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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q2

2023-02-24T21:55:21Z

Ulf:

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|Quaestio 2a

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Question 2a

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|UTRUM POSSIBILE SIT NOS ALIQUID SCIRE

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Whether it is possible that we know anything

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|Consequenter quaeritur, secundo, utrum possibile sit nos aliquid scire.

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Second, it is asked next whether it is possible that we know anything.

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur primo quod non: quia scientia est notitia certa et evidens, et talis est nobis impossibilis; igitur ... et caetera. Maior patet: quia per hoc differt scientia ab opinione, scilicet quia scientia requirit certitudinem, quam opinio non requirit. Minor probatur multipliciter. Primo ex parte sensus: quia illud idem quod nos iudicamus insipidum, id est mali saporis, asinus iudicat sapidum, sicut cardones; et non potest dici quod iudicium nostrum sit melius aut certius quam iudicium asini, quia iudicium asini est per naturam et natura non errat in suis operationibus; et sic patet quod iudicium nostrum ad sensum non est certum. Idem patet de viris et mulieribus, de pueris et senibus: nam quae apparent sapida mulieribus vel pueris apparent insipida viris vel senibus, et e converso, +magis sapida et plus salsa vel modicia+; et non apparet qui istorum verius iudicant, et videtur quod totum sit nobis incertum. Similiter, canes melius odorant quam homines, tamen iudicant quosdam odores suaves et dulces et eos persequuntur tamquam bonos, ut odores cadaverum, quos tamen reputat homo abominabiles. Ideo apparet quod de his non habemus iudicium certum.

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1. First, it is argued that it is not: For, knowledge is a notion [noting, familiarity] that is certain and evident, and this is impossible for us; therefore ... etc. The major premise is clear: For by this knowledge differs from opinion, namely that knowledge requires certainty, which opinion does not require. The minor premise is proven in several ways. First from the senses, for the same thing that we judge [to be] tasteless, i.e. of bad taste, the donkey judges [to be] tasty, such as thistles. And it cannot be said that our judgment is better or more certain than the donkey’s judgment because the donkey’s judgment is by nature and nature does not err in what it does. And so it is clear that our judgment by the senses is not certain. The same is clear from men and women, as well as from children and elderly people. For the things that appear tasty to women or to children appear tasteless to men or to elderly people, and the other way around, +more tasty and more salty or moderate+. And it is not obvious who of them judges more truly, and it seems that everything is uncertain for us. Similarly, dogs have a better sense of smell than humans; nevertheless they judge some smells pleasant and sweet and they pursue them like goods, such as the smells of cadavers, which a human, however, considers abominable. Therefore, it seems that we have no certain judgment about them.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Item, quod sanus iudicat dulce illud saepe aeger iudicat amarum. Si tu diceres quod iudicium sani est bonum et sano est credendum, hoc non potest dici: quia si sanus melius iudicat quam aeger, hoc non est nisi propter meliorem dispositionem organi; ergo nullus simpliciter recte et perfecte iudicabit nisi habuerit organum perfecte dispositum; modo forte nullus habet; ideo nullus perfecte iudicabit. Et iterum probo quod iudicium aegri est bonum: quia nullum agens agit in aliquod passum specie sibi contrariam; ideo numquam dulce agit speciem amaritudinis per quam agens aeger iudicabit amarum, sed oportet illam speciem ab amaro provenire; ideo aeger bene iudicat iudicando amaritudinem.

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2. Also, what the healthy person judges sweet that the sick person often judges bitter. If you were to say that the judgment of the healthy person is good and the healthy person should be believed, then this cannot be said: For, if the healthy person judges better than the sick person, this is only because of the better conditions of the organ. Therefore, no one will judge correctly and perfectly simpliciter, unless he had an organ in perfect conditions, which no one at all has. Therefore, no one will judge perfectly. And, moreover, I prove that the judgment of the sick person is good: For no agent leads by any steps to a [sensible] species that is contrary to its own. Therefore, sweetness never leads to the species of bitterness by which the sick agent will judge [something to be] bitter; but it must rather be that this species comes from bitterness. Therefore, the sick person judges well when he judges [there to be] bitterness.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, exsistens in navi mota in fluuio, videns arborem in litore, iudicat arborem moveri, et stans iuxta arborem iudicat quiescere; et sic nescitur quis recte iudicat. Sane probatur tibi quod exsistens in navi mota recte iudicat: quia exsistens in navi percipit motum ad visum (aliter non iudicaret arborem moveri) et non percipit motum nisi in arbore, quia forte non vidit se ipsum nec navem, immo solum arborem vel litora; ideo in arbore videtur esse motus quem percipit.

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3. Also, when one is in a boat that is moving on a river, seeing a tree on the shore, one judges the tree to be moving, and standing next to the tree one judges it to be at rest. And so it is not known who judges correctly. Indeed, it is proven to you that one judges correctly when one is in the moving boat: For when one is in the boat, one perceives motion by sight (otherwise one would not judge that the tree is moving) and one doesn’t perceive motion except in the tree, because one might not have seen oneself or the boat but rather only the tree or the shore. Therefore, the motion that one perceives seems to be in the tree.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, per aliud medium apparet nobis alius color et alia magnitudo. Unde sol in mane, quando oritur, apparet rubeus et magnus, et cum eleuatus est apparet minor et albus. Et si tu dicis quod hoc est propter indispositionem medii, tunc ex hoc concluditur quod numquam erit perfecte verum et rectum iudicium nisi medium sit perfecte purum, quod non invenitur apud nos. Etiam color non videtur sine lumine, et tamen in intensiori vel minori lumine apparet alius et alius color. Ideo numquam habemus certum iudicium de colore.

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4. Also, through a different medium there appear to us different colours and different sizes. As when the sun appears red and large in the morning, when it is rising, and it appears smaller and white when it has risen. And when you say that this is because of the unsuitability of the medium, then it is concluded from this that there will never be a perfectly true and correct judgment unless the medium was perfectly pure, which doesn’t happen to us. Moreover, a colour isn’t seen without light, but in more and less intense light it appears different again and again. Therefore, we never have a certain judgment about colour.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Item, sensus possunt deludi, ut communiter dicitur; ergo eorum iudicium non est certum nec firmum.

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5. Also, the senses can be deceived, as is commonly said. Therefore, their judgment is neither certain nor reliable.

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Item, illam speciem quam tu habes in sensu de his quae tibi modo apparent, deus omnino potest eam conservare in sensu tuo perfecte rebus non praesentibus, et tunc omnino et penitus tibi apparebit ut nunc apparet; et ita credens te iudicare sicut apparet nunc, non recte iudicares, quia falsum.

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6. Also, consider the species that you have in the senses, of the things that thereby appear to you. God can fully preserve them perfectly in your senses while the things are not present. And then things would appear to you fully and exactly as they appear now. And thinking that you would judge the things as they appear now, you would not judge correctly, because it would be false.

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|<div id=S7></div>7. Immo, sicut aliqui arguunt, quia deus potest hoc facere si velit, et tu non potes scire cum certitudine utrum deus hoc uult, ergo tu non potes esse certus utrum ita est, nec, per consequens, utrum vides aliquam rem extra.

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7. Indeed, as some argue, since God can do that if he wants, and you cannot know with certainty whether God wants to do it, therefore you cannot be certain whether it is the case, nor, consequently, whether you see anything outside [of you].

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|<div id=S8></div>8. Deinde, arguitur ex parte intellectus: quia notitia intellectiva dependet ex sensitiva; igitur, cum sensitiva non sit certa, ut dictum est, sequitur quod non intellectiva. Igitur, in octauo Physicorum*, Aristotiles reprehendit illos qui dicunt quod sensum nolunt sequi, sed rationem; quia sensus, ut dicit Aristotiles, est dignior, id est certior, ratione.

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8. Next, it is argued from the side of the intellect: Since a notion of the intellect depends on a sensible one; so, because the sensible one is not certain, as has been said, it follows that neither is the intellective one. Thus, in book eight of the Physics, Aristotle criticizes those who say that they do not want to follow the sense but reason. For, as Aristotle says, the senses are worth more, that is, are more certain, than reason.

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|<div id=S9></div>9. Item, possibile est quod species sensibilium alienantur antequam perveniant ad ipsum intellectum; et sic non erit certum iudicium ipsius intellectus.

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9. Also, it is possible that the species of the senses are changed before they reach the intellect itself. And so the judgment of the intellect itself will not be certain.

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|<div id=S10></div>10. Item, ex hoc sequitur quod conclusiones non erunt certae si principia non fuerint certa; sed principia non sunt certa. Probatio: quia sunt acquisita per experientiam, ut dicitur secundo huius, et experimentum saepe est fallax: immo nullum experimentum concludit gratia formae propositionem universalem, cum per nullum experimentum fiat inductio in omnibus singularibus; igitur principia non videntur certa.

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|<div id=S11></div>11. Item, causa non potest vere sciri per effectum: quia scientiae debent esse per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire. Nec effectus potest certe sciri per causam, cum causae sint nobis minus notae, et minus notum non notificat magis notum. Nec valet si dicatur quod causae sunt notiores secundum naturam: quia nec est ad propositum nec ad nos de notitia naturae: nos enim scimus qui addiscimus aliquid; ideo patet quod ex nobis notioribus addiscimus.

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|<div id=S12></div>12. Item, videtur quod unum non potest sciri per alterum cum certitudine: quia non videtur certitudo perfecta donec sit reductio facta in primum principium; sed ubi probaretur unum per aliud non posset fieri reductio in primum principium, quod quidem principium fundatur in contradictione, quia duo disparata non contradicunt, ut hoc esse et illud non esse; ideo sic non habetur certitudo*.

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|<div id=S13></div>13. Item, de rebus extra sensus non habetur certitudo, cum tales res sint extra sensibiles, quia singulares sunt et continve mutantur; nec de rebus extra animam, quia illae sunt minus notae quam res extra.

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|<div id=S14></div>14. Ultimo arguitur: quia si aliquid sciretur, hoc esset per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire; tunc quaero utrum illa causa sit nota vel ignota; si non sit nota nec scita, non faciet scire; et si sit scita, hoc etiam esset per causam, ut prius, et ita procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles, in isto libro, diffiniens scire, et dicens quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire*.

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|Ista quaestio continet multas difficultates propter quas antiqui negaverunt scire esse possibile, quae in arguendo ponuntur. Ad quaestionem tamen respondeo quod scire est nobis possibile: quia aliqua sunt principia nobis per se nota et nulli dubia; immo circa ea nullus potest errare, ut patet quarto Metaphysicae*; deinde ex illis principiis possunt educi quaestiones per syllogismos formaliter evidentes, et etiam illae conclusiones sciuntur.

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|Unde debetis notare quod cum ponantur tres operationes intellectus, in earum qualibet sunt aliqua per se manifesta ex natura et inclinatione ipsius intellectus ad veritatem. Unde sicut ignis est naturaliter inclinatus ad calefaciendum et grave ad descendendum, ita intellectus est naturaliter inclinatus ad intelligendum obiecta sibi sufficienter praesentata, et etiam naturaliter inclinatus ad comprehensionem veritatis primorum principiorum complexorum; ideo non oportet quod per aliud primum iudicium declaretur. Ita etiam, in alia operatione intellectus, est discursus per se evidens, sicut sunt syllogismi primae figurae vel expositorii. Ideo quando per primis sic per se notis fit syllogismus formaliter evidens et per se notum, oportet cum certitudine assentire conclusioni, et sic eam esse scitam.

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|Item, Commentator, secundo Metaphysicae*, adducit aliam rationem ad probandum quod scire sit nobis possibile. Quia illud est nobis possibile ad quod nos habemus naturale desiderium, cum natura nihil faciat frustra (primo de Caelo et Mundo*); sed omnes homines natura scire desiderant, ut determinatur in prooemio Metaphysicae*; ergo scire est nobis possibile.

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|Propter solutiones rationum et maiorem evidentiam positionis, est notandum quod ad scientiam* requiritur certitudo et evidentia; et adhuc duo requiruntur, scilicet certitudo veritatis et certitudo assensus. Dico primo "certitudo ueritatis", quia si firmissime et sine aliqua formidine assentiremus propositioni falsae, sicut faciunt haeretici, qui aliquando magis volunt mori quam negare illud cui ipsi assenserunt, tamen non est scientia propter talem assensum, quia deficit veritas et certitudo et firmitas veritatis.

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|Dico secundo quod requiritur certitudo, seu firmitas, assensus, quia de propositione firmissimae et certissimae veritatis possumus dubitare, et sic non firmiter ei assentire, et tunc sic de ea non habemus scientiam.

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|Tertio dico quod cum huius modi duplici firmitate, seu certitudine, requiritur evidentia, ad differentiam fidei vel opinionis. Nam fides est firmissimae et certissimae veritatis, et debet esse cum assensu firmissimo, sed non dicitur scientia, quia ille assensus non est per evidentiam. Similiter etiam de aliquo uerissimo et firmissimo in sua veritate assentimus aliquando per rationem solum probabilem, licet forte credamus eam esse demonstrativam. Et possibile est quod propter illam rationem credamus cum omni assensu firmissimo; unde, septimo Ethicorum*, dicit Aristotiles quod multi aeque firmiter credunt his quae opinantur sicut his quae sciunt, et tamen ille habitus non est scientia, quia non est per rationem simpliciter evidentem, quamuis illi reputarent illam evidentem.

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|Unde iuxta hoc notandum est quod differentia est inter fidem, scientiam et opinionem. Scientia enim, cum firmitate veritatis et assensus requirit evidentiam, quam non habet fides vel opinio. Sed fides differt ab opinione quia fides requirit firmitatem veritatis et assensus, quorum neutrum requirit opinio. Tamen opinio cum illis duabus stare potest, ut dictum fuit; et differt a fide quia opinio est per humanam rationem ex sensibus deductam, fides autem ex voluntate, propter auctoritatem sacrae scripturae solum.

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|Sed de evidentia* debetis notare quod 'evidentia' multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo propriissime, et tunc evidentia propositionis dicitur secundum quam intellectus per suam naturam cogitur propositioni assentire et non potest ei dissentire; et isto modo diceret Aristotiles quod primum principium est nobis evidens.

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|Secundo modo 'evidentia' dicitur quia cuilibet apparet et per nullam rationem humanam +nisi subiectivam+ posset oppositum apparere; et isto modo sunt evidentia principia naturalia et conclusiones naturales. Et notandum est quod haec evidentia non dicitur proprie 'evidentia': quia circa tales propositiones evidentes intellectus posset decipi per causam supernaturalem; quia deus posset facere ignem sine caliditate, et posset facere in sensu meo et conservare speciem sensitivam sine obiecto, et ita per istam evidentiam tu iudicares ac si obiectum esset praesens, et iudicares falsum. Tamen illa evidentia naturalis bene dicitur naturalis, quia secundum illam non potest homo decipi stante communi cursu naturae, licet deciperetur per causam supernaturalem; et haec evidentia sufficit ad naturalem scientiam.

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|Istis visis, facile est solvere rationes.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Et primo, ad illas de sapido et insipido, dicitur quod asinus et homo recte iudicant. Nam cardones sunt sapidi asino et insipidi hominibus, quoniam diversis complexionibus et naturis sunt diversi cibi convenientes et diversi odores. Modo aliquid dicitur 'sapidum' quia sapit et 'insipidum' quia non sapit, vel disconvenienter sapit; similiter odor dicitur 'suavis' vel 'fetidus' quia conveniens vel disconveniens. Ideo homo per rationem iudicat odores sibi inconvenientes esse convenientes cani vel iudicat sibi fetidum non esse fetidum cani, et saporem sibi sapidum iudicat asino insipidum, vel e converso. Ideo uterque recte iudicat.

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|<div id=S2R></div>2.Ad rationem de aegro qui iudicat amarum illud quod tu iudicas esse dulce, dico quod aeger decipitur propter indispositionem organi. Et quando arguitur "ergo numquam erit perfectum iudicium si organum non sit perfecte dispositum", dico quod hoc posset concedi quantum ad gradum saporis vel odoris, tamen non requiritur optima dispositio ad perfecte iudicandum quod hoc est dulce vel amarum. Sed quando ulterius dicitur quod dulcedo ... et caetera, dico quod dulcedo in nullo passo causaret speciem amaritudinis; ideo species amaritudinis in aegro non efficitur a cibo dato, sed ab humoribus infectis circumsolutis linguae, quia masticando cibum commoventur et immutant organum; ideo aeger vere et recte potest iudicare quod ipse sentit amarum, sed decipitur iudicando quod illud amarum sit cibi.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam, de motu arboris, dico quod ille in navi si non videat se aut navem non videt arborem motum, sed videt arborem quiescentem. Tamen, quia per motum hominis in navi species arboris mutat situm in oculo, ideo virtus imaginativa iudicat motum fieri, et quia non percipit motum oculi, iudicat quod arbor moveatur, et decipitur.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam, quae arguebat de colore, conceditur quod impossibile est vel difficillimum iudicare gradum luminis vel coloris; sed cum hoc stat quod vere et recte iudicemus hoc esse album aut rubeum.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad aliam, de illusione sensuum, potest dici quod in medio bene disposito et oculo exsistente sano sunt multa de quibus sensus numquam decipitur per illusionem sensuum videntium, nisi forte illusio esset supernaturalis. Et si aliquando sensus illuduntur, cum hoc in multis potest corrigere intellectus per rationem errorem sensus.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad aliam, arguentem de potentia dei, dico quod ita non intelligitur quin de principiis et conclusionibus talibus habeamus evidentiam naturalem, licet de multis eorum non habeamus evidentiam propriissime dictam.

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|<div id=S7R></div>7. Ad aliam rationem, arguentem de intellectu quia intellectus dependet ex sensu, concedo quod intellectus accipit firmum iudicium et evidens evidentia naturali et iudicio sensus. Sed ultra intellectus de multis virtute propria, quae excedit virtutem sensus, habet firmum iudicium, licet illud non sit sensus iudicium, verbi gratia de universalibus principiis. Immo saepe per rationem intellectus evidenter corrigit errorem sensus, ut patet de magnitudine.

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|<div id=S8R></div>8. Ad aliam, de alienatione specierum, quod numquam perveniant ad intellectum, dicendum est quod aliqua sunt principia quae numquam essent dubia vel incerta propter quamcumque alienatione: verbi gratia, primum principium. Nam quocumque casu posito, verum est quod quodlibet est vel non est*, et quod totum est maius sua parte, et sic de multis aliis.

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|<div id=S9R></div>9. Ad aliam, dicentem quod experientia saepe fallit, dicitur primo quod multa sunt principia evidentia non credita per experientiam, sed per manifestam terminorum inclusionem ad invicem, vel exclusionem, scito quid nominis. Sic enim est evidens quod homo est animal et asinus est animal. Deinde principia sumpta per experientiam adhuc habent naturalem evidentiam. Quia licet experientia pauca et parum examinata saepe fallat, tamen experientia multa et bene in diversis casibus examinata numquam fallit. Et quando ultra opinatur quod experientia numquam gratia formae concludit universale principium, quia numquam fit in omnibus singularibus, respondet Commentator, secundo Physicorum*, quod licet inductio, sive experientia inductiva, non concludat gratia formae, tamen intellectus, ex eius naturali inclinatione ad veritatem, percipiens multotiens ita fieri quod non potest nec potuit recipere instantiam, nec videre esse rationem quare in aliis debeat esse aliter, ipse concedit universale principium tamquam notum et evidens evidentia naturali et possibili circa talia.

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|<div id=S10R></div>10. Ad aliam, dico quod causa potest certe sciri propter quid ipsa est. Et quando dicitur "causa est nobis minus nota", dico quod licet causa sit nobis minus nota quam effectus quantum ad quia est, tamen causa est prius nota, non solum naturae, sed nobis, quam propter quid effectus est. Prius enim est notum tibi quod luna est inter terram et solem quam sit notum tibi propter quid sol eclipsatur, licet prius bene scieris quod sol eclipsatur.

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|<div id=S11R></div>11. Ad aliam, dico quod unum per aliud potest sciri. Nec oportet omnia principia resoluere in primum principium complexum, immo sunt multa alia principia et habentia evidentiam naturalem.

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|<div id=S12R></div>12. Ad aliam, dico quod licet res sensibiles transmutentur, tamen aliquid est evidens de eis, ut saltem quod transmutantur, et quod hoc est album, et quod hoc est homo, licet propter transmutationem sit dubium utrum iste sit totaliter idem homo sicut erat de mane.

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|<div id=S13R></div>13. Ad ultimam, dicitur quod illud quod scitur demonstrative scitur per causam; et ita causa est scita non demonstrative, sed per ipsam; modo illud scire quod diffiniebatur erat scire per demonstrationem et per doctrinam, quo modo non contingit scire principia.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q2

2023-02-24T21:50:26Z

Ulf:

{{Nextpage|[[../Q1|Q1]]|[[../Q3|Q3]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
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|Quaestio 2a

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Question 2a

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|UTRUM POSSIBILE SIT NOS ALIQUID SCIRE

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Whether it is possible that we know anything

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|Consequenter quaeritur, secundo, utrum possibile sit nos aliquid scire.

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Second, it is asked next whether it is possible that we know anything.

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur primo quod non: quia scientia est notitia certa et evidens, et talis est nobis impossibilis; igitur ... et caetera. Maior patet: quia per hoc differt scientia ab opinione, scilicet quia scientia requirit certitudinem, quam opinio non requirit. Minor probatur multipliciter. Primo ex parte sensus: quia illud idem quod nos iudicamus insipidum, id est mali saporis, asinus iudicat sapidum, sicut cardones; et non potest dici quod iudicium nostrum sit melius aut certius quam iudicium asini, quia iudicium asini est per naturam et natura non errat in suis operationibus; et sic patet quod iudicium nostrum ad sensum non est certum. Idem patet de viris et mulieribus, de pueris et senibus: nam quae apparent sapida mulieribus vel pueris apparent insipida viris vel senibus, et e converso, +magis sapida et plus salsa vel modicia+; et non apparet qui istorum verius iudicant, et videtur quod totum sit nobis incertum. Similiter, canes melius odorant quam homines, tamen iudicant quosdam odores suaves et dulces et eos persequuntur tamquam bonos, ut odores cadaverum, quos tamen reputat homo abominabiles. Ideo apparet quod de his non habemus iudicium certum.

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1. First, it is argued that it is not: For, knowledge is a notion [noting, familiarity] that is certain and evident, and this is impossible for us; therefore ... etc. The major premise is clear: For by this knowledge differs from opinion, namely that knowledge requires certainty, which opinion does not require. The minor premise is proven in several ways. First from the senses, for the same thing that we judge [to be] tasteless, i.e. of bad taste, the donkey judges [to be] tasty, such as thistles. And it cannot be said that our judgment is better or more certain than the donkey’s judgment because the donkey’s judgment is by nature and nature does not err in what it does. And so it is clear that our judgment by the senses is not certain. The same is clear from men and women, as well as from children and elderly people. For the things that appear tasty to women or to children appear tasteless to men or to elderly people, and the other way around, +more tasty and more salty or moderate+. And it is not obvious who of them judges more truly, and it seems that everything is uncertain for us. Similarly, dogs have a better sense of smell than humans; nevertheless they judge some smells pleasant and sweet and they pursue them like goods, such as the smells of cadavers, which a human, however, considers abominable. Therefore, it seems that we have no certain judgment about them.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Item, quod sanus iudicat dulce illud saepe aeger iudicat amarum. Si tu diceres quod iudicium sani est bonum et sano est credendum, hoc non potest dici: quia si sanus melius iudicat quam aeger, hoc non est nisi propter meliorem dispositionem organi; ergo nullus simpliciter recte et perfecte iudicabit nisi habuerit organum perfecte dispositum; modo forte nullus habet; ideo nullus perfecte iudicabit. Et iterum probo quod iudicium aegri est bonum: quia nullum agens agit in aliquod passum specie sibi contrariam; ideo numquam dulce agit speciem amaritudinis per quam agens aeger iudicabit amarum, sed oportet illam speciem ab amaro provenire; ideo aeger bene iudicat iudicando amaritudinem.

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2. Also, what the healthy person judges sweet that the sick person often judges bitter. If you were to say that the judgment of the healthy person is good and the healthy person should be believed, then this cannot be said: For, if the healthy person judges better than the sick person, this is only because of the better conditions of the organ. Therefore, no one will judge correctly and perfectly simpliciter, unless he had an organ in perfect conditions, which no one at all has. Therefore, no one will judge perfectly. And, moreover, I prove that the judgment of the sick person is good: For no agent leads by any steps to a [sensible] species that is contrary to its own. Therefore, sweetness never leads to the species of bitterness by which the sick agent will judge [something to be] bitter; but it must rather be that this species comes from bitterness. Therefore, the sick person judges well when he judges [there to be] bitterness.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, exsistens in navi mota in fluuio, videns arborem in litore, iudicat arborem moveri, et stans iuxta arborem iudicat quiescere; et sic nescitur quis recte iudicat. Sane probatur tibi quod exsistens in navi mota recte iudicat: quia exsistens in navi percipit motum ad visum (aliter non iudicaret arborem moveri) et non percipit motum nisi in arbore, quia forte non vidit se ipsum nec navem, immo solum arborem vel litora; ideo in arbore videtur esse motus quem percipit.

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3. Also, when one is in a boat that is moving on a river, seeing a tree on the shore, one judges the tree to be moving, and standing next to the tree one judges it to be at rest. And so it is not known who judges correctly. Indeed, it is proven to you that one judges correctly when one is in the moving boat: For when one is in the boat, one perceives motion by sight (otherwise one would not judge that the tree is moving) and one doesn’t perceive motion except in the tree, because one might not have seen oneself or the boat but rather only the tree or the shore. Therefore, the motion that one perceives seems to be in the tree.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, per aliud medium apparet nobis alius color et alia magnitudo. Unde sol in mane, quando oritur, apparet rubeus et magnus, et cum eleuatus est apparet minor et albus. Et si tu dicis quod hoc est propter indispositionem medii, tunc ex hoc concluditur quod numquam erit perfecte verum et rectum iudicium nisi medium sit perfecte purum, quod non invenitur apud nos. Etiam color non videtur sine lumine, et tamen in intensiori vel minori lumine apparet alius et alius color. Ideo numquam habemus certum iudicium de colore.

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4. Also, through a different medium there appear to us different colours and different sizes. As when the sun appears red and large in the morning, when it is rising, and it appears smaller and white when it has risen. And when you say that this is because of the unsuitability of the medium, then it is concluded from this that there will never be a perfectly true and correct judgment unless the medium was perfectly pure, which doesn’t happen to us. Moreover, a colour isn’t seen without light, but in more and less intense light it appears different again and again. Therefore, we never have a certain judgment about colour.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Item, sensus possunt deludi, ut communiter dicitur; ergo eorum iudicium non est certum nec firmum.

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5. Also, the senses can be deceived, as it commonly said. Therefore, their judgment is neither certain nor reliable.

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Item, illam speciem quam tu habes in sensu de his quae tibi modo apparent, deus omnino potest eam conservare in sensu tuo perfecte rebus non praesentibus, et tunc omnino et penitus tibi apparebit ut nunc apparet; et ita credens te iudicare sicut apparet nunc, non recte iudicares, quia falsum.

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6. Also, consider the species that you have in the senses, of the things that thereby appear to you. God can fully preserve them perfectly in your senses while the things are not present. And then things would appear to you fully and exactly as they appear now. And thinking that you would judge the things as they appear now, you would not judge correctly, because it would be false.

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|<div id=S7></div>7. Immo, sicut aliqui arguunt, quia deus potest hoc facere si velit, et tu non potes scire cum certitudine utrum deus hoc uult, ergo tu non potes esse certus utrum ita est, nec, per consequens, utrum vides aliquam rem extra.

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7. Indeed, as some argue, since God can do that if he wants, and you cannot know with certainty whether God wants to do it, therefore you cannot be certain whether it is the case, nor, consequently, whether you see anything outside [of you].

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|<div id=S8></div>8. Deinde, arguitur ex parte intellectus: quia notitia intellectiva dependet ex sensitiva; igitur, cum sensitiva non sit certa, ut dictum est, sequitur quod non intellectiva. Igitur, in octauo Physicorum*, Aristotiles reprehendit illos qui dicunt quod sensum nolunt sequi, sed rationem; quia sensus, ut dicit Aristotiles, est dignior, id est certior, ratione.

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8. Next, it is argued from the side of the intellect: Since a notion of the intellect depends on a sensible one; so, because the sensible one is not certain, as has been said, it follows that neither is the intellective one. Thus, in book eight of the Physics, Aristotle criticizes those who say that they do not want to follow the sense but reason. For, as Aristotle says, the senses are worth more, that is, are more certain, than reason.

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|<div id=S9></div>9. Item, possibile est quod species sensibilium alienantur antequam perveniant ad ipsum intellectum; et sic non erit certum iudicium ipsius intellectus.

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9. Also, it is possible that the species of the senses are changed before they reach the intellect itself. And so the judgment of the intellect itself will not be certain.

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|<div id=S10></div>10. Item, ex hoc sequitur quod conclusiones non erunt certae si principia non fuerint certa; sed principia non sunt certa. Probatio: quia sunt acquisita per experientiam, ut dicitur secundo huius, et experimentum saepe est fallax: immo nullum experimentum concludit gratia formae propositionem universalem, cum per nullum experimentum fiat inductio in omnibus singularibus; igitur principia non videntur certa.

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|<div id=S11></div>11. Item, causa non potest vere sciri per effectum: quia scientiae debent esse per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire. Nec effectus potest certe sciri per causam, cum causae sint nobis minus notae, et minus notum non notificat magis notum. Nec valet si dicatur quod causae sunt notiores secundum naturam: quia nec est ad propositum nec ad nos de notitia naturae: nos enim scimus qui addiscimus aliquid; ideo patet quod ex nobis notioribus addiscimus.

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|<div id=S12></div>12. Item, videtur quod unum non potest sciri per alterum cum certitudine: quia non videtur certitudo perfecta donec sit reductio facta in primum principium; sed ubi probaretur unum per aliud non posset fieri reductio in primum principium, quod quidem principium fundatur in contradictione, quia duo disparata non contradicunt, ut hoc esse et illud non esse; ideo sic non habetur certitudo*.

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|<div id=S13></div>13. Item, de rebus extra sensus non habetur certitudo, cum tales res sint extra sensibiles, quia singulares sunt et continve mutantur; nec de rebus extra animam, quia illae sunt minus notae quam res extra.

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|<div id=S14></div>14. Ultimo arguitur: quia si aliquid sciretur, hoc esset per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire; tunc quaero utrum illa causa sit nota vel ignota; si non sit nota nec scita, non faciet scire; et si sit scita, hoc etiam esset per causam, ut prius, et ita procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles, in isto libro, diffiniens scire, et dicens quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire*.

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|Ista quaestio continet multas difficultates propter quas antiqui negaverunt scire esse possibile, quae in arguendo ponuntur. Ad quaestionem tamen respondeo quod scire est nobis possibile: quia aliqua sunt principia nobis per se nota et nulli dubia; immo circa ea nullus potest errare, ut patet quarto Metaphysicae*; deinde ex illis principiis possunt educi quaestiones per syllogismos formaliter evidentes, et etiam illae conclusiones sciuntur.

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|Unde debetis notare quod cum ponantur tres operationes intellectus, in earum qualibet sunt aliqua per se manifesta ex natura et inclinatione ipsius intellectus ad veritatem. Unde sicut ignis est naturaliter inclinatus ad calefaciendum et grave ad descendendum, ita intellectus est naturaliter inclinatus ad intelligendum obiecta sibi sufficienter praesentata, et etiam naturaliter inclinatus ad comprehensionem veritatis primorum principiorum complexorum; ideo non oportet quod per aliud primum iudicium declaretur. Ita etiam, in alia operatione intellectus, est discursus per se evidens, sicut sunt syllogismi primae figurae vel expositorii. Ideo quando per primis sic per se notis fit syllogismus formaliter evidens et per se notum, oportet cum certitudine assentire conclusioni, et sic eam esse scitam.

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|Item, Commentator, secundo Metaphysicae*, adducit aliam rationem ad probandum quod scire sit nobis possibile. Quia illud est nobis possibile ad quod nos habemus naturale desiderium, cum natura nihil faciat frustra (primo de Caelo et Mundo*); sed omnes homines natura scire desiderant, ut determinatur in prooemio Metaphysicae*; ergo scire est nobis possibile.

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|Propter solutiones rationum et maiorem evidentiam positionis, est notandum quod ad scientiam* requiritur certitudo et evidentia; et adhuc duo requiruntur, scilicet certitudo veritatis et certitudo assensus. Dico primo "certitudo ueritatis", quia si firmissime et sine aliqua formidine assentiremus propositioni falsae, sicut faciunt haeretici, qui aliquando magis volunt mori quam negare illud cui ipsi assenserunt, tamen non est scientia propter talem assensum, quia deficit veritas et certitudo et firmitas veritatis.

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|Dico secundo quod requiritur certitudo, seu firmitas, assensus, quia de propositione firmissimae et certissimae veritatis possumus dubitare, et sic non firmiter ei assentire, et tunc sic de ea non habemus scientiam.

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|Tertio dico quod cum huius modi duplici firmitate, seu certitudine, requiritur evidentia, ad differentiam fidei vel opinionis. Nam fides est firmissimae et certissimae veritatis, et debet esse cum assensu firmissimo, sed non dicitur scientia, quia ille assensus non est per evidentiam. Similiter etiam de aliquo uerissimo et firmissimo in sua veritate assentimus aliquando per rationem solum probabilem, licet forte credamus eam esse demonstrativam. Et possibile est quod propter illam rationem credamus cum omni assensu firmissimo; unde, septimo Ethicorum*, dicit Aristotiles quod multi aeque firmiter credunt his quae opinantur sicut his quae sciunt, et tamen ille habitus non est scientia, quia non est per rationem simpliciter evidentem, quamuis illi reputarent illam evidentem.

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|Unde iuxta hoc notandum est quod differentia est inter fidem, scientiam et opinionem. Scientia enim, cum firmitate veritatis et assensus requirit evidentiam, quam non habet fides vel opinio. Sed fides differt ab opinione quia fides requirit firmitatem veritatis et assensus, quorum neutrum requirit opinio. Tamen opinio cum illis duabus stare potest, ut dictum fuit; et differt a fide quia opinio est per humanam rationem ex sensibus deductam, fides autem ex voluntate, propter auctoritatem sacrae scripturae solum.

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|Sed de evidentia* debetis notare quod 'evidentia' multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo propriissime, et tunc evidentia propositionis dicitur secundum quam intellectus per suam naturam cogitur propositioni assentire et non potest ei dissentire; et isto modo diceret Aristotiles quod primum principium est nobis evidens.

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|Secundo modo 'evidentia' dicitur quia cuilibet apparet et per nullam rationem humanam +nisi subiectivam+ posset oppositum apparere; et isto modo sunt evidentia principia naturalia et conclusiones naturales. Et notandum est quod haec evidentia non dicitur proprie 'evidentia': quia circa tales propositiones evidentes intellectus posset decipi per causam supernaturalem; quia deus posset facere ignem sine caliditate, et posset facere in sensu meo et conservare speciem sensitivam sine obiecto, et ita per istam evidentiam tu iudicares ac si obiectum esset praesens, et iudicares falsum. Tamen illa evidentia naturalis bene dicitur naturalis, quia secundum illam non potest homo decipi stante communi cursu naturae, licet deciperetur per causam supernaturalem; et haec evidentia sufficit ad naturalem scientiam.

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|Istis visis, facile est solvere rationes.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Et primo, ad illas de sapido et insipido, dicitur quod asinus et homo recte iudicant. Nam cardones sunt sapidi asino et insipidi hominibus, quoniam diversis complexionibus et naturis sunt diversi cibi convenientes et diversi odores. Modo aliquid dicitur 'sapidum' quia sapit et 'insipidum' quia non sapit, vel disconvenienter sapit; similiter odor dicitur 'suavis' vel 'fetidus' quia conveniens vel disconveniens. Ideo homo per rationem iudicat odores sibi inconvenientes esse convenientes cani vel iudicat sibi fetidum non esse fetidum cani, et saporem sibi sapidum iudicat asino insipidum, vel e converso. Ideo uterque recte iudicat.

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|<div id=S2R></div>2.Ad rationem de aegro qui iudicat amarum illud quod tu iudicas esse dulce, dico quod aeger decipitur propter indispositionem organi. Et quando arguitur "ergo numquam erit perfectum iudicium si organum non sit perfecte dispositum", dico quod hoc posset concedi quantum ad gradum saporis vel odoris, tamen non requiritur optima dispositio ad perfecte iudicandum quod hoc est dulce vel amarum. Sed quando ulterius dicitur quod dulcedo ... et caetera, dico quod dulcedo in nullo passo causaret speciem amaritudinis; ideo species amaritudinis in aegro non efficitur a cibo dato, sed ab humoribus infectis circumsolutis linguae, quia masticando cibum commoventur et immutant organum; ideo aeger vere et recte potest iudicare quod ipse sentit amarum, sed decipitur iudicando quod illud amarum sit cibi.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam, de motu arboris, dico quod ille in navi si non videat se aut navem non videt arborem motum, sed videt arborem quiescentem. Tamen, quia per motum hominis in navi species arboris mutat situm in oculo, ideo virtus imaginativa iudicat motum fieri, et quia non percipit motum oculi, iudicat quod arbor moveatur, et decipitur.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam, quae arguebat de colore, conceditur quod impossibile est vel difficillimum iudicare gradum luminis vel coloris; sed cum hoc stat quod vere et recte iudicemus hoc esse album aut rubeum.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad aliam, de illusione sensuum, potest dici quod in medio bene disposito et oculo exsistente sano sunt multa de quibus sensus numquam decipitur per illusionem sensuum videntium, nisi forte illusio esset supernaturalis. Et si aliquando sensus illuduntur, cum hoc in multis potest corrigere intellectus per rationem errorem sensus.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad aliam, arguentem de potentia dei, dico quod ita non intelligitur quin de principiis et conclusionibus talibus habeamus evidentiam naturalem, licet de multis eorum non habeamus evidentiam propriissime dictam.

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|<div id=S7R></div>7. Ad aliam rationem, arguentem de intellectu quia intellectus dependet ex sensu, concedo quod intellectus accipit firmum iudicium et evidens evidentia naturali et iudicio sensus. Sed ultra intellectus de multis virtute propria, quae excedit virtutem sensus, habet firmum iudicium, licet illud non sit sensus iudicium, verbi gratia de universalibus principiis. Immo saepe per rationem intellectus evidenter corrigit errorem sensus, ut patet de magnitudine.

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|<div id=S8R></div>8. Ad aliam, de alienatione specierum, quod numquam perveniant ad intellectum, dicendum est quod aliqua sunt principia quae numquam essent dubia vel incerta propter quamcumque alienatione: verbi gratia, primum principium. Nam quocumque casu posito, verum est quod quodlibet est vel non est*, et quod totum est maius sua parte, et sic de multis aliis.

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|<div id=S9R></div>9. Ad aliam, dicentem quod experientia saepe fallit, dicitur primo quod multa sunt principia evidentia non credita per experientiam, sed per manifestam terminorum inclusionem ad invicem, vel exclusionem, scito quid nominis. Sic enim est evidens quod homo est animal et asinus est animal. Deinde principia sumpta per experientiam adhuc habent naturalem evidentiam. Quia licet experientia pauca et parum examinata saepe fallat, tamen experientia multa et bene in diversis casibus examinata numquam fallit. Et quando ultra opinatur quod experientia numquam gratia formae concludit universale principium, quia numquam fit in omnibus singularibus, respondet Commentator, secundo Physicorum*, quod licet inductio, sive experientia inductiva, non concludat gratia formae, tamen intellectus, ex eius naturali inclinatione ad veritatem, percipiens multotiens ita fieri quod non potest nec potuit recipere instantiam, nec videre esse rationem quare in aliis debeat esse aliter, ipse concedit universale principium tamquam notum et evidens evidentia naturali et possibili circa talia.

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|<div id=S10R></div>10. Ad aliam, dico quod causa potest certe sciri propter quid ipsa est. Et quando dicitur "causa est nobis minus nota", dico quod licet causa sit nobis minus nota quam effectus quantum ad quia est, tamen causa est prius nota, non solum naturae, sed nobis, quam propter quid effectus est. Prius enim est notum tibi quod luna est inter terram et solem quam sit notum tibi propter quid sol eclipsatur, licet prius bene scieris quod sol eclipsatur.

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|<div id=S11R></div>11. Ad aliam, dico quod unum per aliud potest sciri. Nec oportet omnia principia resoluere in primum principium complexum, immo sunt multa alia principia et habentia evidentiam naturalem.

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|<div id=S12R></div>12. Ad aliam, dico quod licet res sensibiles transmutentur, tamen aliquid est evidens de eis, ut saltem quod transmutantur, et quod hoc est album, et quod hoc est homo, licet propter transmutationem sit dubium utrum iste sit totaliter idem homo sicut erat de mane.

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|<div id=S13R></div>13. Ad ultimam, dicitur quod illud quod scitur demonstrative scitur per causam; et ita causa est scita non demonstrative, sed per ipsam; modo illud scire quod diffiniebatur erat scire per demonstrationem et per doctrinam, quo modo non contingit scire principia.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q2

2023-02-24T21:47:56Z

Ulf:

{{Nextpage|[[../Q1|Q1]]|[[../Q3|Q3]]}}

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!valign = top width=55%|English

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|Quaestio 2a

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Question 2a

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|UTRUM POSSIBILE SIT NOS ALIQUID SCIRE

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Whether it is possible that we know anything

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|Consequenter quaeritur, secundo, utrum possibile sit nos aliquid scire.

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Second, it is asked next whether it is possible that we know anything.

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur primo quod non: quia scientia est notitia certa et evidens, et talis est nobis impossibilis; igitur ... et caetera. Maior patet: quia per hoc differt scientia ab opinione, scilicet quia scientia requirit certitudinem, quam opinio non requirit. Minor probatur multipliciter. Primo ex parte sensus: quia illud idem quod nos iudicamus insipidum, id est mali saporis, asinus iudicat sapidum, sicut cardones; et non potest dici quod iudicium nostrum sit melius aut certius quam iudicium asini, quia iudicium asini est per naturam et natura non errat in suis operationibus; et sic patet quod iudicium nostrum ad sensum non est certum. Idem patet de viris et mulieribus, de pueris et senibus: nam quae apparent sapida mulieribus vel pueris apparent insipida viris vel senibus, et e converso, +magis sapida et plus salsa vel modicia+; et non apparet qui istorum verius iudicant, et videtur quod totum sit nobis incertum. Similiter, canes melius odorant quam homines, tamen iudicant quosdam odores suaves et dulces et eos persequuntur tamquam bonos, ut odores cadaverum, quos tamen reputat homo abominabiles. Ideo apparet quod de his non habemus iudicium certum.

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1. First, it is argued that it is not: For, knowledge is a notion [noting, familiarity] that is certain and evident, and this is impossible for us; therefore ... etc. The major premise is clear: For by this knowledge differs from opinion, namely that knowledge requires certainty, which opinion does not require. The minor premise is proven in several ways. First from the senses, for the same thing that we judge [to be] tasteless, i.e. of bad taste, the donkey judges [to be] tasty, such as thistles. And it cannot be said that our judgment is better or more certain than the donkey’s judgment because the donkey’s judgment is by nature and nature does not err in what it does. And so it is clear that our judgment by the senses is not certain. The same is clear from men and women, as well as from children and elderly people. For the things that appear tasty to women or to children appear tasteless to men or to elderly people, and the other way around, +more tasty and more salty or moderate+. And it is not obvious who of them judges more truly, and it seems that everything is uncertain for us. Similarly, dogs have a better sense of smell than humans; nevertheless they judge some smells pleasant and sweet and they pursue them like goods, such as the smells of cadavers, which a human, however, considers abominable. Therefore, it seems that we have no certain judgment about them.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Item, quod sanus iudicat dulce illud saepe aeger iudicat amarum. Si tu diceres quod iudicium sani est bonum et sano est credendum, hoc non potest dici: quia si sanus melius iudicat quam aeger, hoc non est nisi propter meliorem dispositionem organi; ergo nullus simpliciter recte et perfecte iudicabit nisi habuerit organum perfecte dispositum; modo forte nullus habet; ideo nullus perfecte iudicabit. Et iterum probo quod iudicium aegri est bonum: quia nullum agens agit in aliquod passum specie sibi contrariam; ideo numquam dulce agit speciem amaritudinis per quam agens aeger iudicabit amarum, sed oportet illam speciem ab amaro provenire; ideo aeger bene iudicat iudicando amaritudinem.

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2. Also, what the healthy person judges sweet that the sick person often judges bitter. If you were to say that the judgment of the healthy person is good and the healthy person should be believed, then this cannot be said: For, if the healthy person judges better than the sick person, this is only because of the better conditions of the organ. Therefore, no one will judge correctly and perfectly simpliciter, unless he had an organ in perfect conditions, which no one at all has. Therefore, no one will judge perfectly. And, moreover, I prove that the judgment of the sick person is good: For no agent leads by any steps to a [sensible] species that is contrary to its own. Therefore, sweetness never leads to the species of bitterness by which the sick agent will judge [something to be] bitter; but it must rather be that this species comes from bitterness. Therefore, the sick person judges well when he judges [there to be] bitterness.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, exsistens in navi mota in fluuio, videns arborem in litore, iudicat arborem moveri, et stans iuxta arborem iudicat quiescere; et sic nescitur quis recte iudicat. Sane probatur tibi quod exsistens in navi mota recte iudicat: quia exsistens in navi percipit motum ad visum (aliter non iudicaret arborem moveri) et non percipit motum nisi in arbore, quia forte non vidit se ipsum nec navem, immo solum arborem vel litora; ideo in arbore videtur esse motus quem percipit.

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3. Also, when one is in a boat that is moving on a river, seeing a tree on the shore, one judges the tree to be moving, and standing next to the tree one judges it to be at rest. And so it is not known who judges correctly. Indeed, it is proven to you that one judges correctly when one is in the moving boat: For when one is in the boat, one perceives motion by sight (otherwise one would not judge that the tree is moving) and one doesn’t perceive motion except in the tree, because one might not have seen oneself or the boat but rather only the tree or the shore. Therefore, the motion that one perceives seems to be in the tree.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, per aliud medium apparet nobis alius color et alia magnitudo. Unde sol in mane, quando oritur, apparet rubeus et magnus, et cum eleuatus est apparet minor et albus. Et si tu dicis quod hoc est propter indispositionem medii, tunc ex hoc concluditur quod numquam erit perfecte verum et rectum iudicium nisi medium sit perfecte purum, quod non invenitur apud nos. Etiam color non videtur sine lumine, et tamen in intensiori vel minori lumine apparet alius et alius color. Ideo numquam habemus certum iudicium de colore.

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4. Also, through a different medium there appear to us different colours and different sizes. As when the sun appears red and large in the morning, when it is rising, and it appears smaller and white when it has risen. And when you say that this is because of the unsuitability of the medium, then it is concluded from this that there will never be a perfectly true and correct judgment unless the medium was perfectly pure, which doesn’t happen to us. Moreover, a colour isn’t seen without light, but in more and less intense light it appears different again and again. Therefore, we never have a certain judgment about colour.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Item, sensus possunt deludi, ut communiter dicitur; ergo eorum iudicium non est certum nec firmum.

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5. Also, the senses can be deceived, as it commonly said. Therefore, their judgment is neither certain nor reliable.

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Item, illam speciem quam tu habes in sensu de his quae tibi modo apparent, deus omnino potest eam conservare in sensu tuo perfecte rebus non praesentibus, et tunc omnino et penitus tibi apparebit ut nunc apparet; et ita credens te iudicare sicut apparet nunc, non recte iudicares, quia falsum.

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6. Also, consider the species that you have in the senses, of the things that thereby appear to you. God can fully preserve them perfectly in your senses while the things are not present. And then it would appear to you fully and exactly as it appears now. And thinking that you would judge the thing as it appears now, you would not judge correctly, because it would be false.

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|<div id=S7></div>7. Immo, sicut aliqui arguunt, quia deus potest hoc facere si velit, et tu non potes scire cum certitudine utrum deus hoc uult, ergo tu non potes esse certus utrum ita est, nec, per consequens, utrum vides aliquam rem extra.

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7. Indeed, as some argue, since God can do that if he wants, and you cannot know with certainty whether God wants to do it, therefore you cannot be certain whether it is the case, nor, consequently, whether you see anything outside [of you].

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|<div id=S8></div>8. Deinde, arguitur ex parte intellectus: quia notitia intellectiva dependet ex sensitiva; igitur, cum sensitiva non sit certa, ut dictum est, sequitur quod non intellectiva. Igitur, in octauo Physicorum*, Aristotiles reprehendit illos qui dicunt quod sensum nolunt sequi, sed rationem; quia sensus, ut dicit Aristotiles, est dignior, id est certior, ratione.

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8. Next, it is argued from the side of the intellect: Since a notion of the intellect depends on a sensible one; so, because the sensible one is not certain, as has been said, it follows that neither is the intellective one. Thus, in book eight of the Physics, Aristotle criticizes those who say that they do not want to follow the sense but reason. For, as Aristotle says, the senses are worth more, that is, are more certain, than reason.

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|<div id=S9></div>9. Item, possibile est quod species sensibilium alienantur antequam perveniant ad ipsum intellectum; et sic non erit certum iudicium ipsius intellectus.

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9. Also, it is possible that the species of the senses are changed before they reach the intellect itself. And so the judgment of the intellect itself will not be certain.

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|<div id=S10></div>10. Item, ex hoc sequitur quod conclusiones non erunt certae si principia non fuerint certa; sed principia non sunt certa. Probatio: quia sunt acquisita per experientiam, ut dicitur secundo huius, et experimentum saepe est fallax: immo nullum experimentum concludit gratia formae propositionem universalem, cum per nullum experimentum fiat inductio in omnibus singularibus; igitur principia non videntur certa.

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|<div id=S11></div>11. Item, causa non potest vere sciri per effectum: quia scientiae debent esse per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire. Nec effectus potest certe sciri per causam, cum causae sint nobis minus notae, et minus notum non notificat magis notum. Nec valet si dicatur quod causae sunt notiores secundum naturam: quia nec est ad propositum nec ad nos de notitia naturae: nos enim scimus qui addiscimus aliquid; ideo patet quod ex nobis notioribus addiscimus.

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|<div id=S12></div>12. Item, videtur quod unum non potest sciri per alterum cum certitudine: quia non videtur certitudo perfecta donec sit reductio facta in primum principium; sed ubi probaretur unum per aliud non posset fieri reductio in primum principium, quod quidem principium fundatur in contradictione, quia duo disparata non contradicunt, ut hoc esse et illud non esse; ideo sic non habetur certitudo*.

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|<div id=S13></div>13. Item, de rebus extra sensus non habetur certitudo, cum tales res sint extra sensibiles, quia singulares sunt et continve mutantur; nec de rebus extra animam, quia illae sunt minus notae quam res extra.

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|<div id=S14></div>14. Ultimo arguitur: quia si aliquid sciretur, hoc esset per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire; tunc quaero utrum illa causa sit nota vel ignota; si non sit nota nec scita, non faciet scire; et si sit scita, hoc etiam esset per causam, ut prius, et ita procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles, in isto libro, diffiniens scire, et dicens quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire*.

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|Ista quaestio continet multas difficultates propter quas antiqui negaverunt scire esse possibile, quae in arguendo ponuntur. Ad quaestionem tamen respondeo quod scire est nobis possibile: quia aliqua sunt principia nobis per se nota et nulli dubia; immo circa ea nullus potest errare, ut patet quarto Metaphysicae*; deinde ex illis principiis possunt educi quaestiones per syllogismos formaliter evidentes, et etiam illae conclusiones sciuntur.

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|Unde debetis notare quod cum ponantur tres operationes intellectus, in earum qualibet sunt aliqua per se manifesta ex natura et inclinatione ipsius intellectus ad veritatem. Unde sicut ignis est naturaliter inclinatus ad calefaciendum et grave ad descendendum, ita intellectus est naturaliter inclinatus ad intelligendum obiecta sibi sufficienter praesentata, et etiam naturaliter inclinatus ad comprehensionem veritatis primorum principiorum complexorum; ideo non oportet quod per aliud primum iudicium declaretur. Ita etiam, in alia operatione intellectus, est discursus per se evidens, sicut sunt syllogismi primae figurae vel expositorii. Ideo quando per primis sic per se notis fit syllogismus formaliter evidens et per se notum, oportet cum certitudine assentire conclusioni, et sic eam esse scitam.

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|Item, Commentator, secundo Metaphysicae*, adducit aliam rationem ad probandum quod scire sit nobis possibile. Quia illud est nobis possibile ad quod nos habemus naturale desiderium, cum natura nihil faciat frustra (primo de Caelo et Mundo*); sed omnes homines natura scire desiderant, ut determinatur in prooemio Metaphysicae*; ergo scire est nobis possibile.

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|Propter solutiones rationum et maiorem evidentiam positionis, est notandum quod ad scientiam* requiritur certitudo et evidentia; et adhuc duo requiruntur, scilicet certitudo veritatis et certitudo assensus. Dico primo "certitudo ueritatis", quia si firmissime et sine aliqua formidine assentiremus propositioni falsae, sicut faciunt haeretici, qui aliquando magis volunt mori quam negare illud cui ipsi assenserunt, tamen non est scientia propter talem assensum, quia deficit veritas et certitudo et firmitas veritatis.

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|Dico secundo quod requiritur certitudo, seu firmitas, assensus, quia de propositione firmissimae et certissimae veritatis possumus dubitare, et sic non firmiter ei assentire, et tunc sic de ea non habemus scientiam.

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|Tertio dico quod cum huius modi duplici firmitate, seu certitudine, requiritur evidentia, ad differentiam fidei vel opinionis. Nam fides est firmissimae et certissimae veritatis, et debet esse cum assensu firmissimo, sed non dicitur scientia, quia ille assensus non est per evidentiam. Similiter etiam de aliquo uerissimo et firmissimo in sua veritate assentimus aliquando per rationem solum probabilem, licet forte credamus eam esse demonstrativam. Et possibile est quod propter illam rationem credamus cum omni assensu firmissimo; unde, septimo Ethicorum*, dicit Aristotiles quod multi aeque firmiter credunt his quae opinantur sicut his quae sciunt, et tamen ille habitus non est scientia, quia non est per rationem simpliciter evidentem, quamuis illi reputarent illam evidentem.

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|Unde iuxta hoc notandum est quod differentia est inter fidem, scientiam et opinionem. Scientia enim, cum firmitate veritatis et assensus requirit evidentiam, quam non habet fides vel opinio. Sed fides differt ab opinione quia fides requirit firmitatem veritatis et assensus, quorum neutrum requirit opinio. Tamen opinio cum illis duabus stare potest, ut dictum fuit; et differt a fide quia opinio est per humanam rationem ex sensibus deductam, fides autem ex voluntate, propter auctoritatem sacrae scripturae solum.

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|Sed de evidentia* debetis notare quod 'evidentia' multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo propriissime, et tunc evidentia propositionis dicitur secundum quam intellectus per suam naturam cogitur propositioni assentire et non potest ei dissentire; et isto modo diceret Aristotiles quod primum principium est nobis evidens.

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|Secundo modo 'evidentia' dicitur quia cuilibet apparet et per nullam rationem humanam +nisi subiectivam+ posset oppositum apparere; et isto modo sunt evidentia principia naturalia et conclusiones naturales. Et notandum est quod haec evidentia non dicitur proprie 'evidentia': quia circa tales propositiones evidentes intellectus posset decipi per causam supernaturalem; quia deus posset facere ignem sine caliditate, et posset facere in sensu meo et conservare speciem sensitivam sine obiecto, et ita per istam evidentiam tu iudicares ac si obiectum esset praesens, et iudicares falsum. Tamen illa evidentia naturalis bene dicitur naturalis, quia secundum illam non potest homo decipi stante communi cursu naturae, licet deciperetur per causam supernaturalem; et haec evidentia sufficit ad naturalem scientiam.

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|Istis visis, facile est solvere rationes.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Et primo, ad illas de sapido et insipido, dicitur quod asinus et homo recte iudicant. Nam cardones sunt sapidi asino et insipidi hominibus, quoniam diversis complexionibus et naturis sunt diversi cibi convenientes et diversi odores. Modo aliquid dicitur 'sapidum' quia sapit et 'insipidum' quia non sapit, vel disconvenienter sapit; similiter odor dicitur 'suavis' vel 'fetidus' quia conveniens vel disconveniens. Ideo homo per rationem iudicat odores sibi inconvenientes esse convenientes cani vel iudicat sibi fetidum non esse fetidum cani, et saporem sibi sapidum iudicat asino insipidum, vel e converso. Ideo uterque recte iudicat.

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|<div id=S2R></div>2.Ad rationem de aegro qui iudicat amarum illud quod tu iudicas esse dulce, dico quod aeger decipitur propter indispositionem organi. Et quando arguitur "ergo numquam erit perfectum iudicium si organum non sit perfecte dispositum", dico quod hoc posset concedi quantum ad gradum saporis vel odoris, tamen non requiritur optima dispositio ad perfecte iudicandum quod hoc est dulce vel amarum. Sed quando ulterius dicitur quod dulcedo ... et caetera, dico quod dulcedo in nullo passo causaret speciem amaritudinis; ideo species amaritudinis in aegro non efficitur a cibo dato, sed ab humoribus infectis circumsolutis linguae, quia masticando cibum commoventur et immutant organum; ideo aeger vere et recte potest iudicare quod ipse sentit amarum, sed decipitur iudicando quod illud amarum sit cibi.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam, de motu arboris, dico quod ille in navi si non videat se aut navem non videt arborem motum, sed videt arborem quiescentem. Tamen, quia per motum hominis in navi species arboris mutat situm in oculo, ideo virtus imaginativa iudicat motum fieri, et quia non percipit motum oculi, iudicat quod arbor moveatur, et decipitur.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam, quae arguebat de colore, conceditur quod impossibile est vel difficillimum iudicare gradum luminis vel coloris; sed cum hoc stat quod vere et recte iudicemus hoc esse album aut rubeum.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad aliam, de illusione sensuum, potest dici quod in medio bene disposito et oculo exsistente sano sunt multa de quibus sensus numquam decipitur per illusionem sensuum videntium, nisi forte illusio esset supernaturalis. Et si aliquando sensus illuduntur, cum hoc in multis potest corrigere intellectus per rationem errorem sensus.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad aliam, arguentem de potentia dei, dico quod ita non intelligitur quin de principiis et conclusionibus talibus habeamus evidentiam naturalem, licet de multis eorum non habeamus evidentiam propriissime dictam.

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|<div id=S7R></div>7. Ad aliam rationem, arguentem de intellectu quia intellectus dependet ex sensu, concedo quod intellectus accipit firmum iudicium et evidens evidentia naturali et iudicio sensus. Sed ultra intellectus de multis virtute propria, quae excedit virtutem sensus, habet firmum iudicium, licet illud non sit sensus iudicium, verbi gratia de universalibus principiis. Immo saepe per rationem intellectus evidenter corrigit errorem sensus, ut patet de magnitudine.

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|<div id=S8R></div>8. Ad aliam, de alienatione specierum, quod numquam perveniant ad intellectum, dicendum est quod aliqua sunt principia quae numquam essent dubia vel incerta propter quamcumque alienatione: verbi gratia, primum principium. Nam quocumque casu posito, verum est quod quodlibet est vel non est*, et quod totum est maius sua parte, et sic de multis aliis.

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|<div id=S9R></div>9. Ad aliam, dicentem quod experientia saepe fallit, dicitur primo quod multa sunt principia evidentia non credita per experientiam, sed per manifestam terminorum inclusionem ad invicem, vel exclusionem, scito quid nominis. Sic enim est evidens quod homo est animal et asinus est animal. Deinde principia sumpta per experientiam adhuc habent naturalem evidentiam. Quia licet experientia pauca et parum examinata saepe fallat, tamen experientia multa et bene in diversis casibus examinata numquam fallit. Et quando ultra opinatur quod experientia numquam gratia formae concludit universale principium, quia numquam fit in omnibus singularibus, respondet Commentator, secundo Physicorum*, quod licet inductio, sive experientia inductiva, non concludat gratia formae, tamen intellectus, ex eius naturali inclinatione ad veritatem, percipiens multotiens ita fieri quod non potest nec potuit recipere instantiam, nec videre esse rationem quare in aliis debeat esse aliter, ipse concedit universale principium tamquam notum et evidens evidentia naturali et possibili circa talia.

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|<div id=S10R></div>10. Ad aliam, dico quod causa potest certe sciri propter quid ipsa est. Et quando dicitur "causa est nobis minus nota", dico quod licet causa sit nobis minus nota quam effectus quantum ad quia est, tamen causa est prius nota, non solum naturae, sed nobis, quam propter quid effectus est. Prius enim est notum tibi quod luna est inter terram et solem quam sit notum tibi propter quid sol eclipsatur, licet prius bene scieris quod sol eclipsatur.

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|<div id=S11R></div>11. Ad aliam, dico quod unum per aliud potest sciri. Nec oportet omnia principia resoluere in primum principium complexum, immo sunt multa alia principia et habentia evidentiam naturalem.

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|<div id=S12R></div>12. Ad aliam, dico quod licet res sensibiles transmutentur, tamen aliquid est evidens de eis, ut saltem quod transmutantur, et quod hoc est album, et quod hoc est homo, licet propter transmutationem sit dubium utrum iste sit totaliter idem homo sicut erat de mane.

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|<div id=S13R></div>13. Ad ultimam, dicitur quod illud quod scitur demonstrative scitur per causam; et ita causa est scita non demonstrative, sed per ipsam; modo illud scire quod diffiniebatur erat scire per demonstrationem et per doctrinam, quo modo non contingit scire principia.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q2

2023-02-24T21:44:29Z

Ulf:

{{Nextpage|[[../Q1|Q1]]|[[../Q3|Q3]]}}

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!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

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|Quaestio 2a

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Question 2a

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|UTRUM POSSIBILE SIT NOS ALIQUID SCIRE

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Whether it is possible that we know anything

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|Consequenter quaeritur, secundo, utrum possibile sit nos aliquid scire.

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Second, it is asked next whether it is possible that we know anything.

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur primo quod non: quia scientia est notitia certa et evidens, et talis est nobis impossibilis; igitur ... et caetera. Maior patet: quia per hoc differt scientia ab opinione, scilicet quia scientia requirit certitudinem, quam opinio non requirit. Minor probatur multipliciter. Primo ex parte sensus: quia illud idem quod nos iudicamus insipidum, id est mali saporis, asinus iudicat sapidum, sicut cardones; et non potest dici quod iudicium nostrum sit melius aut certius quam iudicium asini, quia iudicium asini est per naturam et natura non errat in suis operationibus; et sic patet quod iudicium nostrum ad sensum non est certum. Idem patet de viris et mulieribus, de pueris et senibus: nam quae apparent sapida mulieribus vel pueris apparent insipida viris vel senibus, et e converso, +magis sapida et plus salsa vel modicia+; et non apparet qui istorum verius iudicant, et videtur quod totum sit nobis incertum. Similiter, canes melius odorant quam homines, tamen iudicant quosdam odores suaves et dulces et eos persequuntur tamquam bonos, ut odores cadaverum, quos tamen reputat homo abominabiles. Ideo apparet quod de his non habemus iudicium certum.

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1. First, it is argued that it is not: For, knowledge is a notion [noting, familiarity] that is certain and evident, and this is impossible for us; therefore ... etc. The major premise is clear: For by this knowledge differs from opinion, namely that knowledge requires certainty, which opinion does not require. The minor premise is proven in several ways. First from the senses, for the same thing that we judge [to be] tasteless, i.e. of bad taste, the donkey judges [to be] tasty, such as thistles. And it cannot be said that our judgment is better or more certain than the donkey’s judgment because the donkey’s judgment is by nature and nature does not err in what it does. And so it is clear that our judgment by the senses is not certain. The same is clear from men and women, as well as from children and elderly people. For the things that appear tasty to women or to children appear tasteless to men or to elderly people, and the other way around, +more tasty and more salty or moderate+. And it is not obvious who of them judges more truly, and it seems that everything is uncertain for us. Similarly, dogs have a better sense of smell than humans; nevertheless they judge some smells pleasant and sweet and they pursue them like goods, such as the smells of cadavers, which a human, however, considers abominable. Therefore, it seems that we have no certain judgment about them.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Item, quod sanus iudicat dulce illud saepe aeger iudicat amarum. Si tu diceres quod iudicium sani est bonum et sano est credendum, hoc non potest dici: quia si sanus melius iudicat quam aeger, hoc non est nisi propter meliorem dispositionem organi; ergo nullus simpliciter recte et perfecte iudicabit nisi habuerit organum perfecte dispositum; modo forte nullus habet; ideo nullus perfecte iudicabit. Et iterum probo quod iudicium aegri est bonum: quia nullum agens agit in aliquod passum specie sibi contrariam; ideo numquam dulce agit speciem amaritudinis per quam agens aeger iudicabit amarum, sed oportet illam speciem ab amaro provenire; ideo aeger bene iudicat iudicando amaritudinem.

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2. Also, what the healthy person judges sweet that the sick person often judges bitter. If you were to say that the judgment of the healthy person is good and the healthy person should be believed, then this cannot be said: For, if the healthy person judges better than the sick person, this is only because of the better conditions of the organ. Therefore, no one will judge correctly and perfectly simpliciter, unless he had an organ in perfect conditions, which no one at all has. Therefore, no one will judge perfectly. And, moreover, I prove that the judgment of the sick person is good: For no agent leads by any steps to a [sensible] species that is contrary to its own. Therefore, sweetness never leads to the species of bitterness by which the sick agent will judge [something to be] bitter; but it must rather be that this species comes from bitterness. Therefore, the sick person judges well when he judges [there to be] bitterness.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, exsistens in navi mota in fluuio, videns arborem in litore, iudicat arborem moveri, et stans iuxta arborem iudicat quiescere; et sic nescitur quis recte iudicat. Sane probatur tibi quod exsistens in navi mota recte iudicat: quia exsistens in navi percipit motum ad visum (aliter non iudicaret arborem moveri) et non percipit motum nisi in arbore, quia forte non vidit se ipsum nec navem, immo solum arborem vel litora; ideo in arbore videtur esse motus quem percipit.

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3. Also, when one is in a boat that is moving on a river, seeing a tree on the shore, one judges the tree to be moving, and standing next to the tree one judges it to be at rest. And so it is not known who judges correctly. Indeed, it is proven to you that one judges correctly when one is in the moving boat: For when one is in the boat, one perceives motion by sight (otherwise one would not judge that the tree is moving) and one doesn’t perceive motion except in the tree, because one might not have seen oneself or the boat but rather only the tree or the shore. Therefore, the motion that one perceives seems to be in the tree.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, per aliud medium apparet nobis alius color et alia magnitudo. Unde sol in mane, quando oritur, apparet rubeus et magnus, et cum eleuatus est apparet minor et albus. Et si tu dicis quod hoc est propter indispositionem medii, tunc ex hoc concluditur quod numquam erit perfecte verum et rectum iudicium nisi medium sit perfecte purum, quod non invenitur apud nos. Etiam color non videtur sine lumine, et tamen in intensiori vel minori lumine apparet alius et alius color. Ideo numquam habemus certum iudicium de colore.

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4. Also, through a different medium there appear to us different colours and different sizes. As when the sun appears red and large in the morning, when it is rising, and it appears smaller and white when it has risen. And when you say that this is because of the unsuitability of the medium, then it is concluded from this that there will never be a perfectly true and correct judgment unless the medium was perfectly pure, which doesn’t happen to us. Moreover, a colour isn’t seen without light, but in more and less intense light it appears different again and again. Therefore, we never have a certain judgment about colour.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Item, sensus possunt deludi, ut communiter dicitur; ergo eorum iudicium non est certum nec firmum.

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5. Also, the senses can be deceived, as it commonly said. Therefore, their judgment is neither certain nor reliable.

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Item, illam speciem quam tu habes in sensu de his quae tibi modo apparent, deus omnino potest eam conservare in sensu tuo perfecte rebus non praesentibus, et tunc omnino et penitus tibi apparebit ut nunc apparet; et ita credens te iudicare sicut apparet nunc, non recte iudicares, quia falsum.

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6. Also, consider the species that you have in the senses, of the things that thereby appear to you. God can fully preserve it perfectly in your senses while the thing is not present. And then it would appear to you fully and exactly as it appears now. And thinking that you would judge the thing as it appears now, you would not judge correctly, because it would be false.

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|<div id=S7></div>7. Immo, sicut aliqui arguunt, quia deus potest hoc facere si velit, et tu non potes scire cum certitudine utrum deus hoc uult, ergo tu non potes esse certus utrum ita est, nec, per consequens, utrum vides aliquam rem extra.

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7. Indeed, as some argue, since God can do that if he wants, and you cannot know with certainty whether God wants to do it, therefore you cannot be certain whether it is the case, nor, consequently, whether you see anything outside [of you].

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|<div id=S8></div>8. Deinde, arguitur ex parte intellectus: quia notitia intellectiva dependet ex sensitiva; igitur, cum sensitiva non sit certa, ut dictum est, sequitur quod non intellectiva. Igitur, in octauo Physicorum*, Aristotiles reprehendit illos qui dicunt quod sensum nolunt sequi, sed rationem; quia sensus, ut dicit Aristotiles, est dignior, id est certior, ratione.

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8. Next, it is argued from the side of the intellect: Since a notion of the intellect depends on a sensible one; so, because the sensible one is not certain, as has been said, it follows that neither is the intellective one. Thus, in book eight of the Physics, Aristotle criticizes those who say that they do not want to follow the sense but reason. For, as Aristotle says, the senses are worth more, that is, are more certain, than reason.

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|<div id=S9></div>9. Item, possibile est quod species sensibilium alienantur antequam perveniant ad ipsum intellectum; et sic non erit certum iudicium ipsius intellectus.

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9. Also, it is possible that the species of the senses are changed before they reach the intellect itself. And so the judgment of the intellect itself will not be certain.

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|<div id=S10></div>10. Item, ex hoc sequitur quod conclusiones non erunt certae si principia non fuerint certa; sed principia non sunt certa. Probatio: quia sunt acquisita per experientiam, ut dicitur secundo huius, et experimentum saepe est fallax: immo nullum experimentum concludit gratia formae propositionem universalem, cum per nullum experimentum fiat inductio in omnibus singularibus; igitur principia non videntur certa.

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|<div id=S11></div>11. Item, causa non potest vere sciri per effectum: quia scientiae debent esse per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire. Nec effectus potest certe sciri per causam, cum causae sint nobis minus notae, et minus notum non notificat magis notum. Nec valet si dicatur quod causae sunt notiores secundum naturam: quia nec est ad propositum nec ad nos de notitia naturae: nos enim scimus qui addiscimus aliquid; ideo patet quod ex nobis notioribus addiscimus.

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|<div id=S12></div>12. Item, videtur quod unum non potest sciri per alterum cum certitudine: quia non videtur certitudo perfecta donec sit reductio facta in primum principium; sed ubi probaretur unum per aliud non posset fieri reductio in primum principium, quod quidem principium fundatur in contradictione, quia duo disparata non contradicunt, ut hoc esse et illud non esse; ideo sic non habetur certitudo*.

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|<div id=S13></div>13. Item, de rebus extra sensus non habetur certitudo, cum tales res sint extra sensibiles, quia singulares sunt et continve mutantur; nec de rebus extra animam, quia illae sunt minus notae quam res extra.

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|<div id=S14></div>14. Ultimo arguitur: quia si aliquid sciretur, hoc esset per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire; tunc quaero utrum illa causa sit nota vel ignota; si non sit nota nec scita, non faciet scire; et si sit scita, hoc etiam esset per causam, ut prius, et ita procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles, in isto libro, diffiniens scire, et dicens quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire*.

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|Ista quaestio continet multas difficultates propter quas antiqui negaverunt scire esse possibile, quae in arguendo ponuntur. Ad quaestionem tamen respondeo quod scire est nobis possibile: quia aliqua sunt principia nobis per se nota et nulli dubia; immo circa ea nullus potest errare, ut patet quarto Metaphysicae*; deinde ex illis principiis possunt educi quaestiones per syllogismos formaliter evidentes, et etiam illae conclusiones sciuntur.

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|Unde debetis notare quod cum ponantur tres operationes intellectus, in earum qualibet sunt aliqua per se manifesta ex natura et inclinatione ipsius intellectus ad veritatem. Unde sicut ignis est naturaliter inclinatus ad calefaciendum et grave ad descendendum, ita intellectus est naturaliter inclinatus ad intelligendum obiecta sibi sufficienter praesentata, et etiam naturaliter inclinatus ad comprehensionem veritatis primorum principiorum complexorum; ideo non oportet quod per aliud primum iudicium declaretur. Ita etiam, in alia operatione intellectus, est discursus per se evidens, sicut sunt syllogismi primae figurae vel expositorii. Ideo quando per primis sic per se notis fit syllogismus formaliter evidens et per se notum, oportet cum certitudine assentire conclusioni, et sic eam esse scitam.

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|Item, Commentator, secundo Metaphysicae*, adducit aliam rationem ad probandum quod scire sit nobis possibile. Quia illud est nobis possibile ad quod nos habemus naturale desiderium, cum natura nihil faciat frustra (primo de Caelo et Mundo*); sed omnes homines natura scire desiderant, ut determinatur in prooemio Metaphysicae*; ergo scire est nobis possibile.

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|Propter solutiones rationum et maiorem evidentiam positionis, est notandum quod ad scientiam* requiritur certitudo et evidentia; et adhuc duo requiruntur, scilicet certitudo veritatis et certitudo assensus. Dico primo "certitudo ueritatis", quia si firmissime et sine aliqua formidine assentiremus propositioni falsae, sicut faciunt haeretici, qui aliquando magis volunt mori quam negare illud cui ipsi assenserunt, tamen non est scientia propter talem assensum, quia deficit veritas et certitudo et firmitas veritatis.

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|Dico secundo quod requiritur certitudo, seu firmitas, assensus, quia de propositione firmissimae et certissimae veritatis possumus dubitare, et sic non firmiter ei assentire, et tunc sic de ea non habemus scientiam.

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|Tertio dico quod cum huius modi duplici firmitate, seu certitudine, requiritur evidentia, ad differentiam fidei vel opinionis. Nam fides est firmissimae et certissimae veritatis, et debet esse cum assensu firmissimo, sed non dicitur scientia, quia ille assensus non est per evidentiam. Similiter etiam de aliquo uerissimo et firmissimo in sua veritate assentimus aliquando per rationem solum probabilem, licet forte credamus eam esse demonstrativam. Et possibile est quod propter illam rationem credamus cum omni assensu firmissimo; unde, septimo Ethicorum*, dicit Aristotiles quod multi aeque firmiter credunt his quae opinantur sicut his quae sciunt, et tamen ille habitus non est scientia, quia non est per rationem simpliciter evidentem, quamuis illi reputarent illam evidentem.

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|Unde iuxta hoc notandum est quod differentia est inter fidem, scientiam et opinionem. Scientia enim, cum firmitate veritatis et assensus requirit evidentiam, quam non habet fides vel opinio. Sed fides differt ab opinione quia fides requirit firmitatem veritatis et assensus, quorum neutrum requirit opinio. Tamen opinio cum illis duabus stare potest, ut dictum fuit; et differt a fide quia opinio est per humanam rationem ex sensibus deductam, fides autem ex voluntate, propter auctoritatem sacrae scripturae solum.

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|Sed de evidentia* debetis notare quod 'evidentia' multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo propriissime, et tunc evidentia propositionis dicitur secundum quam intellectus per suam naturam cogitur propositioni assentire et non potest ei dissentire; et isto modo diceret Aristotiles quod primum principium est nobis evidens.

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|Secundo modo 'evidentia' dicitur quia cuilibet apparet et per nullam rationem humanam +nisi subiectivam+ posset oppositum apparere; et isto modo sunt evidentia principia naturalia et conclusiones naturales. Et notandum est quod haec evidentia non dicitur proprie 'evidentia': quia circa tales propositiones evidentes intellectus posset decipi per causam supernaturalem; quia deus posset facere ignem sine caliditate, et posset facere in sensu meo et conservare speciem sensitivam sine obiecto, et ita per istam evidentiam tu iudicares ac si obiectum esset praesens, et iudicares falsum. Tamen illa evidentia naturalis bene dicitur naturalis, quia secundum illam non potest homo decipi stante communi cursu naturae, licet deciperetur per causam supernaturalem; et haec evidentia sufficit ad naturalem scientiam.

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|Istis visis, facile est solvere rationes.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Et primo, ad illas de sapido et insipido, dicitur quod asinus et homo recte iudicant. Nam cardones sunt sapidi asino et insipidi hominibus, quoniam diversis complexionibus et naturis sunt diversi cibi convenientes et diversi odores. Modo aliquid dicitur 'sapidum' quia sapit et 'insipidum' quia non sapit, vel disconvenienter sapit; similiter odor dicitur 'suavis' vel 'fetidus' quia conveniens vel disconveniens. Ideo homo per rationem iudicat odores sibi inconvenientes esse convenientes cani vel iudicat sibi fetidum non esse fetidum cani, et saporem sibi sapidum iudicat asino insipidum, vel e converso. Ideo uterque recte iudicat.

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|<div id=S2R></div>2.Ad rationem de aegro qui iudicat amarum illud quod tu iudicas esse dulce, dico quod aeger decipitur propter indispositionem organi. Et quando arguitur "ergo numquam erit perfectum iudicium si organum non sit perfecte dispositum", dico quod hoc posset concedi quantum ad gradum saporis vel odoris, tamen non requiritur optima dispositio ad perfecte iudicandum quod hoc est dulce vel amarum. Sed quando ulterius dicitur quod dulcedo ... et caetera, dico quod dulcedo in nullo passo causaret speciem amaritudinis; ideo species amaritudinis in aegro non efficitur a cibo dato, sed ab humoribus infectis circumsolutis linguae, quia masticando cibum commoventur et immutant organum; ideo aeger vere et recte potest iudicare quod ipse sentit amarum, sed decipitur iudicando quod illud amarum sit cibi.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam, de motu arboris, dico quod ille in navi si non videat se aut navem non videt arborem motum, sed videt arborem quiescentem. Tamen, quia per motum hominis in navi species arboris mutat situm in oculo, ideo virtus imaginativa iudicat motum fieri, et quia non percipit motum oculi, iudicat quod arbor moveatur, et decipitur.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam, quae arguebat de colore, conceditur quod impossibile est vel difficillimum iudicare gradum luminis vel coloris; sed cum hoc stat quod vere et recte iudicemus hoc esse album aut rubeum.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad aliam, de illusione sensuum, potest dici quod in medio bene disposito et oculo exsistente sano sunt multa de quibus sensus numquam decipitur per illusionem sensuum videntium, nisi forte illusio esset supernaturalis. Et si aliquando sensus illuduntur, cum hoc in multis potest corrigere intellectus per rationem errorem sensus.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad aliam, arguentem de potentia dei, dico quod ita non intelligitur quin de principiis et conclusionibus talibus habeamus evidentiam naturalem, licet de multis eorum non habeamus evidentiam propriissime dictam.

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|<div id=S7R></div>7. Ad aliam rationem, arguentem de intellectu quia intellectus dependet ex sensu, concedo quod intellectus accipit firmum iudicium et evidens evidentia naturali et iudicio sensus. Sed ultra intellectus de multis virtute propria, quae excedit virtutem sensus, habet firmum iudicium, licet illud non sit sensus iudicium, verbi gratia de universalibus principiis. Immo saepe per rationem intellectus evidenter corrigit errorem sensus, ut patet de magnitudine.

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|<div id=S8R></div>8. Ad aliam, de alienatione specierum, quod numquam perveniant ad intellectum, dicendum est quod aliqua sunt principia quae numquam essent dubia vel incerta propter quamcumque alienatione: verbi gratia, primum principium. Nam quocumque casu posito, verum est quod quodlibet est vel non est*, et quod totum est maius sua parte, et sic de multis aliis.

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|<div id=S9R></div>9. Ad aliam, dicentem quod experientia saepe fallit, dicitur primo quod multa sunt principia evidentia non credita per experientiam, sed per manifestam terminorum inclusionem ad invicem, vel exclusionem, scito quid nominis. Sic enim est evidens quod homo est animal et asinus est animal. Deinde principia sumpta per experientiam adhuc habent naturalem evidentiam. Quia licet experientia pauca et parum examinata saepe fallat, tamen experientia multa et bene in diversis casibus examinata numquam fallit. Et quando ultra opinatur quod experientia numquam gratia formae concludit universale principium, quia numquam fit in omnibus singularibus, respondet Commentator, secundo Physicorum*, quod licet inductio, sive experientia inductiva, non concludat gratia formae, tamen intellectus, ex eius naturali inclinatione ad veritatem, percipiens multotiens ita fieri quod non potest nec potuit recipere instantiam, nec videre esse rationem quare in aliis debeat esse aliter, ipse concedit universale principium tamquam notum et evidens evidentia naturali et possibili circa talia.

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|<div id=S10R></div>10. Ad aliam, dico quod causa potest certe sciri propter quid ipsa est. Et quando dicitur "causa est nobis minus nota", dico quod licet causa sit nobis minus nota quam effectus quantum ad quia est, tamen causa est prius nota, non solum naturae, sed nobis, quam propter quid effectus est. Prius enim est notum tibi quod luna est inter terram et solem quam sit notum tibi propter quid sol eclipsatur, licet prius bene scieris quod sol eclipsatur.

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|<div id=S11R></div>11. Ad aliam, dico quod unum per aliud potest sciri. Nec oportet omnia principia resoluere in primum principium complexum, immo sunt multa alia principia et habentia evidentiam naturalem.

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|<div id=S12R></div>12. Ad aliam, dico quod licet res sensibiles transmutentur, tamen aliquid est evidens de eis, ut saltem quod transmutantur, et quod hoc est album, et quod hoc est homo, licet propter transmutationem sit dubium utrum iste sit totaliter idem homo sicut erat de mane.

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|<div id=S13R></div>13. Ad ultimam, dicitur quod illud quod scitur demonstrative scitur per causam; et ita causa est scita non demonstrative, sed per ipsam; modo illud scire quod diffiniebatur erat scire per demonstrationem et per doctrinam, quo modo non contingit scire principia.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q2

2023-02-22T23:06:40Z

Ulf:

{{Nextpage|[[../Q1|Q1]]|[[../Q3|Q3]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

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|Quaestio 2a

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Question 2a

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|UTRUM POSSIBILE SIT NOS ALIQUID SCIRE

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Whether it is possible that we know anything

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|Consequenter quaeritur, secundo, utrum possibile sit nos aliquid scire.

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Second, it is asked next whether it is possible that we know anything.

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur primo quod non: quia scientia est notitia certa et evidens, et talis est nobis impossibilis; igitur ... et caetera. Maior patet: quia per hoc differt scientia ab opinione, scilicet quia scientia requirit certitudinem, quam opinio non requirit. Minor probatur multipliciter. Primo ex parte sensus: quia illud idem quod nos iudicamus insipidum, id est mali saporis, asinus iudicat sapidum, sicut cardones; et non potest dici quod iudicium nostrum sit melius aut certius quam iudicium asini, quia iudicium asini est per naturam et natura non errat in suis operationibus; et sic patet quod iudicium nostrum ad sensum non est certum. Idem patet de viris et mulieribus, de pueris et senibus: nam quae apparent sapida mulieribus vel pueris apparent insipida viris vel senibus, et e converso, +magis sapida et plus salsa vel modicia+; et non apparet qui istorum verius iudicant, et videtur quod totum sit nobis incertum. Similiter, canes melius odorant quam homines, tamen iudicant quosdam odores suaves et dulces et eos persequuntur tamquam bonos, ut odores cadaverum, quos tamen reputat homo abominabiles. Ideo apparet quod de his non habemus iudicium certum.

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1. First, it is argued that it is not: For, knowledge is a notion [noting, familiarity] that is certain and evident, and this is impossible for us; therefore ... etc. The major premise is clear: For by this knowledge differs from opinion, namely that knowledge requires certainty, which opinion does not require. The minor premise is proven in several ways. First from the senses, for the same thing that we judge [to be] tasteless, i.e. of bad taste, the donkey judges [to be] tasty, such as thistles. And it cannot be said that our judgment is better or more certain than the donkey’s judgment because the donkey’s judgment is by nature and nature does not err in what it does. And so it is clear that our judgment by the senses is not certain. The same is clear from men and women, as well as from children and elderly people. For the things that appear tasty to women or to children appear tasteless to men or to elderly people, and the other way around, +more tasty and more salty or moderate+. And it is not obvious who of them judges more truly, and it seems that everything is uncertain for us. Similarly, dogs have a better sense of smell than humans; nevertheless they judge some smells pleasant and sweet and they pursue them like goods, such as the smells of cadavers, which a human, however, considers abominable. Therefore, it seems that we have no certain judgment about them.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Item, quod sanus iudicat dulce illud saepe aeger iudicat amarum. Si tu diceres quod iudicium sani est bonum et sano est credendum, hoc non potest dici: quia si sanus melius iudicat quam aeger, hoc non est nisi propter meliorem dispositionem organi; ergo nullus simpliciter recte et perfecte iudicabit nisi habuerit organum perfecte dispositum; modo forte nullus habet; ideo nullus perfecte iudicabit. Et iterum probo quod iudicium aegri est bonum: quia nullum agens agit in aliquod passum specie sibi contrariam; ideo numquam dulce agit speciem amaritudinis per quam agens aeger iudicabit amarum, sed oportet illam speciem ab amaro provenire; ideo aeger bene iudicat iudicando amaritudinem.

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2. Also, what the healthy person judges sweet that the sick person often judges bitter. If you were to say that the judgment of the healthy person is good and the healthy person should be believed, then this cannot be said: For, if the healthy person judges better than the sick person, this is only because of the better conditions of the organ. Therefore, no one will judge correctly and perfectly simpliciter, unless he had an organ in perfect conditions, which no one at all has. Therefore, no one will judge perfectly. And, moreover, I prove that the judgment of the sick person is good: For no agent leads by any steps to a [sensible] species that is contrary to its own. Therefore, sweetness never leads to the species of bitterness by which the sick agent will judge [something to be] bitter; but it must rather be that this species comes from bitterness. Therefore, the sick person judges well when he judges [there to be] bitterness.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, exsistens in navi mota in fluuio, videns arborem in litore, iudicat arborem moveri, et stans iuxta arborem iudicat quiescere; et sic nescitur quis recte iudicat. Sane probatur tibi quod exsistens in navi mota recte iudicat: quia exsistens in navi percipit motum ad visum (aliter non iudicaret arborem moveri) et non percipit motum nisi in arbore, quia forte non vidit se ipsum nec navem, immo solum arborem vel litora; ideo in arbore videtur esse motus quem percipit.

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3. Also, when one is in a boat that is moving on a river, seeing a tree on the shore, one judges the tree to be moving, and standing next to the tree one judges it to be at rest. And so it is not known who judges correctly. Indeed, it is proven to you that one judges correctly when one is in the moving boat: For when one is in the boat, one perceives motion by sight (otherwise one would not judge that the tree is moving) and one doesn’t perceive motion except in the tree, because one might not have seen oneself or the boat but rather only the tree or the shore. Therefore, the motion that one perceives seems to be in the tree.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, per aliud medium apparet nobis alius color et alia magnitudo. Unde sol in mane, quando oritur, apparet rubeus et magnus, et cum eleuatus est apparet minor et albus. Et si tu dicis quod hoc est propter indispositionem medii, tunc ex hoc concluditur quod numquam erit perfecte verum et rectum iudicium nisi medium sit perfecte purum, quod non invenitur apud nos. Etiam color non videtur sine lumine, et tamen in intensiori vel minori lumine apparet alius et alius color. Ideo numquam habemus certum iudicium de colore.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Item, sensus possunt deludi, ut communiter dicitur; ergo eorum iudicium non est certum nec firmum.

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Item, illam speciem quam tu habes in sensu de his quae tibi modo apparent, deus omnino potest eam conservare in sensu tuo perfecte rebus non praesentibus, et tunc omnino et penitus tibi apparebit ut nunc apparet; et ita credens te iudicare sicut apparet nunc, non recte iudicares, quia falsum.

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|<div id=S7></div>7. Immo, sicut aliqui arguunt, quia deus potest hoc facere si velit, et tu non potes scire cum certitudine utrum deus hoc uult, ergo tu non potes esse certus utrum ita est, nec, per consequens, utrum vides aliquam rem extra.

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|<div id=S8></div>8. Deinde, arguitur ex parte intellectus: quia notitia intellectiva dependet ex sensitiva; igitur, cum sensitiva non sit certa, ut dictum est, sequitur quod non intellectiva. Igitur, in octauo Physicorum*, Aristotiles reprehendit illos qui dicunt quod sensum nolunt sequi, sed rationem; quia sensus, ut dicit Aristotiles, est dignior, id est certior, ratione.

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|<div id=S9></div>9. Item, possibile est quod species sensibilium alienantur antequam perveniant ad ipsum intellectum; et sic non erit certum iudicium ipsius intellectus.

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|<div id=S10></div>10. Item, ex hoc sequitur quod conclusiones non erunt certae si principia non fuerint certa; sed principia non sunt certa. Probatio: quia sunt acquisita per experientiam, ut dicitur secundo huius, et experimentum saepe est fallax: immo nullum experimentum concludit gratia formae propositionem universalem, cum per nullum experimentum fiat inductio in omnibus singularibus; igitur principia non videntur certa.

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|<div id=S11></div>11. Item, causa non potest vere sciri per effectum: quia scientiae debent esse per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire. Nec effectus potest certe sciri per causam, cum causae sint nobis minus notae, et minus notum non notificat magis notum. Nec valet si dicatur quod causae sunt notiores secundum naturam: quia nec est ad propositum nec ad nos de notitia naturae: nos enim scimus qui addiscimus aliquid; ideo patet quod ex nobis notioribus addiscimus.

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|<div id=S12></div>12. Item, videtur quod unum non potest sciri per alterum cum certitudine: quia non videtur certitudo perfecta donec sit reductio facta in primum principium; sed ubi probaretur unum per aliud non posset fieri reductio in primum principium, quod quidem principium fundatur in contradictione, quia duo disparata non contradicunt, ut hoc esse et illud non esse; ideo sic non habetur certitudo*.

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|<div id=S13></div>13. Item, de rebus extra sensus non habetur certitudo, cum tales res sint extra sensibiles, quia singulares sunt et continve mutantur; nec de rebus extra animam, quia illae sunt minus notae quam res extra.

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|<div id=S14></div>14. Ultimo arguitur: quia si aliquid sciretur, hoc esset per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire; tunc quaero utrum illa causa sit nota vel ignota; si non sit nota nec scita, non faciet scire; et si sit scita, hoc etiam esset per causam, ut prius, et ita procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles, in isto libro, diffiniens scire, et dicens quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire*.

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|Ista quaestio continet multas difficultates propter quas antiqui negaverunt scire esse possibile, quae in arguendo ponuntur. Ad quaestionem tamen respondeo quod scire est nobis possibile: quia aliqua sunt principia nobis per se nota et nulli dubia; immo circa ea nullus potest errare, ut patet quarto Metaphysicae*; deinde ex illis principiis possunt educi quaestiones per syllogismos formaliter evidentes, et etiam illae conclusiones sciuntur.

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|Unde debetis notare quod cum ponantur tres operationes intellectus, in earum qualibet sunt aliqua per se manifesta ex natura et inclinatione ipsius intellectus ad veritatem. Unde sicut ignis est naturaliter inclinatus ad calefaciendum et grave ad descendendum, ita intellectus est naturaliter inclinatus ad intelligendum obiecta sibi sufficienter praesentata, et etiam naturaliter inclinatus ad comprehensionem veritatis primorum principiorum complexorum; ideo non oportet quod per aliud primum iudicium declaretur. Ita etiam, in alia operatione intellectus, est discursus per se evidens, sicut sunt syllogismi primae figurae vel expositorii. Ideo quando per primis sic per se notis fit syllogismus formaliter evidens et per se notum, oportet cum certitudine assentire conclusioni, et sic eam esse scitam.

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|Item, Commentator, secundo Metaphysicae*, adducit aliam rationem ad probandum quod scire sit nobis possibile. Quia illud est nobis possibile ad quod nos habemus naturale desiderium, cum natura nihil faciat frustra (primo de Caelo et Mundo*); sed omnes homines natura scire desiderant, ut determinatur in prooemio Metaphysicae*; ergo scire est nobis possibile.

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|Propter solutiones rationum et maiorem evidentiam positionis, est notandum quod ad scientiam* requiritur certitudo et evidentia; et adhuc duo requiruntur, scilicet certitudo veritatis et certitudo assensus. Dico primo "certitudo ueritatis", quia si firmissime et sine aliqua formidine assentiremus propositioni falsae, sicut faciunt haeretici, qui aliquando magis volunt mori quam negare illud cui ipsi assenserunt, tamen non est scientia propter talem assensum, quia deficit veritas et certitudo et firmitas veritatis.

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|Dico secundo quod requiritur certitudo, seu firmitas, assensus, quia de propositione firmissimae et certissimae veritatis possumus dubitare, et sic non firmiter ei assentire, et tunc sic de ea non habemus scientiam.

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|Tertio dico quod cum huius modi duplici firmitate, seu certitudine, requiritur evidentia, ad differentiam fidei vel opinionis. Nam fides est firmissimae et certissimae veritatis, et debet esse cum assensu firmissimo, sed non dicitur scientia, quia ille assensus non est per evidentiam. Similiter etiam de aliquo uerissimo et firmissimo in sua veritate assentimus aliquando per rationem solum probabilem, licet forte credamus eam esse demonstrativam. Et possibile est quod propter illam rationem credamus cum omni assensu firmissimo; unde, septimo Ethicorum*, dicit Aristotiles quod multi aeque firmiter credunt his quae opinantur sicut his quae sciunt, et tamen ille habitus non est scientia, quia non est per rationem simpliciter evidentem, quamuis illi reputarent illam evidentem.

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|Unde iuxta hoc notandum est quod differentia est inter fidem, scientiam et opinionem. Scientia enim, cum firmitate veritatis et assensus requirit evidentiam, quam non habet fides vel opinio. Sed fides differt ab opinione quia fides requirit firmitatem veritatis et assensus, quorum neutrum requirit opinio. Tamen opinio cum illis duabus stare potest, ut dictum fuit; et differt a fide quia opinio est per humanam rationem ex sensibus deductam, fides autem ex voluntate, propter auctoritatem sacrae scripturae solum.

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|Sed de evidentia* debetis notare quod 'evidentia' multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo propriissime, et tunc evidentia propositionis dicitur secundum quam intellectus per suam naturam cogitur propositioni assentire et non potest ei dissentire; et isto modo diceret Aristotiles quod primum principium est nobis evidens.

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|Secundo modo 'evidentia' dicitur quia cuilibet apparet et per nullam rationem humanam +nisi subiectivam+ posset oppositum apparere; et isto modo sunt evidentia principia naturalia et conclusiones naturales. Et notandum est quod haec evidentia non dicitur proprie 'evidentia': quia circa tales propositiones evidentes intellectus posset decipi per causam supernaturalem; quia deus posset facere ignem sine caliditate, et posset facere in sensu meo et conservare speciem sensitivam sine obiecto, et ita per istam evidentiam tu iudicares ac si obiectum esset praesens, et iudicares falsum. Tamen illa evidentia naturalis bene dicitur naturalis, quia secundum illam non potest homo decipi stante communi cursu naturae, licet deciperetur per causam supernaturalem; et haec evidentia sufficit ad naturalem scientiam.

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|Istis visis, facile est solvere rationes.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Et primo, ad illas de sapido et insipido, dicitur quod asinus et homo recte iudicant. Nam cardones sunt sapidi asino et insipidi hominibus, quoniam diversis complexionibus et naturis sunt diversi cibi convenientes et diversi odores. Modo aliquid dicitur 'sapidum' quia sapit et 'insipidum' quia non sapit, vel disconvenienter sapit; similiter odor dicitur 'suavis' vel 'fetidus' quia conveniens vel disconveniens. Ideo homo per rationem iudicat odores sibi inconvenientes esse convenientes cani vel iudicat sibi fetidum non esse fetidum cani, et saporem sibi sapidum iudicat asino insipidum, vel e converso. Ideo uterque recte iudicat.

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|<div id=S2R></div>2.Ad rationem de aegro qui iudicat amarum illud quod tu iudicas esse dulce, dico quod aeger decipitur propter indispositionem organi. Et quando arguitur "ergo numquam erit perfectum iudicium si organum non sit perfecte dispositum", dico quod hoc posset concedi quantum ad gradum saporis vel odoris, tamen non requiritur optima dispositio ad perfecte iudicandum quod hoc est dulce vel amarum. Sed quando ulterius dicitur quod dulcedo ... et caetera, dico quod dulcedo in nullo passo causaret speciem amaritudinis; ideo species amaritudinis in aegro non efficitur a cibo dato, sed ab humoribus infectis circumsolutis linguae, quia masticando cibum commoventur et immutant organum; ideo aeger vere et recte potest iudicare quod ipse sentit amarum, sed decipitur iudicando quod illud amarum sit cibi.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam, de motu arboris, dico quod ille in navi si non videat se aut navem non videt arborem motum, sed videt arborem quiescentem. Tamen, quia per motum hominis in navi species arboris mutat situm in oculo, ideo virtus imaginativa iudicat motum fieri, et quia non percipit motum oculi, iudicat quod arbor moveatur, et decipitur.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam, quae arguebat de colore, conceditur quod impossibile est vel difficillimum iudicare gradum luminis vel coloris; sed cum hoc stat quod vere et recte iudicemus hoc esse album aut rubeum.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad aliam, de illusione sensuum, potest dici quod in medio bene disposito et oculo exsistente sano sunt multa de quibus sensus numquam decipitur per illusionem sensuum videntium, nisi forte illusio esset supernaturalis. Et si aliquando sensus illuduntur, cum hoc in multis potest corrigere intellectus per rationem errorem sensus.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad aliam, arguentem de potentia dei, dico quod ita non intelligitur quin de principiis et conclusionibus talibus habeamus evidentiam naturalem, licet de multis eorum non habeamus evidentiam propriissime dictam.

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|<div id=S7R></div>7. Ad aliam rationem, arguentem de intellectu quia intellectus dependet ex sensu, concedo quod intellectus accipit firmum iudicium et evidens evidentia naturali et iudicio sensus. Sed ultra intellectus de multis virtute propria, quae excedit virtutem sensus, habet firmum iudicium, licet illud non sit sensus iudicium, verbi gratia de universalibus principiis. Immo saepe per rationem intellectus evidenter corrigit errorem sensus, ut patet de magnitudine.

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|<div id=S8R></div>8. Ad aliam, de alienatione specierum, quod numquam perveniant ad intellectum, dicendum est quod aliqua sunt principia quae numquam essent dubia vel incerta propter quamcumque alienatione: verbi gratia, primum principium. Nam quocumque casu posito, verum est quod quodlibet est vel non est*, et quod totum est maius sua parte, et sic de multis aliis.

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|<div id=S9R></div>9. Ad aliam, dicentem quod experientia saepe fallit, dicitur primo quod multa sunt principia evidentia non credita per experientiam, sed per manifestam terminorum inclusionem ad invicem, vel exclusionem, scito quid nominis. Sic enim est evidens quod homo est animal et asinus est animal. Deinde principia sumpta per experientiam adhuc habent naturalem evidentiam. Quia licet experientia pauca et parum examinata saepe fallat, tamen experientia multa et bene in diversis casibus examinata numquam fallit. Et quando ultra opinatur quod experientia numquam gratia formae concludit universale principium, quia numquam fit in omnibus singularibus, respondet Commentator, secundo Physicorum*, quod licet inductio, sive experientia inductiva, non concludat gratia formae, tamen intellectus, ex eius naturali inclinatione ad veritatem, percipiens multotiens ita fieri quod non potest nec potuit recipere instantiam, nec videre esse rationem quare in aliis debeat esse aliter, ipse concedit universale principium tamquam notum et evidens evidentia naturali et possibili circa talia.

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|<div id=S10R></div>10. Ad aliam, dico quod causa potest certe sciri propter quid ipsa est. Et quando dicitur "causa est nobis minus nota", dico quod licet causa sit nobis minus nota quam effectus quantum ad quia est, tamen causa est prius nota, non solum naturae, sed nobis, quam propter quid effectus est. Prius enim est notum tibi quod luna est inter terram et solem quam sit notum tibi propter quid sol eclipsatur, licet prius bene scieris quod sol eclipsatur.

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|<div id=S11R></div>11. Ad aliam, dico quod unum per aliud potest sciri. Nec oportet omnia principia resoluere in primum principium complexum, immo sunt multa alia principia et habentia evidentiam naturalem.

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|<div id=S12R></div>12. Ad aliam, dico quod licet res sensibiles transmutentur, tamen aliquid est evidens de eis, ut saltem quod transmutantur, et quod hoc est album, et quod hoc est homo, licet propter transmutationem sit dubium utrum iste sit totaliter idem homo sicut erat de mane.

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|<div id=S13R></div>13. Ad ultimam, dicitur quod illud quod scitur demonstrative scitur per causam; et ita causa est scita non demonstrative, sed per ipsam; modo illud scire quod diffiniebatur erat scire per demonstrationem et per doctrinam, quo modo non contingit scire principia.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

2023-02-22T22:40:06Z

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!valign = top width=55%|English
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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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(translated by Ulf Hlobil)

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*.<ref>The sentence is not in Aristotle, but Aquinas uses it in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics ([[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l4n10| 1 l. 4 n. 10]] and [[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l8n4| lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4]]), and Aquinas points to [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L1#bk71b20| AnaPost 71b20]].</ref> It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*.<ref>Here Buridan may have EN, book 10, 1177a18-1179b18, in mind.</ref> So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*,<ref>See EN, book 6, 1177a.</ref> is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]], and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this, one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise, truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, is called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a highest demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a highest demonstration. Therefore, a highest demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one knows many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),”<ref>Topics, 114b (trans. Barnes): “Thus, if to know a thing is to think of it, then also to know many things is to be thinking of many things; whereas this is not true; for it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them.”</ref> and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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1. Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below). However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “highest demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through a highest demonstration. Hence, it may be that a highest demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “highest demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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3. Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions. But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions. And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments. However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration. And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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4. Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing: it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way. But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end. Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical. Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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5. Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time. Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example. As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics]. But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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6. Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect. Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses. However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them. And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing. Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q2

2023-02-20T23:08:39Z

Ulf:

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!valign = top width=55%|English

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|Quaestio 2a

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Question 2a

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|UTRUM POSSIBILE SIT NOS ALIQUID SCIRE

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Whether it is possible that we know anything

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|Consequenter quaeritur, secundo, utrum possibile sit nos aliquid scire.

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Second, it is asked next whether it is possible that we know anything.

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur primo quod non: quia scientia est notitia certa et evidens, et talis est nobis impossibilis; igitur ... et caetera. Maior patet: quia per hoc differt scientia ab opinione, scilicet quia scientia requirit certitudinem, quam opinio non requirit. Minor probatur multipliciter. Primo ex parte sensus: quia illud idem quod nos iudicamus insipidum, id est mali saporis, asinus iudicat sapidum, sicut cardones; et non potest dici quod iudicium nostrum sit melius aut certius quam iudicium asini, quia iudicium asini est per naturam et natura non errat in suis operationibus; et sic patet quod iudicium nostrum ad sensum non est certum. Idem patet de viris et mulieribus, de pueris et senibus: nam quae apparent sapida mulieribus vel pueris apparent insipida viris vel senibus, et e converso, +magis sapida et plus salsa vel modicia+; et non apparet qui istorum verius iudicant, et videtur quod totum sit nobis incertum. Similiter, canes melius odorant quam homines, tamen iudicant quosdam odores suaves et dulces et eos persequuntur tamquam bonos, ut odores cadaverum, quos tamen reputat homo abominabiles. Ideo apparet quod de his non habemus iudicium certum.

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1. First, it is argued that it is not: For, knowledge is a notion [noting, familiarity] that is certain and evident, and this is impossible for us; therefore ... etc. The major premise is clear: For by this knowledge differs from opinion, namely that knowledge requires certainty, which opinion does not require. The minor premise is proven in several ways. First from the senses, for the same thing that we judge [to be] tasteless, i.e. of bad taste, the donkey judges [to be] tasty, such as thistles. And it cannot be said that our judgment is better or more certain than the donkey’s judgment because the donkey’s judgment is by nature and nature does not err in what it does. And so it is clear that our judgment by the senses is not certain. The same is clear from men and women, as well as from children and elderly people. For the things that appear tasty to women or to children appear tasteless to men or to elderly people, and the other way around, +more tasty and more salty or moderate+. And it is not obvious who of them judges more truly, and it seems that everything is uncertain for us. Similarly, dogs have a better sense of smell than humans; nevertheless they judge some smells pleasant and sweet and they pursue them like goods, such as the smells of cadavers, which a human, however, considers abominable. Therefore, it seems that we have no certain judgment about them.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Item, quod sanus iudicat dulce illud saepe aeger iudicat amarum. Si tu diceres quod iudicium sani est bonum et sano est credendum, hoc non potest dici: quia si sanus melius iudicat quam aeger, hoc non est nisi propter meliorem dispositionem organi; ergo nullus simpliciter recte et perfecte iudicabit nisi habuerit organum perfecte dispositum; modo forte nullus habet; ideo nullus perfecte iudicabit. Et iterum probo quod iudicium aegri est bonum: quia nullum agens agit in aliquod passum specie sibi contrariam; ideo numquam dulce agit speciem amaritudinis per quam agens aeger iudicabit amarum, sed oportet illam speciem ab amaro provenire; ideo aeger bene iudicat iudicando amaritudinem.

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2. Also, what the healthy person judges sweet that the sick person often judges bitter. If you were to say that the judgment of the healthy person is good and the healthy person should be believed, then this cannot be said: For, if the healthy person judges better than the sick person, this is only because of the better conditions of the organ. Therefore, no one will judge rightly and perfectly simpliciter, unless he had an organ in perfect conditions, which no one at all has. Therefore, no one will judge perfectly. And, moreover, I prove that the judgment of the sick person is good: For no agent leads by any steps to a [sensible] species that is contrary to its own. Therefore, sweetness never leads to the species of bitterness by which the sick agent will judge [something to be] bitter; but it must rather be that this species comes from bitterness. Therefore, the sick person judges well when he judges [there to be] bitterness.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, exsistens in navi mota in fluuio, videns arborem in litore, iudicat arborem moveri, et stans iuxta arborem iudicat quiescere; et sic nescitur quis recte iudicat. Sane probatur tibi quod exsistens in navi mota recte iudicat: quia exsistens in navi percipit motum ad visum (aliter non iudicaret arborem moveri) et non percipit motum nisi in arbore, quia forte non vidit se ipsum nec navem, immo solum arborem vel litora; ideo in arbore videtur esse motus quem percipit.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, per aliud medium apparet nobis alius color et alia magnitudo. Unde sol in mane, quando oritur, apparet rubeus et magnus, et cum eleuatus est apparet minor et albus. Et si tu dicis quod hoc est propter indispositionem medii, tunc ex hoc concluditur quod numquam erit perfecte verum et rectum iudicium nisi medium sit perfecte purum, quod non invenitur apud nos. Etiam color non videtur sine lumine, et tamen in intensiori vel minori lumine apparet alius et alius color. Ideo numquam habemus certum iudicium de colore.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Item, sensus possunt deludi, ut communiter dicitur; ergo eorum iudicium non est certum nec firmum.

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Item, illam speciem quam tu habes in sensu de his quae tibi modo apparent, deus omnino potest eam conservare in sensu tuo perfecte rebus non praesentibus, et tunc omnino et penitus tibi apparebit ut nunc apparet; et ita credens te iudicare sicut apparet nunc, non recte iudicares, quia falsum.

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|<div id=S7></div>7. Immo, sicut aliqui arguunt, quia deus potest hoc facere si velit, et tu non potes scire cum certitudine utrum deus hoc uult, ergo tu non potes esse certus utrum ita est, nec, per consequens, utrum vides aliquam rem extra.

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|<div id=S8></div>8. Deinde, arguitur ex parte intellectus: quia notitia intellectiva dependet ex sensitiva; igitur, cum sensitiva non sit certa, ut dictum est, sequitur quod non intellectiva. Igitur, in octauo Physicorum*, Aristotiles reprehendit illos qui dicunt quod sensum nolunt sequi, sed rationem; quia sensus, ut dicit Aristotiles, est dignior, id est certior, ratione.

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|<div id=S9></div>9. Item, possibile est quod species sensibilium alienantur antequam perveniant ad ipsum intellectum; et sic non erit certum iudicium ipsius intellectus.

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|<div id=S10></div>10. Item, ex hoc sequitur quod conclusiones non erunt certae si principia non fuerint certa; sed principia non sunt certa. Probatio: quia sunt acquisita per experientiam, ut dicitur secundo huius, et experimentum saepe est fallax: immo nullum experimentum concludit gratia formae propositionem universalem, cum per nullum experimentum fiat inductio in omnibus singularibus; igitur principia non videntur certa.

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|<div id=S11></div>11. Item, causa non potest vere sciri per effectum: quia scientiae debent esse per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire. Nec effectus potest certe sciri per causam, cum causae sint nobis minus notae, et minus notum non notificat magis notum. Nec valet si dicatur quod causae sunt notiores secundum naturam: quia nec est ad propositum nec ad nos de notitia naturae: nos enim scimus qui addiscimus aliquid; ideo patet quod ex nobis notioribus addiscimus.

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|<div id=S12></div>12. Item, videtur quod unum non potest sciri per alterum cum certitudine: quia non videtur certitudo perfecta donec sit reductio facta in primum principium; sed ubi probaretur unum per aliud non posset fieri reductio in primum principium, quod quidem principium fundatur in contradictione, quia duo disparata non contradicunt, ut hoc esse et illud non esse; ideo sic non habetur certitudo*.

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|<div id=S13></div>13. Item, de rebus extra sensus non habetur certitudo, cum tales res sint extra sensibiles, quia singulares sunt et continve mutantur; nec de rebus extra animam, quia illae sunt minus notae quam res extra.

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|<div id=S14></div>14. Ultimo arguitur: quia si aliquid sciretur, hoc esset per causam, ut patet per definitionem ipsius scire; tunc quaero utrum illa causa sit nota vel ignota; si non sit nota nec scita, non faciet scire; et si sit scita, hoc etiam esset per causam, ut prius, et ita procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles, in isto libro, diffiniens scire, et dicens quod demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire*.

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|Ista quaestio continet multas difficultates propter quas antiqui negaverunt scire esse possibile, quae in arguendo ponuntur. Ad quaestionem tamen respondeo quod scire est nobis possibile: quia aliqua sunt principia nobis per se nota et nulli dubia; immo circa ea nullus potest errare, ut patet quarto Metaphysicae*; deinde ex illis principiis possunt educi quaestiones per syllogismos formaliter evidentes, et etiam illae conclusiones sciuntur.

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|Unde debetis notare quod cum ponantur tres operationes intellectus, in earum qualibet sunt aliqua per se manifesta ex natura et inclinatione ipsius intellectus ad veritatem. Unde sicut ignis est naturaliter inclinatus ad calefaciendum et grave ad descendendum, ita intellectus est naturaliter inclinatus ad intelligendum obiecta sibi sufficienter praesentata, et etiam naturaliter inclinatus ad comprehensionem veritatis primorum principiorum complexorum; ideo non oportet quod per aliud primum iudicium declaretur. Ita etiam, in alia operatione intellectus, est discursus per se evidens, sicut sunt syllogismi primae figurae vel expositorii. Ideo quando per primis sic per se notis fit syllogismus formaliter evidens et per se notum, oportet cum certitudine assentire conclusioni, et sic eam esse scitam.

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|Item, Commentator, secundo Metaphysicae*, adducit aliam rationem ad probandum quod scire sit nobis possibile. Quia illud est nobis possibile ad quod nos habemus naturale desiderium, cum natura nihil faciat frustra (primo de Caelo et Mundo*); sed omnes homines natura scire desiderant, ut determinatur in prooemio Metaphysicae*; ergo scire est nobis possibile.

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|Propter solutiones rationum et maiorem evidentiam positionis, est notandum quod ad scientiam* requiritur certitudo et evidentia; et adhuc duo requiruntur, scilicet certitudo veritatis et certitudo assensus. Dico primo "certitudo ueritatis", quia si firmissime et sine aliqua formidine assentiremus propositioni falsae, sicut faciunt haeretici, qui aliquando magis volunt mori quam negare illud cui ipsi assenserunt, tamen non est scientia propter talem assensum, quia deficit veritas et certitudo et firmitas veritatis.

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|Dico secundo quod requiritur certitudo, seu firmitas, assensus, quia de propositione firmissimae et certissimae veritatis possumus dubitare, et sic non firmiter ei assentire, et tunc sic de ea non habemus scientiam.

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|Tertio dico quod cum huius modi duplici firmitate, seu certitudine, requiritur evidentia, ad differentiam fidei vel opinionis. Nam fides est firmissimae et certissimae veritatis, et debet esse cum assensu firmissimo, sed non dicitur scientia, quia ille assensus non est per evidentiam. Similiter etiam de aliquo uerissimo et firmissimo in sua veritate assentimus aliquando per rationem solum probabilem, licet forte credamus eam esse demonstrativam. Et possibile est quod propter illam rationem credamus cum omni assensu firmissimo; unde, septimo Ethicorum*, dicit Aristotiles quod multi aeque firmiter credunt his quae opinantur sicut his quae sciunt, et tamen ille habitus non est scientia, quia non est per rationem simpliciter evidentem, quamuis illi reputarent illam evidentem.

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|Unde iuxta hoc notandum est quod differentia est inter fidem, scientiam et opinionem. Scientia enim, cum firmitate veritatis et assensus requirit evidentiam, quam non habet fides vel opinio. Sed fides differt ab opinione quia fides requirit firmitatem veritatis et assensus, quorum neutrum requirit opinio. Tamen opinio cum illis duabus stare potest, ut dictum fuit; et differt a fide quia opinio est per humanam rationem ex sensibus deductam, fides autem ex voluntate, propter auctoritatem sacrae scripturae solum.

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|Sed de evidentia* debetis notare quod 'evidentia' multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo propriissime, et tunc evidentia propositionis dicitur secundum quam intellectus per suam naturam cogitur propositioni assentire et non potest ei dissentire; et isto modo diceret Aristotiles quod primum principium est nobis evidens.

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|Secundo modo 'evidentia' dicitur quia cuilibet apparet et per nullam rationem humanam +nisi subiectivam+ posset oppositum apparere; et isto modo sunt evidentia principia naturalia et conclusiones naturales. Et notandum est quod haec evidentia non dicitur proprie 'evidentia': quia circa tales propositiones evidentes intellectus posset decipi per causam supernaturalem; quia deus posset facere ignem sine caliditate, et posset facere in sensu meo et conservare speciem sensitivam sine obiecto, et ita per istam evidentiam tu iudicares ac si obiectum esset praesens, et iudicares falsum. Tamen illa evidentia naturalis bene dicitur naturalis, quia secundum illam non potest homo decipi stante communi cursu naturae, licet deciperetur per causam supernaturalem; et haec evidentia sufficit ad naturalem scientiam.

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|Istis visis, facile est solvere rationes.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Et primo, ad illas de sapido et insipido, dicitur quod asinus et homo recte iudicant. Nam cardones sunt sapidi asino et insipidi hominibus, quoniam diversis complexionibus et naturis sunt diversi cibi convenientes et diversi odores. Modo aliquid dicitur 'sapidum' quia sapit et 'insipidum' quia non sapit, vel disconvenienter sapit; similiter odor dicitur 'suavis' vel 'fetidus' quia conveniens vel disconveniens. Ideo homo per rationem iudicat odores sibi inconvenientes esse convenientes cani vel iudicat sibi fetidum non esse fetidum cani, et saporem sibi sapidum iudicat asino insipidum, vel e converso. Ideo uterque recte iudicat.

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|<div id=S2R></div>2.Ad rationem de aegro qui iudicat amarum illud quod tu iudicas esse dulce, dico quod aeger decipitur propter indispositionem organi. Et quando arguitur "ergo numquam erit perfectum iudicium si organum non sit perfecte dispositum", dico quod hoc posset concedi quantum ad gradum saporis vel odoris, tamen non requiritur optima dispositio ad perfecte iudicandum quod hoc est dulce vel amarum. Sed quando ulterius dicitur quod dulcedo ... et caetera, dico quod dulcedo in nullo passo causaret speciem amaritudinis; ideo species amaritudinis in aegro non efficitur a cibo dato, sed ab humoribus infectis circumsolutis linguae, quia masticando cibum commoventur et immutant organum; ideo aeger vere et recte potest iudicare quod ipse sentit amarum, sed decipitur iudicando quod illud amarum sit cibi.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam, de motu arboris, dico quod ille in navi si non videat se aut navem non videt arborem motum, sed videt arborem quiescentem. Tamen, quia per motum hominis in navi species arboris mutat situm in oculo, ideo virtus imaginativa iudicat motum fieri, et quia non percipit motum oculi, iudicat quod arbor moveatur, et decipitur.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam, quae arguebat de colore, conceditur quod impossibile est vel difficillimum iudicare gradum luminis vel coloris; sed cum hoc stat quod vere et recte iudicemus hoc esse album aut rubeum.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad aliam, de illusione sensuum, potest dici quod in medio bene disposito et oculo exsistente sano sunt multa de quibus sensus numquam decipitur per illusionem sensuum videntium, nisi forte illusio esset supernaturalis. Et si aliquando sensus illuduntur, cum hoc in multis potest corrigere intellectus per rationem errorem sensus.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad aliam, arguentem de potentia dei, dico quod ita non intelligitur quin de principiis et conclusionibus talibus habeamus evidentiam naturalem, licet de multis eorum non habeamus evidentiam propriissime dictam.

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|<div id=S7R></div>7. Ad aliam rationem, arguentem de intellectu quia intellectus dependet ex sensu, concedo quod intellectus accipit firmum iudicium et evidens evidentia naturali et iudicio sensus. Sed ultra intellectus de multis virtute propria, quae excedit virtutem sensus, habet firmum iudicium, licet illud non sit sensus iudicium, verbi gratia de universalibus principiis. Immo saepe per rationem intellectus evidenter corrigit errorem sensus, ut patet de magnitudine.

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|<div id=S8R></div>8. Ad aliam, de alienatione specierum, quod numquam perveniant ad intellectum, dicendum est quod aliqua sunt principia quae numquam essent dubia vel incerta propter quamcumque alienatione: verbi gratia, primum principium. Nam quocumque casu posito, verum est quod quodlibet est vel non est*, et quod totum est maius sua parte, et sic de multis aliis.

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|<div id=S9R></div>9. Ad aliam, dicentem quod experientia saepe fallit, dicitur primo quod multa sunt principia evidentia non credita per experientiam, sed per manifestam terminorum inclusionem ad invicem, vel exclusionem, scito quid nominis. Sic enim est evidens quod homo est animal et asinus est animal. Deinde principia sumpta per experientiam adhuc habent naturalem evidentiam. Quia licet experientia pauca et parum examinata saepe fallat, tamen experientia multa et bene in diversis casibus examinata numquam fallit. Et quando ultra opinatur quod experientia numquam gratia formae concludit universale principium, quia numquam fit in omnibus singularibus, respondet Commentator, secundo Physicorum*, quod licet inductio, sive experientia inductiva, non concludat gratia formae, tamen intellectus, ex eius naturali inclinatione ad veritatem, percipiens multotiens ita fieri quod non potest nec potuit recipere instantiam, nec videre esse rationem quare in aliis debeat esse aliter, ipse concedit universale principium tamquam notum et evidens evidentia naturali et possibili circa talia.

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|<div id=S10R></div>10. Ad aliam, dico quod causa potest certe sciri propter quid ipsa est. Et quando dicitur "causa est nobis minus nota", dico quod licet causa sit nobis minus nota quam effectus quantum ad quia est, tamen causa est prius nota, non solum naturae, sed nobis, quam propter quid effectus est. Prius enim est notum tibi quod luna est inter terram et solem quam sit notum tibi propter quid sol eclipsatur, licet prius bene scieris quod sol eclipsatur.

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|<div id=S11R></div>11. Ad aliam, dico quod unum per aliud potest sciri. Nec oportet omnia principia resoluere in primum principium complexum, immo sunt multa alia principia et habentia evidentiam naturalem.

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|<div id=S12R></div>12. Ad aliam, dico quod licet res sensibiles transmutentur, tamen aliquid est evidens de eis, ut saltem quod transmutantur, et quod hoc est album, et quod hoc est homo, licet propter transmutationem sit dubium utrum iste sit totaliter idem homo sicut erat de mane.

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|<div id=S13R></div>13. Ad ultimam, dicitur quod illud quod scitur demonstrative scitur per causam; et ita causa est scita non demonstrative, sed per ipsam; modo illud scire quod diffiniebatur erat scire per demonstrationem et per doctrinam, quo modo non contingit scire principia.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

2023-02-19T00:08:54Z

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*.<ref>The sentence is not in Aristotle, but Aquinas uses it in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics ([[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l4n10| 1 l. 4 n. 10]] and [[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l8n4| lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4]]), and Aquinas points to [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L1#bk71b20| AnaPost 71b20]].</ref> It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*.<ref>Here Buridan may have EN, book 10, 1177a18-1179b18, in mind.</ref> So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*,<ref>See EN, book 6, 1177a.</ref> is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]], and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this, one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise, truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, is called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one knows many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),”<ref>Topics, 114b (trans. Barnes): “Thus, if to know a thing is to think of it, then also to know many things is to be thinking of many things; whereas this is not true; for it is possible to know many things but not to be thinking of them.”</ref> and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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1. Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below). However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “primary demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through primary demonstration. Hence, it may be that a primary demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “primary demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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3. Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions. But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions. And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments. However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration. And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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4. Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing: it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way. But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end. Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical. Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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5. Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time. Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example. As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics]. But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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6. Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect. Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses. However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them. And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing. Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

2023-02-19T00:00:10Z

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*.<ref>The sentence is not in Aristotle, but Aquinas uses it in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics ([[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l4n10| 1 l. 4 n. 10]] and [[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l8n4| lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4]]), and Aquinas points to [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L1#bk71b20| AnaPost 71b20]].</ref> It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*.<ref>Here Buridan may have EN, book 10, 1177a18-1179b18, in mind.</ref> So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*,<ref>See EN, book 6, 1177a.</ref> is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]], and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this, one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise, truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, is called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one knows many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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1. Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below). However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “primary demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through primary demonstration. Hence, it may be that a primary demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “primary demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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3. Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions. But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions. And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments. However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration. And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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4. Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing: it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way. But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end. Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical. Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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5. Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time. Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example. As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics]. But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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6. Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect. Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses. However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them. And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing. Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*.<ref>The sentence is not in Aristotle, but Aquinas uses it in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics ([[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l4n10| 1 l. 4 n. 10]] and [[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l8n4| lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4]]), and Aquinas points to [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L1#bk71b20| AnaPost 71b20]].</ref> It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*.<ref>Here Buridan may have EN, book 10, 1177a18-1179b18, in mind.</ref> So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*,<ref>See EN, book 6, 1177a.</ref> is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]], and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this, one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise, truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, is called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one understands many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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1. Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below). However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “primary demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through primary demonstration. Hence, it may be that a primary demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “primary demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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3. Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions. But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions. And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments. However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration. And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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4. Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing: it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way. But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end. Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical. Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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5. Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time. Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example. As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics]. But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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6. Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect. Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses. However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them. And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing. Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.

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==Notes==
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[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*.<ref>The sentence is not in Aristotle, but Aquinas uses it in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics ([[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l4n10| 1 l. 4 n. 10]] and [[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l8n4| lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4]]), and Aquinas points to [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L1#bk71b20| AnaPost 71b20]].</ref> It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*.<ref>Here Buridan may have EN, book 10, 1177a18-1179b18, in mind.</ref> So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*,<ref>See EN, book 6, 1177a.</ref> is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]], and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this, one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise, truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, is called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [[[Authors/grosseteste|Grosseteste]]] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one understands many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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1. Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below). However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “primary demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through primary demonstration. Hence, it may be that a primary demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “primary demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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3. Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions. But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions. And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments. However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration. And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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4. Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing: it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way. But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end. Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical. Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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5. Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time. Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example. As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics]. But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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6. Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect. Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses. However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them. And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing. Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

2023-02-18T23:51:25Z

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*.<ref>The sentence is not in Aristotle, but Aquinas uses it in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics ([[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l4n10| 1 l. 4 n. 10]] and [[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l8n4| lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4]]), and Aquinas points to [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L1#bk71b20| AnaPost 71b20]].</ref> It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*.<ref>Here Buridan may have EN, book 10, 1177a18-1179b18, in mind.</ref> So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*,<ref>See EN, book 6, 1177a.</ref> is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]], and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this, one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise, truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, is called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one understands many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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1. Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below). However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “primary demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through primary demonstration. Hence, it may be that a primary demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “primary demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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3. Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions. But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions. And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments. However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration. And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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4. Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing: it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way. But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end. Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical. Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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5. Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time. Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example. As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics]. But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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6. Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect. Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses. However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them. And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing. Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

2023-02-18T23:45:30Z

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*.<ref>The sentence is not in Aristotle, but Aquinas uses it in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics ([[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l4n10| 1 l. 4 n. 10]] and [[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l8n4| lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4]]), and Aquinas points to [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L1#bk71b20| AnaPost 71b20]].</ref> It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*.<ref>Here Buridan may have EN, book 10, 1177a18-1179b18, in mind.</ref> So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*,<ref>See EN, book 6, 1177a.</ref> is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]], and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this, one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise, truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one understands many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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1. Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below). However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “primary demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through primary demonstration. Hence, it may be that a primary demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “primary demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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3. Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions. But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions. And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments. However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration. And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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4. Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing: it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way. But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end. Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical. Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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5. Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time. Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example. As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics]. But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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6. Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect. Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses. However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them. And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing. Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.

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==Notes==
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[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*.<ref>The sentence is not in Aristotle, but Aquinas uses it in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics ([[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l4n10| 1 l. 4 n. 10]] and [[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l8n4| lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4]]), and Aquinas points to [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L1#bk71b20| AnaPost 71b20]].</ref> It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*.<ref>Here Buridan may have EN, book 10, 1177a18-1179b18, in mind.</ref> So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*,<ref>See EN, book 6, 1177a.</ref> is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]], and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this, one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise, truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by means of which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one understands many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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1. Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below). However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “primary demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through primary demonstration. Hence, it may be that a primary demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “primary demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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3. Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions. But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions. And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments. However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration. And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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4. Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing: it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way. But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end. Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical. Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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5. Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time. Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example. As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics]. But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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6. Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect. Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses. However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them. And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing. Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.

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==Notes==
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[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*.<ref>The sentence is not in Aristotle, but Aquinas uses it in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics ([[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l4n10| 1 l. 4 n. 10]] and [[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l8n4| lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4]]), and Aquinas points to [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L1#bk71b20| AnaPost 71b20]].</ref> It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*.<ref>Here Buridan may have EN, book 10, 1177a18-1179b18, in mind.</ref> So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*,<ref>See EN, book 6, 1177a.</ref> is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]], and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by means of which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]. But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one understands many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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1. Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below). However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “primary demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through primary demonstration. Hence, it may be that a primary demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “primary demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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3. Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions. But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions. And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments. However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration. And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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4. Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing: it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way. But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end. Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical. Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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5. Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time. Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example. As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics]. But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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6. Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect. Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses. However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them. And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing. Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*.<ref>The sentence is not in Aristotle, but Aquinas uses it in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics ([[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l4n10| 1 l. 4 n. 10]] and [[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l8n4| lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4]]), and Aquinas points to [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L1#bk71b20| AnaPost 71b20]].</ref> It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*.<ref>Here Buridan may have EN, book 10, 1177a18-1179b18, in mind.</ref> So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*,<ref>See EN, book 6, 1177a.</ref> is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this (art), and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this (art). Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by means of which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]). But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one understands many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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1. Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below). However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “primary demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through primary demonstration. Hence, it may be that a primary demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “primary demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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3. Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions. But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions. And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments. However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration. And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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4. Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing: it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way. But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end. Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical. Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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5. Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time. Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example. As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics]. But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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6. Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect. Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses. However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them. And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing. Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

2023-02-18T23:11:15Z

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*.<ref>The sentence is not in Aristotle, but Aquinas uses it in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics ([[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l4n10| 1 l. 4 n. 10]] and [[Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/posteriorum/L1#lib1l8n4| lib. 1 l. 8 n. 4]]), and Aquinas points to [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L1#bk71b20| AnaPost 71b20]].</ref> It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*. So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*, is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this (art), and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this (art). Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by means of which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]). But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one understands many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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1. Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below). However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “primary demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through primary demonstration. Hence, it may be that a primary demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “primary demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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3. Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions. But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions. And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments. However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration. And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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4. Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing: it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way. But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end. Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical. Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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5. Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time. Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example. As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics]. But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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6. Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect. Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses. However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them. And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing. Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.

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==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

2023-02-12T18:31:52Z

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*. It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*. So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*, is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this (art), and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this (art). Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by means of which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]). But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one understands many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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1. Regarding the first [argument], I say that demonstration must be from things that are necessary, that is from necessary premises and conclusions, as the conclusion is called “necessary” in the same sense [as the premises], and also from incorruptible things because what is necessary is incorruptible in the same sense in which it is necessary (and on that there will be a special question below). However, the things signified by the terms of a demonstrable conclusion can be corruptible and contingent in being.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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[2.] Regarding the other [argument], I say that, properly speaking, a demonstration is neither demonstrated nor defined. But this term “demonstration” is defined in that book [Posterior Analytics]. And so, in this sense, knowledge by definition as well as demonstrative knowledge about demonstration is presented in this book. Nor are the objections made against this valid. For, this term “demonstration” is a non-complex term; hence, it is well definable. Similarly, it is clear that of this term “primary demonstration” predicates are demonstrated, and indeed through primary demonstration. Hence, it may be that a primary demonstration is familiar through itself. Nevertheless, many sentences in which something is predicated of this term “primary demonstration” may be doubtful, and such sentences are demonstrated in this book.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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3. Regarding the other argument, it must be known that this name “knowledge” as it is distinguished from “art” and “practical wisdom” is understood most narrowly, and it does not cover anything except speculative dispositions. But art and practical wisdom are practical dispositions. And so, conceiving this name narrowly, logic is not [a brach of] knowledge, but an art, namely [the art] of the construction of arguments. However, often these names “art” and “practical wisdom” are used in a general way for all certain dispositions acquired by demonstration. And in this way “art” is not distinguished from “knowledge”; therefore logic is an art and also [a branch of] knowledge.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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4. Regarding the other argument, I say that logic is practical, as is the demonstrative art treated in the book Posterior [Analytics], since [it is] discussing what is done and teaching a doing: it teaches to make and construct arguments in the right way. But when it is said that a [branch of] knowledge that is directed at knowing is speculative, I say that this is true if it is directed at knowing as a proximate end. If it is, however, directed at something done by us as a proximate end, it is practical; it may be directed at knowing as a remote and final end. Aristotle says this explicitly, in book six of the [Nicomachean] Ethics, laying out that practical wisdom is practical. Although he lays out that it is ultimately directed at [theoretical] wisdom; it is practical because its proximate end is a deed.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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5. Regarding the last [argument], I say that demonstration is intelligible, and I say that it is possible to understand several things at the same time. Nor does Aristotle say in the opposite in book six of the Topics, except as an example. As an example verification is not required, as is clear from the book Prior [Analytics]. But when Aristotle says, in the Metaphysics, that “someone who doesn’t understand one thing understands nothing,” that is certainly true because someone who understands one thousand things understand one and two things.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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6. Regarding the confirmation, I say that not everything that is intelligible moves the intellect. Indeed, if I have a general and specific concept of a human, and I understand all humans in the world, nevertheless a human who is in Rome never moves my intellect, or my senses. However, I admit that my intellect must be moved by something intelligible, and not by all of them. And in general I say that it is not necessary that everything that moves is nobler than what is moved, but [just] the principally moving thing and the principally moved thing. Our intellect, however, is something that is nobler and, of course, not in itself a sensible object.

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==Notes==
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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*. It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics''<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l1/c2#bk982b17|982b 17]]</ref>: “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*. So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*, is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this (art), and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this (art). Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by means of which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” ([[:Category:Ars_vetus|logica vetus]]). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/praedicamenta/boethius|''Categories'']], whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/perihermenias/boethius|''On Interpretation'']].

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book [[Authors/Aristotle/priora|''Prior Analytics'']]. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demonstration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, in the second part of this [book, i.e. [[Authors/Aristotle/posteriora/L/L2|Posterior Analytics]]]). But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one understands many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”<ref>[[Authors/Aristotle/metaphysics/l4#bk1006b10| 1006b 10]] “Nihil enim contingit intelligere nihil intelligentem unum”, (it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing)</ref>

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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It should be noted that although “knowledge” may be said in many ways, yet we here intend to talk about demonstrative knowledge, namely knowledge acquired by demonstration or demonstrations. Next it must be known that there are indeed three ways to be “knowable” through a demonstration. Primarily and immediately knowable is the demonstrable conclusion, which is said to be known by it [the demonstration] because it is concluded from familiar premises. In a second way, those things out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed are said to be “knowable.” For, just as we say that we know a particular conclusion and that it was demonstrated to us, so we often say that a particular predicate is known and demonstrated of a particular subject. Next, in a third way, the things signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions are knowable, and thus we say that we have knowledge about animals and stones, about god and intelligences, and so on about other things.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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That being noted, I easily lay out some conclusions. The first is that there is no knowledge of demonstrations of the first kind, like the knowledge of demonstrable conclusions: For no demonstration, and indeed no syllogism, is produced as the conclusion of any demonstration.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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The second conclusion is that there is no knowledge of demonstration of the second kind, like the knowledge of the terms out of which the demonstrable conclusion is composed: For demonstrations are not terms of conclusions, indeed they are rather composed out of several sentences and terms. However, this conclusion must be qualified in such a way that one demonstration, or one syllogism, can be taken materially and supposed for itself, and thus a term can be produced, namely a subject or a predicate of some sentence or conclusion. But never would a signifying demonstration be accepted as the term of conclusions or sentences.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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The third conclusion is that, understood in the third way, there is knowledge of demonstrations, indeed of all things of the world, like the knowledge of the things that are signified by the terms of demonstrable conclusions. For these terms “being”, “one”, “same”, “different”, “cause”, “caused”, “corruptible”, “incorruptible”, and similarly many others, signify all the things of the world, and yet many demonstrable conclusion can be composed out of these terms, in physics as well as in metaphysics. Therefore, knowledge about all things is possessed through physics as well as metaphysics and, consequently, also about demonstrations.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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Turning to the knowledge of the book Posterior (Analytics), the last conclusion is that about the term “demonstration” knowledge of the third [sic] kind is possessed, like the knowledge of a term out of which a demonstrated conclusion is composed. And this knowledge is presented and passed on in this book Posterior (Analytics), and neither in the Physics nor in the Metaphysics. For indeed, in this book, many conclusions are demonstrated that are composed out of the term “demonstration” as the subject of sentences, e.g., that demonstration is from things that are true or that demonstration is from things that are necessary.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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By means of these insights, the arguments are easily answered.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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==Notes==
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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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|IOHANNIS BURIDANI QUAESTIONES IN DUOS ARISTOTELIS LIBROS POSTERIORUM ANALYTICORUM

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John Buridan

Questions on the Two Books of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics

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| LIBER PRIMUS

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Book One

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| PROOEMIUM

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Preface

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|Scire est rei causam cognoscere*. Constat quod ignorantia scientiae opponitur privative; ideo impossibile est cum scientia perfecta de aliquo stare de illo aliquam ignorantiam. Constat etiam quod numquam dubitare est sine ignorantia; unde dicitur, prooemio Metaphysicae, "qui dubitat, et ignorat".

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To know is to recognize the cause of a thing*. It is clear that ignorance is opposed to knowledge as its privation. It is therefore impossible that with complete knowledge of something there remains any ignorance about that thing. And it is also clear that there is never any being doubtful about something without ignorance. And so it is said in the preface of the ''Metaphysics'': “someone who doubts is also ignorant.”

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|Dubitationes autem de aliquo numquam removentur donec causae illius cognoscantur. Unde videntes eclipsim lunae et causam ignorantes maxime dubitant quo modo illud possit fieri; per notitiam autem causae omnis huius modi dubitatio removetur. Ideo manifestum est quod per notitiam causae vel causarum, et non aliter, scientia certa et perfecta, omnem ignorantiam excludens, exquiritur et habetur. Ideo bene dicebatur "scire est rei causam cognoscere".

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Doubts about anything, however, are never removed until their causes are recognized. And so those who see a lunar eclipse and are ignorant of the cause are very doubtful about how this could happen. By familiarity with the cause of it all, however, the doubt about the way this happens is removed. It is therefore clear that by familiarity with the cause or causes, and not otherwise, is complete and certain knowledge, excluding all ignorance, acquired and possessed. Hence, it is well said: “to know is to recognize the cause of a thing.”

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|In qua propositione, ad recommendationem artis demonstrativae, primo duo oportet notare: primo habitum seu actum animam perficientem inhaerendo, secundo obiectum +ipsam felicitatem aufluendo+. Primum notatur cum dico "scire est", secundum autem cum dico "causam rei cognoscere". Felicitas namque humana, quae est homini summum bonum, in duobus consistit principaliter, scilicet in actu sapientiae +forma et intentione et in subiecto primo eiusdem sapientiae et intentione secundum quoddam obiectum est causa prima+, id est causa causarum; et haec omnia determinantur in decimo Ethicorum.* Ideo dicitur quod humana felicitas est circa supremam virtutem, quae secundum Aristotilem, sexto Ethicorum*, est sapientia; et est optimi obiecti, et illud est prima causa.

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In order to recommend the demonstrative art, two things must first be highlighted in this sentence: first, the disposition or act that inheres in the perfecting soul; second, the object, +from which happiness flows+. The first is highlighted when I say “to know is”, but the second when I say “to recognize the cause of a thing.” For human happiness, which is the human’s highest good, consists mainly in two things, namely in the realization of wisdom, +both by the form and intention as well in the first subject of this wisdom and also by the intention according to which a certain object is the first cause+, that is, the cause of causes. And all this is laid down in the tenth book of the ''Ethics''*. So it is said that human happiness is something like the highest virtue, which according to Aristotle, in book six of the ''Ethics''*, is wisdom, and in particular its best object, and that is the first cause.

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|Et ex omnibus illis manifestum est quod inter alias artes illa maxime facit ad humanam felicitatem acquirendam per quam sapientia, quae est maxima et certissima scientia rerum, per suas causas primas acquiritur. Ars autem demonstrativa, in qua de demonstratione tractatur, est huius modi, quoniam demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire, ut habetur primo huius*, et est syllogismus ex causis primis, veris et immediatis, ut etiam habetur primo huius*. Ideo haec ars demonstrativa inter caeteras artes magis est propinqua humanae felicitati.

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From all of this it is clear that, among all the arts, the one that contributes most to human happiness is the one by which one acquires wisdom, which is the highest and most certain knowledge of things, arrived at from their first causes. The demonstrative art, however, which treats of demonstration, is of this kind; seeing as demonstration is a syllogism by which one comes to know something, as is said at the start of this (art), and it is a syllogism from first causes, that are true and immediate, as is also said at the start of this (art). Therefore, the demonstrative art is, among the other arts, more closely related to human happiness.

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|Ut haec sint evidentiora, et ut appareat excellentia artis demonstrativae super alias partes logicae, dividenda est logica in suas partes. Propter quod sciendum est quod logica sic describi solet: logica est ars discernendi verum a falso. Constat autem quod in dubiis verum a falso non discernitur nisi per argumentationes ex notioribus procedentes, et ideo descriptio praedicta sic intelligitur et exponitur quod logica est ars sciendi instrumenta per quae in dubiis verum a falso possit distingui. Et quia huius modi instrumenta, sicut dixi, sunt argumentationes, ideo logica est ars arguendi et argumentationes construendi.

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In order to clarify these things further and to make the advantages of the demonstrative art over other parts of logic apparent, logic must be divided into its parts. For this one must know that logic is usually described thus: logic is the art of distinguishing truth from falsehood. It is clear, however, that when doubts arise truth cannot be distinguished from falsehood except by arguments from prior things that are more familiar, and so the foregoing description is understood and explained in such a way that logic is the art of knowing the means by means of which one can distinguish truth from falsehood when doubts arise. And since these means are, as I said, arguments, so logic is the art of arguing and constructing arguments.

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|Ideo sciendum est quod artifex non potest bene construere opus suum si ignoret materiam sui operis; ideo oportet materiam cognoscere ex qua facienda sunt argumenta; et illa materia est termini et propositiones, ideo logica dividitur in duas partes. Prima pars considerat de terminis et de propositionibus ex quibus construendae sunt argumentationes, et vocatur 'vetus logica'. Alia pars est de ipsis argumentationibus ex dictis terminis et propositionibus compositis, et vocatur 'nova ars', vel 'nova logica'. Et forte quod huius modi nominatio ex hoc venit quia partes materiales sunt priores via generationis et temporis partibus formalibus; quod autem est prius via generationis et temporis solet vocari 'vetus' et 'antiquum'.

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Hence, it must be known that the artist cannot put together his product well if he doesn’t know the matter of his products. So, it is necessary to recognize the matter out of which arguments are to be made. And this matter are terms and sentences, and because of that logic is divided into two parts. The first part looks at terms and sentences out of which arguments are to be made, and it is called “old logic” (logica vetus). The other part is about the arguments themselves that are composed out of said terms and sentences, and it is called the “new art” or “new logic” (logica nova). And this name may come from the fact that the material parts are prior in generation and in time to the formal parts, but what is prior in generation and time is usually called “old” or “ancient.”

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|Vetus logica dividitur. Quia prima pars est de terminis, quae tractatur in libro Praedicamentorum; ad illius introductionem ordinatus est liber Porphyrii et ad eius complementum liber Sex Principiorum. Secunda pars est de propositionibus et enuntiationibus, quae tractatur in libro Peri Hermeneias.

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The old logic is divided (as follows). Thus, the first part is on terms, which is treated in the book ''Categories'', whose introduction is the aim of Porphyry’s book, which is supplemented by the ''Liber Sex Principiorum''. The second part is on sentences and statements, which is treated in the book ''On Interpretation''.

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|Logica nova dividitur. Prima pars enim determinat de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis ex praemissis, et determinatur in libro Priorum. Alia pars tractat de argumentatione secundum quod est probativa conclusionum, non solum illativa, et illa pars traditur in aliis libris novae logicae. Et potest notari quod ille liber in quo tractatur de argumentatione secundum quod est illativa conclusionis pro tanto vocatur 'liber Priorum' quia probatio praesupponit illationem; unde illatio est secundum rationem prior et communior probatione, quoniam omne argumentum probativum est illativum et non e converso.

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The new logic is divided (as follows). The first part, namely, treats of arguments according to whether the conclusions is a consequence of the premises, and this is treated in the book ''Prior Analytics''. The other part investigates arguments according to whether they prove the conclusion, not just whether the conclusion is a consequence. And this part is set out in the other books of the new logic. And it can be noted that the book in which arguments are investigated according to whether the conclusions is a consequence (of the premises) is therefore called the “Prior” book because a proof presupposes consequence. Hence, consequence is conceptually [i.e. according to reason] prior and more general than proof, seeing as every argument that provides a proof is also one in which a consequence relation holds but not the other way around.

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|Deinde, illa pars quae considerat de argumentationibus in quantum sunt probativae dividitur secundum fines diversos ad quos diversae partes ordinantur. Aliquae enim probationes ordinantur ad opinionem nobis generandam secundum quam his quae prius erant dubia assentimus, non tamen cum certitudine; et huius modi probationes sunt argumentationes dialecticae, de quibus tractatur in parte logica quae vocatur dialectica.

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Moreover, the part that considers arguments insofar as they provide proofs is divided according to the different goals at which the different parts are directed. For, some proofs are directed at generating opinions of ours according to which we assent to what was previously in doubt, but not with certainty. And these kind of proofs are dialectical arguments, which are investigated in the part of logic that is called dialect.

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|Et illa dialectica dividitur. Quoniam una eius pars ordinatur principaliter ad scientias speculativas, vel saltem ordinatur consequenter tam ad scientias speculativas quam ad practicas; et illa pars tractatur in libris Topicorum et Elenchorum. Alia pars contracta est ad mores, sive ad scientiam moralem, et illa traditur in libris Rhetoricae et Poeticae. Et bene Aristotiles expresse dicit rhetoricam et poetriam esse partes dialecticae, et, per consequens, logicae. Liber Topicorum Boethii compositus est ad complendum librum Topicorum Aristotilis. Liber Divisionum Boethii principaliter ordinatur ad artem definitivam, quae iterum ordinatur ad artem demonstrativam. Et sic omnes libri logicae sunt nobis enumerati et contra invicem divisi.

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And this dialectic is divided (as follows). Seeing as one of its parts is principally directed at theoretical knowledge, or adequately directed at theoretical knowledge at least as much as at practical knowledge. And this part is treated in the books ''Topics'' and ''Sophistical Refutations''. The other part touches on practices, or on moral knowledge, and this is treated in the books ''Rhetoric'' and ''Poetics''. And Aristotle says rightly and explicitly that rhetoric and poetics are part of dialectic and, consequently, of logic. Boethius’s book on the Topics was written to supplement Aristotle’s ''Topics''. Boethius’s book ''On Division'' is principally directed at the art of definition, which is in turn directed at the demonstrative art. And in this way all the books of logic have been listed and distinguished from each other by us.

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|Sed debetis scire quod ille liber in quo traditur ars demonstrativa pro tanto vocatur 'liber Posteriorum' quia, ut iam dixi, liber Topicorum et iste liber Posteriorum naturali ordine doctrinae sequuntur librum Priorum. Et iterum naturali ordine doctrinae ars dialectica praecedit artem demonstrativam; disputatio namque ad utramque partem per dialecticam disponit ad inveniendum per rationes demonstrativae, per quas habetur scientia perfecta de rebus. Ideo ars demonstrativa inter caeteras partes logicae est ultima et finalis, ad quam omnes alias ordinantur. Ideo liber iste, in quo talis ars traditur, nominatur 'Posteriorum'. Et quia ad praesens habemus hunc librum exponendum, nos merito circa primum librum movemus talem quaestionem: utrum de demonstratione possit esse scientia.

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But you must know that the book in which the demonstrative art is treated, to some extent, called the “posterior book” because, as I already said, the books ''Topics'' and this book Posterior (Analytics) follow in the natural order of teaching after the book Prior (Analytics). And again in this natural order of teaching the art of dialects proceeds the demonstrative art. After all, arguing for either side of something with the help of dialectic prepares one to find demonstrative reasons, by which perfect knowledge of things is obtained. Therefore, the demonstrative art is among the other parts of logic the ultimate and final one, at which all the others are directed. Therefore, that book in which such an art is treated is called “Posterior.” And since we must presently expound this book, we appropriately move on, regarding the first book, to the following question: whether there can be knowledge about demonstration.

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|Quaestio 1a

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Question 1a

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|UTRUM DE DEMONSTRATIONE POSSIT ESSE SCIENTIA

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Whether there can be knowledge about demostration

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|<div id=S1></div>1. Arguitur quod non: quia omnis scientia est de necessariis et impossibilibus aliter se habere et perpetuis, ut patet primo huius; et nulla scientia est de entibus per accidens, quae sunt contingentia: nulla enim scientia est de corruptibilibus (haec omnia ponuntur primo huius); sed demonstrationes non sunt necessariae nec sunt perpetuae, immo sunt corruptibiles et contingentes, quia possunt esse et non esse quando nos volumus: facimus enim eas quando volumus; igitur de demonstrationibus non potest esse scientia.

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1. It is argued that not: For, all knowledge is of things that are necessary, that cannot stand otherwise, and that are everlasting, as is evident from the first of this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). And no knowledge of things is had through their accidents, which are contingent. Indeed, there is no knowledge of corruptible things (all of which is laid out at the start of this (book [i.e. AnaPost])). But demonstrations are neither necessary nor everlasting, but rather corruptible and contingent, because they can be and not be when we want it; for we make them when we want to do so. Therefore, there cannot be any knowledge of demonstrations.

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|<div id=S2></div>2. Secundo, omne quod scitur scitur per definitionem vel per demonstrationem, ut dicit Lincolniensis*, secundo huius; sed neutro modo potest demonstratio sciri; igitur nullo modo. Probo minorem. Primo, quod demonstratio non scitur per definitionem: quia solius incomplexi est definitio; demonstratio autem non est incomplexa; igitur non scitur per definitionem. Nec etiam scitur per demonstrationem: quia sequeretur quod idem notificaret se ipsum. Probo quod de demonstratione potissima non possit esse scientia per demonstrationem: quia demonstratio debet tradi per notiora et nulla demonstratio est notior demonstratione potissima; ideo demonstratio potissima per nullam demonstrationem scitur vel notificatur.

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2. Second, everything that is known, is known either by definition or by demonstration, as the Lincolnite [Grosseteste] says, following this (book [i.e. AnaPost]). But demonstration can be known in neither of these ways, and therefore in no way. I prove the minor (premise). First, that demonstration is not known by definition: For, a definition exists only of something non-complex, but a demonstration is not something non-complex. Therefore, it is not known be definition. Nor is it known by demonstration: For, it would follow that it is made known by itself. I prove that, of a primary demonstration, there cannot be any knowledge by demonstration. For a demonstration must be given from something that is more familiar, and nothing is more familiar than a primary demonstration. Therefore, a primary demonstration is not know or made known by any demonstration.

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|<div id=S3></div>3. Item, nulla est scientia de demonstratione nisi logica; sed logica non est scientia; igitur nulla scientia est de demonstratione. Et ego probo unico argumento minorem: quia nulla ars est scientia, eo quod ars et scientia contra invicem distinguuntur, sexto Ethicorum*; modo logica est ars, ut communiter dicitur; ergo ipsa non est scientia.

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3. Also, knowledge of demonstration is nothing unless it is logic, but logic is not (a branch of) knowledge. Therefore, there is no (branch of knowledge) of demonstration. And I prove the minor (premise) by just a single argument: For, no art is (a branch of) knowledge, because art and knowledge (science) are distinguished from one another, in book six of the Ethics. Now, logic is an art, as is commonly said. So, it is not (a branch of) knowledge.

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|<div id=S4></div>4. Item, si esset de demonstratione scientia, vel esset practica vel speculativa (a sufficienti divisione); non speculativa, quia ipsa est de operatis a nobis, nec practica, quia ipsa ordinatur finaliter ad scire, et talis non est practica, ut habetur secundo Metaphysicae*.

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4. Also, if there was knowledge of demonstration, it would be either practical or speculative (by an exhaustive division). Not speculative because it is about something done by us; nor practical because it is ultimately directed at knowledge, and that is not practical, as is said in the second book of Metaphysics.

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|<div id=S5></div>5. Ultimo arguitur: demonstratio non est intelligibilis; igitur de ipsa non est scientia. Consequentia patet: quia scientia est habitus intellectualis; igitur non est nisi de intelligibilibus. Antecedens probatur. Primo, quia si demonstratio intelligeretur, oporteret plura simul intelligere, quod est contra Aristotilem, in Topicis, dicentem "contingit plura scire, unum autem intelligere"*, et etiam, quarto Metaphysicae, "qui non unum intelligit nihil intelligit"*.

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5. Lastly, it is argued: Demonstration is not intelligible, therefore there is no knowledge of it. It is clear how this follows (from the antecedent): Since knowledge is a state of the intellect, therefore it is only about intelligible things. The antecedent is proven (as follows). First, if a demonstration were understood, one would have to understand several things at the same time, which contradicts Aristotle saying, in Topics, “it can happen that one understands many things but one understands only one thing (at a time),” and also in book four of Metaphysics, “someone who doesn’t understand one thing, understands nothing.”

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|<div id=S6></div>6. Secundo, confirmatur quod demonstratio non sit intelligibilis: quia intelligibile debet movere intellectum; sed movens debet esse nobilius moto, ut dicitur secundo de Anima*, et demonstratio non est nobilior intellectu; igitur ipsa non est intelligibilis.

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6. Second, it is confirmed that demonstration is not intelligible: For what is intelligible must move the intellect. But what moves must be nobler than what is moved, as is said in the second book of De Anima, and demonstration is not nobler than the intellect. So it is not intelligible.

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|In oppositum est Aristotiles et omnes alii, quoniam per librum Posteriorum habemus scientiam de demonstrationibus.

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Against this is Aristotle and all the others, seeing as we have knowledge about demonstrations from the book Posterior (Analytics).

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|Notandum est quod licet 'scientia' multipliciter dicatur, tamen intendimus hic loqui de scientia demonstrativa, scilicet per demonstrationem vel demonstrationes acquisita. Et tunc sciendum est quod triplex est 'scibile'*, scilicet per demonstrationem. Primum et immediatum scibile est conclusio demonstrabilis, quae ex eo dicitur sciri quia ex praemissis notis concluditur. Secundo modo, 'scibilia' dicuntur ex quibus conclusio demonstrabilis componitur. Unde, sicut dicimus nos scire talem conclusionem et eam nobis esse demonstratam, ita saepe dicimus tale praedicatum esse scitum et demonstratum de tali subiecto. Deinde, tertio modo, scibilia sunt res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium, et ita dicimus nos habere scientiam de animalibus et lapidibus, de deo et intelligentiis, et sic de aliis.

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|Istis notatis, pono faciliter aliquas conclusiones. Prima est quod de demonstrationibus non est scientia primo modo, scilicet tamquam de conclusionibus demonstrabilibus: quia nulla demonstratio, immo etiam nullus syllogismus, efficitur conclusio alicuius demonstrationis.

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|Secunda conclusio est quod nulla scientia est de demonstratione secundo modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrabilis componitur: quia demonstrationes non sunt termini conclusionum, immo componuntur ex multis propositionibus et terminis. Tamen illa conclusio est moderanda sic quod una demonstratio, vel unus syllogismus, potest sumi materialiter et supponere pro se, et ita posset effici terminus, scilicet subiectum vel praedicatum, alicuius propositionis vel conclusionis. Sed numquam demonstratio significative accepta esset terminus conclusionis vel propositionis.

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|Tertia conclusio est quod capiendo tertio modo est scientia de demonstrationibus, immo de omnibus rebus mundi, tamquam de his quae per terminos conclusionis demonstrabilis significantur. Quia isti termini 'ens', 'unum', 'idem', 'diversum', 'causa', 'causatum', 'corruptibile', 'incorruptibile', et sic de multis aliis, significant omnes res mundi, et tamen ex istis terminis possunt componi multae conclusiones demonstrabiles, tam in physica quam in metaphysica. Igitur de omnibus rebus habetur scientia tam per physicam quam per metaphysicam, et, per consequens, de demonstrationibus.

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|Ultima conclusio est, descendens ad scientiam libri Posteriorum, quod de isto termino 'demonstratio' habetur scientia tertio modo, scilicet tamquam de termino ex quo conclusio demonstrata componitur. Et haec scientia habetur et traditur in isto libro Posteriorum, et non in Physica nec in Metaphysica. Multae enim conclusiones demonstrantur in isto libro quae componuntur ex isto termino 'demonstratio' tamquam ex subiecto propositionis; verbi gratia, quod demonstratio est ex veris vel quod demonstratio est ex necessariis.

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|Istis visis faciliter respondetur ad rationes.

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|<div id=S1R></div>1. Ad primam dico quod demonstratio debet esse ex necessariis, id est ex praemissis necessariis et conclusionibus, eo modo quo conclusio vocatur 'necessaria', et etiam ex incorruptibilibus, quia necessarium est incorruptibile eo modo quo est necessarium (et de hoc fiet post quaestio specialis). Tamen res significatae per terminos conclusionum demonstrabilium possunt esse corruptibiles et contingentes in essendo.

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|Ad aliam dico quod demonstratio non definitur nec demonstratur proprie loquendo. Sed iste terminus 'demonstratio' definitur in hoc libro, et de isto termino 'demonstratio multa praedicata demonstrantur in hoc libro. Et sic, ad istum sensum, habetur in isto libro scientia tam definitiva quam demonstrativa de demonstratione. Nec valent obiectiones contra hoc factae. Quia iste terminus 'demonstratio' est terminus incomplexus; ideo bene est diffinibilis. Similiter patet quod de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima' demonstrantur praedicata, et per demonstrationem potissimam. Unde licet demonstratio potissima sit per se nota, tamen multae propositiones possunt esse dubiae in quibus aliquid praedicatur de isto termino 'demonstratio potissima', et tales propositiones demonstrantur in hoc libro.

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|<div id=S3R></div>3. Ad aliam rationem, sciendum est quod hoc nomen 'scientia' prout distinguitur contra 'artem' et 'prudentiam' accipitur propriissime, et non extendit se nisi ad habitus speculativos; ars autem et prudentia sunt habitus practici. Et sic, capiendo ista nomina proprie, logica non est scientia, sed ars, scilicet formativa argumentationum. Tamen saepe haec nomina 'ars' et 'prudentia' accipiuntur communiter pro omni habitu certo per demonstrationem acquisito. Et sic 'ars' non distinguitur contra 'scientiam'; igitur sic logica est ars et scientia.

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|<div id=S4R></div>4. Ad aliam rationem, dico quod logica est practica, etiam ars demonstrativa tractata in libro Posteriorum, quia arguens ad opus et docens operationem: docet debito modo facere et componere argumentationem. Sed quando dicitur quod illa scientia est speculativa quae ordinatur ad scire, dico quod verum est si ordinatur ad scire tamquam ad finem propinquum. Sed si ordinatur ad opus nostrum tamquam ad finem propinquum, ipsa est practica, licet ordinetur ad scire tamquam ad finem remotum et ultimatum. Hoc dicit Aristotiles expresse, sexto Ethicorum*, ponens prudentiam esse practicam; tamen ponit eam finaliter ordinari ad sapientiam; est tamen practica quia eius finis propinquus est opus.

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|<div id=S5R></div>5. Ad ultimam dico quod demonstratio est intelligibilis, et dico quod possibile est plura simul intelligere. Nec Aristotiles in sexto Topicorum dicit oppositum nisi exemplariter; modo exemplorum non requiritur verificatio, ut patet primo Priorum*. Sed quando dicit Aristotiles, in Metaphysica, quod "qui unum non intelligit nihil intelligit"*, certe verum est, quia qui intelligit mille unum et duo intelligit.

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|<div id=S6R></div>6. Ad confirmationem, dico quod non omne intelligibile movet intellectum. Nam si habeo conceptum communem et specificum hominis, et omnes homines mundi intelligo, tamen homo qui est in Roma numquam movet intellectum meum, vel sensum. Tamen concedo quod oportet intellectum meum ab aliquo intelligibili moveri, et non ab omni. Et universaliter dico quod non oportet omne movens esse nobilius moto, sed movens principale et motor principalis; intellectus autem noster est aliquis quo est nobilior, et non scilicet obiectum sensibile per se.

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==Notes==
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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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Authors/Buridan/In libros posteriorum analyticorum/Liber 1/Q1

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