Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 29 - Revision history

Ragnarr49 at 18:31, 19 April 2025

2025-04-19T18:31:34Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 13:31, 19 April 2025
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	\|\|Cap. 29. De uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili		\|\|Cap. 29. De uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili

	\|\|Chapter 29. On uniform syllogisms from propositions de impossibili ~~(of impossibility)~~.		\|\|Chapter 29. On uniform syllogisms from propositions de impossibili.
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	\|\|Post praedicta de uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili est dicendum. Et est sciendum quod si propositiones omnes sumantur in sensu compositionis, talis discursus non valet, quia argueretur per istam regulam falsam ‘praemissae sunt impossibiles, igitur conclusio est impossibilis’		\|\|Post praedicta de uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili est dicendum. Et est sciendum quod si propositiones omnes sumantur in sensu compositionis, talis discursus non valet, quia argueretur per istam regulam falsam ‘praemissae sunt impossibiles, igitur conclusio est impossibilis’

	\|\| After the above, we must speak of uniform syllogisms from propositions ~~of impossibility~~. And it should be known that if all propositions are taken in the sense of composition, such a discourse is not valid, because it would be argued by this false rule ‘the premises are impossible, therefore the conclusion is impossible’.		\|\| After the above, we must speak of uniform syllogisms from propositions de impossibili. And it should be known that if all propositions are taken in the sense of composition, such a discourse is not valid, because it would be argued by this false rule ‘the premises are impossible, therefore the conclusion is impossible’.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|\|Similiter, si omnes propositiones de impossibili sumantur in sensu {{p\|435}} divisionis, non valet talis discursus, quia nullus talis in prima figura potest regulari per dici de omni vel de nullo. Unde sic arguendo ‘omnis homo impossibiliter est asinus; omne rudibile impossibiliter est homo; igitur omne rudibile impossibiliter est asinus’, patet quod non valet nec regulatur per dici de omni, quia per minorem non denotatur subiectum maioris verificari de aliquo sed magis removeri. Et ita cum quaelibet de impossibili aequivaleat uni negativae, et ex omnibus negativis non contingit arguere, manifestum est quod ex propositionibus de impossibili non contingit arguere.		\|\|Similiter, si omnes propositiones de impossibili sumantur in sensu {{p\|435}} divisionis, non valet talis discursus, quia nullus talis in prima figura potest regulari per dici de omni vel de nullo. Unde sic arguendo ‘omnis homo impossibiliter est asinus; omne rudibile impossibiliter est homo; igitur omne rudibile impossibiliter est asinus’, patet quod non valet nec regulatur per dici de omni, quia per minorem non denotatur subiectum maioris verificari de aliquo sed magis removeri. Et ita cum quaelibet de impossibili aequivaleat uni negativae, et ex omnibus negativis non contingit arguere, manifestum est quod ex propositionibus de impossibili non contingit arguere.

	\|\| Similarly, if all propositions ~~about the impossible~~ are taken in the sense of division, such a discourse is not valid, because no such in the first figure can be governed by ~~to be said of all or nothing~~. Hence, thus arguing ‘every man is not possibly a donkey; every tamable thing is not possibly a man; therefore every tamable thing is not possibly a donkey’, it is clear that it is not valid nor is it governed by to be said of all, because by the minor the subject of the major is not denoted to be verified about something, but rather to be removed. And so since any proposition ~~of impossibility~~ is equivalent to one negative, and it is not possible to argue from all negatives, it is clear that it is not possible to argue from propositions ~~of impossibility~~.		\|\| Similarly, if all propositions de impossibili are taken in the sense of division, such a discourse is not valid, because no such in the first figure can be governed by dici de omni vel dici de nullo. Hence, thus arguing ‘every man is not possibly a donkey; every tamable thing is not possibly a man; therefore every tamable thing is not possibly a donkey’, it is clear that it is not valid nor is it governed by to be said of all, because by the minor the subject of the major is not denoted to be verified about something, but rather to be removed. And so since any proposition de impossibili is equivalent to one negative, and it is not possible to argue from all negatives, it is clear that it is not possible to argue from propositions de impossibili.

	\|}		\|}

Ragnarr49 at 14:13, 16 March 2025

2025-03-16T14:13:33Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 09:13, 16 March 2025
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	\|\|Cap. 29. De uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili		\|\|Cap. 29. De uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili

	\|\|Chapter 29. On uniform syllogisms from propositions de impossibili (of ~~the impossible~~).		\|\|Chapter 29. On uniform syllogisms from propositions de impossibili (of impossibility).
	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top

	\|\|Post praedicta de uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili est dicendum. Et est sciendum quod si propositiones omnes sumantur in sensu compositionis, talis discursus non valet, quia argueretur per istam regulam falsam ‘praemissae sunt impossibiles, igitur conclusio est impossibilis’		\|\|Post praedicta de uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili est dicendum. Et est sciendum quod si propositiones omnes sumantur in sensu compositionis, talis discursus non valet, quia argueretur per istam regulam falsam ‘praemissae sunt impossibiles, igitur conclusio est impossibilis’

	\|\| After the above, we must speak of uniform syllogisms from propositions of ~~the impossible~~. And it should be known that if all propositions are taken in the sense of composition, such a discourse is not valid, because it would be argued by this false rule ‘the premises are impossible, therefore the conclusion is impossible’.		\|\| After the above, we must speak of uniform syllogisms from propositions of impossibility. And it should be known that if all propositions are taken in the sense of composition, such a discourse is not valid, because it would be argued by this false rule ‘the premises are impossible, therefore the conclusion is impossible’.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|\|Similiter, si omnes propositiones de impossibili sumantur in sensu {{p\|435}} divisionis, non valet talis discursus, quia nullus talis in prima figura potest regulari per dici de omni vel de nullo. Unde sic arguendo ‘omnis homo impossibiliter est asinus; omne rudibile impossibiliter est homo; igitur omne rudibile impossibiliter est asinus’, patet quod non valet nec regulatur per dici de omni, quia per minorem non denotatur subiectum maioris verificari de aliquo sed magis removeri. Et ita cum quaelibet de impossibili aequivaleat uni negativae, et ex omnibus negativis non contingit arguere, manifestum est quod ex propositionibus de impossibili non contingit arguere.		\|\|Similiter, si omnes propositiones de impossibili sumantur in sensu {{p\|435}} divisionis, non valet talis discursus, quia nullus talis in prima figura potest regulari per dici de omni vel de nullo. Unde sic arguendo ‘omnis homo impossibiliter est asinus; omne rudibile impossibiliter est homo; igitur omne rudibile impossibiliter est asinus’, patet quod non valet nec regulatur per dici de omni, quia per minorem non denotatur subiectum maioris verificari de aliquo sed magis removeri. Et ita cum quaelibet de impossibili aequivaleat uni negativae, et ex omnibus negativis non contingit arguere, manifestum est quod ex propositionibus de impossibili non contingit arguere.

	\|\| Similarly, if all propositions about the impossible are taken in the sense of division, such a discourse is not valid, because no such in the first figure can be ~~regulated~~ by ~~saying about everything~~ or ~~about~~ nothing. Hence, thus arguing ‘every man is not possibly a donkey; every ~~rude~~ thing is not possibly a man; therefore every ~~rude~~ thing is not possibly a donkey’, it is clear that it is not valid nor is it governed by ~~saying de onmi (about everything)~~, because by the minor the subject of the major is not denoted to be verified about something, but rather to be removed. And so since any proposition ~~about the impossible~~ is equivalent to one negative, and it is not possible to argue from all negatives, it is clear that it is not possible to argue from propositions ~~about the impossible~~.		\|\| Similarly, if all propositions about the impossible are taken in the sense of division, such a discourse is not valid, because no such in the first figure can be governed by to be said of all or nothing. Hence, thus arguing ‘every man is not possibly a donkey; every tamable thing is not possibly a man; therefore every tamable thing is not possibly a donkey’, it is clear that it is not valid nor is it governed by to be said of all, because by the minor the subject of the major is not denoted to be verified about something, but rather to be removed. And so since any proposition of impossibility is equivalent to one negative, and it is not possible to argue from all negatives, it is clear that it is not possible to argue from propositions of impossibility.

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Ragnarr49 at 03:34, 8 March 2025

2025-03-08T03:34:17Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:34, 7 March 2025
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	\|\|Cap. 29. De uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili		\|\|Cap. 29. De uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili

	\|\|Chapter 29.		\|\|Chapter 29. On uniform syllogisms from propositions de impossibili (of the impossible).
			\|- valign = top

	~~\|- valign = top~~
	\|\|Post praedicta de uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili est dicendum. Et est sciendum quod si propositiones omnes sumantur in sensu compositionis, talis discursus non valet, quia argueretur per istam regulam falsam ‘praemissae sunt impossibiles, igitur conclusio est impossibilis’		\|\|Post praedicta de uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili est dicendum. Et est sciendum quod si propositiones omnes sumantur in sensu compositionis, talis discursus non valet, quia argueretur per istam regulam falsam ‘praemissae sunt impossibiles, igitur conclusio est impossibilis’

	\|\|		\|\| After the above, we must speak of uniform syllogisms from propositions of the impossible. And it should be known that if all propositions are taken in the sense of composition, such a discourse is not valid, because it would be argued by this false rule ‘the premises are impossible, therefore the conclusion is impossible’.

	\|- valign = top		\|- valign = top
	\|\|Similiter, si omnes propositiones de impossibili sumantur in sensu {{p\|435}} divisionis, non valet talis discursus, quia nullus talis in prima figura potest regulari per dici de omni vel de nullo. Unde sic arguendo ‘omnis homo impossibiliter est asinus; omne rudibile impossibiliter est homo; igitur omne rudibile impossibiliter est asinus’, patet quod non valet nec regulatur per dici de omni, quia per minorem non denotatur subiectum maioris verificari de aliquo sed magis removeri. Et ita cum quaelibet de impossibili aequivaleat uni negativae, et ex omnibus negativis non contingit arguere, manifestum est quod ex propositionibus de impossibili non contingit arguere.		\|\|Similiter, si omnes propositiones de impossibili sumantur in sensu {{p\|435}} divisionis, non valet talis discursus, quia nullus talis in prima figura potest regulari per dici de omni vel de nullo. Unde sic arguendo ‘omnis homo impossibiliter est asinus; omne rudibile impossibiliter est homo; igitur omne rudibile impossibiliter est asinus’, patet quod non valet nec regulatur per dici de omni, quia per minorem non denotatur subiectum maioris verificari de aliquo sed magis removeri. Et ita cum quaelibet de impossibili aequivaleat uni negativae, et ex omnibus negativis non contingit arguere, manifestum est quod ex propositionibus de impossibili non contingit arguere.

	\|\|		\|\| Similarly, if all propositions about the impossible are taken in the sense of division, such a discourse is not valid, because no such in the first figure can be regulated by saying about everything or about nothing. Hence, thus arguing ‘every man is not possibly a donkey; every rude thing is not possibly a man; therefore every rude thing is not possibly a donkey’, it is clear that it is not valid nor is it governed by saying de onmi (about everything), because by the minor the subject of the major is not denoted to be verified about something, but rather to be removed. And so since any proposition about the impossible is equivalent to one negative, and it is not possible to argue from all negatives, it is clear that it is not possible to argue from propositions about the impossible.

	\|}		\|}

Ragnarr49 at 03:24, 8 March 2025

2025-03-08T03:24:12Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 22:24, 7 March 2025
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	\|\|Cap. 29. De uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili		\|\|Cap. 29. De uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili

	\|\|		\|\|Chapter 29.

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Edward Ockham at 09:09, 13 June 2015

2015-06-13T09:09:40Z

New page

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 28|Chapter 28]]|[[../Chapter 30|Chapter 30]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 29. De uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili

||

|- valign = top
||Post praedicta de uniformi ex propositionibus de impossibili est dicendum. Et est sciendum quod si propositiones omnes sumantur in sensu compositionis, talis discursus non valet, quia argueretur per istam regulam falsam ‘praemissae sunt impossibiles, igitur conclusio est impossibilis’

||

|- valign = top
||Similiter, si omnes propositiones de impossibili sumantur in sensu {{p|435}} divisionis, non valet talis discursus, quia nullus talis in prima figura potest regulari per dici de omni vel de nullo. Unde sic arguendo ‘omnis homo impossibiliter est asinus; omne rudibile impossibiliter est homo; igitur omne rudibile impossibiliter est asinus’, patet quod non valet nec regulatur per dici de omni, quia per minorem non denotatur subiectum maioris verificari de aliquo sed magis removeri. Et ita cum quaelibet de impossibili aequivaleat uni negativae, et ex omnibus negativis non contingit arguere, manifestum est quod ex propositionibus de impossibili non contingit arguere.

||

|}

==Notes==
<references/>