opinabilis, quia semper genus praedicatur de pluribus quam sua species.		\|Notandum quod `participare' accipitur hic, sicut prius, pro subici cum signo universali respectu illius et non e converso, secundum modum ibi dictum. Octava regula est: si aliquid praedicetur de pluribus quam aliud, illud aliud non est genus illius; sicut quia opinabile praedicatur de pluribus quam ens, ideo ens non est genus opinabilis, quia semper genus praedicatur de pluribus quam sua species.
	\|It should be noted that `participating' is taken here, as before, for a subject with a universal sign with respect to it and not the other way around, according to the manner stated there. The eighth rule is: if something is predicated of more than another, that other is not its genus; just as, since an imaginable is predicated of more than a being, therefore a being is not a genus of imaginable, because a genus is always predicated of more than its species.		\|It should be noted that 'participating' is taken here, as before, for a subject with a universal sign with respect to it and not the other way around, according to the manner stated there. The eighth rule is: if something is predicated of more than another, that other is not its genus; just as, since an imaginable is predicated of more than a being, therefore a being is not a genus of imaginable, because a genus is always predicated of more than its species.
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	\|Sciendum est quod non semper actualiter genus praedicatur de pluribus quam sua species, quia si nullum animal esset nisi homo, animal non praedicaretur actualiter de pluribus quam homo pro tunc.		\|Sciendum est quod non semper actualiter genus praedicatur de pluribus quam sua species, quia si nullum animal esset nisi homo, animal non praedicaretur actualiter de pluribus quam homo pro tunc.
	\|It must be known that a genus is not always actually predicated of more than its species, because if there were no animal but man, ~~the~~ animal would not actually be predicated of more than man for that time.		\|It must be known that a genus is not always actually predicated of more than its species, because if there were no animal but man, animal would not actually be predicated of more than man for that time.
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	\|Et ideo debet auctoritas Aristotelis intelligi, quod semper genus praedicatur de pluribus quam sua species, nisi omnia individua alicuius speciei vel specierum sint destructa vel nonexsistentia.		\|Et ideo debet auctoritas Aristotelis intelligi, quod semper genus praedicatur de pluribus quam sua species, nisi omnia individua alicuius speciei vel specierum sint destructa vel nonexsistentia.
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	\|Unde dicit Philosophus, ibidem, sic: ``Si neque subalterna genera sint neque sub eodem ambo, non erit quod assignatum est genus. Sed contra hoc videtur esse Philosophus in libro Praedicamentorum, ubi dicit quod ``diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diversae sunt species et differentiae.		\|Unde dicit Philosophus, ibidem, sic: ``Si neque subalterna genera sint neque sub eodem ambo, non erit quod assignatum est genus. Sed contra hoc videtur esse Philosophus in libro Praedicamentorum, ubi dicit quod ``diversorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diversae sunt species et differentiae.
	\|Whence the Philosopher says, ibid., thus: `If there are neither subordinate genera nor both under the same genus, there will be no assigned genus'. But the Philosopher seems to be against this in the book of Predications, where he says that `different genera that are not placed subordinately have different species and differences.		\|Whence the Philosopher says, ibid., thus: 'If there are neither subordinate genera nor both under the same genus, there will be no assigned genus'. But the Philosopher seems to be against this in the book of Predications, where he says that 'different genera that are not placed subordinately have different species and differences.
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	\|Et si hoc, igitur idem non potest esse species talium generum diversorum et non subalternatim positorum: Praeterea, omne genus dividitur per differentias oppositas, quarum una removetur universaliter ab alia, igitur idem non potest contineri sub diversis generibus non subalternatis: Praeterea, ista regula videtur esse contra praedicta, quia dictum est prius quod diversa praedicamenta praedicantur de eodem, et tamen ista praedicamenta non continentur sub eodem genere nec sunt subalterna: Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod semper diversorum {{p\|657}} generum non subalternatim positorum diversae sunt species et differentiae, si sint genera habentia differentias; non tamen oportet quod omnes species talium generum sint diversae, et ita stat quod aliqua sit eadem species eorum.		\|Et si hoc, igitur idem non potest esse species talium generum diversorum et non subalternatim positorum: Praeterea, omne genus dividitur per differentias oppositas, quarum una removetur universaliter ab alia, igitur idem non potest contineri sub diversis generibus non subalternatis: Praeterea, ista regula videtur esse contra praedicta, quia dictum est prius quod diversa praedicamenta praedicantur de eodem, et tamen ista praedicamenta non continentur sub eodem genere nec sunt subalterna: Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod semper diversorum {{p\|657}} generum non subalternatim positorum diversae sunt species et differentiae, si sint genera habentia differentias; non tamen oportet quod omnes species talium generum sint diversae, et ita stat quod aliqua sit eadem species eorum.
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	\|Verbi gratia animal dividitur per rationale et irrationale, et una illarum removetur universaliter ab alia; postea est aliquod genus quod est praecise commune equo et asino. Sit ita quod forte habent aliquam convenientiam inter se, qualem neutrum illorum habet cum quocumque alio animali, et ideo ab eis potest abstrahi unum genus praecise commune illis, et vocetur illud genus a.		\|Verbi gratia animal dividitur per rationale et irrationale, et una illarum removetur universaliter ab alia; postea est aliquod genus quod est praecise commune equo et asino. Sit ita quod forte habent aliquam convenientiam inter se, qualem neutrum illorum habet cum quocumque alio animali, et ideo ab eis potest abstrahi unum genus praecise commune illis, et vocetur illud genus a.
	\|For example, animal is divided into rational and irrational, and one of these is universally removed from the other; subsequently there is a certain genus that is precisely common to the horse and the ~~ass~~. Let it be so that perhaps they have some compatibility with each other, such as none of them has with any other animal, and therefore one genus can be abstracted from them precisely common to them, and that genus may be called a.		\|For example, animal is divided into rational and irrational, and one of these is universally removed from the other; subsequently there is a certain genus that is precisely common to the horse and the donkey. Let it be so that perhaps they have some compatibility with each other, such as none of them has with any other animal, and therefore one genus can be abstracted from them precisely common to them, and that genus may be called a.
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	\|Similiter, forte bos et equus habent aliquam specialem convenientiam, qualem neutrum illorum habet cum quocumque alio animali; et tunc poterit ab eis abstrahi unum genus praecise commune illis, et vocetur b.		\|Similiter, forte bos et equus habent aliquam specialem convenientiam, qualem neutrum illorum habet cum quocumque alio animali; et tunc poterit ab eis abstrahi unum genus praecise commune illis, et vocetur b.

Ragnarr49 at 23:38, 29 March 2025

2025-03-29T23:38:48Z

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Ragnarr49 at 18:44, 23 February 2025

2025-02-23T18:44:19Z

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Ragnarr49 at 17:39, 23 February 2025

2025-02-23T17:39:44Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 12:39, 23 February 2025
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	\|Quadragesima secunda regula est quod in nominibus et verbis corruptivis et generativis, et aliis similitudinem aliquam secundum derivationem vel inflexionem seu declinationem habentibus, si unum est genus unius, et reliquum erit genus alterius; sicut ista habent similitu{{p\|666}}dinem secundum derivationem `dissolvi', `dissolutio' et similiter ista `corrumpi', `corruptio', et ideo si `dissolvi' est species `corrumpi', `dissolutio' est species `corruptionis'.		\|Quadragesima secunda regula est quod in nominibus et verbis corruptivis et generativis, et aliis similitudinem aliquam secundum derivationem vel inflexionem seu declinationem habentibus, si unum est genus unius, et reliquum erit genus alterius; sicut ista habent similitu{{p\|666}}dinem secundum derivationem `dissolvi', `dissolutio' et similiter ista `corrumpi', `corruptio', et ideo si `dissolvi' est species `corrumpi', `dissolutio' est species `corruptionis'.
	\|		\|The fourty-second rule is that in corruptive and generative nouns and verbs, and others having some resemblance according to derivation, inflection, or declension, if one is the genus of one, and the rest shall be the genus of another; just as these have a similarity according to the derivation of `dissolved', `dissolution' and similarly those `corrupt', `corruption', and therefore if `dissolved' is a species of `corrupted', ``dissolution' is a species of `corruption'.
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	\|Similiter, sicut se habent secundum talem similitudinem `aedificare' et `aedificatum esse', ita se habent `operari' et `operatum esse'; et ideo si `aedificare' sit species `operari', `aedificatum esse' erit species `operati esse'.		\|Similiter, sicut se habent secundum talem similitudinem `aedificare' et `aedificatum esse', ita se habent `operari' et `operatum esse'; et ideo si `aedificare' sit species `operari', `aedificatum esse' erit species `operati esse'.
	\|		\|Similarly, just as `to build' and `to be built' are related according to such similarity, so `to work' and `to be worked' are related. and therefore if `to build' is a species of `to work', `to be built' will be a species of `to be worked'.
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	\|Et sicut est de istis, ita est de aliis talem similitudinem habentibus. Ex istis omnibus patet quod talis ordo ita potest reperiri in nominibus sicut in verbis. Quadragesima tertia regula est quod privatio et habitus non sunt in eodem genere proximo. Quadragesima quarta regula est quod si habente tam genere quam specie privative oppositum, si oppositum non est in opposito nec propositum in proposito. Quadragesima quinta regula est: si oppositum in opposito et propositum in proposito. Notandum quod `genus' quadrupliciter accipitur, scilicet strictissime pro aliquo communi praedicabili in quid de multis rebus vel de pronominibus demonstrantibus plures res, quarum nulla nata est esse forma vel materia essentialis alterius rei specie differentis. Et isto modo non invenitur aliquod genus secundum intentionem Aristotelis, quidquid sit de veritate, nisi in praedicamento substantiae et qualitatis; quia secundum intentionem Aristotelis nullum aliud genus praedicatur in quid de pronomine demonstrante quamcumque rem per se exsistentem in genere.		\|Et sicut est de istis, ita est de aliis talem similitudinem habentibus. Ex istis omnibus patet quod talis ordo ita potest reperiri in nominibus sicut in verbis. Quadragesima tertia regula est quod privatio et habitus non sunt in eodem genere proximo. Quadragesima quarta regula est quod si habente tam genere quam specie privative oppositum, si oppositum non est in opposito nec propositum in proposito. Quadragesima quinta regula est: si oppositum in opposito et propositum in proposito. Notandum quod `genus' quadrupliciter accipitur, scilicet strictissime pro aliquo communi praedicabili in quid de multis rebus vel de pronominibus demonstrantibus plures res, quarum nulla nata est esse forma vel materia essentialis alterius rei specie differentis. Et isto modo non invenitur aliquod genus secundum intentionem Aristotelis, quidquid sit de veritate, nisi in praedicamento substantiae et qualitatis; quia secundum intentionem Aristotelis nullum aliud genus praedicatur in quid de pronomine demonstrante quamcumque rem per se exsistentem in genere.
	\|		\|And as it is with these, so it is with others having such a likeness. From all these it is clear that such an order can be found in nouns as well as in words. The fourty-third rule is that privation and habit are not in the same category. The forty-fourth rule is that if having tuch a genus with an opposite in both genus and species, if the opposite is not in the opposite, nor the proposition in the proposition. The fourty-fifth rule is: if the opposite is in the opposite then the proposition isin the proposition. It is to be noted that 'genus' is taken fourfold, namely, strictly as something common that can be predicated of many things or of pronouns denoting several things, none of which is made to be the essential form or matter of another thing different in kind. And in this way no genus is found according to Aristotle's intention, whatever it may be about truth, except in the predication of substance and quality; because, according to Aristotle's intention, no other genus is predicated of any thing of the pronoun showing any thing existing by itself in the genus.
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	\|Secundo modo accipitur genus strictius pro praedicabili in quid de pluribus rebus quae non sunt eiusdem rationis, sive aliqua illarum rerum sit nata esse pars essentialis alicuius alterius rei sive non.		\|Secundo modo accipitur genus strictius pro praedicabili in quid de pluribus rebus quae non sunt eiusdem rationis, sive aliqua illarum rerum sit nata esse pars essentialis alicuius alterius rei sive non.
	\|		\|In the second mode, a genus is taken more strictly as being predicable of several things which are not of the same reason, whether any one of those things is made to be an essential part of some other thing or not.
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	\|Et isto modo hoc commune `forma' est genus omnium formarum et hoc commune `anima' est genus ad animam vegetativam, sensitivam et intellectivam. Tertio modo accipitur genus stricte pro aliquo {{p\|667}} positivo praedicabili in quid de pluribus positivis; et sic quantitas, relatio et huiusmodi sunt genera.		\|Et isto modo hoc commune `forma' est genus omnium formarum et hoc commune `anima' est genus ad animam vegetativam, sensitivam et intellectivam. Tertio modo accipitur genus stricte pro aliquo {{p\|667}} positivo praedicabili in quid de pluribus positivis; et sic quantitas, relatio et huiusmodi sunt genera.
	\|		\|And in this way this common 'form' is the genus of all forms, and this common 'soul' is the genus for the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual soul. In the third way, a genus is taken strictly for some positive predicable into something out of several positives; and thus quantity, relation, and the like are genera.
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	\|Quarto accipitur large pro omni praedicabili in quid de pluribus praedicabilibus, sive sit positivum sive negativum.		\|Quarto accipitur large pro omni praedicabili in quid de pluribus praedicabilibus, sive sit positivum sive negativum.
	\|		\|Fourthly, it is taken broadly for every predicable in quid of several predicables, whether it be positive or negative.
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	\|Et sic accipit Philosophus hic genus. Illud autem dicitur praedicari in quid per quod contingit respondere ad quaestionem factam per quid.		\|Et sic accipit Philosophus hic genus. Illud autem dicitur praedicari in quid per quod contingit respondere ad quaestionem factam per quid.
	\|		\|And so the Philosopher takes this genus. But that is said to be predicated in quid by which it happens to answer the question made by what.
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	\|Nunc autem si quaeratur, quid est caecitas, potest responderi quod est privatio, et ita, large, aliquod privativum est genus. Alia regula est: si affirmatio est genus affirmationis, et negatio speciei erit genus negationis generis; sicut si animal sit genus hominis, non-homo erit genus non-animalis.		\|Nunc autem si quaeratur, quid est caecitas, potest responderi quod est privatio, et ita, large, aliquod privativum est genus. Alia regula est: si affirmatio est genus affirmationis, et negatio speciei erit genus negationis generis; sicut si animal sit genus hominis, non-homo erit genus non-animalis.
	\|		\|Now if it is asked, what is blindness, it can be answered that it is privation, and thus, broadly speaking, it is a kind of privation. Another rule is: if an affirmation is the genus of affirmation, and the negation of the species will be the genus of negation of the genus; just as if animal is the genus of man, non-human will be the genus of the non-animal.
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	\|Alia regula est: si negatio est genus negationis, affirmatio opposita negationi, quae est species, erit genus alterius; sicut si non-suave sit genus non-boni, bonum erit genus suavis. Sciendum est quod hic accipitur genus largissime, sicut prius.		\|Alia regula est: si negatio est genus negationis, affirmatio opposita negationi, quae est species, erit genus alterius; sicut si non-suave sit genus non-boni, bonum erit genus suavis. Sciendum est quod hic accipitur genus largissime, sicut prius.
	\|		\|Another rule is: if negation is the genus of negation, an affirmative opposite to a negative, which is a species, will be of another genus; just as if non-sweet is the genus of non-good, good will be the gebus of sweet. It must be known that here the genus is taken very broadly, as before.
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	\|Alia regula est: si species est ad aliquid, et genus est ad aliquid et e converso. Sciendum quod hoc est verum quando genus praedicatur in quid de specie; quando autem genus praedicatur de specie et non in quid, non oportet quod si species sit ad aliquid, quod genus sit ad aliquid, nec e converso.		\|Alia regula est: si species est ad aliquid, et genus est ad aliquid et e converso. Sciendum quod hoc est verum quando genus praedicatur in quid de specie; quando autem genus praedicatur de specie et non in quid, non oportet quod si species sit ad aliquid, quod genus sit ad aliquid, nec e converso.
	\|		\|Another rule is: if there is a species for something, then there is a genus for something, and vice versa. It must be known that this is true when the genus is predicated in quid of the species; But when the genus is predicated of the species and not in quid, it is not necessary that if the species is to something, for which the genus is to something, nor vice versa.
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	\|Et sic solvendae sunt instantiae quas ponit Aristoteles circa istam regulam.		\|Et sic solvendae sunt instantiae quas ponit Aristoteles circa istam regulam.
	\|		\|And thus must be resolved the instances which Aristotle sets forth concerning this rule.
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	\|Alia regula est: si tam genere quam specie exsistente ad aliquid species non dicitur ad idem secundum se et secundum idem genus, non est species illius generis. Alia regula est: si non dicitur ad idem secundum se et secundum genus et secundum omnia superiora ad illud genus, non est species ipsius. Istae regulae intelligendae sunt quando genus praedicatur in quid de specie. Alia regula est quod species et genus, quando sunt ad aliquid, dicuntur ad tertium secundum eundem casum, scilicet vel secundum casum {{p\|668}} genitivum vel dativum et huiusmodi.		\|Alia regula est: si tam genere quam specie exsistente ad aliquid species non dicitur ad idem secundum se et secundum idem genus, non est species illius generis. Alia regula est: si non dicitur ad idem secundum se et secundum genus et secundum omnia superiora ad illud genus, non est species ipsius. Istae regulae intelligendae sunt quando genus praedicatur in quid de specie. Alia regula est quod species et genus, quando sunt ad aliquid, dicuntur ad tertium secundum eundem casum, scilicet vel secundum casum {{p\|668}} genitivum vel dativum et huiusmodi.

Ragnarr49 at 16:50, 23 February 2025

2025-02-23T16:50:01Z

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	\|{{p\|665}} Istae tres regulae intelligendae sunt sicut praecedentes. Quadragesima regula est: si principale sit species principalis, et coniugatum erit species coniugati, et casus casus; sicut si iustitia sit species disciplinae, iustus erit species disciplinati et iuste species disciplinate. Sciendum est quod hic accipitur `species' large pro omni illo quod est per se superius sive secundum praedicationem sive secundum consequentiam. Et isto modo `virtuose' est superius et genus ad `iuste', quia quamvis haec non sit vera		\|{{p\|665}} Istae tres regulae intelligendae sunt sicut praecedentes. Quadragesima regula est: si principale sit species principalis, et coniugatum erit species coniugati, et casus casus; sicut si iustitia sit species disciplinae, iustus erit species disciplinati et iuste species disciplinate. Sciendum est quod hic accipitur `species' large pro omni illo quod est per se superius sive secundum praedicationem sive secundum consequentiam. Et isto modo `virtuose' est superius et genus ad `iuste', quia quamvis haec non sit vera
	\|		\|These three rules are to be understood as the previous ones. The fourtieth rule is: if the principal is the species of the principal, then the conjugated will be the species of the conjugated species, and the case will be the case; just as if justice is a species of virtue, the just will be the species of the virtuous and justly the species of virtously. It must be known that here 'species' is taken broadly for everything that is superior in itself, either by predication or by consequence. And in this way 'virtuously' is superior and genus to 'justly', because although this is not true
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	\|'iuste est disciplinate', tamen ista consequentia est bona `iste iuste agit, igitur virtuose agit' et non e converso; et pro tanto dicitur `disciplinate' esse superius ad `iuste'. Et ideo regulae prius datae de praedicatione generis de specie et consimiles, intelligendae sunt quando genus natum est praedicari, quia videlicet est nomen, sive in conceptu sive in voce; quando autem non est nomen, non sunt regulae intelligendae de tali genere.		\|'iuste est disciplinate', tamen ista consequentia est bona `iste iuste agit, igitur virtuose agit' et non e converso; et pro tanto dicitur `disciplinate' esse superius ad `iuste'. Et ideo regulae prius datae de praedicatione generis de specie et consimiles, intelligendae sunt quando genus natum est praedicari, quia videlicet est nomen, sive in conceptu sive in voce; quando autem non est nomen, non sunt regulae intelligendae de tali genere.
	\|		\|'justly is virtously', yet this consequence is good: 'he acts justly, therefore he acts virtuously' and not the other way around; and for this reason it is said that `virtuous' is superior to `just'. And therefore the rules previously given concerning the predication of a genus, of a species, and the like, are to be understood when a genus is made to be predicated, because it is clearly a name, whether in concept or verbally; but when there is no name, there are no rules to be understood about such a genus.
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	\|Quadragesima prima regula est: demonstratis quatuor, et primo se habente ad secundum sicut tertium se habet ad quartum, si secundum sit genus primi, quartum erit genus tertii; sicut si homo se habet ad animal sicut albedo ad colorem, si animal sit genus hominis, color erit genus albedinis.		\|Quadragesima prima regula est: demonstratis quatuor, et primo se habente ad secundum sicut tertium se habet ad quartum, si secundum sit genus primi, quartum erit genus tertii; sicut si homo se habet ad animal sicut albedo ad colorem, si animal sit genus hominis, color erit genus albedinis.
	\|		\|The fourty-first rule is: of four things demonstrated, and the first being related to the second as the third is related to the fourth, if the second is the genus of the first, the fourth will be the genus of the third; just as if man is to an animal as whiteness is to color, if an animal is the type of man, color will be the type of whiteness.
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	\|Ista regula est intelligenda quando similiter se habent secundum praedicationem et ordinem consequentiae, vel quando illa similitudo est causa quare unum illorum est genus alterius.		\|Ista regula est intelligenda quando similiter se habent secundum praedicationem et ordinem consequentiae, vel quando illa similitudo est causa quare unum illorum est genus alterius.
	\|		\|This rule is to be understood when they are alike according to predication and order of consequence, or when that similarity is the reason why one of them is the genus of the other.
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	\|Quadragesima secunda regula est quod in nominibus et verbis corruptivis et generativis, et aliis similitudinem aliquam secundum derivationem vel inflexionem seu declinationem habentibus, si unum est genus unius, et reliquum erit genus alterius; sicut ista habent similitu{{p\|666}}dinem secundum derivationem `dissolvi', `dissolutio' et similiter ista `corrumpi', `corruptio', et ideo si `dissolvi' est species `corrumpi', `dissolutio' est species `corruptionis'.		\|Quadragesima secunda regula est quod in nominibus et verbis corruptivis et generativis, et aliis similitudinem aliquam secundum derivationem vel inflexionem seu declinationem habentibus, si unum est genus unius, et reliquum erit genus alterius; sicut ista habent similitu{{p\|666}}dinem secundum derivationem `dissolvi', `dissolutio' et similiter ista `corrumpi', `corruptio', et ideo si `dissolvi' est species `corrumpi', `dissolutio' est species `corruptionis'.

Ragnarr49 at 16:09, 23 February 2025

2025-02-23T16:09:20Z

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	\|Sciendum quod istud de bono non dicitur nisi gratia exempli, et ideo non oportet curare sive `bonum' sit genus sive non. Trigesima tertia regula: si generum contrariorum sit aliquod medium, et specierum contrariarum erit aliquod medium et e converso.		\|Sciendum quod istud de bono non dicitur nisi gratia exempli, et ideo non oportet curare sive `bonum' sit genus sive non. Trigesima tertia regula: si generum contrariorum sit aliquod medium, et specierum contrariarum erit aliquod medium et e converso.
	\|		\|It should be known that this is not said of good except by way of example, and therefore it is not necessary to care whether 'good' is a genus or not. The thirty-third rule: if there is some mean of opposite genera, then of opposite species there will be some mean, and vice versa.
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	\|Ista regula habet instantiam, sicut patet, quando plures species continentur sub uno genere quam sub alio, et ideo intelligenda est quando utrumque genus habet species aequales.		\|Ista regula habet instantiam, sicut patet, quando plures species continentur sub uno genere quam sub alio, et ideo intelligenda est quando utrumque genus habet species aequales.
	\|		\|This rule has an instance, as is clear, when more species are contained under one genus than under another, and therefore it must be understood when both genera have equal species.
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	\|Similiter intelligenda est quando species unius generis non est medium inter duas species alterius generis. Trigesima quarta regula est: quando tam genus quam species sunt contraria, si habent medium debent habere medium eodem modo, ut scilicet quod si inter species sit medium positivum, inter genera debet esse medium positivum et e converso; et si inter species sit medium per abnegationem, inter genera debet esse medium per abnegationem et e converso.		\|Similiter intelligenda est quando species unius generis non est medium inter duas species alterius generis. Trigesima quarta regula est: quando tam genus quam species sunt contraria, si habent medium debent habere medium eodem modo, ut scilicet quod si inter species sit medium positivum, inter genera debet esse medium positivum et e converso; et si inter species sit medium per abnegationem, inter genera debet esse medium per abnegationem et e converso.
	\|		\|It must be understood similarly when a species of one genus is not intermediate between two species of another genus. The thirty-fourth rule is: when both genus and species are opposites, if they have a mean, they must have a mean in the same way, namely that if there is a positive mean between species, there must be a positive mean between genera, and vice versa; and if between species there is a mean by negation, there must be a mean between genera by negation and vice versa.
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	\|Trigesima quinta regula est: si extrema contraria sint in aliquo genere non habente contrarium, medium inter illa extrema erit in eodem genere. Trigesima sexta regula est: si genus habet contrarium, species habet contrarium.		\|Trigesima quinta regula est: si extrema contraria sint in aliquo genere non habente contrarium, medium inter illa extrema erit in eodem genere. Trigesima sexta regula est: si genus habet contrarium, species habet contrarium.
	\|		\|The thirty-fifth rule is: if the opposite extremes are in any genus that has no opposite, the mean between those extremes will be in the same genus. The thirty-sixth rule is: if the genus has its opposite, the species has its opposite.
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	\|Sciendum quod istae tres ultimae regulae intelligendae sunt sicut quarta praecedens. Trigesima septima regula: si species habens contrarium sit in aliquo genere non habente contrarium, species opposita erit in eodem genere.		\|Sciendum quod istae tres ultimae regulae intelligendae sunt sicut quarta praecedens. Trigesima septima regula: si species habens contrarium sit in aliquo genere non habente contrarium, species opposita erit in eodem genere.
	\|		\|It should be known that these three last rules are to be understood as the fourth preceding. The thirty-seventh rule: if a species having its opposite is in a genus not having its opposite, the opposite species will be in the same genus.
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	\|Trigesima octava regula est: si medium inter extrema sit in aliquo genere non habente contrarium, extrema contraria sunt in eodem genere. Trigesima nona regula est: si species contraria est in contrario genere, et species opposita est in opposito genere; sicut si iustitia est species virtutis, iniustitia est species vitii.		\|Trigesima octava regula est: si medium inter extrema sit in aliquo genere non habente contrarium, extrema contraria sunt in eodem genere. Trigesima nona regula est: si species contraria est in contrario genere, et species opposita est in opposito genere; sicut si iustitia est species virtutis, iniustitia est species vitii.
	\|		\|The thirty-eighth rule is: if the mean between the extremes is in a genus not having its opposite, the opposite extremes are in the same genus. The thirty-ninth rule is: if the opposite species is in the opposite genus, then the opposed species is in the opposed genus; just as if justice is a species of virtue, injustice is a species of vice.
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	\|{{p\|665}} Istae tres regulae intelligendae sunt sicut praecedentes. Quadragesima regula est: si principale sit species principalis, et coniugatum erit species coniugati, et casus casus; sicut si iustitia sit species disciplinae, iustus erit species disciplinati et iuste species disciplinate. Sciendum est quod hic accipitur `species' large pro omni illo quod est per se superius sive secundum praedicationem sive secundum consequentiam. Et isto modo `virtuose' est superius et genus ad `iuste', quia quamvis haec non sit vera		\|{{p\|665}} Istae tres regulae intelligendae sunt sicut praecedentes. Quadragesima regula est: si principale sit species principalis, et coniugatum erit species coniugati, et casus casus; sicut si iustitia sit species disciplinae, iustus erit species disciplinati et iuste species disciplinate. Sciendum est quod hic accipitur `species' large pro omni illo quod est per se superius sive secundum praedicationem sive secundum consequentiam. Et isto modo `virtuose' est superius et genus ad `iuste', quia quamvis haec non sit vera