Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1 - Revision history

Edward Ockham at 14:48, 2 March 2023

2023-03-02T14:48:17Z

Edward Ockham at 11:10, 2 March 2023

2023-03-02T11:10:55Z

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	Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics		Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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	~~(translated by Ulf Hlobil)~~

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Brunellus: Prooemium: corrections to Hlobil's translation

2023-02-28T21:04:44Z

Prooemium: corrections to Hlobil's translation

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Brunellus: Prooemium: corrections to Hubien's transcription of MS Liège UL 44, f. 200r (olim 198r)

2023-02-28T19:59:00Z

Prooemium: corrections to Hubien's transcription of MS Liège UL 44, f. 200r (olim 198r)

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	\|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis ~~huius modi~~ dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".		\|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huiusmodi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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	\|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam ~~felicitatem aufluendo+~~. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae ~~+forma~~ et ~~intentione~~ et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et ~~intentione~~ secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.		\|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum ipsam felicitantem influendo. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae forma⟨liter⟩ et intrinsece et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae ⟨materialiter⟩ et ⟨ex⟩[in]trinsece; secundum +quoddam+ obiectum est causa prima, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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	\|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est ~~huius modi~~, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ~~ut habetur~~ primo huius, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.		\|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huiusmodi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ⟨ut habetur⟩ primo huius, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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	\|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut ~~appareat excellentia~~ artis demonstrativae super alias ~~partes~~ logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars ~~sciendi~~ instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia ~~huius modi~~ instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.		\|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut apparea[n]t excellenti[or]a artis demonstrativae super alias artes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta logicae sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars +faciendi+ instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huiusmodi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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	\|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex ~~non~~ potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam ~~cognoscere~~ ex ~~qua~~ facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones~~, ideo~~ logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars ~~est~~ de ipsis ~~argumentationibus~~ ex dictis terminis et propositionibus ~~compositis~~, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod ~~huius modi~~ nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.		\|Ideo sciendum est quod [idem] artifex ⟨non⟩ potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo [non] oportet materiam ⟨cognoscere⟩[contingere] ex ⟨qua⟩[quibus] facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones. Ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars de ipsis ar⟨gumen⟩tibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus componendis, et vocatur 'nova ars' vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huiusmodi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus et ipso toto; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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	\|Vetus logica dividitur~~. Quia~~ prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad ~~illius~~ introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.		\|Vetus logica dividitur, quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad istius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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	\|Logica nova dividitur~~. Prima~~ pars ~~enim~~ determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa ~~conclusionum~~, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior ~~probatione~~, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.		\|Logica nova dividitur, prima enim pars determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionis, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatio⟨ne⟩, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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	\|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae ~~partes~~ ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et ~~huius modi~~ probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte ~~logica~~ quae vocatur dialectica.		\|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae probationes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad certam scientiam acquirendam; et istae sunt demonstrationes de quibus ⟨tractatur⟩[traditur] in libro Posteriorum. Aliae probationes generantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huiusmodi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logicae quae vocatur dialectica.

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	\|Et ~~illa~~ dialectica dividitur~~. Quoniam~~ una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in ~~libris~~ Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.		\|Et ista dialectica dividitur, quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libro Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et per consequens logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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	\|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et ~~iste~~ liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica ~~praecedit~~ artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes ~~demonstrativae,~~ per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes ~~alias~~ ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.		\|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et ille liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica ⟨praecedit⟩[recipit] artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum [per] rationes demonstrativas per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes aliae ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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Ulf at 22:40, 22 February 2023

2023-02-22T22:40:06Z

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	Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics		Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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			(translated by Ulf Hlobil)

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	2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2\|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a ~~primary~~ demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a ~~primary~~ demonstration. Therefore, a ~~primary~~ demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.		2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2\|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a highest demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a highest demonstration. Therefore, a highest demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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	[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term ~~“primary~~ demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through ~~primary~~ demonstration. Hence, it may be that a ~~primary~~ demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term ~~“primary~~ demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.		[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “highest demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through a highest demonstration. Hence, it may be that a highest demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “highest demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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Ulf at 00:08, 19 February 2023

2023-02-19T00:08:54Z

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	5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one knows many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10\| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>		5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one knows many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),”<ref>Topics, 114b (trans. Barnes): “Thus, if to know a thing is to think of it, then also to know many things is to be thinking of many things; whereas this is not true; for it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them.”</ref> and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10\| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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Ulf at 00:00, 19 February 2023

2023-02-19T00:00:10Z

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	5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one ~~understands~~ many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10\| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>		5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one knows many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10\| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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Ulf at 23:56, 18 February 2023

2023-02-18T23:56:42Z

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	2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [~~[[Authors/grosseteste\|~~Grosseteste]]] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2\|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.		2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2\|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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Ulf at 23:55, 18 February 2023

2023-02-18T23:55:27Z

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	2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2\|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.		2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [[[Authors/grosseteste\|Grosseteste]]] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2\|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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Ulf at 23:51, 18 February 2023

2023-02-18T23:51:25Z

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	But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.		But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, is called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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