Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 34 - Revision history

Ragnarr49 at 13:20, 23 March 2025

2025-03-23T13:20:05Z

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	\|Et est dicendum quod generaliter definitio exprimens quid nominis non potest demonstrari de definito, sed ista praesupponitur omni demonstrationi et omni syllogismo. Et si talis definitio sit definitio vocalis vel signum ad placitum institutum, tantum scitur per doctrinam, in addiscendo scilicet ab aliis loquentibus significata vocabulorum vel instituendo talia signa ad significandum.		\|Et est dicendum quod generaliter definitio exprimens quid nominis non potest demonstrari de definito, sed ista praesupponitur omni demonstrationi et omni syllogismo. Et si talis definitio sit definitio vocalis vel signum ad placitum institutum, tantum scitur per doctrinam, in addiscendo scilicet ab aliis loquentibus significata vocabulorum vel instituendo talia signa ad significandum.

	\|And it must be said that, in general, a definition expressing the meaning of a name cannot be demonstrated about the defined, but this is presupposed to every demonstration and every syllogism. And if such a definition is a vocal definition or a sign established by convention, it is only known through learning, that is, in learning from other speakers the significations of terms or establishing such signs to signify.		\|And it must be said that, in general, a definition expressing the meaning of a name cannot be demonstrated about the thing defined, but this is presupposed to every demonstration and every syllogism. And if such a definition is a vocal definition or a sign established by convention, it is only known through learning, that is, in learning from other speakers the significations of terms or establishing such signs to signify.

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	\|Sed de alia definitione est maior difficultas. Et est sciendum quod tales definitiones possunt esse diversae. Quandoque enim praeter definitionem exprimentem quid nominis potest {{p\|571}} a qualibet causa sumi definitio, si ibi sint quatuor causae, et si sint ibi tantum causa finalis et efficiens, potest ab utraque illarum sumi definitio. Et illae definitiones quae sumuntur a causa finali et formali vocantur definitiones formales, illae autem quae sumuntur a causa efficiente et materiali vocantur definitiones materiales.		\|Sed de alia definitione est maior difficultas. Et est sciendum quod tales definitiones possunt esse diversae. Quandoque enim praeter definitionem exprimentem quid nominis potest {{p\|571}} a qualibet causa sumi definitio, si ibi sint quatuor causae, et si sint ibi tantum causa finalis et efficiens, potest ab utraque illarum sumi definitio. Et illae definitiones quae sumuntur a causa finali et formali vocantur definitiones formales, illae autem quae sumuntur a causa efficiente et materiali vocantur definitiones materiales.

	\|But there is a greater difficulty about other definitions. And it must be known that such definitions can be different. For sometimes, in addition to the definition expressing what a name is, a definition can be taken from any cause, if there are four causes, and if there ~~are~~ only a final and efficient cause, the definition can be taken from both types. And those definitions which are taken from a final and formal cause are called formal definitions, and those which are taken from an efficient and material cause are called material definitions.		\|But there is a greater difficulty about other definitions. And it must be known that such definitions can be different. For sometimes, in addition to the definition expressing what a name is, a definition can be taken from any cause, if there are four causes, and if there is only a final and efficient cause, the definition can be taken from both types. And those definitions which are taken from a final and formal cause are called formal definitions, and those which are taken from an efficient and material cause are called material definitions.

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	\|Et sic se habent quod definitio materialis potest demonstrari quandoque per definitionem formalem. Verbi gratia praesupponatur significatum vocabuli istius termini ‘domus’, et per consequens praesupponatur definitio exprimens quid nominis; qua nota, adquiratur sine demonstratione definitio sumpta a causa finali domus, ut sciatur quod ‘domus est cooperimentum prohibens nos a frigore, ventis, pluvia et caumatibus’.		\|Et sic se habent quod definitio materialis potest demonstrari quandoque per definitionem formalem. Verbi gratia praesupponatur significatum vocabuli istius termini ‘domus’, et per consequens praesupponatur definitio exprimens quid nominis; qua nota, adquiratur sine demonstratione definitio sumpta a causa finali domus, ut sciatur quod ‘domus est cooperimentum prohibens nos a frigore, ventis, pluvia et caumatibus’.

	\|And so it is that a material definition can sometimes be demonstrated by a formal definition. For example, the meaning of the term 'house' is presupposed, and consequently a definition is presupposed expressing what the name means; by which note, the definition taken from the final cause of the house is acquired without demonstration, so that it is known that 'the house is a covering that ~~prevents~~ us from cold, winds, rain and snow'.		\|And so it is that a material definition can sometimes be demonstrated by a formal definition. For example, the meaning of the term 'house' is presupposed, and consequently a definition is presupposed expressing what the name means; by which note, the definition taken from the final cause of the house is acquired without demonstration, so that it is known that 'the house is a covering that protects us from cold, winds, rain and snow'.

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	\|Et similiter si ista oratio ‘syllogismus faciens scire’ non esset definitio indicans quid nominis demonstrationis, per istam definitionem sumptam a causa finali demonstrationis posset demonstrari ista definitio ‘ <demonstratio est> ex primis et veris et immediatis’.		\|Et similiter si ista oratio ‘syllogismus faciens scire’ non esset definitio indicans quid nominis demonstrationis, per istam definitionem sumptam a causa finali demonstrationis posset demonstrari ista definitio ‘ <demonstratio est> ex primis et veris et immediatis’.

	\|And similarly, if this sentence 'making a syllogism to know' was not a definition indicating what the ~~name of~~ demonstration is, by means of this definition taken from the cause of the final demonstration it could be demonstrated that this definition is '<demonstration is> from the first and true and immediate'.		\|And similarly, if this sentence 'making a syllogism to know' was not a definition indicating what the term demonstration is, by means of this definition taken from the cause of the final demonstration it could be demonstrated that this definition is '<demonstration is> from the first and true and immediate'.

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Ragnarr49 at 11:40, 27 February 2025

2025-02-27T11:40:58Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:40, 27 February 2025
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	\|{{p\|572}} Ex praedictis patet quod praeter definitionem exprimentem quid nominis possunt eiusdem passionis et eiusdem nominis esse plures definitiones, quarum una est indemonstrabilis et alia demonstrabilis.		\|{{p\|572}} Ex praedictis patet quod praeter definitionem exprimentem quid nominis possunt eiusdem passionis et eiusdem nominis esse plures definitiones, quarum una est indemonstrabilis et alia demonstrabilis.

	\|From the above it is clear that, in addition to the definition expressing what a name can be, there are several definitions of the same ~~property~~ and the same name, one of which is unprovable and the other demonstrable.		\|From the above it is clear that, in addition to the definition expressing what a name can be, there are several definitions of the same attribute and the same name, one of which is unprovable and the other demonstrable.

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Ragnarr49 at 02:54, 27 February 2025

2025-02-27T02:54:07Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:54, 26 February 2025
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	\|{{p\|572}} Ex praedictis patet quod praeter definitionem exprimentem quid nominis possunt eiusdem passionis et eiusdem nominis esse plures definitiones, quarum una est indemonstrabilis et alia demonstrabilis.		\|{{p\|572}} Ex praedictis patet quod praeter definitionem exprimentem quid nominis possunt eiusdem passionis et eiusdem nominis esse plures definitiones, quarum una est indemonstrabilis et alia demonstrabilis.

	\|From the above it is clear that, in addition to the definition expressing what a name can be, there are several definitions of the same ~~passion~~ and the same name, one of which is unprovable and the other demonstrable.		\|From the above it is clear that, in addition to the definition expressing what a name can be, there are several definitions of the same property and the same name, one of which is unprovable and the other demonstrable.

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Ragnarr49 at 18:46, 16 February 2025

2025-02-16T18:46:00Z

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Edward Ockham at 11:22, 13 June 2015

2015-06-13T11:22:38Z

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{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 33|Chapter 33]]|[[../Chapter 35|Chapter 35]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
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|CAP. 34. QUOMODO DEFINITIONES CONNOTATIVORUM POSSUNT COGNOSCI DE DEFINITIS?.

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|Declarata praemissa divisione definitionum connotativorum, videndum est quomodo istae definitiones possunt cognosci de definitis.

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|Et est dicendum quod generaliter definitio exprimens quid nominis non potest demonstrari de definito, sed ista praesupponitur omni demonstrationi et omni syllogismo. Et si talis definitio sit definitio vocalis vel signum ad placitum institutum, tantum scitur per doctrinam, in addiscendo scilicet ab aliis loquentibus significata vocabulorum vel instituendo talia signa ad significandum.

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|Et ideo de tali definitione non est magna difficultas, quamvis propter ignorantiam talium definitionum innumerae difficultates et infinita opinionum contrarietas tam in philosophia quam in theologia consurgant.

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|Sed de alia definitione est maior difficultas. Et est sciendum quod tales definitiones possunt esse diversae. Quandoque enim praeter definitionem exprimentem quid nominis potest {{p|571}} a qualibet causa sumi definitio, si ibi sint quatuor causae, et si sint ibi tantum causa finalis et efficiens, potest ab utraque illarum sumi definitio. Et illae definitiones quae sumuntur a causa finali et formali vocantur definitiones formales, illae autem quae sumuntur a causa efficiente et materiali vocantur definitiones materiales.

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|Et sic se habent quod definitio materialis potest demonstrari quandoque per definitionem formalem. Verbi gratia praesupponatur significatum vocabuli istius termini ‘domus’, et per consequens praesupponatur definitio exprimens quid nominis; qua nota, adquiratur sine demonstratione definitio sumpta a causa finali domus, ut sciatur quod ‘domus est cooperimentum prohibens nos a frigore, ventis, pluvia et caumatibus’.

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|Quo facto potest demonstrari quod domus componitur ex lignis, lapidibus, et sic de aliis, per tale argumentum ‘omne prohibens a frigore, pluvia etc. componitur ex lignis etc.’, --- quae ex hoc scitur quod talia possunt resistere pluviae etc. ---; ‘sed domus est cooperimentum prohibens nos etc.; ergo domus componitur ex talibus’.

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|Ista conclusio ignota fit nota non per experientiam sed per propositiones notas, dispositas in modo et in figura, et ita una definitio demonstratur per aliam de definito. Sed hoc numquam verum est nisi quando definitum est connotativum, cuiusmodi sunt omnia nomina artificialium.

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|Et similiter si ista oratio ‘syllogismus faciens scire’ non esset definitio indicans quid nominis demonstrationis, per istam definitionem sumptam a causa finali demonstrationis posset demonstrari ista definitio ‘ <demonstratio est> ex primis et veris et immediatis’.

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|Et ideo quia auctores aliquando utuntur hoc nomine ‘demonstratio’ non tamquam nomine connotativo, dicunt quod Aristoteles per unam definitionem demonstrationis demonstrat aliam de demonstratione.

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|{{p|572}} Ex praedictis patet quod praeter definitionem exprimentem quid nominis possunt eiusdem passionis et eiusdem nominis esse plures definitiones, quarum una est indemonstrabilis et alia demonstrabilis.

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|Propter quod ex omni tali demonstratione potest elici definitio et ex omni tali definitione potest haberi demonstratio. Sed praeter istas definitiones est una definitio complectens utramque, quae non differt a demonstratione nisi situ.

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|Verbi gratia sit haec demonstratio ‘omne cooperimentum prohibens nos a pluvia et ventis etc. componitur ex lignis, lapidibus etc.; domus est cooperimentum prohibens etc.; ergo domus componitur ex talibus’.

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|In ista demonstratione ponuntur duae definitiones, quarum una est medium et alia est praedicatum conclusionis, quae coniungantur ad invicem sic ‘domus est quoddam cooperimentum compositum ex lignis et lapidibus, prohibens nos a pluvia, frigore etc.’.

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|Patet quod quidquid ponitur in demonstratione, ponitur in hac definitione, sed diverso ordine. Nam in demonstratione praeponitur definitio sumpta a fine, in ista autem definitione completa praeponitur definitio sumpta a partibus domus.

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|Oportet autem scire quod quando duae definitiones coniunguntur ad invicem ut faciant definitionem unam completam, non sunt secundum se totas coniungendae, quia tunc in illa tota definitione esset nugatio; sed posita una definitione, coniungenda est tota alia praeter illud quod iam acceptum est, sicut patere potest in praedicta definitione domus.

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|Sciendum est etiam quod in hac parte non tantum vocatur ‘materia’ vel ‘causa materialis’ aliqua pars distincta realiter a forma et componens cum ea ipsam recipiendo, sed causa materialis vocatur hic pars integralis rei, quo modo ligna et lapides vocantur materia domus et duae praemissae et conclusio vocantur materia syllogismi vel demonstrationis.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}} [[Category:Untranslated]]