Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q2 - Revision history

Edward Ockham at 14:49, 2 March 2023

2023-03-02T14:49:27Z

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	~~Whether it is possible that we know anything~~

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	~~Second, it is asked next whether it is possible that we know anything.~~

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	1. First, it is argued that it is not: For, knowledge is a notion [noting, familiarity] that is certain and evident, and this is impossible for us; therefore ... etc. The major premise is clear: For by this knowledge differs from opinion, namely that knowledge requires certainty, which opinion does not require. The minor premise is proven in several ways. First from the senses, for the same thing that we judge [to be] tasteless, i.e. of bad taste, the donkey judges [to be] tasty, such as thistles. And it cannot be said that our judgment is better or more certain than the donkey’s judgment because the donkey’s judgment is by nature and nature does not err in what it does. And so it is clear that our judgment by the senses is not certain. The same is clear from men and women, as well as from children and elderly people. For the things that appear tasty to women or to children appear tasteless to men or to elderly people, and the other way around, +more tasty and more salty or moderate+. And it is not obvious who of them judges more truly, and it seems that everything is uncertain for us. Similarly, dogs have a better sense of smell than humans; nevertheless they judge some smells pleasant and sweet and they pursue them like goods, such as the smells of cadavers, which a human, however, considers abominable. Therefore, it seems that we have no certain judgment about them.

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	2. Also, what the healthy person judges sweet that the sick person often judges bitter. If you were to say that the judgment of the healthy person is good and the healthy person should be believed, then this cannot be said: For, if the healthy person judges better than the sick person, this is only because of the better conditions of the organ. Therefore, no one will judge correctly and perfectly simpliciter, unless he had an organ in perfect conditions, which no one at all has. Therefore, no one will judge perfectly. And, moreover, I prove that the judgment of the sick person is good: For no agent leads by any steps to a [sensible] species that is contrary to its own. Therefore, sweetness never leads to the species of bitterness by which the sick agent will judge [something to be] bitter; but it must rather be that this species comes from bitterness. Therefore, the sick person judges well when he judges [there to be] bitterness.

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	3. Also, when one is in a boat that is moving on a river, seeing a tree on the shore, one judges the tree to be moving, and standing next to the tree one judges it to be at rest. And so it is not known who judges correctly. Indeed, it is proven to you that one judges correctly when one is in the moving boat: For when one is in the boat, one perceives motion by sight (otherwise one would not judge that the tree is moving) and one doesn’t perceive motion except in the tree, because one might not have seen oneself or the boat but rather only the tree or the shore. Therefore, the motion that one perceives seems to be in the tree.

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	4. Also, through a different medium there appear to us different colours and different sizes. As when the sun appears red and large in the morning, when it is rising, and it appears smaller and white when it has risen. And when you say that this is because of the unsuitability of the medium, then it is concluded from this that there will never be a perfectly true and correct judgment unless the medium was perfectly pure, which doesn’t happen to us. Moreover, a colour isn’t seen without light, but in more and less intense light it appears different again and again. Therefore, we never have a certain judgment about colour.

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	~~5. Also, the senses can be deceived, as is commonly said. Therefore, their judgment is neither certain nor reliable.~~

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	6. Also, consider the species that you have in the senses, of the things that thereby appear to you. God can fully preserve them perfectly in your senses while the things are not present. And then things would appear to you fully and exactly as they appear now. And thinking that you would judge the things as they appear now, you would not judge correctly, because it would be false.

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	7. Indeed, as some argue, since God can do that if he wants, and you cannot know with certainty whether God wants to do it, therefore you cannot be certain whether it is the case, nor, consequently, whether you see anything outside [of you].

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	8. Next, it is argued from the side of the intellect: Since a notion of the intellect depends on a sensible one; so, because the sensible one is not certain, as has been said, it follows that neither is the intellective one. Thus, in book eight of the Physics,<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/physics/liber8#bk253a32\|Book VIII Chapter 3 253a32]]</ref> Aristotle criticizes those who say that they do not want to follow the sense but reason. For, as Aristotle says, the senses are worth more, that is, are more certain, than reason.

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	~~9. Also, it is possible that the species of the senses are changed before they reach the intellect itself. And so the judgment of the intellect itself will not be certain.~~

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Edward Ockham at 17:15, 25 February 2023

2023-02-25T17:15:57Z

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Edward Ockham at 17:15, 25 February 2023

2023-02-25T17:15:42Z

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	8. Next, it is argued from the side of the intellect: Since a notion of the intellect depends on a sensible one; so, because the sensible one is not certain, as has been said, it follows that neither is the intellective one. Thus, in book eight of the Physics, Aristotle criticizes those who say that they do not want to follow the sense but reason. For, as Aristotle says, the senses are worth more, that is, are more certain, than reason.		8. Next, it is argued from the side of the intellect: Since a notion of the intellect depends on a sensible one; so, because the sensible one is not certain, as has been said, it follows that neither is the intellective one. Thus, in book eight of the Physics,<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/physics/liber8#bk253a32\|Book VIII Chapter 3 253a32]]</ref> Aristotle criticizes those who say that they do not want to follow the sense but reason. For, as Aristotle says, the senses are worth more, that is, are more certain, than reason.

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Ulf at 21:55, 24 February 2023

2023-02-24T21:55:21Z

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	5. Also, the senses can be deceived, as it commonly said. Therefore, their judgment is neither certain nor reliable.		5. Also, the senses can be deceived, as is commonly said. Therefore, their judgment is neither certain nor reliable.

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Ulf at 21:50, 24 February 2023

2023-02-24T21:50:26Z

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	6. Also, consider the species that you have in the senses, of the things that thereby appear to you. God can fully preserve them perfectly in your senses while the things are not present. And then it would appear to you fully and exactly as ~~it appears~~ now. And thinking that you would judge the ~~thing~~ as ~~it appears~~ now, you would not judge correctly, because it would be false.		6. Also, consider the species that you have in the senses, of the things that thereby appear to you. God can fully preserve them perfectly in your senses while the things are not present. And then things would appear to you fully and exactly as they appear now. And thinking that you would judge the things as they appear now, you would not judge correctly, because it would be false.

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Ulf at 21:47, 24 February 2023

2023-02-24T21:47:56Z

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	6. Also, consider the species that you have in the senses, of the things that thereby appear to you. God can fully preserve it perfectly in your senses while the ~~thing is~~ not present. And then it would appear to you fully and exactly as it appears now. And thinking that you would judge the thing as it appears now, you would not judge correctly, because it would be false.		6. Also, consider the species that you have in the senses, of the things that thereby appear to you. God can fully preserve them perfectly in your senses while the things are not present. And then it would appear to you fully and exactly as it appears now. And thinking that you would judge the thing as it appears now, you would not judge correctly, because it would be false.

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Ulf at 21:44, 24 February 2023

2023-02-24T21:44:29Z

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			4. Also, through a different medium there appear to us different colours and different sizes. As when the sun appears red and large in the morning, when it is rising, and it appears smaller and white when it has risen. And when you say that this is because of the unsuitability of the medium, then it is concluded from this that there will never be a perfectly true and correct judgment unless the medium was perfectly pure, which doesn’t happen to us. Moreover, a colour isn’t seen without light, but in more and less intense light it appears different again and again. Therefore, we never have a certain judgment about colour.

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			5. Also, the senses can be deceived, as it commonly said. Therefore, their judgment is neither certain nor reliable.

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			6. Also, consider the species that you have in the senses, of the things that thereby appear to you. God can fully preserve it perfectly in your senses while the thing is not present. And then it would appear to you fully and exactly as it appears now. And thinking that you would judge the thing as it appears now, you would not judge correctly, because it would be false.

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			7. Indeed, as some argue, since God can do that if he wants, and you cannot know with certainty whether God wants to do it, therefore you cannot be certain whether it is the case, nor, consequently, whether you see anything outside [of you].

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			8. Next, it is argued from the side of the intellect: Since a notion of the intellect depends on a sensible one; so, because the sensible one is not certain, as has been said, it follows that neither is the intellective one. Thus, in book eight of the Physics, Aristotle criticizes those who say that they do not want to follow the sense but reason. For, as Aristotle says, the senses are worth more, that is, are more certain, than reason.

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			9. Also, it is possible that the species of the senses are changed before they reach the intellect itself. And so the judgment of the intellect itself will not be certain.

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Ulf at 23:06, 22 February 2023

2023-02-22T23:06:40Z

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	2. Also, what the healthy person judges sweet that the sick person often judges bitter. If you were to say that the judgment of the healthy person is good and the healthy person should be believed, then this cannot be said: For, if the healthy person judges better than the sick person, this is only because of the better conditions of the organ. Therefore, no one will judge ~~rightly~~ and perfectly simpliciter, unless he had an organ in perfect conditions, which no one at all has. Therefore, no one will judge perfectly. And, moreover, I prove that the judgment of the sick person is good: For no agent leads by any steps to a [sensible] species that is contrary to its own. Therefore, sweetness never leads to the species of bitterness by which the sick agent will judge [something to be] bitter; but it must rather be that this species comes from bitterness. Therefore, the sick person judges well when he judges [there to be] bitterness.		2. Also, what the healthy person judges sweet that the sick person often judges bitter. If you were to say that the judgment of the healthy person is good and the healthy person should be believed, then this cannot be said: For, if the healthy person judges better than the sick person, this is only because of the better conditions of the organ. Therefore, no one will judge correctly and perfectly simpliciter, unless he had an organ in perfect conditions, which no one at all has. Therefore, no one will judge perfectly. And, moreover, I prove that the judgment of the sick person is good: For no agent leads by any steps to a [sensible] species that is contrary to its own. Therefore, sweetness never leads to the species of bitterness by which the sick agent will judge [something to be] bitter; but it must rather be that this species comes from bitterness. Therefore, the sick person judges well when he judges [there to be] bitterness.

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			3. Also, when one is in a boat that is moving on a river, seeing a tree on the shore, one judges the tree to be moving, and standing next to the tree one judges it to be at rest. And so it is not known who judges correctly. Indeed, it is proven to you that one judges correctly when one is in the moving boat: For when one is in the boat, one perceives motion by sight (otherwise one would not judge that the tree is moving) and one doesn’t perceive motion except in the tree, because one might not have seen oneself or the boat but rather only the tree or the shore. Therefore, the motion that one perceives seems to be in the tree.

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Ulf at 23:08, 20 February 2023

2023-02-20T23:08:39Z

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			Question 2a

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			Whether it is possible that we know anything

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			Second, it is asked next whether it is possible that we know anything.

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			1. First, it is argued that it is not: For, knowledge is a notion [noting, familiarity] that is certain and evident, and this is impossible for us; therefore ... etc. The major premise is clear: For by this knowledge differs from opinion, namely that knowledge requires certainty, which opinion does not require. The minor premise is proven in several ways. First from the senses, for the same thing that we judge [to be] tasteless, i.e. of bad taste, the donkey judges [to be] tasty, such as thistles. And it cannot be said that our judgment is better or more certain than the donkey’s judgment because the donkey’s judgment is by nature and nature does not err in what it does. And so it is clear that our judgment by the senses is not certain. The same is clear from men and women, as well as from children and elderly people. For the things that appear tasty to women or to children appear tasteless to men or to elderly people, and the other way around, +more tasty and more salty or moderate+. And it is not obvious who of them judges more truly, and it seems that everything is uncertain for us. Similarly, dogs have a better sense of smell than humans; nevertheless they judge some smells pleasant and sweet and they pursue them like goods, such as the smells of cadavers, which a human, however, considers abominable. Therefore, it seems that we have no certain judgment about them.

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			2. Also, what the healthy person judges sweet that the sick person often judges bitter. If you were to say that the judgment of the healthy person is good and the healthy person should be believed, then this cannot be said: For, if the healthy person judges better than the sick person, this is only because of the better conditions of the organ. Therefore, no one will judge rightly and perfectly simpliciter, unless he had an organ in perfect conditions, which no one at all has. Therefore, no one will judge perfectly. And, moreover, I prove that the judgment of the sick person is good: For no agent leads by any steps to a [sensible] species that is contrary to its own. Therefore, sweetness never leads to the species of bitterness by which the sick agent will judge [something to be] bitter; but it must rather be that this species comes from bitterness. Therefore, the sick person judges well when he judges [there to be] bitterness.

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Edward Ockham: Text replace - "{{reflist}}" to "{{reflist}}Category:Untranslated"

2012-01-29T12:13:32Z

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|Quaestio 2a

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|UTRUM POSSIBILE SIT NOS ALIQUID SCIRE

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|Consequenter quaeritur, secundo, utrum possibile sit nos aliquid scire.

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur primo quod non: quia scientia est notitia certa et evidens, et talis est nobis impossibilis; igitur ... et caetera. Maior patet: quia per hoc differt scientia ab opinione, scilicet quia scientia requirit certitudinem, quam opinio non requirit. Minor probatur multipliciter. Primo ex parte sensus: quia illud idem quod nos iudicamus insipidum, id est mali saporis, asinus iudicat sapidum, sicut cardones; et non potest dici quod iudicium nostrum sit melius aut certius quam iudicium asini, quia iudicium asini est per naturam et natura non errat in suis operationibus; et sic patet quod iudicium nostrum ad sensum non est certum. Idem patet de viris et mulieribus, de pueris et senibus: nam quae apparent sapida mulieribus vel pueris apparent insipida viris vel senibus, et e converso, +magis sapida et plus salsa vel modicia+; et non apparet qui istorum verius iudicant, et videtur quod totum sit nobis incertum. Similiter, canes melius odorant quam homines, tamen iudicant quosdam odores suaves et dulces et eos persequuntur tamquam bonos, ut odores cadaverum, quos tamen reputat homo abominabiles. Ideo apparet quod de his non habemus iudicium certum.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Item, quod sanus iudicat dulce illud saepe aeger iudicat amarum. Si tu diceres quod iudicium sani est bonum et sano est credendum, hoc non potest dici: quia si sanus melius iudicat quam aeger, hoc non est nisi propter meliorem dispositionem organi; ergo nullus simpliciter recte et perfecte iudicabit nisi habuerit organum perfecte dispositum; modo forte nullus habet; ideo nullus perfecte iudicabit. Et iterum probo quod iudicium aegri est bonum: quia nullum agens agit in aliquod passum specie sibi contrariam; ideo numquam dulce agit speciem amaritudinis per quam agens aeger iudicabit amarum, sed oportet illam speciem ab amaro provenire; ideo aeger bene iudicat iudicando amaritudinem.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, exsistens in navi mota in fluuio, videns arborem in litore, iudicat arborem moveri, et stans iuxta arborem iudicat quiescere; et sic nescitur quis recte iudicat. Sane probatur tibi quod exsistens in navi mota recte iudicat: quia exsistens in navi percipit motum ad visum (aliter non iudicaret arborem moveri) et non percipit motum nisi in arbore, quia forte non vidit se ipsum nec navem, immo solum arborem vel litora; ideo in arbore videtur esse motus quem percipit.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, per aliud medium apparet nobis alius color et alia magnitudo. Unde sol in mane, quando oritur, apparet rubeus et magnus, et cum eleuatus est apparet minor et albus. Et si tu dicis quod hoc est propter indispositionem medii, tunc ex hoc concluditur quod numquam erit perfecte verum et rectum iudicium nisi medium sit perfecte purum, quod non invenitur apud nos. Etiam color non videtur sine lumine, et tamen in intensiori vel minori lumine apparet alius et alius color. Ideo numquam habemus certum iudicium de colore.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Item, sensus possunt deludi, ut communiter dicitur; ergo eorum iudicium non est certum nec firmum.

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Item, illam speciem quam tu habes in sensu de his quae tibi modo apparent, deus omnino potest eam conservare in sensu tuo perfecte rebus non praesentibus, et tunc omnino et penitus tibi apparebit ut nunc apparet; et ita credens te iudicare sicut apparet nunc, non recte iudicares, quia falsum.

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|<div id=S7></div>7. Immo, sicut aliqui arguunt, quia deus potest hoc facere si velit, et tu non potes scire cum certitudine utrum deus hoc uult, ergo tu non potes esse certus utrum ita est, nec, per consequens, utrum vides aliquam rem extra.

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|<div id=S8></div>8. Deinde, arguitur ex parte intellectus: quia notitia intellectiva dependet ex sensitiva; igitur, cum sensitiva non sit certa, ut dictum est, sequitur quod non intellectiva. Igitur, in octauo Physicorum*, Aristotiles reprehendit illos qui dicunt quod sensum nolunt sequi, sed rationem; quia sensus, ut dicit Aristotiles, est dignior, id est certior, ratione.

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|<div id=S9></div>9. Item, possibile est quod species sensibilium alienantur antequam perveniant ad ipsum intellectum; et sic non erit certum iudicium ipsius intellectus.

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|<div id=S10></div>10. Item, ex hoc sequitur quod conclusiones non erunt certae si principia non fuerint certa; sed principia non sunt certa. Probatio: quia sunt acquisita per experientiam, ut dicitur secundo huius, et experimentum saepe est fallax: immo nullum experimentum concludit gratia formae propositionem universalem, cum per nullum experimentum fiat inductio in omnibus singularibus; igitur principia non videntur certa.

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|<div id=S11></div>11. Item, causa non potest vere sciri per effectum: quia scientiae debent esse per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire. Nec effectus potest certe sciri per causam, cum causae sint nobis minus notae, et minus notum non notificat magis notum. Nec valet si dicatur quod causae sunt notiores secundum naturam: quia nec est ad propositum nec ad nos de notitia naturae: nos enim scimus qui addiscimus aliquid; ideo patet quod ex nobis notioribus addiscimus.

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|<div id=S12></div>12. Item, videtur quod unum non potest sciri per alterum cum certitudine: quia non videtur certitudo perfecta donec sit reductio facta in primum principium; sed ubi probaretur unum per aliud non posset fieri reductio in primum principium, quod quidem principium fundatur in contradictione, quia duo disparata non contradicunt, ut hoc esse et illud non esse; ideo sic non habetur certitudo*.

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|<div id=S13></div>13. Item, de rebus extra sensus non habetur certitudo, cum tales res sint extra sensibiles, quia singulares sunt et continve mutantur; nec de rebus extra animam, quia illae sunt minus notae quam res extra.

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|<div id=S14></div>14. Ultimo arguitur: quia si aliquid sciretur, hoc esset per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire; tunc quaero utrum illa causa sit nota vel ignota; si non sit nota nec scita, non faciet scire; et si sit scita, hoc etiam esset per causam, ut prius, et ita procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles, in isto libro, diffiniens scire, et dicens quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire*.

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|Ista quaestio continet multas difficultates propter quas antiqui negaverunt scire esse possibile, quae in arguendo ponuntur. Ad quaestionem tamen respondeo quod scire est nobis possibile: quia aliqua sunt principia nobis per se nota et nulli dubia; immo circa ea nullus potest errare, ut patet quarto Metaphysicae*; deinde ex illis principiis possunt educi quaestiones per syllogismos formaliter evidentes, et etiam illae conclusiones sciuntur.

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|Unde debetis notare quod cum ponantur tres operationes intellectus, in earum qualibet sunt aliqua per se manifesta ex natura et inclinatione ipsius intellectus ad veritatem. Unde sicut ignis est naturaliter inclinatus ad calefaciendum et grave ad descendendum, ita intellectus est naturaliter inclinatus ad intelligendum obiecta sibi sufficienter praesentata, et etiam naturaliter inclinatus ad comprehensionem veritatis primorum principiorum complexorum; ideo non oportet quod per aliud primum iudicium declaretur. Ita etiam, in alia operatione intellectus, est discursus per se evidens, sicut sunt syllogismi primae figurae vel expositorii. Ideo quando per primis sic per se notis fit syllogismus formaliter evidens et per se notum, oportet cum certitudine assentire conclusioni, et sic eam esse scitam.

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|Item, Commentator, secundo Metaphysicae*, adducit aliam rationem ad probandum quod scire sit nobis possibile. Quia illud est nobis possibile ad quod nos habemus naturale desiderium, cum natura nihil faciat frustra (primo de Caelo et Mundo*); sed omnes homines natura scire desiderant, ut determinatur in prooemio Metaphysicae*; ergo scire est nobis possibile.

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|Propter solutiones rationum et maiorem evidentiam positionis, est notandum quod ad scientiam* requiritur certitudo et evidentia; et adhuc duo requiruntur, scilicet certitudo veritatis et certitudo assensus. Dico primo "certitudo ueritatis", quia si firmissime et sine aliqua formidine assentiremus propositioni falsae, sicut faciunt haeretici, qui aliquando magis volunt mori quam negare illud cui ipsi assenserunt, tamen non est scientia propter talem assensum, quia deficit veritas et certitudo et firmitas veritatis.

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|Dico secundo quod requiritur certitudo, seu firmitas, assensus, quia de propositione firmissimae et certissimae veritatis possumus dubitare, et sic non firmiter ei assentire, et tunc sic de ea non habemus scientiam.

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|Tertio dico quod cum huius modi duplici firmitate, seu certitudine, requiritur evidentia, ad differentiam fidei vel opinionis. Nam fides est firmissimae et certissimae veritatis, et debet esse cum assensu firmissimo, sed non dicitur scientia, quia ille assensus non est per evidentiam. Similiter etiam de aliquo uerissimo et firmissimo in sua veritate assentimus aliquando per rationem solum probabilem, licet forte credamus eam esse demonstrativam. Et possibile est quod propter illam rationem credamus cum omni assensu firmissimo; unde, septimo Ethicorum*, dicit Aristotiles quod multi aeque firmiter credunt his quae opinantur sicut his quae sciunt, et tamen ille habitus non est scientia, quia non est per rationem simpliciter evidentem, quamuis illi reputarent illam evidentem.

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|Unde iuxta hoc notandum est quod differentia est inter fidem, scientiam et opinionem. Scientia enim, cum firmitate veritatis et assensus requirit evidentiam, quam non habet fides vel opinio. Sed fides differt ab opinione quia fides requirit firmitatem veritatis et assensus, quorum neutrum requirit opinio. Tamen opinio cum illis duabus stare potest, ut dictum fuit; et differt a fide quia opinio est per humanam rationem ex sensibus deductam, fides autem ex voluntate, propter auctoritatem sacrae scripturae solum.

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|Sed de evidentia* debetis notare quod 'evidentia' multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo propriissime, et tunc evidentia propositionis dicitur secundum quam intellectus per suam naturam cogitur propositioni assentire et non potest ei dissentire; et isto modo diceret Aristotiles quod primum principium est nobis evidens.

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|Secundo modo 'evidentia' dicitur quia cuilibet apparet et per nullam rationem humanam +nisi subiectivam+ posset oppositum apparere; et isto modo sunt evidentia principia naturalia et conclusiones naturales. Et notandum est quod haec evidentia non dicitur proprie 'evidentia': quia circa tales propositiones evidentes intellectus posset decipi per causam supernaturalem; quia deus posset facere ignem sine caliditate, et posset facere in sensu meo et conservare speciem sensitivam sine obiecto, et ita per istam evidentiam tu iudicares ac si obiectum esset praesens, et iudicares falsum. Tamen illa evidentia naturalis bene dicitur naturalis, quia secundum illam non potest homo decipi stante communi cursu naturae, licet deciperetur per causam supernaturalem; et haec evidentia sufficit ad naturalem scientiam.

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|Istis visis, facile est solvere rationes.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Et primo, ad illas de sapido et insipido, dicitur quod asinus et homo recte iudicant. Nam cardones sunt sapidi asino et insipidi hominibus, quoniam diversis complexionibus et naturis sunt diversi cibi convenientes et diversi odores. Modo aliquid dicitur 'sapidum' quia sapit et 'insipidum' quia non sapit, vel disconvenienter sapit; similiter odor dicitur 'suavis' vel 'fetidus' quia conveniens vel disconveniens. Ideo homo per rationem iudicat odores sibi inconvenientes esse convenientes cani vel iudicat sibi fetidum non esse fetidum cani, et saporem sibi sapidum iudicat asino insipidum, vel e converso. Ideo uterque recte iudicat.

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|<div id=S2R></div>2.Ad rationem de aegro qui iudicat amarum illud quod tu iudicas esse dulce, dico quod aeger decipitur propter indispositionem organi. Et quando arguitur "ergo numquam erit perfectum iudicium si organum non sit perfecte dispositum", dico quod hoc posset concedi quantum ad gradum saporis vel odoris, tamen non requiritur optima dispositio ad perfecte iudicandum quod hoc est dulce vel amarum. Sed quando ulterius dicitur quod dulcedo ... et caetera, dico quod dulcedo in nullo passo causaret speciem amaritudinis; ideo species amaritudinis in aegro non efficitur a cibo dato, sed ab humoribus infectis circumsolutis linguae, quia masticando cibum commoventur et immutant organum; ideo aeger vere et recte potest iudicare quod ipse sentit amarum, sed decipitur iudicando quod illud amarum sit cibi.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam, de motu arboris, dico quod ille in navi si non videat se aut navem non videt arborem motum, sed videt arborem quiescentem. Tamen, quia per motum hominis in navi species arboris mutat situm in oculo, ideo virtus imaginativa iudicat motum fieri, et quia non percipit motum oculi, iudicat quod arbor moveatur, et decipitur.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam, quae arguebat de colore, conceditur quod impossibile est vel difficillimum iudicare gradum luminis vel coloris; sed cum hoc stat quod vere et recte iudicemus hoc esse album aut rubeum.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad aliam, de illusione sensuum, potest dici quod in medio bene disposito et oculo exsistente sano sunt multa de quibus sensus numquam decipitur per illusionem sensuum videntium, nisi forte illusio esset supernaturalis. Et si aliquando sensus illuduntur, cum hoc in multis potest corrigere intellectus per rationem errorem sensus.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad aliam, arguentem de potentia dei, dico quod ita non intelligitur quin de principiis et conclusionibus talibus habeamus evidentiam naturalem, licet de multis eorum non habeamus evidentiam propriissime dictam.

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|<div id=S7R></div>7. Ad aliam rationem, arguentem de intellectu quia intellectus dependet ex sensu, concedo quod intellectus accipit firmum iudicium et evidens evidentia naturali et iudicio sensus. Sed ultra intellectus de multis virtute propria, quae excedit virtutem sensus, habet firmum iudicium, licet illud non sit sensus iudicium, verbi gratia de universalibus principiis. Immo saepe per rationem intellectus evidenter corrigit errorem sensus, ut patet de magnitudine.

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|<div id=S8R></div>8. Ad aliam, de alienatione specierum, quod numquam perveniant ad intellectum, dicendum est quod aliqua sunt principia quae numquam essent dubia vel incerta propter quamcumque alienatione: verbi gratia, primum principium. Nam quocumque casu posito, verum est quod quodlibet est vel non est*, et quod totum est maius sua parte, et sic de multis aliis.

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|<div id=S9R></div>9. Ad aliam, dicentem quod experientia saepe fallit, dicitur primo quod multa sunt principia evidentia non credita per experientiam, sed per manifestam terminorum inclusionem ad invicem, vel exclusionem, scito quid nominis. Sic enim est evidens quod homo est animal et asinus est animal. Deinde principia sumpta per experientiam adhuc habent naturalem evidentiam. Quia licet experientia pauca et parum examinata saepe fallat, tamen experientia multa et bene in diversis casibus examinata numquam fallit. Et quando ultra opinatur quod experientia numquam gratia formae concludit universale principium, quia numquam fit in omnibus singularibus, respondet Commentator, secundo Physicorum*, quod licet inductio, sive experientia inductiva, non concludat gratia formae, tamen intellectus, ex eius naturali inclinatione ad veritatem, percipiens multotiens ita fieri quod non potest nec potuit recipere instantiam, nec videre esse rationem quare in aliis debeat esse aliter, ipse concedit universale principium tamquam notum et evidens evidentia naturali et possibili circa talia.

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|<div id=S10R></div>10. Ad aliam, dico quod causa potest certe sciri propter quid ipsa est. Et quando dicitur "causa est nobis minus nota", dico quod licet causa sit nobis minus nota quam effectus quantum ad quia est, tamen causa est prius nota, non solum naturae, sed nobis, quam propter quid effectus est. Prius enim est notum tibi quod luna est inter terram et solem quam sit notum tibi propter quid sol eclipsatur, licet prius bene scieris quod sol eclipsatur.

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|<div id=S11R></div>11. Ad aliam, dico quod unum per aliud potest sciri. Nec oportet omnia principia resoluere in primum principium complexum, immo sunt multa alia principia et habentia evidentiam naturalem.

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|<div id=S12R></div>12. Ad aliam, dico quod licet res sensibiles transmutentur, tamen aliquid est evidens de eis, ut saltem quod transmutantur, et quod hoc est album, et quod hoc est homo, licet propter transmutationem sit dubium utrum iste sit totaliter idem homo sicut erat de mane.

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|<div id=S13R></div>13. Ad ultimam, dicitur quod illud quod scitur demonstrative scitur per causam; et ita causa est scita non demonstrative, sed per ipsam; modo illud scire quod diffiniebatur erat scire per demonstrationem et per doctrinam, quo modo non contingit scire principia.

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==Notes==
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