Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 29 - Revision history

Edward Ockham at 08:59, 25 October 2025

2025-10-25T08:59:00Z

Edward Ockham at 08:01, 16 August 2025

2025-08-16T08:01:24Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 03:01, 16 August 2025
Line 48:		Line 48:
	\|Sed forte dices quod hic est syllogismus ex prioribus ‘omne animal est substantia; omnis homo est animal; igitur omnis homo est substantia’, igitur hic est demonstratio a priori: Praeterea, secundum dicta, quaelibet talis propositio esset per se nota, quia quaelibet talis propositio cognosceretur cognitis terminis, secundum istum processum.		\|Sed forte dices quod hic est syllogismus ex prioribus ‘omne animal est substantia; omnis homo est animal; igitur omnis homo est substantia’, igitur hic est demonstratio a priori: Praeterea, secundum dicta, quaelibet talis propositio esset per se nota, quia quaelibet talis propositio cognosceretur cognitis terminis, secundum istum processum.

	\|But perhaps you will say that this is a syllogism from the previous ones, 'every animal is a substance; every man is an animal; Therefore, every man is a substance', so here is a ~~prior~~ demonstration: Further, according to what has been said, every such proposition would be known in itself, because every such proposition would be known by known terms, according to this process.		\|But perhaps you will say that this is a syllogism from the previous ones, 'every animal is a substance; every man is an animal; Therefore, every man is a substance', so here is ''a priori'' demonstration: Further, according to what has been said, every such proposition would be known in itself, because every such proposition would be known by known terms, according to this process.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top

Ragnarr49 at 12:15, 23 March 2025

2025-03-23T12:15:00Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 07:15, 23 March 2025
Line 13:		Line 13:
	\|Definitio exprimens quid rei, non data per additamentum, semper continet pro prima parte aliquod genus definiti et pro alia parte vel pro aliis partibus continet differentiam vel differentias essentiales vel aliquos obliquos significantes per se et primo partes rei. Et istae partes sunt diversae; nam genus importat totum, aliae partes significant partes distinctas rei.		\|Definitio exprimens quid rei, non data per additamentum, semper continet pro prima parte aliquod genus definiti et pro alia parte vel pro aliis partibus continet differentiam vel differentias essentiales vel aliquos obliquos significantes per se et primo partes rei. Et istae partes sunt diversae; nam genus importat totum, aliae partes significant partes distinctas rei.

	\|A definition expressing what a thing is, not given by an addition, always contains for the first part some kind of thing defined and for another part or for other parts it contains a difference or essential differences or some indirect signifiers by itself and the first parts of the thing. And these parts are different; for the genus signifies the whole, the other parts signifying the distinct parts of the thing.		\|A definition expressing what a thing is, not given by an addition, always contains for the first part some kind of thing defined and for another part or for other parts it contains a difference or essential differences or some indirect signifiers per se (in itself) and the first parts of the thing. And these parts are different; for the genus signifies the whole, the other parts signifying the distinct parts of the thing.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
Line 58:		Line 58:
	\|Quod videtur manifeste falsum, cum multae tales sint dubiae multis: Praeterea, viso aliquo a remotis, potest ignorari an sit animal, et possum ulteriori experientia certificari quod est animal; igitur quod homo sit animal, potest demonstrari: Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod non omnis syllogismus ex prioribus est demonstratio, quia non quilibet talis syllogismus facit scire.		\|Quod videtur manifeste falsum, cum multae tales sint dubiae multis: Praeterea, viso aliquo a remotis, potest ignorari an sit animal, et possum ulteriori experientia certificari quod est animal; igitur quod homo sit animal, potest demonstrari: Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod non omnis syllogismus ex prioribus est demonstratio, quia non quilibet talis syllogismus facit scire.

	\|This seems manifestly false, since there are many such doubts for many people: Further, when something is seen from a distance, it can be unknown whether it is an animal, and I can be certified by further experience that it is an animal; Therefore, it can be demonstrated that man is an animal: To the first of these we must say that not every syllogism is a demonstration from priors, because not every such syllogism makes one ~~aware~~.		\|This seems manifestly false, since there are many such doubts for many people: Further, when something is seen from a distance, it can be unknown whether it is an animal, and I can be certified by further experience that it is an animal; Therefore, it can be demonstrated that man is an animal: To the first of these we must say that not every syllogism is a demonstration from priors, because not every such syllogism makes one to know.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
Line 78:		Line 78:
	\|Et tunc aliquis, qui talem conceptum mentalem non habet, potest scire significata vocabulorum et simul cum hoc potest nescire eam, eo quod aliquos conceptus mentales non habet; sed habet conceptus mentales plures, quorum aliqui, si componantur ad invicem, totum resultans ex eis erit convertibile cum illa voce.		\|Et tunc aliquis, qui talem conceptum mentalem non habet, potest scire significata vocabulorum et simul cum hoc potest nescire eam, eo quod aliquos conceptus mentales non habet; sed habet conceptus mentales plures, quorum aliqui, si componantur ad invicem, totum resultans ex eis erit convertibile cum illa voce.

	\|And then someone who does not have such a mental concept can know the meaning of terms and at the same time he ~~can~~ not know it, because he does not have some mental concepts; but he has several mental concepts, some of which, if they are combined with each other, the whole resulting from them will be convertible with that word.		\|And then someone who does not have such a mental concept can know the meaning of terms and at the same time he may not know it, because he does not have some mental concepts; but he has several mental concepts, some of which, if they are combined with each other, the whole resulting from them will be convertible with that word.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|{{p\|559}} Et ita talis propositio vocalis non est per se nota, quia non quaelibet notitia qua scitur quid significant termini sufficit ad sciendum talem propositionem. Et sicut illa propositio vocalis non est per se nota, ita illa mentalis quae componitur ex conceptibus compositis non est per se nota, quia potest haberi, quamvis nesciatur.		\|{{p\|559}} Et ita talis propositio vocalis non est per se nota, quia non quaelibet notitia qua scitur quid significant termini sufficit ad sciendum talem propositionem. Et sicut illa propositio vocalis non est per se nota, ita illa mentalis quae componitur ex conceptibus compositis non est per se nota, quia potest haberi, quamvis nesciatur.

	\|And so such a vocal proposition is not known in itself, because not every information by which it is known what the terms signify is sufficient to know such a proposition. And just as that vocal proposition is not known in itself, so the mental one which is composed of compound concepts is not known in itself, because it can be had, although it is not known.		\|And so, such a vocal proposition is not known in itself, because not every information by which it is known what the terms signify is sufficient to know such a proposition. And just as that vocal proposition is not known in itself, so the mental one which is composed of compound concepts is not known in itself, because it can be had, although it is not known.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
Line 108:		Line 108:
	\|Et ita propositio talis, saltem large accipiendo demonstrationem, potest fieri nota per demonstrationem, ex quo potest concludi syllogismo faciente ipsam conclusionem esse evidenter notam quae prius erat dubia vel apparuit esse falsa.		\|Et ita propositio talis, saltem large accipiendo demonstrationem, potest fieri nota per demonstrationem, ex quo potest concludi syllogismo faciente ipsam conclusionem esse evidenter notam quae prius erat dubia vel apparuit esse falsa.

	\|And so a proposition of this kind, at least by taking ~~the~~ demonstration broadly, can be known by demonstration, from which it can be concluded by making a syllogism that the conclusion itself is clearly known which was previously doubtful or appeared to be false.		\|And so a proposition of this kind, at least by taking demonstration broadly, can be known by demonstration, from which it can be concluded by making a syllogism that the conclusion itself is clearly known which was previously doubtful or appeared to be false.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
Line 118:		Line 118:
	\|Unde de talibus dico, proportionaliter, sicut dixi alias de illa propositione ‘Deus est’, quam format beatus videns essentiam divinam et de ista propositione quam nos habemus modo de facto, quia sicut sunt distinctae propositiones, ita illae propositiones quarum unam posset habere de leone ille qui videt vel vidit intuitive substantiam leonis et illa propositio quam modo de facto habeo de leone sunt distinctae propositiones, et una est demonstrabilis, large accipiendo demonstrationem, et alia nullo modo est demonstrabilis.		\|Unde de talibus dico, proportionaliter, sicut dixi alias de illa propositione ‘Deus est’, quam format beatus videns essentiam divinam et de ista propositione quam nos habemus modo de facto, quia sicut sunt distinctae propositiones, ita illae propositiones quarum unam posset habere de leone ille qui videt vel vidit intuitive substantiam leonis et illa propositio quam modo de facto habeo de leone sunt distinctae propositiones, et una est demonstrabilis, large accipiendo demonstrationem, et alia nullo modo est demonstrabilis.

	\|Wherefore I say of such things, proportionally, as I have said elsewhere of that proposition 'God is', which the blessed one forms when he sees the divine essence, and of that proposition which we have de facto, because just as they are distinct propositions, so those propositions, one of which he who sees or has seen intuitively the substance of a lion could have about a lion, and that proposition which I just de facto have about a lion are distinct propositions, and one is demonstrable, taking ~~the~~ demonstration broadly, and the other is in no way demonstrable.		\|Wherefore I say of such things, proportionally, as I have said elsewhere of that proposition 'God is', which the blessed one forms when he sees the divine essence, and of that proposition which we have de facto, because just as they are distinct propositions, so those propositions, one of which he who sees or has seen intuitively the substance of a lion could have about a lion, and that proposition which I just de facto have about a lion are distinct propositions, and one is demonstrable, taking demonstration broadly, and the other is in no way demonstrable.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Similiter illa propositio quam format caecus a nativitate de coloribus, dicendo quod albedo est color, est distincta propositio ab illa quam ego formo in mente, dicendo quod albedo est color; et una est simpliciter indemonstrabilis et alia forte est demonstrabilis, large accipiendo demonstrationem.		\|Similiter illa propositio quam format caecus a nativitate de coloribus, dicendo quod albedo est color, est distincta propositio ab illa quam ego formo in mente, dicendo quod albedo est color; et una est simpliciter indemonstrabilis et alia forte est demonstrabilis, large accipiendo demonstrationem.

	\|Similarly, that proposition which a blind man forms from birth about colors, saying that white is a color, is a distinct proposition from that which I form in my mind, saying that white is a color; and the one is simply indemonstrable, and the other may be demonstrable, taking ~~the~~ demonstration broadly.		\|Similarly, that proposition which a blind man forms from birth about colors, saying that white is a color, is a distinct proposition from that which I form in my mind, saying that white is a color; and the one is simply indemonstrable, and the other may be demonstrable, taking demonstration broadly.

	\|}		\|}
	==Notes==		==Notes==
	{{reflist}} [[Category:Untranslated]]		{{reflist}} [[Category:Untranslated]]

Ragnarr49 at 11:38, 27 February 2025

2025-02-27T11:38:15Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 06:38, 27 February 2025
Line 28:		Line 28:
	\|Et ista cognitio vocatur conceptus, intentio, passio, qui conceptus communis est omni homini; quo exsistente in intellectu statim intellectus scit quod homo est aliquid, sine discursu.		\|Et ista cognitio vocatur conceptus, intentio, passio, qui conceptus communis est omni homini; quo exsistente in intellectu statim intellectus scit quod homo est aliquid, sine discursu.

	\|And this knowledge is called concept, intention, ~~property~~, which concept is common to every man; by which, existing in the intellect, the intellect immediately knows that man is something, without discourse.		\|And this knowledge is called concept, intention, attribute, which concept is common to every man; by which, existing in the intellect, the intellect immediately knows that man is something, without discourse.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Deinde apprehenso alio animali ab homine vel aliis animalibus, elicitur una notitia generalis omni animali, et illa notitia generalis omni animali vocatur passio seu intentio animae sive conceptus communis omni animali.		\|Deinde apprehenso alio animali ab homine vel aliis animalibus, elicitur una notitia generalis omni animali, et illa notitia generalis omni animali vocatur passio seu intentio animae sive conceptus communis omni animali.

	\|Then, when another animal is caught by man or other animals, one general information is elicited for every animal, and that general information for every animal is called the ~~property~~ or intention of the soul or a concept common to every animal.		\|Then, when another animal is caught by man or other animals, one general information is elicited for every animal, and that general information for every animal is called the attribute or intention of the soul or a concept common to every animal.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top

Ragnarr49 at 02:51, 27 February 2025

2025-02-27T02:51:28Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 21:51, 26 February 2025
Line 28:		Line 28:
	\|Et ista cognitio vocatur conceptus, intentio, passio, qui conceptus communis est omni homini; quo exsistente in intellectu statim intellectus scit quod homo est aliquid, sine discursu.		\|Et ista cognitio vocatur conceptus, intentio, passio, qui conceptus communis est omni homini; quo exsistente in intellectu statim intellectus scit quod homo est aliquid, sine discursu.

	\|And this knowledge is called concept, intention, ~~passion (experience)~~, which concept is common to every man; by which, existing in the intellect, the intellect immediately knows that man is something, without discourse.		\|And this knowledge is called concept, intention, property, which concept is common to every man; by which, existing in the intellect, the intellect immediately knows that man is something, without discourse.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|Deinde apprehenso alio animali ab homine vel aliis animalibus, elicitur una notitia generalis omni animali, et illa notitia generalis omni animali vocatur passio seu intentio animae sive conceptus communis omni animali.		\|Deinde apprehenso alio animali ab homine vel aliis animalibus, elicitur una notitia generalis omni animali, et illa notitia generalis omni animali vocatur passio seu intentio animae sive conceptus communis omni animali.

	\|Then, when another animal is caught by man or other animals, one general information is elicited for every animal, and that general information for every animal is called the ~~passion (experience)~~ or intention of the soul or a concept common to every animal.		\|Then, when another animal is caught by man or other animals, one general information is elicited for every animal, and that general information for every animal is called the property or intention of the soul or a concept common to every animal.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top

Ragnarr49 at 16:36, 16 February 2025

2025-02-16T16:36:19Z

Show changes

Edward Ockham at 11:17, 13 June 2015

2015-06-13T11:17:41Z

New page

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 28|Chapter 28]]|[[../Chapter 30|Chapter 30]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|{{p|557}} CAP. 29. DE DEFINITIONE EXPRIMENTE QUID REI, NON DATA PER ADDITAMENTUM.

|

|- valign = top
|Definitio exprimens quid rei, non data per additamentum, semper continet pro prima parte aliquod genus definiti et pro alia parte vel pro aliis partibus continet differentiam vel differentias essentiales vel aliquos obliquos significantes per se et primo partes rei. Et istae partes sunt diversae; nam genus importat totum, aliae partes significant partes distinctas rei.

|

|- valign = top
|Prima pars definitionis, puta genus, nec a priori nec a posteriori potest demonstrari de definito; sicut quod homo sit animal demonstrari non potest, sed propositio talis sine syllogismo accipitur, mediante notitia intuitiva.

|

|- valign = top
|Unde istis conceptibus ‘homo’ et ‘animal’ exsistentibus in intellectu et aliquo homine viso statim scitur quod homo est animal. Non quod isti conceptus praecedant notitiam intuitivam hominis, sed iste est processus quod primo homo cognoscitur aliquo sensu particulari, deinde ille idem homo cognoscitur ab intellectu, quo cognito habetur una notitia generalis et communis omni homini.

|

|- valign = top
|Et ista cognitio vocatur conceptus, intentio, passio, qui conceptus communis est omni homini; quo exsistente in intellectu statim intellectus scit quod homo est aliquid, sine discursu.

|

|- valign = top
|Deinde apprehenso alio animali ab homine vel aliis animalibus, elicitur una notitia generalis omni animali, et illa notitia generalis omni animali vocatur passio seu intentio animae sive conceptus communis omni animali.

|

|- valign = top
|Quo exsistente in anima potest intellectus componere istum conceptum cum conceptu priori, quibus compositis ad invicem mediante hoc verbo ‘est’, statim intellectus assentit illi complexo, sine omni syllogismo.

|

|- valign = top
|Et ita quaelibet talis propositio in qua praedicatur genus de definito propriissime dicto habetur sine syllogismo. Et hoc est universaliter verum de omni genere {{p|558}} respectu speciei quae est mere absoluta, quia talis propositio statim scitur cognitis terminis perfecte.

|

|- valign = top
|Sed forte dices quod hic est syllogismus ex prioribus ‘omne animal est substantia; omnis homo est animal; igitur omnis homo est substantia’, igitur hic est demonstratio a priori: Praeterea, secundum dicta, quaelibet talis propositio esset per se nota, quia quaelibet talis propositio cognosceretur cognitis terminis, secundum istum processum.

|

|- valign = top
|Et ita ista esset per se nota ‘homo est animal’ et ista ‘albedo est qualitas’, et sic de aliis.

|

|- valign = top
|Quod videtur manifeste falsum, cum multae tales sint dubiae multis: Praeterea, viso aliquo a remotis, potest ignorari an sit animal, et possum ulteriori experientia certificari quod est animal; igitur quod homo sit animal, potest demonstrari: Ad primum istorum dicendum est quod non omnis syllogismus ex prioribus est demonstratio, quia non quilibet talis syllogismus facit scire.

|

|- valign = top
|Et hoc, quia conclusio non potest esse primo ignota et postea per illum syllogismum, tamquam per causam efficientem et sufficientem, fieri nota, quod tamen requiritur ad demonstrationem, ideo ille syllogismus non est demonstratio.

|

|- valign = top
|Ad secundum dicendum quod quaelibet talis propositio mentalis in qua subiciuntur et praedicantur tales conceptus mere absoluti est per se nota, quia statim sciuntur cognitis terminis.

|

|- valign = top
|Tamen non quaelibet propositio talis vocalis est per se nota, nam ex quo voces sunt ad placitum, voces mere absolutae possunt imponi eisdem de quibus habemus, vel alii habent, tales conceptus.

|

|- valign = top
|Et tunc aliquis, qui talem conceptum mentalem non habet, potest scire significata vocabulorum et simul cum hoc potest nescire eam, eo quod aliquos conceptus mentales non habet; sed habet conceptus mentales plures, quorum aliqui, si componantur ad invicem, totum resultans ex eis erit convertibile cum illa voce.

|

|- valign = top
|{{p|559}} Et ita talis propositio vocalis non est per se nota, quia non quaelibet notitia qua scitur quid significant termini sufficit ad sciendum talem propositionem. Et sicut illa propositio vocalis non est per se nota, ita illa mentalis quae componitur ex conceptibus compositis non est per se nota, quia potest haberi, quamvis nesciatur.

|

|- valign = top
|Unde ego modo de facto scio quid significat hoc nomen ‘leo’ et scio quid significat hoc nomen ‘animal’ et tamen ignoro istam propositionem ‘leo potest esse animal’, quamvis credam eam esse veram.

|

|- valign = top
|Et habeo unam propositionem mentalem cuius subiectum est compositum ex multis notitiis incomplexis quarum nulla est simplex et propria leoni; sed propositionem mentalem cuius subiectum sit aliquod simplex mere absolutum proprium leonibus non habeo, quia si talem propositionem mentalem haberem, statim, sine syllogismo, scirem eam.

|

|- valign = top
|Sed numquid propositio mentalis in qua subicitur tale compositum et etiam propositio vocalis sunt demonstrabiles, ex quo sunt dubitabiles?

|

|- valign = top
|Potest dici quod large accipiendo demonstrationem, tales sunt demonstrabiles. Et hoc, quia conclusio potest esse ignota et dubia et postea, scita propositione maiore in qua praedicatur idem praedicatum de conceptu mentali adquisito per notitiam intuitivam rei et scita minore in qua praedicatur idem conceptus de subiecto conclusionis, potest conclusio fieri nota.

|

|- valign = top
|Et ita propositio talis, saltem large accipiendo demonstrationem, potest fieri nota per demonstrationem, ex quo potest concludi syllogismo faciente ipsam conclusionem esse evidenter notam quae prius erat dubia vel apparuit esse falsa.

|

|- valign = top
|Ad tertium concedo quod viso aliquo a remotis potest dubitari an sit animal et potest per aliquos effectus fieri notum quod est animal. Et tamen non erit demonstratio, quia demonstratio non est de singularibus, una autem tantum propositio singularis fit ibi nota. Et posito quod demonstratio esset de singularibus, adhuc non esset ibi demonstratio propositionis mentalis, habentis conceptum simplicem et {{p|560}} mere absolutum et proprium pro subiecto, sed esset demonstratio propositionis habentis unum conceptum compositum pro subiecto.

|

|- valign = top
|Unde de talibus dico, proportionaliter, sicut dixi alias de illa propositione ‘Deus est’, quam format beatus videns essentiam divinam et de ista propositione quam nos habemus modo de facto, quia sicut sunt distinctae propositiones, ita illae propositiones quarum unam posset habere de leone ille qui videt vel vidit intuitive substantiam leonis et illa propositio quam modo de facto habeo de leone sunt distinctae propositiones, et una est demonstrabilis, large accipiendo demonstrationem, et alia nullo modo est demonstrabilis.

|

|- valign = top
|Similiter illa propositio quam format caecus a nativitate de coloribus, dicendo quod albedo est color, est distincta propositio ab illa quam ego formo in mente, dicendo quod albedo est color; et una est simpliciter indemonstrabilis et alia forte est demonstrabilis, large accipiendo demonstrationem.

|

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}} [[Category:Untranslated]]