Edward Ockham: Created page with "{{Nextpage|ARTICLE 2|ARTICLE 4}}
Naturale-Supernaturale Cognitio naturalis-supernaturalis *Revelatio
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2012-03-31T15:20:19Z

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*[[#S1|Naturale-Supernaturale]]
*[[#S2|Cognitio naturalis-supernaturalis]]
*[[#S3|Revelatio]]

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! valign="top" width="55%" | English
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| '''Articulus III - respondetur directe ad quaestionem.'''
| '''Article III - responding directly to the question'''.
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| <div id="S1"></div>18. (20) — '''Naturale-Supernaturale'''
| '''Natural and Supernatural'''
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| — Ad quaestionem igitur respondeo, distinguendo primo, qualiter aliquid dicitur ''supernaturale''. — Potentia enim receptiva comparatur ad ''actum'' quem recipit, vel ad ''agens'' a quo recipit. — ''Primo modo'' ipsa est potentia naturalis, vel violenta, vel neutra. * Dicitur * ''naturalis'', si naturaliter inclinetur: ''violenta'', si sit contra inclinationem naturalem: ''neutra'', si neque inclinatur ad istam formam * quam recipit *, neque ad oppositam. In hac autem comparatione nulla est ''supernaturalitas''.
| Therefore I reply to the question, by first distinguishing in what way something is called supernatural. For a receptive potentiality is either (a) compared to the actuality which it it receives, or (b) to the agent from which it receives. In the first way it is a natural potential, or a violent one. It is called 'natural' if it is naturally inclined; 'violent' if it is contrary to the natural inclination, or 'neither' if it is neither inclined to the form which it receives, nor to the opposite. But in this comparison, nothing is 'supernatural'.
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| — Sed comparando receptivum ad ''agens'' a quo recipit formam, est ''naturalitas'' quando receptivum comparatur ad tale agens quod natum est naturaliter imprimere talem formam in tali passo: ''supernaturalitas'' autem quando comparatur ad tale agens quod non est naturaliter impressivum illius formae in illud passum<ref>(1) Dari formas seu habitus intrinsece supernaturales, et non tantum per respectum ad agens, docet SUBTILIS pluribi, maxime I. d. 17. q. 3. n. (18; seqq. — n. (21) seqq. — III. d. 23. n. (9) seqq.</ref>.
| But by comparing the receptive object to the agent from which it receives the form, it is ''natural'' when the receptive object is compared to such an agent which is naturally suited to impress such a form in such a passive object, but ''supernatural'' when it is compared to an agent of the sort that is not naturally impressive of that form in the passive object.
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| <div id="S2"></div>19. (21) — '''Cognitio naturalis-supernaturalis'''
| '''Cognition of natural and supernatural'''
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| — Ad propositum dico, quod comparando intellectum possibilem ad ''notitiam actualem in se'', nulla est sibi cognitio supernaturalis; quia intellectus possibilis quacumque cognitione naturaliter perficitur, et ad quamcumque ''naturaliter inclinatur''. — Sed ''secundo modo'' loquendo, sic est ''supernaturalis'' quia generatur ab aliquo [20] agente quod non est natum movere intellectum possibilem ad talem cognitionem ''naturaliter''. Pro statu autem isto, secundum Philosophum, intellectus possibilis natus est moveri ad cognitionem ab intellectu agente et phantasmate; igitur sola illa cognitio ''naturalis'' est quae ab istis agentibus potest imprimi.
| In the present case, I say that by comparing a possible understanding to the actual knowledge in it, nothing is a supernatural cognition for it, for a possible understanding is naturally completed [''perficitur''] by any cognition, and is naturally inclined to anything. But in the ''second'' way of speaking, the supernatural is the sort of thing which is generated by some agent that is not suited to move a possible understanding to such a cognition naturally.  For in this [earthly] state, according to the Philosopher, a possible understanding is is suited to be moved to cognition by the agent intellect and by a phantasmata.  Therefore a cognition is only ''natural'' when it can be impressed by those agents.
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| Virtute autem istorum potest haberi omnis cognitio ''incomplexa'' quae secundum legem communem habetur a viatore, sicut patet in ''instantia'' contra ''tertiam rationem'' principalem [nn. 14 et 15]. Et ideo licet Deus possit per revelationem specialem cognitionem alicuius incomplexi causare, sicut in raptu, non tamen talis cognitio supernaturalis est ''necessaria'' de communi lege.
| In virtue of these [agents] every incomplex cognition can be held which is held by the wayfarer according to common law [?], as is clear in the counterexample to the third main argument [nn. 14 & 15].  And therefore although God could cause the cognition of something incomplex by some specific revelation, e.g. in rapture, nevertheless it is not the case that such a supernatural cognition is necessary by the common law.
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| — De ''complexis'' autem veritatibus secus est; quia, sicut ostensum est per ''tres rationes primas'' contra ''primam opinionem'' adductas [nn. 7. 8. 13], posita tota actione intellectus agentis et phantasmatum, multae complexiones remanebunt ignotae et nobis neutrae, quarum cognitio est nobis necessaria. Istarum igitur notitiam est necesse nobis ''supernaturaliter'' tradi; quia nullus earum notitiam potuit naturaliter invenire, et eam aliis docendo tradere; quia sicut uni, ita cuilibet ex naturalibus erunt neutrae.
| But it is otherwise with complex truths. For, as was shown by the three first arguments against the first opinion  [nn. 7. 8. 13], given the whole action of the agent intellect and the phantasmata, many complex [truths]. whose cognition is necessary to us, will remain unknown and neutral to us.  Therefore the knowledge of such truths must necessarily be handed to us supernaturally, for no one could naturally discover knowledge of them, or hand them to others by teaching, for just as [they are neutral] to one person, so they will be neutral to anyone from natural phenomena.
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| (22) Utrum autem post primam traditionem doctrinae de talibus possit aliquis assentire naturaliter doctrinae traditae. De hoc in ''III. lib. dist. 23''.
| But on whether, after receiving the teaching of such things, someone could agree naturally to receiving teaching, see ''book III'', distinction 23.
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| <div id="S3"></div>20. — '''Revelatio'''
| '''Revelation'''
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| Haec autem prima traditio talis doctrinae dicitur ''revelatio''; quae ideo est ''supernaturalis'', quia est ab agente quod non est naturaliter motivum intellectus nostri pro statu isto. — Aliter etiam posset dici ''supernaturalis'', quia est ab agente supplente vicem obiecti supernaturalis. Nam obiectum natum causare notitiam huius, ''Deus est trinus et unus'', vel similium, est essentia sub ''propria ratione'' cognita: ipsa autem sub tali ratione cognoscibilis est obiectum nobis ''supernaturale''<ref>(1) Vid. infr. I. d, 3. q. 2. n. (16).</ref>. Quodcumque igitur agens causat notitiam aliquarum veritatum, quae per tale obiectum sic cognitum natae sunt esse evidentes, illud agens in hoc supplet vicem illius obiecti.
| Now the first reception of such teaching is called ''revelation'', which is therefore supernatural, for it is from an agent which does not naturally move our understanding in this [earthly] state.  It could be called supernatural in another way, for it is from an agent taking the place [''supplente vicem''] of a supernatural object.  For the object that is suited to bring about knowledge of [the proposition] 'God is three and one', or of similar [propositions], is an essence cognised under a proper aspect.  But that [essence] cognisable under such an aspect is a ''supernatural'' object to us.  Therefore, whatever agent causes knowledge of some truths, which through such an object thus known are suited to be evident, in that case that agent, takes the place of that object.
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| Quod si ipsum agens causaret notitiam perfectam istarum veritatum qualem ipsum obiectum in se cognitum causaret, (tunc ''perfecte'' suppleret vicem obiecti; sed si agens non [21] ita perfectam notitiam causat sicut obiectum in se causaret <ref>(a) Deest in ed. Ven.</ref>), tunc ''imperfecte'' supplet vicem obiecti, pro quanto scilicet imperfecta notitia, quam facit, virtualiter continetur in illa perfecta, cuius obiectum in se cognitum esset causa. Ita in proposito: nam revelans hanc, ''Deus est trinus'', causat in * intellectu * aliqualem notitiam huius veritatis, licet obscuram, quia causat de obiecto non sub ''propria ratione'' cognito; quod obiectum si cognitum esset, natum esset causare notitiam perfectam et claram veritatis illius.
| But if that agent were to cause complete knowledge of those truths, the sort of knowledge which that object would cause if cognised in itself, then it would completely take the place of the object.  But if the agent does not cause complete knowledge in the way that the object would cause in itself, then it incompletely takes the place of the object, namely, forasmuch as the incomplete knowledge, which it causes, is virtually contained in that complete [knowledge], whose object cognised in itself would be the cause.  So in the case in hand: for the one revealing [the proposition] "God is three" causes some sort of knowledge of this truth in the understanding, although [it is] obscure, for it causes [knowledge]''' '''of the object not cognised under its proper aspect, which object, if it were cognised, would be suited to cause clear and complete knowledge of that truth.
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| Pro quanto igitur haec notitia obscura in illa clara includitur eminenter sicut imperfectum in perfecto, pro tanto revelans hanc obscuram et causans supplet vicem obiecti illius clarae notitiae causativi; praecipue cum non possit notitiam alicuius veritatis causare, nisi ut supplens vicem alicuius obiecti, nec veritatum talium de illo obiecto notitiam causare posset ut supplens vicem obiecti alicuius inferioris naturaliter motivi intellectus nostri, * et * quia nullum tale virtualiter includit aliquam notitiam istarum veritatum, etiam nec obscuram; igitur oportet quod in causando etiam istam obscuram aliqualiter suppleat vicem obiecti supernaturalis.
| Therefore, forasmuch as this obscure knowledge is included in that clear knowledge, as the imperfect in the perfect, so the one revealing this obscure [knowledge], and causing [it] takes the place of the object of that clear, causative [?] knowledge, mainly because it could not cause knowledge of any truth except as taking the place of some object, nor could it cause knowledge of such truths about that object as taking the place of any inferior object, naturally motive of our understanding, and because no such [object?] includes any knowledge of these truths, not even obscure [knowledge]. Therefore it has to be that even when causing that obscure [knowledge] it takes the place of the supernatural object in some way.
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| Differentia * autem * istorum duorum modorum ponendi ''supernaturalitatem'' notitiae revelatae patet separando unum ab alio: puta, si agens supernaturale causaret notitiam obiecti naturalis, ut si infunderet Geometriam alicui, illa esset supernaturalis ''primo'' modo, et non ''secundo'' modo: si autem infunderet notitiam huius, ''Deus est trinus'', vel similium, haec supernaturalis esset ''utroque'' modo, quia secundus infert primum, licet non e converso: ubi autem est primus tantum, ibi non est necesse quod sit sic supernaturalis, quin naturaliter possit haberi: ubi vero est secundus modus est necessitas ut supernaturaliter habeatur, quia naturaliter haberi non potest.
| But the difference of those two modes of positing the supernatural nature of revealed knowledge is clear by separating the one from the other.  For example, if the supernatural agent were to cause knowledge of a natural object, e.g. if it were to infuse geometry in someone, that would be supernatural in the first way, and not in the second way. But if it were to infuse knowledge of [the proposition] "God is three", or of similar [propositions], this would be supernatural in both ways, because the second implies the first, although not conversely.  But where it is the first only, it is not necessary there that it is supernatural in this way, but that it could be held naturally.  But where it is the second mode, it is necessary that it is held supernaturally, because it cannot be held naturally.
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== Notes ==

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Authors/Duns Scotus/Ordinatio/Ordinatio I (Quaracchi)/Prologus/Q1/A3 - Revision history

Edward Ockham: Created page with "{{Nextpage|ARTICLE 2|ARTICLE 4}} *Naturale-Supernaturale *Cognitio naturalis-supernaturalis *Revelatio {| cellpadding="..."

Edward Ockham: Created page with "{{Nextpage|ARTICLE 2|ARTICLE 4}}
Naturale-Supernaturale Cognitio naturalis-supernaturalis *Revelatio
{| cellpadding="..."