Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 11 - Revision history

Ragnarr49 at 22:29, 22 April 2025

2025-04-22T22:29:43Z

Ragnarr49 at 15:00, 29 March 2025

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Ragnarr49 at 22:07, 17 February 2025

2025-02-17T22:07:25Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:07, 17 February 2025
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	\|CAP. 11. DE REGULIS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE EX UNA DE INESSE ET ALIA DE MODO.		\|CAP. 11. DE REGULIS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE EX UNA DE INESSE ET ALIA DE MODO.

	\|Chapter 11. On the rules that govern consequences from one x of essence and another of a mode.		\|Chapter 11. On the rules that govern consequences from one proposition of essence and another of a mode.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Circa consequentias ex una de inesse et alia de modo est primo sciendum quod illa de necessario, sive sumatur in sensu compositionis sive in sensu divisionis, semper infert illam de inesse; sed non e converso, nisi forte aliquando gratia materiae.		\|Circa consequentias ex una de inesse et alia de modo est primo sciendum quod illa de necessario, sive sumatur in sensu compositionis sive in sensu divisionis, semper infert illam de inesse; sed non e converso, nisi forte aliquando gratia materiae.

	\|With regard to the consequences from one ~~being~~ and another mode, it is first to be known that ~~that~~ of necessity, whether taken in the sense of composition or in the sense of division, always entails that of being; but not the other way round, except perhaps sometimes by the ~~grace of~~ matter.		\|With regard to the consequences from one proposition of essence and another of a mode, it is first to be known that the one of necessity, whether taken in the sense of composition or in the sense of division, always entails that of being; but not the other way round, except perhaps sometimes thanks to the matter.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Circa illas de possibili est primo sciendum quod illa de possibili, sive sumatur in sensu divisionis sive in sensu compositionis, non infert suam de inesse. Non enim sequitur `haec est possibilis: homo est albus, igitur homo est albus'; nec sequitur `homo potest esse albus, igitur homo est albus'.		\|Circa illas de possibili est primo sciendum quod illa de possibili, sive sumatur in sensu divisionis sive in sensu compositionis, non infert suam de inesse. Non enim sequitur `haec est possibilis: homo est albus, igitur homo est albus'; nec sequitur `homo potest esse albus, igitur homo est albus'.

	\|		\|With regard to those things about the possible, it must first be known that the thing about the possible, whether taken in the sense of division or in the sense of composition, does not infer its own existence. For it does not follow that 'this is possible: a man is white, therefore a man is white'; nor does it follow that ` aman can be white, therefore a man is white'.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Sed illa de inesse semper infert suam de possibili, quia {{p\|638}} sequitur `Sortes est albus, igitur haec est possibilis: Sortes est albus'; et similiter `igitur Sortes potest esse albus'. Et hoc est verum, sive subiectum consequentis sumatur pro eo quod est sive pro eo quod potest esse.		\|Sed illa de inesse semper infert suam de possibili, quia {{p\|638}} sequitur `Sortes est albus, igitur haec est possibilis: Sortes est albus'; et similiter `igitur Sortes potest esse albus'. Et hoc est verum, sive subiectum consequentis sumatur pro eo quod est sive pro eo quod potest esse.

	\|		\|But that of being (essence) always infers that of the possible, because it follows that `Socrates is white, therefore this is possible: Socrates is white'; and similarly `therefore Socrates can be white'. And this is true, whether the subject of the consequent is taken for what it is or for what it may be.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Circa propositiones de contingenti est sciendum quod si illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu compositionis vel aliqua aequivalens ei, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `haec est contingens: Sortes est albus, ergo Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, ergo haec est contingens: Deus est immortalis'.		\|Circa propositiones de contingenti est sciendum quod si illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu compositionis vel aliqua aequivalens ei, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `haec est contingens: Sortes est albus, ergo Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, ergo haec est contingens: Deus est immortalis'.

	\|		\|With regard to propositions about the contingent, it must be known that if that contingent is taken in the sense of composition or something equivalent to it, it does not infer its own existence, nor vice versa. For it does not follow that 'this is contingent: Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that God is immortal, therefore this is contingent: God is immortal.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Similiter si sumatur in sensu divisionis, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `contingit Sortem esse album, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, igitur contingit Deum esse immortalem'.		\|Similiter si sumatur in sensu divisionis, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `contingit Sortem esse album, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, igitur contingit Deum esse immortalem'.

	\|		\|Similarly, if it is taken in the sense of division, it does not infer its own existence, nor vice versa. For it does not follow that `It happens that Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is white''; nor does it follow that `God is immortal, therefore it happens that God is immortal.'

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Circa illas de impossibili est sciendum quod illa de impossibili in sensu compositionis non infert suam de inesse sed semper contradictoriam suae de inesse; sicut non sequitur `omnem hominem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur omnis homo est asinus', sed sequitur `ergo aliquis homo non est asinus'. Illa autem de inesse non infert illam de impossibili.		\|Circa illas de impossibili est sciendum quod illa de impossibili in sensu compositionis non infert suam de inesse sed semper contradictoriam suae de inesse; sicut non sequitur `omnem hominem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur omnis homo est asinus', sed sequitur `ergo aliquis homo non est asinus'. Illa autem de inesse non infert illam de impossibili.

	\|		\|With regard to the impossible, it must be known that the impossible in the sense of composition does not imply its own existence, but always contradicts its own existence. just as it does not follow that 'it is impossible for every man to be an ass, therefore every man is an ass', but it follows that 'therefore some man is not an ass'. But that of essence does not infer that which is impossible.

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	\|Similiter illa de impossibili, si sumatur in sensu divisionis et modus possibilitatis sit negatus, infert suam de inesse et non e converso; sicut sequitur `homo non potest esse asinus, ergo homo non est asinus', sed non e converso. Si autem ponatur ibi `impossibile' vel eius adverbium, non infert suam de inesse sed contradictoriam ipsius. Sicut non sequitur `Sortem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur Sortes est asinus', nec sequitur `Sortes impossibiliter est asinus, igitur Sortes est asinus', sed magis sequitur `ergo Sortes non est asinus'. E converso autem non sequitur, sicut manifeste patet.		\|Similiter illa de impossibili, si sumatur in sensu divisionis et modus possibilitatis sit negatus, infert suam de inesse et non e converso; sicut sequitur `homo non potest esse asinus, ergo homo non est asinus', sed non e converso. Si autem ponatur ibi `impossibile' vel eius adverbium, non infert suam de inesse sed contradictoriam ipsius. Sicut non sequitur `Sortem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur Sortes est asinus', nec sequitur `Sortes impossibiliter est asinus, igitur Sortes est asinus', sed magis sequitur `ergo Sortes non est asinus'. E converso autem non sequitur, sicut manifeste patet.

	\|		\|Similarly, that of the impossible, if it is taken in the sense of division and the mode of possibility is denied, infers its own from essence and not the other way around; as it follows, `a man cannot be an ass, therefore a man is not an ass', but not the other way around. But if 'impossible' or its adverb is placed there, it does not infer its own existence but its contradictory. Just as it does not follow that `It is impossible for Socrates to be an ass, therefore Socrates is an ass', nor does it follow that `Socrates is impossible to be an ass, therefore Socrates is an ass'', but rather it follows that `Therefore Socrates is not an ass.' But the converse does not follow, as is plainly evident.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Circa alias modales sciendum quod raro vel numquam illae de inesse inferunt illas de modo; sicut non sequitur `homo est albus, ergo homo per se est albus'; `homo est albus, ergo homo scitur esse albus'; `homo est animal, igitur homo per accidens est animal'. Tamen frequenter illae de modo inferunt illas de inesse; sicut sequitur `homo per se est animal, {{p\|639}} igitur homo est animal'; `album scitur esse homo, igitur album est homo'. Et sic de multis aliis.		\|Circa alias modales sciendum quod raro vel numquam illae de inesse inferunt illas de modo; sicut non sequitur `homo est albus, ergo homo per se est albus'; `homo est albus, ergo homo scitur esse albus'; `homo est animal, igitur homo per accidens est animal'. Tamen frequenter illae de modo inferunt illas de inesse; sicut sequitur `homo per se est animal, {{p\|639}} igitur homo est animal'; `album scitur esse homo, igitur album est homo'. Et sic de multis aliis.

	\|		\|With regard to other modals, it is to be known that they rarely or never infer from existence those of the mode; just as it does not follow that `man is white, therefore man is white in himself'; `a man is white, therefore a man is known to be white'; `A man is an animal, therefore a man is an animal by accident'. However, they frequently infer from the way they are; as it follows, `a man is by himself an animal, therefore a man is an animal'; `a white thing is known to be a man, therefore a white thing is a man'. And so about many others.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Aliquae tamen non inferunt suas de inesse; sicut non sequitur `Sortes creditur esse albus, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Sortes opinatur hominem esse album, igitur homo est albus'. Ad sciendum autem quando talis consequentia est bona et quando non, utendum est ista regula: quia si sit talis modus qui non potest competere nisi propositioni verae, consequentia est bona ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse. Si autem sit talis modus qui possit competere propositioni falsae, consequentia ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse non valet.		\|Aliquae tamen non inferunt suas de inesse; sicut non sequitur `Sortes creditur esse albus, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Sortes opinatur hominem esse album, igitur homo est albus'. Ad sciendum autem quando talis consequentia est bona et quando non, utendum est ista regula: quia si sit talis modus qui non potest competere nisi propositioni verae, consequentia est bona ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse. Si autem sit talis modus qui possit competere propositioni falsae, consequentia ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse non valet.

	\|		\|Some, however, do not infer their existence; just as it does not follow that `Socrates is believed to be white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that `Socrates thinks that a man is white, therefore a man is white'. In order to know when such a consequence is good and when it is not, we must use this rule: if there is such a mode which can only correspond to a proposition of truth, the consequence is good from that mode to its existence. But if there is such a mode as can be appropriate to a false proposition, the inference from that mode to its existence is invalid.

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	\|Huiusmodi sunt tales: creditum, opinatum, concessum, dubitatum et huiusmodi.		\|Huiusmodi sunt tales: creditum, opinatum, concessum, dubitatum et huiusmodi.

	\|		\|They are of this kind: believed, thought, granted, doubted, and the like.

	\|}		\|}

Ragnarr49 at 21:45, 17 February 2025

2025-02-17T21:45:17Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 16:45, 17 February 2025
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	\|CAP. 11. DE REGULIS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE EX UNA DE INESSE ET ALIA DE MODO.		\|CAP. 11. DE REGULIS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE EX UNA DE INESSE ET ALIA DE MODO.

	\|		\|Chapter 11. On the rules that govern consequences from one x of essence and another of a mode.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Circa consequentias ex una de inesse et alia de modo est primo sciendum quod illa de necessario, sive sumatur in sensu compositionis sive in sensu divisionis, semper infert illam de inesse; sed non e converso, nisi forte aliquando gratia materiae.		\|Circa consequentias ex una de inesse et alia de modo est primo sciendum quod illa de necessario, sive sumatur in sensu compositionis sive in sensu divisionis, semper infert illam de inesse; sed non e converso, nisi forte aliquando gratia materiae.

	\|		\|With regard to the consequences from one being and another mode, it is first to be known that that of necessity, whether taken in the sense of composition or in the sense of division, always entails that of being; but not the other way round, except perhaps sometimes by the grace of matter.

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Edward Ockham at 11:56, 13 June 2015

2015-06-13T11:56:15Z

New page

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 10|Chapter 10]]|[[../Chapter 12|Chapter 12]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 11. DE REGULIS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE EX UNA DE INESSE ET ALIA DE MODO.

|

|- valign = top
|Circa consequentias ex una de inesse et alia de modo est primo sciendum quod illa de necessario, sive sumatur in sensu compositionis sive in sensu divisionis, semper infert illam de inesse; sed non e converso, nisi forte aliquando gratia materiae.

|

|- valign = top
|Circa illas de possibili est primo sciendum quod illa de possibili, sive sumatur in sensu divisionis sive in sensu compositionis, non infert suam de inesse. Non enim sequitur `haec est possibilis: homo est albus, igitur homo est albus'; nec sequitur `homo potest esse albus, igitur homo est albus'.

|

|- valign = top
|Sed illa de inesse semper infert suam de possibili, quia {{p|638}} sequitur `Sortes est albus, igitur haec est possibilis: Sortes est albus'; et similiter `igitur Sortes potest esse albus'. Et hoc est verum, sive subiectum consequentis sumatur pro eo quod est sive pro eo quod potest esse.

|

|- valign = top
|Circa propositiones de contingenti est sciendum quod si illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu compositionis vel aliqua aequivalens ei, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `haec est contingens: Sortes est albus, ergo Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, ergo haec est contingens: Deus est immortalis'.

|

|- valign = top
|Similiter si sumatur in sensu divisionis, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `contingit Sortem esse album, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, igitur contingit Deum esse immortalem'.

|

|- valign = top
|Circa illas de impossibili est sciendum quod illa de impossibili in sensu compositionis non infert suam de inesse sed semper contradictoriam suae de inesse; sicut non sequitur `omnem hominem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur omnis homo est asinus', sed sequitur `ergo aliquis homo non est asinus'. Illa autem de inesse non infert illam de impossibili.

|

|- valign = top
|Similiter illa de impossibili, si sumatur in sensu divisionis et modus possibilitatis sit negatus, infert suam de inesse et non e converso; sicut sequitur `homo non potest esse asinus, ergo homo non est asinus', sed non e converso. Si autem ponatur ibi `impossibile' vel eius adverbium, non infert suam de inesse sed contradictoriam ipsius. Sicut non sequitur `Sortem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur Sortes est asinus', nec sequitur `Sortes impossibiliter est asinus, igitur Sortes est asinus', sed magis sequitur `ergo Sortes non est asinus'. E converso autem non sequitur, sicut manifeste patet.

|

|- valign = top
|Circa alias modales sciendum quod raro vel numquam illae de inesse inferunt illas de modo; sicut non sequitur `homo est albus, ergo homo per se est albus'; `homo est albus, ergo homo scitur esse albus'; `homo est animal, igitur homo per accidens est animal'. Tamen frequenter illae de modo inferunt illas de inesse; sicut sequitur `homo per se est animal, {{p|639}} igitur homo est animal'; `album scitur esse homo, igitur album est homo'. Et sic de multis aliis.

|

|- valign = top
|Aliquae tamen non inferunt suas de inesse; sicut non sequitur `Sortes creditur esse albus, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Sortes opinatur hominem esse album, igitur homo est albus'. Ad sciendum autem quando talis consequentia est bona et quando non, utendum est ista regula: quia si sit talis modus qui non potest competere nisi propositioni verae, consequentia est bona ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse. Si autem sit talis modus qui possit competere propositioni falsae, consequentia ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse non valet.

|

|- valign = top
|Huiusmodi sunt tales: creditum, opinatum, concessum, dubitatum et huiusmodi.

|

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:29, 22 April 2025
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	\|CAP. 11. DE REGULIS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE EX UNA DE INESSE ET ALIA DE MODO.		\|CAP. 11. DE REGULIS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE EX UNA DE INESSE ET ALIA DE MODO.

	\|Chapter 11. On the rules that govern consequences from one proposition ~~of inherence~~ and another of a mode.		\|Chapter 11. On the rules that govern consequences from one assertoric proposition and another of a mode.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Circa consequentias ex una de inesse et alia de modo est primo sciendum quod illa de necessario, sive sumatur in sensu compositionis sive in sensu divisionis, semper infert illam de inesse; sed non e converso, nisi forte aliquando gratia materiae.		\|Circa consequentias ex una de inesse et alia de modo est primo sciendum quod illa de necessario, sive sumatur in sensu compositionis sive in sensu divisionis, semper infert illam de inesse; sed non e converso, nisi forte aliquando gratia materiae.

	\|With regard to the consequences from one proposition ~~of inherence~~ and another of a mode, it is first to be known that the one ~~of necessity~~, whether taken in the sense of composition or in the sense of division, always entails ~~that of being~~; but not the other way round, except perhaps sometimes thanks to the matter.		\|With regard to the consequences from one assertoric proposition and another of a mode, it is first to be known that the one de necessario, whether taken in the sense of composition or in the sense of division, always entails the assertoric; but not the other way round, except perhaps sometimes thanks to the matter.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Circa illas de possibili est primo sciendum quod illa de possibili, sive sumatur in sensu divisionis sive in sensu compositionis, non infert suam de inesse. Non enim sequitur `haec est possibilis: homo est albus, igitur homo est albus'; nec sequitur `homo potest esse albus, igitur homo est albus'.		\|Circa illas de possibili est primo sciendum quod illa de possibili, sive sumatur in sensu divisionis sive in sensu compositionis, non infert suam de inesse. Non enim sequitur `haec est possibilis: homo est albus, igitur homo est albus'; nec sequitur `homo potest esse albus, igitur homo est albus'.

	\|With regard to propositions ~~of possibility~~, it must first be known that a proposition ~~of possibility~~, whether taken in the sense of division or in the sense of composition, does not infer its ~~own existence~~. For it does not follow that 'this is possible: a man is white, therefore a man is white'; nor does it follow that 'a man can be white, therefore a man is white'.		\|With regard to propositions de possibili, it must first be known that a proposition de possibili, whether taken in the sense of division or in the sense of composition, does not infer its assertoric. For it does not follow that 'this is possible: a man is white, therefore a man is white'; nor does it follow that 'a man can be white, therefore a man is white'.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Sed illa de inesse semper infert suam de possibili, quia {{p\|638}} sequitur `Sortes est albus, igitur haec est possibilis: Sortes est albus'; et similiter `igitur Sortes potest esse albus'. Et hoc est verum, sive subiectum consequentis sumatur pro eo quod est sive pro eo quod potest esse.		\|Sed illa de inesse semper infert suam de possibili, quia {{p\|638}} sequitur `Sortes est albus, igitur haec est possibilis: Sortes est albus'; et similiter `igitur Sortes potest esse albus'. Et hoc est verum, sive subiectum consequentis sumatur pro eo quod est sive pro eo quod potest esse.

	\|But that ~~of inherence~~ always infers that ~~of the possible~~, because it follows that 'Socrates is white, therefore this is possible: Socrates is white'; and similarly 'therefore Socrates can be white'. And this is true, whether the subject of the consequent is taken for what it is or for what it may be.		\|But that assertoric always infers that de possibili, because it follows that 'Socrates is white, therefore this is possible: Socrates is white'; and similarly 'therefore Socrates can be white'. And this is true, whether the subject of the consequent is taken for what it is or for what it may be.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Circa propositiones de contingenti est sciendum quod si illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu compositionis vel aliqua aequivalens ei, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `haec est contingens: Sortes est albus, ergo Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, ergo haec est contingens: Deus est immortalis'.		\|Circa propositiones de contingenti est sciendum quod si illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu compositionis vel aliqua aequivalens ei, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `haec est contingens: Sortes est albus, ergo Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, ergo haec est contingens: Deus est immortalis'.

	\|With regard to propositions ~~of contingency~~, it must be known that if the proposition ~~of contingency~~ is taken in the sense of composition or something equivalent to it, it does not infer its ~~own existence~~, nor vice versa. For it does not follow that 'this is contingent: Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that 'God is immortal, therefore this is contingent: God is immortal.'		\|With regard to propositions de contingenti, it must be known that if the proposition de contingenti is taken in the sense of composition or something equivalent to it, it does not infer its assertoric, nor vice versa. For it does not follow that 'this is contingent: Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that 'God is immortal, therefore this is contingent: God is immortal.'

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Similiter si sumatur in sensu divisionis, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `contingit Sortem esse album, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, igitur contingit Deum esse immortalem'.		\|Similiter si sumatur in sensu divisionis, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `contingit Sortem esse album, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, igitur contingit Deum esse immortalem'.

	\|Similarly, if it is taken in the sense of division, it does not infer its ~~own existence~~, nor vice versa. For it does not follow that 'It happens that Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that 'God is immortal, therefore it happens that God is immortal.'		\|Similarly, if it is taken in the sense of division, it does not infer its assertoric, nor vice versa. For it does not follow that 'It happens that Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that 'God is immortal, therefore it happens that God is immortal.'

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Circa illas de impossibili est sciendum quod illa de impossibili in sensu compositionis non infert suam de inesse sed semper contradictoriam suae de inesse; sicut non sequitur `omnem hominem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur omnis homo est asinus', sed sequitur `ergo aliquis homo non est asinus'. Illa autem de inesse non infert illam de impossibili.		\|Circa illas de impossibili est sciendum quod illa de impossibili in sensu compositionis non infert suam de inesse sed semper contradictoriam suae de inesse; sicut non sequitur `omnem hominem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur omnis homo est asinus', sed sequitur `ergo aliquis homo non est asinus'. Illa autem de inesse non infert illam de impossibili.

	\|With regard to the impossible, it must be known that the impossible in the sense of composition does not imply its ~~own existence~~, but always contradicts its ~~own existence~~. just as it does not follow that 'it is impossible for every man to be a donkey, therefore every man is a donkey', but it follows that 'therefore some man is not a donkey'. But that ~~of inherence~~ does not infer that which is impossible.		\|With regard to the impossible, it must be known that the impossible in the sense of composition does not imply its assertoric, but always contradicts its assertoric. just as it does not follow that 'it is impossible for every man to be a donkey, therefore every man is a donkey', but it follows that 'therefore some man is not a donkey'. But that assertoric does not infer that which is impossible.

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	\|Similiter illa de impossibili, si sumatur in sensu divisionis et modus possibilitatis sit negatus, infert suam de inesse et non e converso; sicut sequitur `homo non potest esse asinus, ergo homo non est asinus', sed non e converso. Si autem ponatur ibi `impossibile' vel eius adverbium, non infert suam de inesse sed contradictoriam ipsius. Sicut non sequitur `Sortem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur Sortes est asinus', nec sequitur `Sortes impossibiliter est asinus, igitur Sortes est asinus', sed magis sequitur `ergo Sortes non est asinus'. E converso autem non sequitur, sicut manifeste patet.		\|Similiter illa de impossibili, si sumatur in sensu divisionis et modus possibilitatis sit negatus, infert suam de inesse et non e converso; sicut sequitur `homo non potest esse asinus, ergo homo non est asinus', sed non e converso. Si autem ponatur ibi `impossibile' vel eius adverbium, non infert suam de inesse sed contradictoriam ipsius. Sicut non sequitur `Sortem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur Sortes est asinus', nec sequitur `Sortes impossibiliter est asinus, igitur Sortes est asinus', sed magis sequitur `ergo Sortes non est asinus'. E converso autem non sequitur, sicut manifeste patet.

	\|Similarly, that of the impossible, if it is taken in the sense of division and the mode of possibility is denied, infers its ~~own of inherence~~ and not the other way around; as it follows, `a man cannot be a donkey, therefore a man is not a donkey', but not the other way around. But if 'impossible' or its adverb is placed there, it does not infer its ~~own existence~~ but its contradictory. Just as it does not follow that 'It is impossible for Socrates to be a donkey, therefore Socrates is a donkey', nor does it follow that 'Socrates is impossible to be a donkey, therefore Socrates is a donkey', but rather it follows that 'Therefore Socrates is not a donkey.' But the converse does not follow, as is plainly evident.		\|Similarly, that of the impossible, if it is taken in the sense of division and the mode of possibility is denied, infers its assertoric and not the other way around; as it follows, `a man cannot be a donkey, therefore a man is not a donkey', but not the other way around. But if 'impossible' or its adverb is placed there, it does not infer its assertoric but its contradictory. Just as it does not follow that 'It is impossible for Socrates to be a donkey, therefore Socrates is a donkey', nor does it follow that 'Socrates is impossible to be a donkey, therefore Socrates is a donkey', but rather it follows that 'Therefore Socrates is not a donkey.' But the converse does not follow, as is plainly evident.

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	\|Circa alias modales sciendum quod raro vel numquam illae de inesse inferunt illas de modo; sicut non sequitur `homo est albus, ergo homo per se est albus'; `homo est albus, ergo homo scitur esse albus'; `homo est animal, igitur homo per accidens est animal'. Tamen frequenter illae de modo inferunt illas de inesse; sicut sequitur `homo per se est animal, {{p\|639}} igitur homo est animal'; `album scitur esse homo, igitur album est homo'. Et sic de multis aliis.		\|Circa alias modales sciendum quod raro vel numquam illae de inesse inferunt illas de modo; sicut non sequitur `homo est albus, ergo homo per se est albus'; `homo est albus, ergo homo scitur esse albus'; `homo est animal, igitur homo per accidens est animal'. Tamen frequenter illae de modo inferunt illas de inesse; sicut sequitur `homo per se est animal, {{p\|639}} igitur homo est animal'; `album scitur esse homo, igitur album est homo'. Et sic de multis aliis.

	\|With regard to other modals, it is to be known that ~~they~~ rarely or never ~~infer of inherence~~ those of the mode; just as it does not follow that 'man is white, therefore man is white per se'; 'a man is white, therefore a man is known to be white'; 'A man is an animal, therefore a man is an animal by accident'. However, a modal proposition frequently infers ~~inherence~~; as it follows, 'a man is inherently an animal, therefore a man is an animal'; 'a white thing is known to be a man, therefore a white thing is a man'. And so about many others.		\|With regard to other modals, it is to be known that the assertoric rarely or never infers those of the mode; just as it does not follow that 'man is white, therefore man is white per se'; 'a man is white, therefore a man is known to be white'; 'A man is an animal, therefore a man is an animal by accident'. However, a modal proposition frequently infers the assertoric; as it follows, 'a man is inherently an animal, therefore a man is an animal'; 'a white thing is known to be a man, therefore a white thing is a man'. And so about many others.

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	\|Aliquae tamen non inferunt suas de inesse; sicut non sequitur `Sortes creditur esse albus, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Sortes opinatur hominem esse album, igitur homo est albus'. Ad sciendum autem quando talis consequentia est bona et quando non, utendum est ista regula: quia si sit talis modus qui non potest competere nisi propositioni verae, consequentia est bona ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse. Si autem sit talis modus qui possit competere propositioni falsae, consequentia ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse non valet.		\|Aliquae tamen non inferunt suas de inesse; sicut non sequitur `Sortes creditur esse albus, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Sortes opinatur hominem esse album, igitur homo est albus'. Ad sciendum autem quando talis consequentia est bona et quando non, utendum est ista regula: quia si sit talis modus qui non potest competere nisi propositioni verae, consequentia est bona ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse. Si autem sit talis modus qui possit competere propositioni falsae, consequentia ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse non valet.

	\|Some, however, do not infer their ~~inherence~~; just as it does not follow that 'Socrates is believed to be white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that 'Socrates thinks that a man is white, therefore a man is white'. In order to know when such a consequence is good and when it is not, we must use this rule: if there is such a mode that can only correspond to a proposition of truth, the consequence is good from that mode to its ~~inherence~~. But if there is such a mode as can be appropriate to a false proposition, the inference from that mode to its ~~inherence~~ is invalid.		\|Some, however, do not infer their assertoric; just as it does not follow that 'Socrates is believed to be white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that 'Socrates thinks that a man is white, therefore a man is white'. In order to know when such a consequence is good and when it is not, we must use this rule: if there is such a mode that can only correspond to a proposition of truth, the consequence is good from that mode to its assertoric. But if there is such a mode as can be appropriate to a false proposition, the inference from that mode to its assertoric is invalid.

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	\|CAP. 11. DE REGULIS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE EX UNA DE INESSE ET ALIA DE MODO.		\|CAP. 11. DE REGULIS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE EX UNA DE INESSE ET ALIA DE MODO.

	\|Chapter 11. On the rules that govern consequences from one proposition of ~~essence~~ and another of a mode.		\|Chapter 11. On the rules that govern consequences from one proposition of inherence and another of a mode.

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	\|Circa consequentias ex una de inesse et alia de modo est primo sciendum quod illa de necessario, sive sumatur in sensu compositionis sive in sensu divisionis, semper infert illam de inesse; sed non e converso, nisi forte aliquando gratia materiae.		\|Circa consequentias ex una de inesse et alia de modo est primo sciendum quod illa de necessario, sive sumatur in sensu compositionis sive in sensu divisionis, semper infert illam de inesse; sed non e converso, nisi forte aliquando gratia materiae.

	\|With regard to the consequences from one proposition of ~~essence~~ and another of a mode, it is first to be known that the one of necessity, whether taken in the sense of composition or in the sense of division, always entails that of being; but not the other way round, except perhaps sometimes thanks to the matter.		\|With regard to the consequences from one proposition of inherence and another of a mode, it is first to be known that the one of necessity, whether taken in the sense of composition or in the sense of division, always entails that of being; but not the other way round, except perhaps sometimes thanks to the matter.

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	\|Circa illas de possibili est primo sciendum quod illa de possibili, sive sumatur in sensu divisionis sive in sensu compositionis, non infert suam de inesse. Non enim sequitur `haec est possibilis: homo est albus, igitur homo est albus'; nec sequitur `homo potest esse albus, igitur homo est albus'.		\|Circa illas de possibili est primo sciendum quod illa de possibili, sive sumatur in sensu divisionis sive in sensu compositionis, non infert suam de inesse. Non enim sequitur `haec est possibilis: homo est albus, igitur homo est albus'; nec sequitur `homo potest esse albus, igitur homo est albus'.

	\|With regard to ~~those things about the possible~~, it must first be known that ~~the thing about the possible~~, whether taken in the sense of division or in the sense of composition, does not infer its own existence. For it does not follow that 'this is possible: a man is white, therefore a man is white'; nor does it follow that ~~` aman~~ can be white, therefore a man is white'.		\|With regard to propositions of possibility, it must first be known that a proposition of possibility, whether taken in the sense of division or in the sense of composition, does not infer its own existence. For it does not follow that 'this is possible: a man is white, therefore a man is white'; nor does it follow that 'a man can be white, therefore a man is white'.

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	\|Sed illa de inesse semper infert suam de possibili, quia {{p\|638}} sequitur `Sortes est albus, igitur haec est possibilis: Sortes est albus'; et similiter `igitur Sortes potest esse albus'. Et hoc est verum, sive subiectum consequentis sumatur pro eo quod est sive pro eo quod potest esse.		\|Sed illa de inesse semper infert suam de possibili, quia {{p\|638}} sequitur `Sortes est albus, igitur haec est possibilis: Sortes est albus'; et similiter `igitur Sortes potest esse albus'. Et hoc est verum, sive subiectum consequentis sumatur pro eo quod est sive pro eo quod potest esse.

	\|But that of ~~being (essence)~~ always infers that of the possible, because it follows that `Socrates is white, therefore this is possible: Socrates is white'; and similarly `therefore Socrates can be white'. And this is true, whether the subject of the consequent is taken for what it is or for what it may be.		\|But that of inherence always infers that of the possible, because it follows that 'Socrates is white, therefore this is possible: Socrates is white'; and similarly 'therefore Socrates can be white'. And this is true, whether the subject of the consequent is taken for what it is or for what it may be.

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	\|Circa propositiones de contingenti est sciendum quod si illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu compositionis vel aliqua aequivalens ei, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `haec est contingens: Sortes est albus, ergo Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, ergo haec est contingens: Deus est immortalis'.		\|Circa propositiones de contingenti est sciendum quod si illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu compositionis vel aliqua aequivalens ei, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `haec est contingens: Sortes est albus, ergo Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, ergo haec est contingens: Deus est immortalis'.

	\|With regard to propositions ~~about the contingent~~, it must be known that if ~~that contingent~~ is taken in the sense of composition or something equivalent to it, it does not infer its own existence, nor vice versa. For it does not follow that 'this is contingent: Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that God is immortal, therefore this is contingent: God is immortal.		\|With regard to propositions of contingency, it must be known that if the proposition of contingency is taken in the sense of composition or something equivalent to it, it does not infer its own existence, nor vice versa. For it does not follow that 'this is contingent: Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that 'God is immortal, therefore this is contingent: God is immortal.'

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	\|Similiter si sumatur in sensu divisionis, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `contingit Sortem esse album, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, igitur contingit Deum esse immortalem'.		\|Similiter si sumatur in sensu divisionis, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `contingit Sortem esse album, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, igitur contingit Deum esse immortalem'.

	\|Similarly, if it is taken in the sense of division, it does not infer its own existence, nor vice versa. For it does not follow that `It happens that Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is white''; nor does it follow that `God is immortal, therefore it happens that God is immortal.'		\|Similarly, if it is taken in the sense of division, it does not infer its own existence, nor vice versa. For it does not follow that 'It happens that Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that 'God is immortal, therefore it happens that God is immortal.'

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	\|Circa illas de impossibili est sciendum quod illa de impossibili in sensu compositionis non infert suam de inesse sed semper contradictoriam suae de inesse; sicut non sequitur `omnem hominem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur omnis homo est asinus', sed sequitur `ergo aliquis homo non est asinus'. Illa autem de inesse non infert illam de impossibili.		\|Circa illas de impossibili est sciendum quod illa de impossibili in sensu compositionis non infert suam de inesse sed semper contradictoriam suae de inesse; sicut non sequitur `omnem hominem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur omnis homo est asinus', sed sequitur `ergo aliquis homo non est asinus'. Illa autem de inesse non infert illam de impossibili.

	\|With regard to the impossible, it must be known that the impossible in the sense of composition does not imply its own existence, but always contradicts its own existence. just as it does not follow that 'it is impossible for every man to be ~~an ass~~, therefore every man is ~~an ass~~', but it follows that 'therefore some man is not ~~an ass~~'. But that of ~~essence~~ does not infer that which is impossible.		\|With regard to the impossible, it must be known that the impossible in the sense of composition does not imply its own existence, but always contradicts its own existence. just as it does not follow that 'it is impossible for every man to be a donkey, therefore every man is a donkey', but it follows that 'therefore some man is not a donkey'. But that of inherence does not infer that which is impossible.

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	\|Similiter illa de impossibili, si sumatur in sensu divisionis et modus possibilitatis sit negatus, infert suam de inesse et non e converso; sicut sequitur `homo non potest esse asinus, ergo homo non est asinus', sed non e converso. Si autem ponatur ibi `impossibile' vel eius adverbium, non infert suam de inesse sed contradictoriam ipsius. Sicut non sequitur `Sortem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur Sortes est asinus', nec sequitur `Sortes impossibiliter est asinus, igitur Sortes est asinus', sed magis sequitur `ergo Sortes non est asinus'. E converso autem non sequitur, sicut manifeste patet.		\|Similiter illa de impossibili, si sumatur in sensu divisionis et modus possibilitatis sit negatus, infert suam de inesse et non e converso; sicut sequitur `homo non potest esse asinus, ergo homo non est asinus', sed non e converso. Si autem ponatur ibi `impossibile' vel eius adverbium, non infert suam de inesse sed contradictoriam ipsius. Sicut non sequitur `Sortem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur Sortes est asinus', nec sequitur `Sortes impossibiliter est asinus, igitur Sortes est asinus', sed magis sequitur `ergo Sortes non est asinus'. E converso autem non sequitur, sicut manifeste patet.

	\|Similarly, that of the impossible, if it is taken in the sense of division and the mode of possibility is denied, infers its own ~~from essence~~ and not the other way around; as it follows, `a man cannot be ~~an ass~~, therefore a man is not ~~an ass~~', but not the other way around. But if 'impossible' or its adverb is placed there, it does not infer its own existence but its contradictory. Just as it does not follow that `It is impossible for Socrates to be ~~an ass~~, therefore Socrates is ~~an ass~~', nor does it follow that `Socrates is impossible to be ~~an ass~~, therefore Socrates is ~~an ass'~~', but rather it follows that `Therefore Socrates is not ~~an ass~~.' But the converse does not follow, as is plainly evident.		\|Similarly, that of the impossible, if it is taken in the sense of division and the mode of possibility is denied, infers its own of inherence and not the other way around; as it follows, `a man cannot be a donkey, therefore a man is not a donkey', but not the other way around. But if 'impossible' or its adverb is placed there, it does not infer its own existence but its contradictory. Just as it does not follow that 'It is impossible for Socrates to be a donkey, therefore Socrates is a donkey', nor does it follow that 'Socrates is impossible to be a donkey, therefore Socrates is a donkey', but rather it follows that 'Therefore Socrates is not a donkey.' But the converse does not follow, as is plainly evident.

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	\|Circa alias modales sciendum quod raro vel numquam illae de inesse inferunt illas de modo; sicut non sequitur `homo est albus, ergo homo per se est albus'; `homo est albus, ergo homo scitur esse albus'; `homo est animal, igitur homo per accidens est animal'. Tamen frequenter illae de modo inferunt illas de inesse; sicut sequitur `homo per se est animal, {{p\|639}} igitur homo est animal'; `album scitur esse homo, igitur album est homo'. Et sic de multis aliis.		\|Circa alias modales sciendum quod raro vel numquam illae de inesse inferunt illas de modo; sicut non sequitur `homo est albus, ergo homo per se est albus'; `homo est albus, ergo homo scitur esse albus'; `homo est animal, igitur homo per accidens est animal'. Tamen frequenter illae de modo inferunt illas de inesse; sicut sequitur `homo per se est animal, {{p\|639}} igitur homo est animal'; `album scitur esse homo, igitur album est homo'. Et sic de multis aliis.

	\|With regard to other modals, it is to be known that they rarely or never infer ~~from existence~~ those of the mode; just as it does not follow that `man is white, therefore man is white ~~in himself~~'; `a man is white, therefore a man is known to be white'; `A man is an animal, therefore a man is an animal by accident'. However, ~~they~~ frequently ~~infer from the way they are~~; as it follows, `a man is ~~by himself~~ an animal, therefore a man is an animal'; `a white thing is known to be a man, therefore a white thing is a man'. And so about many others.		\|With regard to other modals, it is to be known that they rarely or never infer of inherence those of the mode; just as it does not follow that 'man is white, therefore man is white per se'; 'a man is white, therefore a man is known to be white'; 'A man is an animal, therefore a man is an animal by accident'. However, a modal proposition frequently infers inherence; as it follows, 'a man is inherently an animal, therefore a man is an animal'; 'a white thing is known to be a man, therefore a white thing is a man'. And so about many others.

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	\|Aliquae tamen non inferunt suas de inesse; sicut non sequitur `Sortes creditur esse albus, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Sortes opinatur hominem esse album, igitur homo est albus'. Ad sciendum autem quando talis consequentia est bona et quando non, utendum est ista regula: quia si sit talis modus qui non potest competere nisi propositioni verae, consequentia est bona ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse. Si autem sit talis modus qui possit competere propositioni falsae, consequentia ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse non valet.		\|Aliquae tamen non inferunt suas de inesse; sicut non sequitur `Sortes creditur esse albus, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Sortes opinatur hominem esse album, igitur homo est albus'. Ad sciendum autem quando talis consequentia est bona et quando non, utendum est ista regula: quia si sit talis modus qui non potest competere nisi propositioni verae, consequentia est bona ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse. Si autem sit talis modus qui possit competere propositioni falsae, consequentia ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse non valet.

	\|Some, however, do not infer their ~~existence~~; just as it does not follow that `Socrates is believed to be white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that `Socrates thinks that a man is white, therefore a man is white'. In order to know when such a consequence is good and when it is not, we must use this rule: if there is such a mode ~~which~~ can only correspond to a proposition of truth, the consequence is good from that mode to its ~~existence~~. But if there is such a mode as can be appropriate to a false proposition, the inference from that mode to its ~~existence~~ is invalid.		\|Some, however, do not infer their inherence; just as it does not follow that 'Socrates is believed to be white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that 'Socrates thinks that a man is white, therefore a man is white'. In order to know when such a consequence is good and when it is not, we must use this rule: if there is such a mode that can only correspond to a proposition of truth, the consequence is good from that mode to its inherence. But if there is such a mode as can be appropriate to a false proposition, the inference from that mode to its inherence is invalid.

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