The Logic Museum - User contributions [en-gb]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 2

2025-06-14T00:43:10Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 1|Chapter 1]]|[[../Chapter 3|Chapter 3]]}}

{| border="1" cellpadding=10
|-
! valign="top" width="45%" | Latin
! valign="top" width="55%" | English
|- valign="top"
| '''[Cap. 2 De quibusdam praeambulis quae praemittenda sunt antequam descendatur ad propositum]'''
| '''[Chapter 2. Of certain preliminaries which we should give first, before we go to the matter in hand]'''
|- valign="top"
| Positis divisionibus et distinctionibus syllogismi, de quibusdam dividentibus in speciali est dicendum. Et primo de uniformi generatione syllogismorum de inesse, secundo de uniformi modalium, et tertio de mixtis.
| Having given the divisions and distinctions of the syllogism, we should speak of certain specific divisions. And first, of the uniform generation of assertoric syllogisms, second, of the uniform generation of modal syllogisms, and third, of mixed syllogisms.
|- valign="top"
| Circa primum primo est dicendum de syllogismis ex omnibus de inesse et de praesenti, secundo de aliis. Sed antequam accedatur ad propositum, videnda sunt quaedam praeambula.
| Concerning the first, we should speak about syllogisms from propositions that are all assertoric and present tense, second, of others. But before we reach the matter in hand, we should deal with certain preliminaries.
|- valign="top"
| Primum est quod tantum sunt duae praemissae categoricae ponendae in syllogismo et conclusio; et tantum tres termini, scilicet maior extremitas et minor et medium. Est autem medium quod ponitur in utraque praemissa; maior extremitas est quae cum medio termino ponitur in maiori; minor extremitas quae ponitur cum medio in minori propositione, hoc est in secunda propositione.
| The first is that in a syllogism there are only two categorical premisses plus a conclusion, and only three terms , namely the major, the minor and the middle term. Now the middle is the term given in both premisses, the major is the term which is given with the middle term in the major premiss, the minor term is the term which is given with the middle in the minor premiss (i.e. the second proposition)
|- valign="top"
| Secundum est quod tantum sunt tres figurae. Prima est in qua medius terminus subicitur in prima propositione et praedicatur in secunda. Secunda figura est quando medius terminus praedicatur in utraque. Tertia figura est quando medius terminus subicitur in utraque. Non est apponenda quarta figura, quia si medius terminus praedicetur in prima propositione et subiciatur in secunda, non erit nisi transpositio propositionum positarum in prima figura, et ideo non sequitur alia conclusio quam illa quae sequitur ex praemissis dispositis in prima figura.
| The second is that there are only three figures. The first is in which the middle term is the subject in the first premiss, and the predicate in the second. The second figure is when the middle term is predicated in both. The third figure is when the middle term is the subject in both. There is no fourth figure to be added, for if the middle term is the predicate in the first proposition and the subject in the second, it will only be a transposition of the propositions given in the first figure, and therefore there will not follow any other conclusion than that which follows from the premisses arranged in the first figure.
|- valign="top"
| Et ideo non est negandum quin possit argui ex duabus praemissis in quarum prima medius terminus praedicetur et in secunda subiciatur, sed illa conclusio quae primo sequitur ex illis praemissis erit eadem quae sequitur ex eisdem praemissis dispositis in prima figura. Si enim arguatur sic 'omnis homo est animal; omne animal est substantia', conclusio quae primo sequitur est ista 'igitur omnis homo est substantia'. Et ista sequitur ex praemissis eisdem, dispositis in prima figura, sic 'omne animal est substantia omnis homo est animal; igitur omnis homo est substantia'.
| And therefore it should not be denied but that it could be argued from the two premisses, in the first of which the middle term is the predicate and in the second the subject, but the conclusion which first follows from those premisses will be the same as from the same premisses arranged in the first figure. For if we argue "every man is an animal, every animal is a substance", the conclusion which follows first is "therefore every man is a substance". And this follows from the same premisses arranged as in the first figure, thus: "every animal is a substance, every man is an animal, therefore every man is a substance".
|- valign="top"
| Tertium praeambulum est quod omnis syllogismus, immediate vel mediate, regulatur per dici de omni vel per dici de nullo. Syllogismi enim in prima figura regulantur immediate per dici de omni vel per dici de nullo. Syllogismi autem secundae et tertiae figurae reducuntur in syllogismos primae figurae, vel per conversionem vel per impossibile vel per transpositionem propositionum, et ideo mediate regulantur per dici de omni vel per dici de nullo. Et quandocumque sic est quod aliquis discursus regulatur per dici de omni vel per dici de nullo, sive mediate sive immediate, ille discursus est bonus.
| The third preliminary is that every syllogism, immediate or mediate, is governed by ''dici de omni'' (to be said of all) or ''dici de nullo'' (to be said of none). For syllogisms in the first figure are governed immediately by ''dici de omni'', or by ''dici de nullo''. And syllogisms of the second and third figure are reduced into syllogisms of the first figure, either by conversion or ''per impossible'' (by impossibility) or by the transposition of propositions, and are therefore mediately governed by ''dici de omni'' or ''dici de nullo''. And whenever it is the case that some discourse is governed by ''dici de omni'' or ''dici de nullo'', whether mediately or immediately, that discourse is good.
|- valign="top"
| Est autem dici de omni quando nihil est sumere sub subiecto, quin de eo dicatur praedicatum,. Quod est sic intelligendum: non quod praedicatum conveniat cuilibet de quo dicitur subiectum, -- tunc enim non esset dici de omni nisi in propositionibus veris --, sed sufficit quod per talem propositionem denotetur quod nihil sit sumere sub subiecto, quin de eo dicatur praedicatum. Et hoc denotatur per omnem propositionem universalem affirmativam. Dici de nullo est quando per eam denotatur quod de quocumque dicitur subiectum, quod ab eo removetur praedicatum. Et hoc denotatur per omnem propositionem universalem negativam, sive sit vera sive falsa.
| Now ''dici de omni'' happens when nothing is subsumed under the subject, without the predicate being predicated of it, which is to be understood as follows. Not that the predicate belongs to everything of which the subject is predicated (for then it would only be ''dici de omni'' in true propositions), but that it is sufficient that by such a proposition it is denoted that nothing is subsumed under the subject, without the predicate being predicated of it. And this is denoted by every universal affirmative proposition. ''Dici de nullo'' is when it is denoted by the proposition that whatever the subject is predicated of, the predicate is removed from it. And this is denoted by every universal negative proposition, whether it is true or false. 

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]
[[Category:Dici de omni]]

User talk:Ragnarr49

2025-04-26T13:22:50Z

Ragnarr49: /* Welcome */

==Welcome==
Thanks for these corrections - some pretty gross errors there!

We ought to discuss the review methodology some time. [[User:Edward Ockham|Edward Ockham]] 05:37, 29 November 2018 (CST)

If you look at [[Authors/Ockham/Summa_Logicae/Book_I/Chapter_2]] you can see the tick box in action. [[Authors/Ockham/Summa_Logicae/Book_I]] shows the colour coding for templates. However there is no code for copyediting work, which is what (I think) you are doing. Any thoughts welcome. [[User:Edward Ockham|Edward Ockham]] 05:41, 29 November 2018 (CST)

I agree that my efforts are copyediting or proofreading. I do not feel they are a blessing of the translation by a competent authority. I do not think that they warrant color coding. Thank you.

I have just translated the missing and untranslated portions of Summa Logicae, Book 1, Ch 49-53. You may want to check it and update the status as you see fit. Ch 52 and 53 are currently labeled as Untranslated. Thanks and best wishes.

------------------------------

Hello,
I am back after a long hiatus and have started supplying translations for various chapters in Section 3 of Occam's Summa Logicae. I am not a professional logician, so I occasionally struggle with some terminology. Ultimately, it would be good to have a pro go through and make wording consistent, especially since there are multiple translators. I am making fairly rapid progress.
Best wishes,
Jim Cooper

-----------------------------

Hello, It is good to hear from you. I am glad that the site is still active. Things were pretty quiet for a while. I am going through and editing the translation of Book 3 for accuracy and consistency. Over the course of translating, I came up with what I felt were better solutions, so I am going back through and bringing it all up to par. Plenty of typos to fix, too. I am changing the status to Reviewed by Translator as I go. I filled the gaps in the first 2 books, except for 13 chapters in book 2, which I will do when I finish the review of Book 3. Is there a way to generate a PDF or other document of the full text? I would like to have it in a portable format. I look forward to your improvements. There are a few chapters that were tough to translate, which could definitely use a rework. Thanks, and let me know when you are able to tackle it. I did my best to translate everything to English, to better serve a casual reader, although that is not as smooth as leaving technical terms like 'de possibili' in Latin. When we're done, we should give this some publicity, since it has never been fully translated before. Maybe update the Wikipedia page.

-----------------------------

I finished a review of Book 3 and made many corrections and refinements. I am now working the untranslated chapters in Book 2. I put in a discussion on Book 2, Chapter 21 about "de inesse", which I have translated as "of inherence". I have finished the untranslated chapters in Book 2.
Best wishes, Jim

-----------------------------

Hello, I have finished changing terminology to de necessario, de possibili, de contingenti, and assertoric. I also changed de impossibili, dici de omni, dici de nullo and their variants.
Best wishes, Jim

-----------------------------

:Hi. As I mentioned, I am finishing off the book but will review in May. [[User:Edward Ockham|Edward Ockham]] ([[User talk:Edward Ockham|talk]]) 16:15, 12 April 2025 (CDT)

==Welcome back==
Hello, thanks for this impressive effort. I am on a project until May, but I will work through your translation in time. Much of this has never been translated before. [[User:Edward Ockham|Edward Ockham]] ([[User talk:Edward Ockham|talk]]) 14:38, 21 March 2025 (CDT)

==Test==

Message [[User:Edward Ockham|Edward Ockham]] ([[User talk:Edward Ockham|talk]]) 06:17, 13 April 2025 (CDT)
:Reply to message [[User:Edward Ockham|Edward Ockham]] ([[User talk:Edward Ockham|talk]]) 06:17, 13 April 2025 (CDT)

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 12

2025-04-26T13:13:48Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 11|Chapter 11]]|[[../Chapter 13|Chapter 13]]}}
 
{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||CAP. 12. DE FALLACIA CONSEQUENTIS.

||Chapter 12. On the fallacy of the consequent.

|- valign = top
||Quia secundum Aristotelem fallacia consequentis est pars accidentis, ideo post fallaciam accidentis sequitur videre de fallacia consequentis.

||Thus, according to Aristotle, the fallacy of the consequent is a part of accident, therefore after the fallacy of the accident it follows to examine the fallacy of the consequent.

|- valign = top
||Et est fallacia consequentis quando creditur antecedens sequi ad consequens sicut consequens sequitur ad antecedens. Ita quod causa apparentiae istius fallaciae provenit ex similitudine consequentis ad antecedens; et causa non-exsistentiae est diversitas inter antecedens et consequens.

||And there is a fallacy of the consequent when it is believed that the antecedent follows the consequent as the consequent follows the antecedent. So that the cause of the appearance of this fallacy comes from the similarity of the consequent to the antecedent; and the cause of its non-existence is the diversity between the antecedent and the consequent.

|- valign = top
||Fit autem fallacia consequentis vel arguendo ex propositionibus quarum una sequitur ad aliam et non e converso; vel arguendo ex una condicionali ad aliam condicionalem in qua oppositum antecedentis primae condicionalis ponitur antecedens et oppositum consequentis primae condicionalis ponitur loco consequentis.

||But the fallacy of the consequent occurs either by arguing from propositions one of which follows from another and not vice versa; or by arguing from one conditional to another conditional in which the opposite of the antecedent of the first conditional is placed as the antecedent and the opposite of the consequent of the first conditional is placed in place of the consequent.

|- valign = top
||Sicut sic arguendo `si homo currit, animal currit; igitur si nullus homo currit, nullum animal currit'.

||As in arguing thus `if a man runs, an animal runs; therefore if no man runs, no animal runs'.

|- valign = top
||Hic enim est fallacia consequentis. Et est regula generalis pro omnibus talibus quod quando arguitur ex condicionali una ad aliam condicionalem, in qua oppositum antecedentis primae ponitur loco antecedentis et oppositum consequentis loco consequentis, est fallacia consequentis.

||For here is the fallacy of the consequent. And there is a general rule for all such things that when an argument is made from one conditional to another conditional, in which the opposite of the first antecedent is put in place of the antecedent and the opposite of the consequent in place of the consequent, there is a fallacy of the consequent.

|- valign = top
||Et hoc propter istam regulam: quamvis aliqua consequentia sit bona, non oportet oppositum antecedentis inferre oppositum consequentis, quamvis aliquando gratia terminorum ex opposito antecedentis sequatur oppositum consequentis.

||And this is because of this rule: although a consequence is good, one must not infer the opposite of the antecedent from the opposite of the consequent, although sometimes, by virtue of the terms, the opposite of the consequent follows from the opposite of the antecedent.

|- valign = top
||Et ideo de isto non oportet plus loqui, quia evidenter potest sciri quando iste modus accidit et quando non, scita ista regula data nunc, et scito quando est alius modus istius fallaciae. Unde sciendum est quod quandoque committitur fallacia consequentis arguendo enthymematice et quandoque arguendo ex pluribus propositionibus.

||And therefore there is no need to speak more about this, because it can be clearly known when this mode occurs and when it does not, knowing this rule given now, and knowing when there is another mode of this fallacy. Hence it should be known that sometimes the fallacy of the consequent is committed by arguing enthymematically and sometimes by arguing from several propositions.

|- valign = top
||Si arguatur ex pluribus propositionibus, ad hoc quod sit consequens requiritur quod consequens inferat quamlibet propositionem positam in antecedente, et non e converso.

||If it is argued from several propositions, for it to be consequent it is required that the consequent infer any proposition placed in the antecedent, and not vice versa.

|- valign = top
||Et si arguatur in figura, semper simul cum hoc erit fallacia accidentis. Et universaliter quando est fallacia consequentis etiam in enthymemate, et illa consequentia reducitur in figuram debitam, si remaneat fallacia consequentis in illo discursu composito ex propositionibus dispositis in figura, erit non solum fallacia consequentis, sed etiam erit fallacia accidentis.

||And if it is argued in a figure, there will always be a fallacy of accident along with this. And universally, when there is a fallacy of the consequent even in an enthymeme, and that consequence is reduced to the proper figure, if the fallacy of the consequent remains in that discourse composed of propositions arranged in the figure, there will be not only a fallacy of the consequent, but there will also be a fallacy of accident.

|- valign = top
||Et pro tanto dicit Philosophus quod consequens est pars accidentis, quia ubicumque est dispositio propositionum in figura, si sit ibi fallacia consequentis, erit etiam ibi fallacia accidentis, sed non e converso.

||And for this reason the Philosopher says that the consequent is a part of the accident, because wherever there is an arrangement of propositions in a figure, if there is a fallacy of the consequent there, there will also be a fallacy of the accident there, but not vice versa.

|- valign = top
||Unde hic est fallacia consequentis `omnis homo est animal; omnis asinus est animal; ergo omnis asinus est homo', quia utraque praemissa sequitur ex conclusione et non e converso; et est etiam hic fallacia accidentis, sicut patet per praedicta.

||Hence here is a fallacy of the consequent `every man is an animal; every donkey is an animal; therefore every donkey is a man', because both premises follow from the conclusion and not vice versa; and here too there is a fallacy of accident, as is clear from what has been said.

|- valign = top
||Sed hic `omnis homo est albus; omnis homo est visus; ergo omne visum est album' est fallacia accidentis, sed non est hic fallacia consequentis, quia conclusio nullam praemissam infert.

||But this, `every man is white; every man is a seen thing; therefore every seen thing is white', is a fallacy of accident, but it is not here a fallacy of the consequent, because the conclusion does not imply any premise.

|- valign = top
||Et ideo falsum est quod aliqui dicunt quod semper arguendo ex omnibus affirmativis in secunda figura est facere fallaciam consequentis. Videndum est ergo de fallacia consequentis arguendo enthymematice, quo viso scietur faciliter quando generaliter est fallacia consequentis, sive arguatur ex pluribus praemissis sive non.

||And therefore it is false what some say, that by always arguing from all the affirmatives in the second figure, one is creating a fallacy of the consequent. Therefore, we must see about the fallacy of the consequent by arguing enthymematically, by which it will be easily known when there is a fallacy of the consequent in general, whether it is argued from several premises or not.

|- valign = top
||Unde sciendum quod ad assignandum fallaciam consequentis non sufficit dicere quod sequitur e converso et non sic. Quamvis enim ista sit generalis solutio, tamen praeter istam solutionem generalem oportet dare aliam regulam specialem quare sequitur e converso et non sic.

||Hence it should be known that to assign the fallacy of the consequent it is not enough to say that it follows conversely and not thus. For although this is a general solution, nevertheless, in addition to this general solution it is necessary to give another special rule why it follows from the converse and not so.

|- valign = top
||Et hoc est in assignando duas regulas speciales, per quarum unam declaratur quod sequitur e converso et per aliam quod non sequitur sic. Et ita generaliter in assignatione fallaciae consequentis oportet duas regulas speciales assignare et pro diversis sophismatibus oportet diversis regulis uti, de quibus aliquae gratia exempli subicientur.

||And this is in assigning two special rules, by one of which it is declared that it follows conversely and by the other that it does not follow thus. And so generally in assigning the fallacy of the consequent it is necessary to assign two special rules and for different sophisms it is necessary to use different rules, of which some examples will be given.

|- valign = top
||Unde sciendum quod quando arguitur ab inferiori distributo ad superius distributum est fallacia consequentis.

||Hence it should be known that when an argument is made from an inferior distributed to a superior distributed, it is a fallacy of the consequent.

|- valign = top
||Sicut hic est fallacia consequentis `omnis homo currit, igitur omne animal currit'. Tenet enim e converso per istam regulam `a superiori distributo ad inferius distributum est bona consequentia'; non tenet autem sic, quia ab inferiori ad superius cum distributione non valet consequentia.

||Just as here is a fallacy of the consequent: `every man runs, therefore every animal runs'. For conversely, by this rule `from a superior distributed to an inferior distributed is a good consequence' holds; but it does not hold in this way, because the consequence from a lower to a higher is not valid with distribution.

|- valign = top
||Similiter quando arguitur a termino stante confuse tantum ad terminum stantem determinate, nulla variatione facta circa alios terminos, est fallacia consequentis.

||Similarly, when an argument is made from a term that stands only confusedly to a term that stands determinately, with no variation made regarding other terms, it is a fallacy of the consequent.

|- valign = top
||Sicut hic est fallacia consequentis `omnis homo est animal, igitur animal est omnis homo'. Tenet enim e converso, per istam regulam `a termino stante determinate ad terminum stantem confuse tantum, nulla variatione facta circa alios terminos, est bona consequentia', eo quod contingit ascendere ad terminum stantem confuse tantum.

||Just as here is a fallacy of the consequent: `every man is an animal, therefore an animal is every man'. For it holds conversely, by this rule `from a term standing determinately to a term standing only confusedly, with no variation made about other terms, is a good consequence', because it is possible to ascend to a term standing only confusedly.

|- valign = top
||Non tenet autem sic, propter istam regulam quae nunc dicta est, scilicet quod `a termino stante confuse tantum ad terminum stantem determinate non valet consequentia'. Unde per istum modum peccant omnia talia sophismata: omni parte istius continui est aliqua pars eius prius terminata, ergo aliqua pars istius continui est prius terminata omni parte istius continui; inter omne instans futurum et hoc instans est aliquod instans medium, ergo aliquod instans est medium inter omne instans futurum et hoc instans; omni quantitate potest fieri aliqua quantitas maior, igitur potest fieri aliqua quantitas maior omni quantitate; post omnem diem potest esse aliqua dies, ergo aliqua dies potest esse post omnem diem; omni parte continui potest dari aliqua pars minor, ergo aliqua pars minor omni parte continui potest dari.

||But it does not hold thus, because of that rule which has just been stated, namely that `from a terminus standing only confusedly to a terminus standing determinately the consequence is not valid'. Hence in this way all such sophisms err: in every part of that continuum there is some part of it previously terminated, therefore some part of that continuum is previously terminated in every part of that continuum; between every future instant and this instant there is some intermediate instant, therefore some instant is intermediate between every future instant and this instant; some quantity can be made greater than every quantity, therefore some quantity can be made greater than every quantity; after every day there can be some day, therefore some day can be after every day; in every part of the continuum there can be some smaller part, therefore some smaller part can be made in every part of the continuum.

|- valign = top
||In omnibus enim istis et consimilibus praedicatum in antecedente supponit confuse tantum, propter hoc quod sequitur signum mediate, et in conclusione supponit determinate, quia praecedit signum, ideo est fallacia consequentis.

||For in all these and similar cases the predicate in the antecedent supposits only confusedly, because the sign follows mediately, and in the conclusion it supposits determinately, because the sign precedes, therefore it is a fallacy of the consequent.

|- valign = top
||<Similiter est hic>: utrumque istorum potest esse verum, <demonstratis duobus contradictoriis dubitabilibus>, ergo aliquod verum potest esse utrumque istorum. Item, arguendo a termino stante determinate vel confuse tantum ad terminum stantem confuse et distributive, est fallacia consequentis.

||It is similar here: both of these can be true, <having demonstrated two doubtful contradictions>, therefore something true can be both of these. Likewise, by arguing from a term that stands determinately or only confusedly to a term that stands confusedly and distributively, there is a fallacy of the consequent.

|- valign = top
||Sicut hic: tu ignoras aliquam propositionem, ergo tu nescis aliquam propositionem; tu dubitas aliquid, igitur tu nescis aliquid; Sortes videt non-hominem, ergo Sortes non videt hominem.

||As here: you are ignorant of some proposition, therefore you do not know some proposition; you doubt something, therefore you do not know something; Socrates sees a non-man, therefore Socrates does not see a man.

|- valign = top
||Item, quando obliquus et rectus sequuntur signum universale affirmativum, primo ponendo rectum post signum et obliquum, et post praeponendo rectum signo et obliquo, est facere fallaciam consequentis.

||Likewise, when the oblique and the direct (nominative) follow a universal affirmative sign, by first placing the direct after the sign and the oblique, and then by placing the direct before the sign and the oblique, one is creating a fallacy of the consequent.

|- valign = top
||Sicut sic arguendo `omnem hominem videns est asinus, ergo videns omnem hominem est asinus'; quia ponatur quod quilibet asinus videat aliquem hominem et nullus asinus videat omnem hominem, tunc est antecedens verum et consequens falsum.

||For example, by arguing that `everything seeing a man is a donkey, therefore something seeing every man is a donkey'; because it is assumed that every donkey sees some man and no donkey sees every man, then the antecedent is true and the consequent false.

|- valign = top
||Item, quando alicuius universalis quaelibet singularis per se sumpta est vera, tamen simul sumpta sunt incompossibilia, et tamen quaelibet est compossibilis alteri, tunc arguendo ab universali de possibili, aequivalenti sensui compositionis, ad propositionem de possibili in qua subiectum cum eodem signo ponitur a parte praedicati, est fallacia consequentis.

||Likewise, when any singular of some universal taken by itself is true, yet taken together they are incompatible, and yet each is composable with the other, then arguing from the universal de possibili, equivalent to the sense of composition, to a proposition de possibili in which the subject is placed with the same sign on the part of the predicate, is a fallacy of the consequent.

|- valign = top
||Sicut sic arguendo `secundum omne signum potest continuum dividi, igitur continuum potest dividi secundum omne signum'. Nec sequitur `continuum potest dividi secundum hoc signum et continuum potest dividi secundum illud signum, et sic de singulis, ergo continuum potest dividi secundum omne signum'.

||Just as by arguing thus `according to every sign a continuum can be divided, therefore a continuum can be divided according to every sign.' Nor does it follow `a continuum can be divided according to this sign and a continuum can be divided according to that sign, and so on for each, therefore a continuum can be divided according to every sign.'

|- valign = top
||Tamen frequenter in auctoribus una talium propositionum ponitur loco alterius, quamvis de virtute sermonis non aequivaleant. Propter quod in talibus est fallacia consequentis, secundum principia Aristotelis, `omni forma potest haec materia privari, igitur haec materia potest privari omni forma'.

||Yet frequently in authors one of such propositions is put in place of the other, although they are not equivalent in reality. Because of this, in such propositions there is a fallacy of the consequence, according to Aristotle's principles, `of every form this matter can be deprived, therefore this matter can be deprived of every form'.

|- valign = top
||Per istam enim `omni forma potest haec materia privari' non denotatur nisi quod quaelibet talis sit possibilis `hac forma privatur haec materia', quacumque forma demonstrata.

||For by this `of every form this matter can be deprived' is denoted nothing but that any such `this matter is deprived of this form' is possible, whatever form is demonstrated.

|- valign = top
||Et manifestum est, secundum principia Aristotelis, quod quaelibet talis est vera. Sed per istam `haec materia potest privari omni forma' denotatur quod haec sit possibilis `haec materia est privata omni forma'.

||And it is clear, according to Aristotle's principles, that any such thing is true. But by this `this matter can be deprived of every form' is denoted that this is possible `this matter is deprived of all form'.

|- valign = top
||Sed haec est impossibilis, secundum principia Aristotelis. Similiter hic est fallacia consequentis `in omni instanti futuro potest iste peccare, --- demonstrato aliquo qui nunc est sub actu meritorio ---, igitur iste potest peccare in omni instanti futuro'.

||But this is impossible, according to Aristotle's principles. Similarly, here is a fallacy of the consequent `in every future instant this person can sin, --- pointing to someone who is now doing a meritorious act ---, therefore this person can sin in every future instant'.

|- valign = top
||Nam antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, eo quod non est dare ultimum rei permanentis in esse, et per consequens si iste actus meritorius est, erit post hoc instans. Similiter hic est fallacia consequentis `ante omne instans futurum potest Sortes non esse, ergo Sortes potest non esse ante omne instans futurum'.

||For the antecedent is true and the consequent false, because it is not possible to give the ultimate of a thing that remains in being, and consequently if this act is meritorious, there will be an instant after this. Similarly, here is a fallacy of the consequent `before every future instant Socrates cannot be, therefore Socrates cannot be before every future instant'.

|- valign = top
||Item, quando aliqua propositio modalis non potest converti transponendo praecise terminos sequentes et praecedentes verbum vel verba, arguendo a tali modali indefinita vel universali ad conversam singularem vel ei aequivalentem est fallacia consequentis quantum est ex forma arguendi, quamvis in aliquibus terminis teneat.

||Likewise, when some modal proposition cannot be converted by precisely transposing the terms following and preceding the word or words, arguing from such an indefinite or universal modal to a converted singular or equivalent is a fallacy of the consequent as far as it is from the form of the argument, although it holds for some terms.

|- valign = top
||Propter quod in talibus est fallacia consequentis `actum meritorium potest Deus facere se solo, ergo Deus se solo potest facere actum meritorium'. Verumtamen sciendum est quod in omnibus praedictis potest assignari fallacia figurae dictionis.

||Because of this, in such things there is a fallacy of the consequent: `God can perform a meritorious act by himself alone, therefore God alone, by himself can perform a meritorious act.' However, it should be known that in all the above, a fallacy of figure of speech can be assigned.

|- valign = top
||Multae aliae regulae possent dari deservientes isti fallaciae. Sed sciendum est quod ad sciendum generaliter quando est fallacia consequentis et quando non, oportet scire omnes regulas, datas prius, deservientes consequentiis, et universaliter omnes quae possunt deservire cuicumque enthymemati. Et ideo nisi sciantur omnes regulae consequentiarum non potest universaliter sciri quando est ista fallacia et quando non accidit huiusmodi fallacia.

||Many other rules could be given that serve this fallacy. But it should be known that in order to know generally when there is a fallacy of the consequent and when not, it is necessary to know all the rules given previously that serve consequences, and universally all those that can serve any enthymeme. And therefore, unless all the rules of consequences are known, it cannot be known universally when this fallacy exists and when this kind of fallacy does not occur.
|}

==Notes==
<references/>
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 11

2025-04-26T13:12:16Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 10|Chapter 10]]|[[../Chapter 12|Chapter 12]]}} 

{| border="1" cellpadding=10
|-
! valign="top" width="45%" | Latin
! valign="top" width="55%" | English
|- valign="top"
| '''[CAP. 11. DE FALLACIA ACCIDENTIS]'''
| '''[Chapter 11.  On the fallacy of accident]'''
|- valign="top"
| Post fallacias in dictione dicendum est de fallaciis extra dictionem, inter quas primo ponitur fallacia accidentis. Circa quam sciendum quod hic non accipitur `accidens' illo modo quo accipitur prius, ubi determinatur de accidente quod ponitur unum quinque universalium, sed accipitur hic 'accidens' pro omni termino qui potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum distinctum ab alio. Unde omnis terminus qui potest esse subiectum vel praedicatum propositionis potest esse et est accidens respectu alicuius, quia est distinctum praedicabile vel subicibile ab alio praedicabili.
| After linguistic fallacies we should speak of non-linguistic fallacies, of which first given is the fallacy of accident. Concerning this it should be known that ‘accident’ is not understood here in the mode in which it was accepted before, where it was determined before that an accident is one of the five universals. Rather, ‘accident’ is understood here for any term which can be a subject or predicate distinct from another. Hence, every term which can be the subject or predicate of a proposition can be and is an accident in respect of another, for it is a distinct predicable or ‘subjectible’ from another predicable.
|- valign="top"
| Causa apparentiae istius fallaciae est identitas praedicationis unius termini cum alio, hoc est, causa quare decipit: quia videmus unum terminum de alio praedicari affirmative vel negative, credimus quod quidquid dicitur de uno, dicetur de reliquo.
| The reason for the appearance of this fallacy is the identity of predication of one term with another, that is, the reason why it deceives, for we see one term predicated affirmatively or negatively of another, and we see that whatever is said of one, will be said of the other.
|- valign="top"
| Causa non-exsistentiae est, quia quamvis unus terminus praedicetur de alio, non est necesse quod quidquid dicitur de accidente, hoc est de uno illorum, quod propter hoc dicatur de reliquo; vel non est necesse eodem modo dici de reliquo quo unum illorum dicitur de alio.
| The cause of non-existence is that although one term is predicated of another, it is not necessary that whatever is said of the accident, i.e. of one of them, is said on that account of the other, or that it is not necessary to be said in the same way of the other, by which one of them is said of another.
|- valign="top"
| Et ideo responsio generalis ad omnes paralogismos accidentis est dicere quod non est necesse sequi conclusionem ex praemissis, hoc est, non est necesse praedicatum conclusionis dici de subiecto conclusionis propter unionem illorum in praemissis cum aliquo uno.
| And therefore the general reply to all paralogisms of accident is to say that it is not necessary that the conclusion follows from the premises, i.e. that it is not necessary that the predicate of the conclusion is predicated of the subject of the conclusion, because of their union in the premises with some single thing.
|- valign="top"
| Sicut non est necesse ista extrema <'homo --- asinus'> coniungi per praedicationem, sic dicendo `homo est asinus', quamvis isti duo termini `homo' et `asinus' coniungantur per praedicationem cum hoc medio `animal', sic dicendo `asinus est animal', `homo est animal'.
| For example, it is not necessary for the extremes ‘man … donkey’ to be joined in predication, in saying ‘a man is a donkey’, although the two terms ‘man’ and ‘donkey’ are joined by predication with the middle term ‘animal’, in saying ‘a donkey is an animal’, ‘a man is an animal’.
|- valign="top"
| Et ista est responsio generalis ad omnes paralogismos accidentis. Sed praeter istam responsionem generalem oportet, secundum Aristotelem, proferre `ut', hoc est oportet assignare aliquam regulam evidentem specialem quare non sequitur, et pro diversis oportet diversas regulas speciales assignare. Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod duo sunt modi principales istius fallaciae. Unus modus est quando aliqua quae per praedicationem coniunguntur in praemissis cum tertio, concluduntur coniungi inter se in conclusione. Secundus modus est quando aliqua coniuncta cum aliquo uno per propositiones diversas concluduntur per unicam propositionem coniungi cum eodem tertio.
| And that is a general reply to all paralogisms of accident. But beyond that general response we have, according to Aristotle, to utter ‘as’, i.e. we have to assign some evident specific rule why it does not follow, and we have to assign diverse specific rules for diverse cases. For evidence of this you should know that there are two principal modes of this fallacy. One mode is when things which are joined in predication are joined in the premises with a third, are concluded to be joined with one another in the conclusion. The second mode is when things joined with some single thing by diverse propositions are concluded, by a single proposition, to be joined with the same third thing.
|- valign="top"
| Et est sciendum quod fallacia accidentis non est assignanda ex variatione medii, quia non oportet medium in fallacia accidentis variari. Hic enim nulla est variatio medii `Sortes est homo; Plato est homo; ergo Plato est Sortes'. Sed semper vel frequenter accidit fallacia accidentis ex identitate medii; quando enim propter hoc quod aliqua coniunguntur per praedicationem in medio non variato creditur quod coniungantur per praedicationem inter se, et tamen non oportet, est fallacia accidentis. Sed hic non potest dari aliqua regula generalis sufficiens, quia nec per variationem medii, sicut dictum est, nec per reduplicationem minoris propositionis super maiorem extremitatem, quia frequenter talis reduplicativa est impossibilis, et tamen syllogismus est bonus.
| And it should be known that the fallacy of accident should not be assigned from the variation of the middle, because the middle does not have to be varied in the fallacy of accident. For in “Socrates is a man, Plato is a man, therefore Plato is Socrates” there is no variation of the middle term. But always or frequently the fallacy of accident happens with the identity of the middle, for when, from the fact that some things are joined by predication in a middle which is not varied, it is believed that they are joined by predication between themselves, and yet this does not have to be fallacy of accident. But here there cannot be given some general rule that is sufficient, because it is neither by variation of the middle, as was said, nor by reduplication of the minor proposition above the major extremity, because frequently such a reduplicative is impossible, and yet the syllogism is good.
|- valign="top"
| Sicut hic est bonus syllogismus `omnis homo est lapis; omnis albedo est homo; ergo omnis albedo est lapis', et tamen ista reduplicativa est impossibilis `omnis albedo est homo in quantum est lapis'.
| For example, the syllogism “every man is a stone, every whiteness is a man, therefore every whiteness is a stone” is good, and yet the reduplicative “every whiteness is a man insofar as it is a stone”.
|- valign="top"
| Non potest igitur dari regula generalis pro omnibus paralogismis per quam sufficienter sciatur fallacia accidentis in quolibet casu. Est igitur sciendum quod primus modus fallaciae accidentis est quando praemissae disponuntur in figura et non in modo.
| Nor can there be given a general rule for all paralogisms through which fallacy of accident is sufficiently known in every case. Therefore, it should be known that the first mode of the fallacy of accident is when premises are disposed in figure and not in mode.
|- valign="top"
| Et hoc potest accidere vel quando praemissae sunt simpliciter categoricae et de praesenti et de inesse, vel quando sunt de modo, vel una est de modo et alia de inesse, vel de praeterito vel de futuro.
| And this can happen either when the premises are simply categorical and present tense assertoric, or when they are modal, or one is  modal and the other assertoric, or past or future.
|- valign="top"
| Unde penes istum modum fallaciae accidentis peccant omnes coniugationes inutiles, sive uniformes sive mixtae, de quibus loquitur Philosophus I Priorum et de quibus dictum est prius.
| Hence, all useless conjunctions err in this mode of the fallacy of accident, whether they are uniform or mixed, of which the Philosopher speaks about in the Prior Analytics, and of which we spoke earlier.
|- valign="top"
| Et ideo ad sciendum quando est iste modus fallaciae accidentis, oportet scire omnes regulas illas et oportet scire penes quam illarum regularum peccat paralogismus, et ideo pro diversis oportet diversas regulas assignare.
| And therefore it should be known that when it is this mode of the fallacy of accident, one has to know all the rules, and to know according to which of those rules the paralogism errs, and therefore one has to assign diverse rules for diverse cases.
|- valign="top"
| Unde hic est fallacia accidentis `veniens cognoscitur a te; Coriscus est veniens; igitur Coriscus cognoscitur a te'. Et in assignando debes proferre `ut', et dicere quod hic est fallacia accidentis, quia maior est particularis vel indefinita in prima figura in syllogismo affirmativo; quae maior si esset in proposito universalis, non esset aliqua fallacia.
| Hence "the one coming is known by you, Coriscus is coming, therefore Coriscus is known by you". And in assigning, you ought to say 'so', and say that this is the fallacy of accident, because the major is particular or indefinite in the first figure in an affirmative syllogism, which if the major were universal, there would be no fallacy.
|- valign="top"
| Unde hic nulla est fallacia `omnis veniens cognoscitur a te; Coriscus est veniens; igitur Coriscus cognoscitur a te', quia maior est universalis. Similiter hic est fallacia accidentis `omnis homo est animal; omnis asinus est animal; igitur omnis asinus est homo'.
| Hence there is no fallacy in "everything coming is known by you, Coriscus is coming, therefore Coriscus is known by you", for the major is universal.  Similarly "every man is an animal, every donkey is an animal, therefore every donkey is a man" is a fallacy of accident.
|- valign="top"
| Et assignatio generalis debet esse ista, quod hic est fallacia accidentis, quia quamvis animal praedicetur de homine, non oportet quod de quocumque dicitur `animal' quod de eodem dicatur `homo' tali modo quo animal dicitur de homine.
| And the general assignment must be this, that here is a fallacy of accident, because although an animal is predicated of a man, it is not necessary that whatever is said of an `animal' should be said of the same thing as a `man' in the same way that an animal is said of a man.
|- valign="top"
| Et proferendo `ut', debes dicere in speciali quod hic est fallacia accidentis, quia arguitur ex omnibus affirmativis in secunda figura. Et ita pro diversis debent diversae regulae assignari, et sine illis regulis non potest sciri universaliter quando est fallacia accidentis et quando non.
| And in pronouncing 'so', you must say in particular that here is a fallacy of accident, because it is argued from all the affirmatives in the second figure. And so different rules must be assigned to different things, and without those rules it cannot be universally known when the fallacy of an accident is and when it is not.
|- valign="top"
| Quando igitur accidit fallacia accidentis penes istum modum arguendi ex propositionibus mere categoricis et mere de inesse et mere de praesenti facile est scire per regulas Aristotelis, traditas in I Priorum, de uniformi generatione syllogismorum de inesse, praeterquam in uno casu, scilicet in divinis, ubi concedendum est quod una res simplex est plures personae, quae inter se sunt distinctae realiter, de quibus tactum est prius, quia in talibus terminis est frequenter fallacia accidentis et non in aliis.
| When, therefore, the fallacy of accident occurs close to this method of arguing from propositions that are merely categorical and merely assertoric and merely of the present, it is easy to know by Aristotle's rules, handed down in Prior Analytics I, of the uniform generation of assertoric syllogisms, except in one case, that is, of the divine, where it must be admitted that one simple thing is a plurality of persons, which are distinct from each other in reality, of which we have touched before, because in such terms the fallacy of accident is frequent and not in others.
|- valign="top"
| Unde hic est fallacia accidentis `omnis essentia divina est Pater; Filius est essentia divina; ergo Filius est Pater'. Et debet specialis regula assignari talis: quia una essentia est plures personae, quae personae sunt distinctae inter se, non oportet quod omne nomen personae de quo praedicatur nomen essentiae praedicetur de nomine alterius personae.
| Whence here is a fallacy of accident, `every divine essence is the Father; The Son is the divine essence; therefore the Son is the Father'. And a special rule must be assigned as follows: since one essence is many persons, which persons are distinct from one another, it is not necessary that every name of a person of which the name of the essence is predicated is predicated of the name of another person.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter hic est fallacia accidentis `haec essentia est Pater; haec essentia est Filius; ergo
| Similarly here is a fallacy of accident, `this essence is the Father; this essence is the Son; therefore,
|- valign="top"
| Filius est Pater'. Et isti deservit consimilis regula; quia enim una essentia est plures personae, ideo non sequitur quod quamvis de nomine proprio illius vel de pronomine demonstrante illam essentiam praedicentur nomina illarum personarum quod propter hoc unum nomen unius personae praedicetur de reliquo.
| the Son is the Father. And a similar rule serves these; For since one essence is many persons, it does not follow that although the names of those persons are predicated of the proper name of that person or of the pronoun showing that essence, that for this reason the one name of one person is predicated of the rest.
|- valign="top"
| Sicut propter hoc quod iste terminus `homo', qui significat plures homines, praedicetur de nominibus singulorum hominum, non oportet quod illa nomina quae praedicantur de hoc nomine `homo' sine signo universali, praedicentur de se invicem.
| Just as because this term `man', which signifies many men, is predicated of the names of individual men, it is not necessary that those names which are predicated of this name `man' without a universal sign be predicated of each other.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter hic est fallacia accidentis, propter similem regulam `haec spiratio est paternitas; haec spiratio est filiatio; ergo filiatio est paternitas'. Similiter hic `haec essentia est Pater; haec essentia est Filius; ergo Filius est Pater'. Similiter hic `haec essentia est Pater; Filius non est Pater; igitur Filius non est essentia'.
| Similarly here is a fallacy of accident, because of a similar rule `this spiration is paternity; this spiration is filiation; therefore filiation is paternity'. Similarly here `this essence is the Father; this essence is the Son; therefore the Son is the Father'. Similarly here `this essence is the Father; the Son is not the Father; therefore the Son is not an essence'.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter hic `omnis Deus est Pater; Filius est Deus; igitur Filius est Pater'. Et si dicatur quod hic non est fallacia, quia haec est falsa `omnis Deus est Pater', contra hoc potest argui, quia si haec sit falsa `omnis Deus est Pater', ergo sua opposita est vera `aliquis Deus non est Pater'.
| Similarly here `every God is the Father; the Son is God; therefore the Son is the Father'. And if it is said that there is no fallacy here, because `every God is the Father' is false, it can be argued against this, because if `every God is the Father' is false, then its opposite is true `some God is not the Father'.
|- valign="top"
| Et manifestum est quod haec est vera `aliquis Deus est Pater'; igitur sunt plures dii, quorum unus est Pater et alius non est Pater, sicut sequitur `aliqua essentia divina est Pater; et aliqua essentia divina non est Pater; igitur sunt plures essentiae'.
| And it is clear that this is true: `some God is the Father'; therefore there are many gods, one of whom is the Father and another is not the Father, as follows: `some divine essence is the Father; and some divine essence is not the Father; therefore there are many essences'.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter hic est fallacia accidentis `contradictoria verificantur de essentia et Patre; et essentia et Pater sunt idem; igitur contradictoria verificantur de essentia et Patre pro eodem'.
| Similarly, here is a fallacy of accident: `Contradictory things are verified about the essence and the Father; and the essence and the Father are the same; therefore contradictory things are verified about the essence and the Father for the same thing'.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter hic est fallacia accidentis `essentia est Pater; Pater non est Filius; igitur essentia non est Filius'. Et pro omnibus talibus non potest assignari nisi talis regula: essentia divina, quae est unus
| Similarly, here is a fallacy of accident `the essence is the Father; the Father is not the Son; therefore the essence is not the Son'. And for all such things, no other rule can be assigned than this: the divine essence, which is one.
|- valign="top"
| Deus et unica essentia, est plures personae. Propter quod ubi non obviat relationis oppositio quod conceditur de una persona concedendum est de alia; ubi autem obviat relationis oppositio non est concedendum de qualibet persona quod de una conceditur.
| God, and the one essence, is many persons. Wherefore, where there is no opposition of relation to it, what is conceded of one person must be conceded of another; but where there is opposition of relation to it, what is conceded of one person must not be conceded of any (other) person.
|- valign="top"
| Et ad hoc est semper aspiciendum in respondendo ad discursus ex terminis importantibus divinas personas. Et ideo quamvis in talibus discursibus, in quibus exemplificatum est, sit fallacia accidentis, tamen in talibus discursibus compositis ex terminis importantibus creaturas numquam est fallacia accidentis.
| And this is what must always be observed in responding to discourses made up of terms that imply divine persons. And therefore, although in such discourses, in which the example was given, there is a fallacy of accident, nevertheless in such discourses composed of terms that imply creatures there is never a fallacy of accident.
|- valign="top"
| In terminis tamen et discursibus compositis ex terminis importantibus divinas personas est fallacia accidentis. Et ideo secus est de discursibus compositis ex terminis importantibus creaturas et de discursibus de quibus exemplificatum est.
| However, in terms and discourses composed of terms that imply divine persons, there is a fallacy of accident. And therefore it is different with discourses composed of terms that imply creatures and with the discourses of which example has been given.
|- valign="top"
| Propter quod dico quod in terminis importantibus creaturas, ubicumque sunt praemissae dispositae vocaliter in modo et in figura, secundum regulas traditas superius de syllogismis uniformibus et mixtis, numquam est fallacia accidentis, quamvis aliquando possit esse fallacia aequivocationis et amphiboliae et compositionis et divisionis et accentus et in uno casu fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, nisi aliqui termini includant aequivalenter aliqua syncategoremata vel aliquas alias determinationes, de quibus dictum est in primo tractatu istius Summa.
| Because of this I say that in terms that imply creatures, wherever the premises are arranged vocally in mode and figure, according to the rules given above about uniform and mixed syllogisms, there is never a fallacy of accident, although sometimes there can be a fallacy of equivocation and amphiboly and composition and division and accent and in one case a fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter (accordingly and simply), unless some terms include equivalently some syncategorematic terms or some other determinations, of which we spoke in the first treatise of this Summa.
|- valign="top"
| Propter quod omnes tales syllogismi sunt boni `omnis intellectus humanus est anima intellectiva; omnis voluntas humana est anima intellectiva; ergo aliqua voluntas humana est intellectus humanus'.
| Because of this, all such syllogisms are good: `every human intellect is an intellectual soul; every human will is an intellectual soul; therefore, some human will is a human intellect'.
|- valign="top"
| 'Omnis creatura est creata; omnis creatio est creatura; igitur omnis creatio est creata', et innumerabiles tales, quos nonnulli ignorantes logicam negant, propter quod in errores varios elabuntur.
| `Every creature is created; every creation is a creature; therefore, every creation is created', and countless others like it, which some ignorant of logic deny, because of which they slip into various errors.
|- valign="top"
| Sicut autem nonnunquam accidit fallacia accidentis propter hoc quod praemissae de inesse et de praesenti non ordinantur secundum regulas debitas in modo et in figura, ita etiam accidit fallacia accidentis propter hoc quod praemissae de praeterito vel de futuro vel de modo non ordinantur secundum veras regulas in modo et figura.
| But just as the fallacy of accident sometimes occurs because premises that are assertoric and of present things are not ordered according to the due rules in mode and figure, so too does the fallacy of accident occur because premises about past or future or mode are not ordered according to the true rules in mode and figure.
|- valign="top"
| Propter hoc hic est fallacia accidentis `Filius Dei fuit Deus ab aeterno; Filius Dei non fuit homo ab aeterno; igitur homo non fuit Filius Dei ab aeterno'. Similiter hic `Deus non potest facere actum meritorium sine voluntate; actus meritorius est aliquid; igitur aliquid non potest fieri a Deo sine voluntate'.
| For this reason, here is a fallacy of accident: `The Son of God was God from eternity; the Son of God was not man from eternity; therefore man was not the Son of God from eternity'. Similarly here: `God cannot do a meritorious act without will; a meritorious act is something; therefore something cannot be done by God without will'.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter hic `naturaliter potest sciri quod omnis Deus est immortalis; tres personae sunt Deus, vel Pater est Deus; ergo naturaliter potest sciri quod tres personae sunt immortales, vel quod Pater est immortalis'.
| Similarly here `it can be known naturally that every God is immortal; three persons are God, or the Father is God; therefore it can be known naturally that three persons are immortal, or that the Father is immortal'.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter est hic, secundum unam opinionem, `scio quod omnis anima intellectiva est substantia; intellectus est anima intellectiva; ergo scio quod intellectus est substantia'. Et sicut est de talibus, ita est de multis aliis, quae tamen possunt sciri evidenter, scitis regulis datis de generatione syllogismorum uniformium et mixtorum, propter quarum ignorantiam multi decipiuntur per fallaciam accidentis.
| Similarly, according to one opinion, `I know that every intellectual soul is a substance; the intellect is an intellectual soul; therefore I know that the intellect is a substance.' And as it is about such things, so it is about many others, which, however, can be known clearly, knowing the rules given for the generation of uniform and mixed syllogisms, because of the ignorance of which many are deceived by the fallacy of accident.
|- valign="top"
| Secundus modus principalis fallaciae accidentis est quando aliqua per praedicationem coniunguntur cum tertio non variato in diversis propositionibus et in conclusione coniunguntur illa eadem cum illo tertio non variato; sicut sic arguendo `iste canis est tuus; iste canis est pater; ergo iste canis est tuus pater'.
| The second main mode of the fallacy of accident is when some things are joined by predication to an unvaried third in different propositions and in the conclusion the same things are joined to that unvaried third; as in arguing thus `this dog is yours; this dog is a father; therefore this dog is your father'.
|- valign="top"
| Verumtamen non semper quando sic arguitur est fallacia accidentis.
| However, it is not always so that when arguing in this way it is a fallacy of accident.
|- valign="top"
| Hic enim nulla est fallacia accidentis `iste homo est albus; iste homo est animal; ergo iste homo est animal album'. Et ideo ad cognoscendum quando in tali modo arguendi est fallacia accidentis et quando non, videndum est an ex propositione in qua illa duo praedicantur coniunctim de aliquo contingat inferre praedicationem unius de altero et an talis oratio sit propria.
| For here there is no fallacy of accident `this man is white; this man is an animal; therefore this man is a white animal'. And therefore, to know when there is a fallacy of accident in such a way of arguing and when there is not, we must see whether from a proposition in which those two are predicated jointly of something it is possible to infer the predication of one of the other and whether such an argument is proper.
|- valign="top"
| Et si sic, non est ibi fallacia accidentis. Propter quod hic non est fallacia accidentis `Sortes est rationalis; Sortes est animal; igitur Sortes est animal rationale'.
| And if so, there is no fallacy of accident there. Because of this, there is no fallacy of accident here: `Socrates is rational; Socrates is an animal; therefore Socrates is a rational animal'.
|- valign="top"
| Si autem talis oratio sit impropria, tunc non valet, sicut non sequitur `Sortes est animal; Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes est homo --- animal'.
| But if such a sentence is improper, then it is not valid, just as it does not follow that `Socrates is an animal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is a man = animal'.
|- valign="top"
| Nec sequitur `Sortes est lapis; Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes est homo --- lapis'. Similiter si ex tali praedicatione propria non contingat inferre praedicationem unius illorum coniunctorum de reliquo, est fallacia accidentis.
| Nor does it follow that `Socrates is a stone; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is a man - stone'. Similarly, if from such a proper predication it is not possible to infer the predication of one of those conjoined things from the rest, it is a fallacy of accident.
|- valign="top"
| Et ideo quia ista consequentia non valet `iste est pater tuus, ergo est tuus', ideo hic est fallacia accidentis `iste canis est tuus; iste canis est pater; ergo iste canis est pater tuus'. Similiter, quia non sequitur `iste est monachus albus, igitur est albus', ideo hic est fallacia accidentis `iste est albus; iste est monachus; ergo iste est albus monachus', et ita est de consimilibus.
| And therefore because this consequence is not valid `this is your father, therefore he is yours', therefore here is the fallacy of accident `this is your dog; this dog is a father; therefore this dog is your father'. Similarly, because it does not follow `this is a white monk, therefore he is white', therefore here is the fallacy of accident `this is white; this is a monk; therefore this is a white monk', and so it is with the like.
|- valign="top"
| Verumtamen sciendum est quod semper in tali argumento est fallacia figurae dictionis, et ita semper in tali modo arguendi concurrunt fallacia accidentis et fallacia figurae dictionis. Tamen quando quis credit quod sequitur conclusio propter hoc quod illa coniungebantur eidem tertio in praemissis, decipitur per fallaciam accidentis.
| However, it should be known that in such an argument there is always a fallacy of figure of speech, and thus in such a way of arguing there always concur the fallacy of accident and the fallacy of figure of speech. However, when someone believes that the conclusion follows because they were connected to the same third in the premises, he is deceived by the fallacy of accident.
|- valign="top"
| Si autem credat conclusionem sequi propter similitudinem illarum dictionum ad alias dictiones, in quibus scit tenere talem modum arguendi, decipitur per fallaciam figurae dictionis.
| But if he believes that the conclusion follows because of the similarity of those words to other words in which he knows that such a way of arguing holds, he is deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech.
|- valign="top"
| Et in isto casu potest assignari aliqua multiplicitas in fallacia figurae dictionis, pro eo quod unus terminus aliter accipitur in una propositione et in alia; quia tamen nulla una oratio est multiplex, ideo non est ibi nec aequivocatio, nec amphibolia, nec compositio et divisio, nec accentus.
| And in this case some multiplicity can be assigned in the fallacy of the figure of speech, because one term is understood differently in one proposition and in another; yet because no one utterance is multiple, therefore there is neither equivocation, nor amphiboly, nor composition and division, nor accent.
|- valign="top"
| Unde sciendum est quod si semper quaelibet dictio in tali modo arguendi uniformiter acciperetur, non esset ibi aliqua fallacia dictarum; immo, si servaretur forma syllogistica, non ponendo medium terminum in conclusione, non esset ibi fallacia accidentis.
 
| Hence it should be known that if every statement in such a way of arguing were always accepted uniformly, there would be no fallacy of what was said; indeed, if the syllogistic form were observed, by not placing a middle term in the conclusion, there would be no fallacy of accident.
|- valign="top"
| Sicut hic non est fallacia accidentis `iste canis est tuus; iste canis est pater; ergo aliquis pater est tuus'; sicut nec hic `iste est albus; iste est monachus; igitur aliquis monachus est albus'.
| Just as here there is no fallacy of accident `this dog is yours; this dog is a father; therefore some father is yours'; just as here there is no fallacy of accident `this is white; this is a monk; therefore some monk is white'.
|- valign="top"
| Sed in tali modo arguendi aliqua dictio diversimode accipitur in diversis propositionibus. Unde in ista `iste canis est tuus' li tuus significat possessionem, in ista autem `iste canis est tuus pater' li tuus non significat possessionem sed significat patrem istius hominis; propter quod aliter accipitur in una propositione et in alia. Nulla tamen oratio est multiplex. Et si quaeras, unde est hoc quod aliud significat in una propositione et in alia, dicendum est quod causa quare ista vox significat aliud in una propositione et in alia non potest esse nisi voluntas utentium, qui sic volunt uti.
| But in such a way of arguing, a certain expression is taken differently in different propositions. Hence in this `this dog is yours', 'yours' signifies possession, but in this `this dog is your father', 'your' does not signify possession but signifies the father of that man; for which reason it is taken differently in one proposition and in another. Yet no sentence is multiple. And if you ask, whence it is that it signifies one thing in one proposition and in another, it must be said that the reason why this expression signifies one thing in one proposition and in another cannot be except the will of the users, who wish to use it in this way.
|- valign="top"
| Sed ex hoc videtur quod hic est praecise fallacia in dictione. Potest dici quod hic non est praecise fallacia in dictione, quia non est inconveniens ponere quin talis modus arguendi possit servari in propositionibus mentalibus.
| But from this it is seen that here there is precisely a fallacy in diction. It can be said that here there is not precisely a fallacy in the word, because it is not unreasonable to suppose that such a mode of argument cannot be observed in mental propositions.
|- valign="top"
| Unde non est inconveniens quin sicut aliqua dictio ad placitum significativa significat unum quando per se ponitur et aliud quando adiungitur alteri ita idem signum naturale naturaliter significat unum quando per se ponitur et aliud quando coniungitur alteri, sicut posset exemplificari de multis naturalibus.
| Hence it is not unreasonable that just as some word used to signify a particular thing signifies one thing when it is used by itself and another thing when it is joined to another, so the same natural sign naturally signifies one thing when it is used by itself and another thing when it is joined to another, as could be exemplified by many natural things.
|- valign="top"
| Sciendum est autem quod non tantum contingit sic arguere ex omnibus affirmativis, sed etiam contingit arguere ex una affirmativa et alia negativa. Unde hic est fallacia accidentis `iste non est albus, iste est monachus; igitur iste non est monachus albus'.
| It should be noted, however, that it is not only possible to argue in this way from all affirmatives, but it is also possible to argue from one affirmative and another negative. Hence here is a fallacy of accident `this is not white, this is a monk; therefore this is not a white monk'.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter hic `hoc non est tuum; hoc est opus; ergo hoc non est opus tuum'. Et consimiliter est in aliis.
| Similarly here, `this is not yours; this is a work; therefore this is not your work.' And it is similar in other cases.
|}

== Notes ==

<references />

[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 10

2025-04-26T13:08:50Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 9|Chapter 9]]|[[../Chapter 11|Chapter 11]]}}
 
{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||CAP. 10. DE FALLACIA FIGURAE DICTIONIS.

||Chapter 10. On the fallacy of 'figure of speech'.

|- valign = top
||Post fallacias in dictione, iuxta quas sunt aliquae orationes multiplices, dicendum est de fallacia figurae dictionis, quae non oritur ex alicuius orationis multiplicitate, sed oritur magis ex aliquarum dictionum similitudine.

||After fallacies in diction, according to which some speeches are multiple, we must speak of fallacies of figure of speech, which does not arise from the multiplicity of any speech, but arises rather from the similarity of some wordings.

|- valign = top
||Ita quod fallacia figurae dictionis est deceptio proveniens ex aliqua similitudine dictionis, ita quod causa apparentiae est similitudo dictionis ad dictionem et causa non-exsistentiae est diversitas significatorum vel modorum significandi vel accidentium grammaticalium dictionum.

||So that the fallacy of the figure of speech is a deception resulting from some similarity of wording, so that the cause of appearance is the similarity of statement to statement and the cause of non-existence is the diversity of meanings or ways of signifying or grammatical accidents of speech.

|- valign = top
||Et accipio hic `significata' largissime. Unde generalis modus solvendi paralogismos penes istam fallaciam est ostendere aliquam diversitatem inter significata vel modos significandi vel accidentia dictionum propter quam non valet argumentum. Ista enim fallacia semper ex hoc accidit quod quia aliquis modus arguendi tenet in aliquibus dictionibus creditur ex hoc quod talis modus arguendi valeat in aliis consimilibus dictionibus, in quibus tamen non valet propter hoc quod illae dictiones diversae, quamvis videantur similes, habent diversa significata, large accipiendo significata, vel diversum modum significandi vel diversa accidentia grammaticalia.

||And I take `significant' here very liberally. Hence the general method of resolving paralogisms involving this fallacy is to show some difference between the signifieds, or modes of signification, or accidents of speech, because of which the argument is invalid. For this fallacy always occurs from the fact that because a certain method of reasoning holds in some expressions it is believed from this fact that such a method of reasoning is valid in other similar expressions, in which it is not valid because those different expressions, although they seem similar, have different meanings, understanding meanings broadly, or a different mode of meaning or different grammatical accidents.

|- valign = top
||Verbi gratia: videmus enim quod iste syllogismus est bonus `omnis substantia corporea est colorata; capra est substantia corporea; igitur capra est colorata', ita quod nulla est variatio inter praedicatum maioris et praedicatum conclusionis.

||For example: for we see that this syllogism is good: `every corporeal substance is colored; A goat is a corporeal substance; therefore the goat is colored', so that there is no variation between the predicate of the major and the predicate of the conclusion.

|- valign = top
||Si propter hoc credatur quod in consimili modo arguendi ex aliis terminis non sit aliqua variatio facienda inter praedicatum maioris et praedicatum conclusionis, sicut sic arguendo `omnis substantia corporea est colorata; patriarcha est substantia corporea; igitur patriarcha est colorata', deceptio fiet per fallaciam figurae dictionis.

||If, for this reason, it is believed that in a similar way of arguing from other terms there is no variation to be made between the predicate of the major and the predicate of the conclusion, just as by arguing that `every corporeal substance is colored; the patriarch is a corporeal substance; therefore the patriarch is colored', the deception will be done through the fallacy of the figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Unde generaliter quandocumque est fallacia figurae dictionis, contingit invenire consimilem modum arguendi bonum ex aliis terminis, et hoc propter diversitatem accidentium grammaticalium vel modorum significandi vel propter diversitatem significatorum, largissime accipiendo `significata'.

||Hence, in general, whenever there is a fallacy of a figure of speech, it is possible to find a similar way of arguing well from other terms, and this because of the diversity of grammatical accidents or ways of signifying, or because of the diversity of things signified, taking signified very broadly.

|- valign = top
||Iuxta praedicta possunt accipi tres modi istius fallaciae.

||According to what has been said, there are three modes of this fallacy.

|- valign = top
||Quorum primus est quando accidit defectus in arguendo propter diversitatem accidentium grammaticalium diversarum dictionum. Et talis modus arguendi sophisticus vel semper vel frequenter ducit ad soloecismum. Unde si arguatur sic `omne animal est coloratum; homo est animal; igitur homo est coloratum', dicendum est quod hic est fallacia figurae dictionis.

||The first of these is when a failure occurs in reasoning because of the diversity of the grammatical accidents of different expressions. And such a sophistic way of reasoning either always or frequently leads to soloecism. Wherefore if it be argued thus, `every animal is a colored thing; man is an animal; therefore man is a colored thing', it must be said that here is the fallacy of the figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Quia enim `homo' non est neutrius generis sicut `animal' est neutrius generis, ideo non debet inferri ista conclusio `homo est coloratum' sed ista `homo est coloratus'. Et quandoque variatio vocalis alicuius termini debet fieri in diversis propositionibus propter variationem accidentium diversorum terminorum.

||For since `man' is not of either kind, just as `animal' is of neither kind, therefore the conclusion should not be inferred that ``man is a colored thing'' but rather that `a man is colored'. And sometimes the variation of the vowel of a certain term must be made in different propositions because of the variation of the accidents of the different terms.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic potest assignari fallacia figurae dictionis `omne album est corpus; omnis homo est album; igitur omnis homo est corpus'. Et si dicatur quod semper in omni fallacia debet esse aliqua apparentia, hic autem nulla videtur, igitur etc., dicendum est quod non requiritur in omni fallacia tanta apparentia quae decipiat sapientes, sed sufficit tanta quae aliquos simplices fallere possit.

||Similarly, here may be assigned the fallacy of the figure of speech, `every white thing is a body; every man is a white thing; therefore every man is a body'. And if it is said that in every fallacy there must always be some appearance, but here nothing is seen, therefore, etc., it must be said that in every fallacy it is not necessary to have so much appearance as to deceive the wise, but so much as to be able to deceive some simple people is sufficient.

|- valign = top
||Et sic est in proposito, quia aliqui simplices possent in consimilibus decipi. Secundus modus principalis istius fallaciae accipitur ex diversitate significatorum diversarum dictionum.

||And so it is in a proposition, because some simple people might be deceived in the similarity. The second main mode of this fallacy is taken from the diversity of meanings of different expressions.

|- valign = top
||Verumtamen aliqua diversitas talis est sufficiens ad istam fallaciam in aliquo modo arguendi et aliqua non sufficit. Sed ad sciendum in speciali quando sufficit et quando non sufficit, per logicam sciri non potest, sicut nec per logicam sciri potest in speciali de qualibet dictione an sit aequivoca vel non sit aequivoca, sed hoc debet sciri per speciales scientias.

||Nevertheless, some such diversity is sufficient to justify this fallacy in some way, and some is not. But in order to know in particular when it is sufficient and when it is not sufficient, it cannot be known through logic, just as neither can it be known through logic in particular whether any saying is equivocal or not equivocal, but this must be known through special sciences.

|- valign = top
||Penes istum modum peccant talia argumenta sophistica `calefacere est agere, igitur videre est agere', `calefieri est pati, ergo videri est pati'. Causa apparentiae istarum consequentiarum sophisticarum est similis terminatio istorum verborum `videre --- calefacere', `videri --- calefieri'.

||According to this method, such sophistic arguments as `to warm up is to act, therefore to see is to act', `to be warmed is to experience, therefore to be seen to experience'. The reason for the appearance of these sophisticated consequences is the similar ending of these words `to see --- to heat', `to be seen --- to be heated'.

|- valign = top
||Causa non exsistentiae est diversitas significatorum.

||The reason for its non-existence is the diversity of meanings.

|- valign = top
||Quia enim `calefacere' significant calorem causatum a calefaciente in calefacto et `videre' significat visionem causatam a viso in vidente et non causatam a vidente in viso, ideo non valet consequentia.

||For 'to heat' signifies the heat caused by the heating in the heated, and 'to see' signifies the vision caused by the seen in the seer and not caused by the seer in the seen, therefore the conclusion is invalid.

|- valign = top
||Similiter tales consequentiae non valent `calefaciens est agens, igitur videns est agens',

||Similarly, such conclusions do not hold: `Heating is the agent, therefore the seeing is the agent'.

|- valign = top
||'calefactum patitur, igitur visum patitur'. Et universaliter quando dictiones habent eadem accidentia grammaticalia et eosdem modos significandi, et propter hoc quod habent consimiles terminationes et consimiles modos significandi creditur quod illud commune praedicabile quod verificatur de uno verificetur de reliquo, et tamen propter hoc quod significant diversa non est sic, sed est fallacia figurae dictionis.

||`heated is experienced, therefore sight is experienced'. And universally, when expressions have the same grammatical accidents and the same ways of signifying, and because they have similar endings and similar ways of signifying, it is believed that the common predicate which is verified of one is verified of the other, and yet because of the fact that the signifiers are different, it is not so, but is a fallacy of the figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Et accidit frequenter iste modus figurae dictionis quando arguitur per locum a simili vel per aliquem locum consimilem. Puta: quia enim `visum' est participium verbi passivi, secundum grammaticos, ideo potest credi quod sicut `calefactum', quod est participium verbi passivi, non potest verificari nisi de passo, sic quod `visum' non possit verificari nisi de passo.

||And this mode of figure of speech frequently occurs when it is argued by a similar passage or by some similar passage. For example, because `seen' is a participle of the passive verb, according to the grammarians, therefore it can be believed that just as `heated', which is a participle of the passive verb, cannot be verified except from experience, so that `seen' cannot be verified except from experience.

|- valign = top
||Et talis sic credens, nesciens naturam significatorum per istos terminos vel nesciens quid et quomodo significant, decipitur per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Si enim credat quod sicut `calefactum' significat illud quod patitur, et in quo est calor, in recto et illud a quo patitur in obliquo, sic `visum' significet illud in quo est visio in recto et illud a quo est visio in obliquo, decipitur.

||And such a person believing in this way, not knowing the nature of what is signified by these terms or not knowing what and how they mean, is deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech. For if he believes that just as 'heated' signifies that which is experienced, and in which there is heat, in the nominative case and that from which it is experienced in the oblique, so 'sight' signifies that in which the vision is directly and that from which the vision is in the oblique, he is deceived.

|- valign = top
||Et ideo ad istum modum figurae dictionis perfecte sciendum necesse est scire naturas rerum et etiam necesse est scire grammaticam per quam scitur quid vox significat uno modo et quid alio modo significandi.

||And therefore, in order to know perfectly this mode of figure of speech, it is necessary to know the natures of things, and it is also necessary to know the grammar by which it is known what a word means in one way and what it means in another way.

|- valign = top
||Nec tamen iste modus est ex diversitate modorum significandi aliquarum dictionum, ex hoc scilicet quod una dictio habet unum modum significandi, et alia dictio non habet illum modum significandi, sed est ex diversitate significatorum.

||And yet this mode is not due to the diversity of the modes of signifying certain expressions, namely, from the fact that one expression has one mode of signifying, and another expression does not have that mode of signifying, but it is due to the diversity of the things signified.

|- valign = top
||Quia enim diversa, quamvis eisdem modis significandi, significantur per istum terminum

||Because different things, although they are signified by the same modes, are signified by this term

|- valign = top
||'visum' et per istum terminum `calefactum' ideo est ibi fallacia. Oportet autem scire quod iste modus non contingit tantum quando propter consimiles terminationes et consimiles modos significandi creditur quod illud quod est commune uni est commune alteri, sicut sic arguendo `albedo est qualitas, igitur hirundo est qualitas', `qualitas differt realiter a substantia, igitur quantitas differt realiter a substantia', `musica est feminini generis, igitur propheta est femini generis', et sic de multis aliis, sed etiam iste modus reperiri potest quando propter naturam rei significatae aliquis discursus vel consequentia valet et tamen alio termino posito in praedicto discursu vel consequentia loco alicuius termini ibi positi non valeret.

||`seen' and by that term `heated' is therefore a fallacy there. It is necessary to know that this method does not occur only when, because of similar endings and similar ways of signifying, it is believed that what is common to one is common to the other, as in arguing that `whiteness is a quality, therefore a swallow is a quality', `a quality really differs from a substance, therefore a quantity really differs from a substance', `music is of the feminine gender, therefore the prophet is of the feminine gender', and so on with many others, but this mode can also be found when, because of the nature of the thing signified, as someone is discussing it the consequence is valid, and yet if another term were placed in the aforesaid discourse, the consequence would not be valid for any term placed there.

|- valign = top
||Verbi gratia secundum opinionem Aristotelis hoc est bonum argumentum `iste dabit bovem coloratum; iste non habet bovem coloratum; igitur iste dabit bovem quem non habet', et tamen sic arguendo `iste dabit bovem album; iste non habet bovem album; igitur iste dabit bovem quem non habet' non valet, quia praemissae possunt esse verae conclusione exsistente falsa. Similiter talis discursus est bonus `iste est modo albus; iste cras non erit albus; igitur iste amittet aliquam rem quam modo habet'. Et tamen iste discursus secundum principia Aristotelis non valet `iste aer est nunc bicubitus; iste aer cras non erit bicubitus; ergo iste aer amittet cras aliquam rem quam nunc habet', et tamen idem modus arguendi videtur utrobique.

||For example, according to the opinion of Aristotle, this is a good argument: `this man will give a colored ox; he has no colored ox; therefore he will give an ox which he does not have', and yet arguing thus, `this man will give a white ox; he has no white ox; therefore this man will give an ox which he does not have' does not hold, because the premises may be true with the existing conclusion being false. Similarly, such a discourse is good, `this man is now white; he will not be white tomorrow; therefore, he will lose some property which he has right now'. And yet this discourse is not valid according to Aristotle's principles: `this air is now calm; this air will not be calm tomorrow; therefore, this air will tomorrow lose some of the property it has now', and yet the same method of reasoning seems to be the same on both sides.

|- valign = top
||Et ideo si propter hoc credatur, quia alicubi tenet talis modus arguendi quod ubique valeat, fiet deceptio per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Et si quaeratur quare magis est fallacia figurae dictionis in uno discursu quam in alio, dicendum est quod hoc est propter hoc quod medium intrinsecum per quod tenet unus discursus est necessarium et medium intrinsecum per quod tenet alius discursus non est necessarium.

||And therefore, if because of that it is believed, because elsewhere such a method of reasoning holds that is valid everywhere, it will be a deception through the fallacy of a figure of speech. And if it is asked why there is more fallacy of the figure of speech in one discourse than in another, it must be said that this is because the intrinsic medium by which one discourse holds is necessary, and the intrinsic medium by which another discourse holds is not necessary.

|- valign = top
||Ad cuius evidentiam est sciendum quod quaedam consequentiae, etiam formales, tenent per medium intrinsecum et quaedam tenent per medium extrinsecum. Illae tenent per medium intrinsecum quae tenent virtute unius propositionis formatae ex eisdem terminis, sicut ista consequentia `omnis homo est animal, igitur Sortes est animal' tenet per medium intrinsecum, quia tenet virtute unius propositionis formatae ex eisdem terminis, puta ex istis terminis `Sortes' et `homo', quia tenet virtute istius medii `Sortes est homo'.

||For the evidence of which it is necessary to know that certain consequences, even formal ones, hold through an intrinsic medium and others through an external medium. Those hold by virtue of an intrinsic medium which hold by virtue of a single proposition formed from the same terms, just as this conclusion `every man is an animal, therefore Socrates is an animal' holds by an intrinsic medium, because it holds by virtue of a single proposition formed from the same terms, for example from these terms `Socrates' and `man', because it holds by virtue of that medium `Socrates is a man'.

|- valign = top
||Si enim ista propositio esset falsa, consequentia prima in nullo valeret. Illae autem consequentiae vel discursus tenent per medium extrinsecum quae tenent sufficienter virtute alicuius regulae generalis non formatae ex terminis talis consequentiae vel discursus, vel si formetur ex illis hoc accidit, quia aliae consequentiae et discursus tenent aeque bene per hoc medium vel per tale medium extrinsecum ex quorum terminis non formatur talis regula generalis. Sicut patet de ista consequentia `omnis homo est animal, igitur tantum animal est homo', quae tenet per istud medium `ab universali ad exclusivam de terminis transpositis est bona consequentia'. Et ista consequentia `omnis homo est animal, igitur aliquod animal est homo' tenet per istam regulam `universalis affirmativa convertitur per accidens'.

||For if this proposition were false, the first consequence would have no validity. But those consequences or discourses hold through an external medium which hold sufficiently by virtue of some general rule not formed from the terms of such a consequence or discourse; or if it is formed from them, this happens because other consequences and discourses hold equally well through this medium or through such an external medium from the terms of which such a general rule is not formed. This is clear from this conclusion, `every man is an animal, therefore only an animal is a man', which holds through this medium, `from the universal to the exclusive is a good consequence transposed from the extremes'. And this conclusion, `every man is an animal, therefore some animal is a man,' holds by this rule, `the universal affirmative is converted by accident.'

|- valign = top
||Et ideo quandocumque accipiuntur aliquae consequentiae vel discursus quae non rectificantur vel regulantur per aliquam regulam generalem, videndum est si possint rectificari per aliquam propositionem veram formatam ex eisdem terminis.

||And therefore whenever some conclusions or discourses are accepted which are not rectified or governed by any general rule, it must be seen whether they can be rectified by some true proposition formed from the same terms.

|- valign = top
||Et si sic, consequentia erit bona; si non, consequentia non valebit. Sic autem est in proposito. Nam tales consequentiae `iste non habet bovem coloratum; iste dabit bovem coloratum; igitur iste dabit bovem quem non habet', `iste dabit bovem album; iste non habet bovem album; ergo iste dabit bovem quem non habet' non possunt regulari per aliquam regulam generalem; igitur si valeant, oportet habere aliquod medium verum ex eisdem terminis.

||And if so, the consequence will be good; if not, the consequence will not be valid. And so it is in a proposition. For such consequences as `this man does not have a colored ox; he will give a colored ox; therefore he will give an ox which he does not have', `this man will give a white ox; he has no white ox; therefore he will give an ox which he does not have' cannot be governed by any general rule; therefore, if they are valid, it is necessary to have some true medium from the same terms.

|- valign = top
||Nunc autem ita est quod prima consequentia tenet per medium verum et necessarium, secundum principia Aristotelis, quod est istud `si aliquid est bos, ipsum est coloratum'.

||But now it is so that the first consequence holds by means of truth and necessity, according to Aristotle's principles, which is that if something is an ox, it is itself colored.

|- valign = top
||Unde quia secundum principia Aristotelis impossibile est quod aliquid sit bos et non sit coloratus, ideo ista consequentia est bona `iste dabit bovem coloratum; et iste non habet bovem coloratum; igitur iste dabit bovem quem non habet'.

||Hence, since according to Aristotle's principles it is impossible for anything to be an ox and not be colored, therefore this conclusion is good: `this man does not have a colored ox; he will give a colored ox; therefore he will give an ox which he does not have'
|- valign = top
||Sed quia possibile est quod idem bos numero sit primo non albus et postea albus, ideo illud medium intrinsecum per quod tenet alia consequentia `si aliquid est bos, ipsum est album', est simpliciter falsum.

||But since it is possible for the same number of cattle to be first non-white and then white, therefore that intrinsic means by which other consequences hold, `if something is an ox, it is itself white,' is simply false.

|- valign = top
||Et ideo iste discursus non valet `iste dabit bovem album; iste non habet bovem album; igitur dabit bovem quem non habet', quia iste poterit dare bovem quem habet, qui nunc non est albus, sed poterit esse albus quando dabit eum.

||And therefore this discourse is not valid: 'this man will give a white ox; he has no white ox; therefore he will give an ox which he does not have', because he will be able to give the ox which he has, which is not white now, but will be able to be white when he gives it.

|- valign = top
||Similiter ista consequentia est bona `iste nunc est albus; iste cras non erit albus; ergo iste carebit aliqua re quam nunc habet', et tenet virtute istius medii `album significat aliquam rem distinctam secundum se totam ab illo quod est album'.

||Similarly, this conclusion is good: `This thing is now white; this thing will not be white tomorrow; therefore this thing will lack something that it now has', and it holds by virtue of this medium that 'white signifies something distinct in its entirety from that which is white'.

|- valign = top
||Sed ista consequentia secundum principia Aristotelis non valet `iste aer est nunc bicubitus; iste aer cras non erit bicubitus; igitur iste aer carebit aliqua re quam nunc habet', quia secundum principia Aristotelis ista est falsa `bicubitum significat aliquam rem secundum se totam distinctam ab illo quod est bicubitum et a parte eius'.

||But this conclusion is not valid according to Aristotle's principles: `this air is now calm; this air will not be calm tomorrow; therefore this air will lack some thing which it now has', because according to Aristotle's principles this is false: `calm signifies some thing in its own right distinct from that which is calm and from its part'.

|- valign = top
||Et ita, universaliter, quando aliqua consequentia tenet in aliquibus terminis virtute medii necessarii intrinseci et aliqua consequentia habens terminos habentes consimiles modos significandi, quamvis non significent eadem eodem modo quo alii termini significant illa vel alia, propter defectum talis medii intrinseci non valet, potest ibi assignari fallacia figurae dictionis.

||And so, universally, when some consequence holds in some terms by virtue of a necessary intrinsic medium, and some consequence having terms having similar ways of signifying, although they do not mean the same thing in the same way as other terms mean that or the other, is not valid because of the lack of such an intrinsic medium, the fallacy of the figure of speech may be assigned there.

|- valign = top
||Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `iste est pater; iste non fuit pater; igitur iste est mutatus', `iste est similis; iste non erit similis; ergo iste mutabitur', et sic de multis aliis. Est autem sciendum quod iste modus fallaciae figurae dictionis numquam habet locum quando accipiuntur duae praemissae mere categoricae et mere de inesse et mere de praesenti, dispositae vocaliter in modo et figura.

||Whence here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `This one is a father; he was not a father; therefore he has changed', 'this thing is similar; this thing will not be similar; therefore this thing will be changed', and so about many others. It must be known, however, that this mode of illusory figure of speech never takes place when two premises are taken that are purely categorical and purely assertoric and purely about the present, arranged verbally in manner and form.

|- valign = top
||Et ideo accidit frequenter iste modus arguendi ex aliqua propositione de praeterito vel de futuro vel de modo. Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `iste potest esse albus; iste non est albus; igitur iste potest esse aliquid quod nunc non est'.

||And therefore this frequently happens in this way of arguing from some statement about the past or the future or a mode. Whence this is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `This man may be white; this man is not white; therefore, he may be something which he is not now.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic `Filius Dei non fuit homo ab aeterno; Filius Dei fuit homo ex tempore; ergo

||Similarly here, `the Son of God was not a man from eternity; The Son of God was a man from a time; therefore

|- valign = top
||Filius Dei fuit aliquid ex tempore quod non fuit ab aeterno'. Tamen in istis potest assignari non tantum iste modus sed etiam tertius modus, de quo statim post dicetur, sicut in simili patebit ibidem.

||the Son of God was something from a time that was not from eternity'. However, in these, not only this mode can be assigned, but also a third mode, which will be spoken about immediately after, as will be clear in the same place.

|- valign = top
||Tertius modus principalis figurae dictionis est habens ortum ex diversitate modorum significandi diversarum dictionum quae videntur similes inter se, propter quod quandoque deceptus credit quod similiter est arguendum ex una dictione et ex alia.

||The third principal mode of figure of speech is that which has arisen from the diversity of the ways of signifying different sayings which seem similar to each other, because of which a deceived person believes that the same thing is to be argued from one statement and from another.

|- valign = top
||Et potest iste modus subdividi.

||And this mode can be subdivided.

|- valign = top
||Ad cuius intellectum sciendum quod modi significandi non sunt aliquae res additae ipsis dictionibus, advenientes eis, sed est metaphorica locutio, dicendo quod dictiones habent diversos modos significandi, quia per talem orationem intelligitur ista oratio `diversae dictiones diversimode significant illa quae significant'. Quia aliquae dictiones proprie non significant, sed magis adiunctae aliis consignificant vel dant aliis supponere vel determinato modo stare, cuiusmodi sunt syncategoremata, videlicet coniunctiones, praepositiones et huiusmodi. Aliquae autem significant determinate res et finita significatione, secundum modum loquendi Boethii, sicut nomina categorematica et pronomina et participia et huiusmodi; et illorum quaedam sunt nomina mere absoluta et quaedam connotativa, sicut dictum est prius in primo tractatu.

||For the understanding of which it is necessary to know that the ways of signifying are not some things added to the statements themselves, coming into them, but it is a metaphorical expression, saying that the statements have different ways of signifying, because by such a speech is meant the speech 'different statements signify in different ways what they signify'. Because some expressions do not have a proper meaning, but rather are attached to others and signify or allow others to assume or stand in a specific way, such as syncategorematic terms, that is, conjunctions, prepositions and the like. Some, however, signify definite things and a finite meaning, according to Boethius' manner of speaking, such as categorical nouns and pronouns and participles and the like; and some of these are purely absolute names and some are connotative, as was said before in the first treatise.

|- valign = top
||Similiter, quaedam sunt propria, sicut pronomina et nomina propria, et quaedam sunt communia, quae ideo habent diversum modum significandi quia unum significat unum et non plura et reliquum significat plura vel potest significare.

||Similarly, some are proper, like pronouns and proper nouns, and some are common, which therefore have a different way of signifying because one signifies one and not several, and the other signifies or can signify several.

|- valign = top
||Et secundum praedicta sub isto tertio modo principali possunt accipi tres modi speciales istius fallaciae. Primus modus potest esse secundum dictiones quae habent finitas significationes et quae non habent finitas significationes.

||And according to what has been said, under this third mode may be understood three principal special modes of this fallacy. The first mode can be based on words that have finite meanings and those that do not have finite meanings.

|- valign = top
||Et penes istum modum peccant consequentiae in quibus commutatur unus modus supponendi in alium; sicut si arguatur sic `omnis homo est animal, ergo animal est omnis homo'.

||And according to this mode, the consequences in which one mode of supposition is exchanged for another are wrong; just as if it were argued that `every man is an animal, therefore an animal is every man'.

|- valign = top
||Et ad evidentiam istius exempli et sibi similium est primo sciendum quod hic potest assignari fallacia figurae dictionis propter hoc quod eadem dictio in antecedente habet unam suppositionem et in consequente habet aliam, quamvis hoc non sit sufficiens, sicut ostendetur.

||And for the evidence of this example and others similar to it, it is first to be known that the fallacy of the figure of speech can be attributed to this because the same saying has one supposition in the antecedent and another in the consequent, although this is not sufficient, as will be shown.

|- valign = top
||Et similitudo dictionum est causa istius deceptionis; quia enim in multis non refert sic transponere dictiones, --- bene enim sequitur `homo albus est homo, ergo homo est homo albus', similiter sequitur `animal rationale est homo, ergo homo est animal rationale' --- propter hoc potest aliquis deceptus credere quod talis modus arguendi valeat in omnibus, et decipitur per fallaciam figurae dictionis.

||And the similitude of the sayings is the cause of this deception; for in many cases it does not matter to transpose sayings in this way, --- for it follows well that `a white man is a man, therefore a man is a white man', similarly it follows that `a rational animal is a man, therefore a man is a rational animal' --- because of this, someone may be deceived into believing that such a way of reasoning is valid in all things, and is deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Et oritur haec fallacia ex diversitate modorum significandi. Propter hoc enim quod `omnis' non habet talem modum significandi qualem habet `album' vel aliqua dictio talis, sed tantum consignificat sive facit terminum cui additur stare pro omnibus suis significatis, et facit terminum mediate sequentem stare confuse tantum, qualiter non stat in consequente, ideo est fallacia figurae dictionis et oritur ex similitudine dictionis ad aliam dictionem. Et est sciendum quod non quaelibet variatio suppositionis causat fallaciam figurae dictionis. Tunc enim in demonstratione potissima esset fallacia figurae dictionis. Sed generaliter quando arguitur a termino stante confuse tantum ad terminum stantem determinate, saltem enthymematice, est fallacia figurae dictionis, si circa alium terminum et dispositiones eius nulla sit penitus facta variatio; quamvis simul cum hoc sit ibi fallacia consequentis, sicut est in exemplo proposito.

||And this fallacy arises from the diversity of modes of signifying. Because `all' does not have the same mode of signifying as does `white' or any such expression, but it only connotes whether it makes the term to which it is added stand for all its signified things, and makes the term that follows mediately stand confused only, as it does not stand in the consequent, therefore it is a fallacy of the figure of speech and arises from the similitude of the saying to another saying. And it must be known that not every variation of the supposition causes the fallacy of the figure of speech. For then the fallacy of the figure of speech would be most important in the demonstration. But in general, when it is argued from a term standing confusedly only to a term standing determinately, at least enthymematically, it is a fallacy of the figure of speech, if there is no corresponding variation of another term and its dispositions; although at the same time as this there is the fallacy of the consequent, as it is in the example provided.

|- valign = top
||Si tamen argueretur sic `omnis homo est animal, igitur animal est homo', quamvis in antecedente supponat confuse tantum et in consequente determinate, quia tamen signum additum homini in antecedente non additur sibi in consequente, non est ibi fallacia figurae dictionis.

||If, however, it were argued thus, `every man is an animal, therefore an animal is a man,' although in the antecedent it supposits only confusedly and in the consequent definitely, because the sign added to man in the antecedent is not added to man in the consequent, there is no fallacy of the figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Penes istum modum peccant omnia talia sophismata `omni parte continui est aliqua pars minor, igitur aliqua pars est minor omni parte continui'. Antecedens est verum, quia quaelibet singularis est vera, et consequens est falsum, quia quaelibet singularis est falsa.

||According to this method, all such sophistries fall into error: `every part of the continuum has some smaller part, therefore some part is smaller than every part of the continuum'. The antecedent is true, because each individual is true, and the consequent is false, because each individual is false.

|- valign = top
||Sed consequentia non valet, quia `pars' in antecedente supponit confuse tantum et in consequente supponit determinate. Sed quia evidentius est in talibus fallacia consequentis quam fallacia figurae dictionis, ideo quando de fallacia consequentis agetur, diversa exempla adducentur.

||But the inference is not valid, because `part' supposits in the antecedent only confusedly and in the consequent it supposits determinately. But since in such cases the fallacy of the consequent is more evident than the fallacy of the figure of speech, therefore, when it comes to the fallacy of the consequent, different examples will be adduced.

|- valign = top
||Similiter, arguendo a termino stante determinate vel confuse tantum ad eundem terminum stantem confuse et distributive, est fallacia figurae dictionis, quamvis etiam sit ibi fallacia consequentis, sicut hic `tu dubitas aliquod verum, igitur tu nescis aliquod verum'.

||Similarly, by arguing from a term standing determinately or confusedly only to the same term standing confusedly and distributively, there is a fallacy of the figure of speech, although there is also a fallacy of consequence, as here: `you doubt a certain truth, therefore you do not know a certain truth'.

|- valign = top
||Unde si arguatur sic `illud quod tu dubitas, tu non scis; tu dubitas aliquod verum; igitur tu non scis aliquod verum' est fallacia figurae dictionis, quia in antecedente stat `verum' determinate et in consequente stat confuse tantum.

||Hence, if it is argued thus, `that which you doubt, you do not know; you doubt some truth; therefore, you do not know some truth' is a fallacy of the figure of speech, because in the antecedent 'truth' stands determinately and in the consequent it stands only confusedly.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic `illud quod non est aliquid, ab illo differt; Sortes non est omnis homo; igitur Sortes ab omni homine differt', nam in antecedente `homo' stat determinate, propter negationem praecedentem, et in consequente stat confuse et distributive.

||Similarly here, `that which is not something differs from it; every man is Socrates; therefore, Socrates differs from every man', for in the antecedent 'man' stands determinately, because of the preceding negation, and in the consequent it stands confusedly and distributively.

|- valign = top
||Oportet autem scire quod non tantum contingit facere fallaciam figurae dictionis propter varium modum supponendi eiusdem termini sed etiam propter varium modum supponendi diversorum terminorum, ita quod alius terminus correspondens non mutetur.

||It is necessary to know that it is not only possible to make a fallacy of the figure of speech because of a different mode of suppositing the same term, but also because of a different mode of suppositing different terms, so that another corresponding term is not changed.

|- valign = top
||Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `omnis homo est animal, igitur substantia est omnis homo', et ita est de consimilibus. Non solum autem tertius modus accidit ex vario modo significandi, qui frequenter accidit ex modo significandi termini categorematici et syncategorematici, sed etiam accidit ex diversis modis significandi incomplexorum in diversis praedicamentis.

||Hence this is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `every man is an animal, therefore every man is a substance', and so it is with the like. Not only does the third mode occur from a different mode of signifying, which frequently happens from the mode of signifying categorematic and syncategorematic terms, but it also happens from different modes of signification by complexes in different propositions.

|- valign = top
||Quando enim propter hoc quod si arguatur ex omnibus terminis eiusdem praedicamenti erit bonum argumentum creditur propter hoc quod similiter arguendo ex terminis diversorum praedicamentorum sit conveniens argumentum et tamen non est, tunc accidit fallacia figurae dictionis.

||For when, since if it is argued from all the terms of the same proposition, it will be a good argument, it is believed that by similarly arguing from the terms of different predicates, it is a suitable argument, and yet it is not, then the fallacy of the figure of speech occurs.

|- valign = top
||Creditur enim propter similitudinem dictionum quod consimiliter contingit arguere ex istis terminis sicut ex illis, et tunc fiet deceptio per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Est autem primo sciendum quod non semper quando arguitur ex terminis diversorum praedicamentorum est fallacia figurae dictionis, quia universaliter quando praemissae sunt mere de inesse et de praesenti et categoricae et in recto, et dispositae in modo et in figura, non est fallacia figurae dictionis, qualescumque sint termini.

||For it is believed, because of the similarity of the wordings, that it is possible to argue similarly from these terms as from those, and then there will be deception through the fallacy of the figure of speech. But first of all it must be known that there is not always a fallacy of figure of speech when it is argued from the terms of different categories, because universally when premises are merely assertoric and of the present and categorical and correct, and arranged in manner and figure, there is no fallacy of figure of speech, whatever the terms may be.

|- valign = top
||Nec plus refert quod omnes termini sint eiusdem praedicamenti quam diversorum.

||Nor does it matter more that all the terms are of the same category than of different ones.

|- valign = top
||Unde ita valet iste syllogismus `omnis homo est animal; album est homo; igitur album est animal' sicut iste `omnis homo est animal; Sortes est homo; igitur Sortes est animal'. Et ita, universaliter, est de consimilibus.

||Hence this syllogism is valid: `every man is an animal; a man is a white thing; therefore, a white thing is an animal', just as this `every man is an animal; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates is an animal.' And so it is universally about propositions like these.

|- valign = top
||Et ideo ad assignandum fallaciam figurae dictionis non sufficit dicere quod commutatur unum praedicamentum in reliquum, sed oportet dicere rationem magis specialem. Est igitur sciendum quod quamvis syllogistice arguendo ita contingit arguere ex terminis diversorum praedicamentorum sicut ex terminis eiusdem praedicamenti, tamen non syllogistice frequenter contingit arguere ex terminis eiusdem praedicamenti et non ex terminis diversorum praedicamentorum.

||And therefore, to assign the fallacy of the figure of speech, it is not sufficient to say that one predicate is exchanged for the others, but it is necessary to say a more special reason. It must therefore be known that although in arguing syllogistically it is possible to argue from the terms of different predicates as well as from the terms of the same predicate, yet it is not frequently possible to argue syllogistically from the terms of the same predicate and not from the terms of different predicates.

|- valign = top
||Et hoc multipliciter contingere potest, nam uno modo potest contingere propter diversitatem signorum distributivorum. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod sicut diversis praedicamentis congruunt diversa interrogativa, ita quod ad diversa interrogativa per incomplexa diversorum praedicamentorum fit responsio, --- nam si quaeratur quid est homo, convenienter respondetur quod est animal; et si quaeratur qualis est homo, convenienter respondetur quod est albus vel musicus, et non quod est animal; et si quaeratur ubi est homo, convenienter respondetur quod est in foro vel in campis, et sic de aliis ---, sic diversis praedicamentis correspondent diversa distributiva, sicut praedicamento substantiae correspondet `quilibet', `quidquid' et huiusmodi.

||And this can happen in many ways, for it can happen in one way because of the diversity of distributive signs. For the evidence of which we must know that just as different questions correspond to different predicates, so the answer to different questions is made through the complexities of the different predicates. And if it is asked what a man is, it is properly answered that he is white or a musician, and not that he is an animal; and if it is asked where a man is, the appropriate answer is that he is in the market or in the fields, and so on of other things. Thus different distributives correspond to different predicates, just as `anyone', `anything' and the like correspond to the predicate of substance.

|- valign = top
||Hoc tamen est sciendum quod talia distributiva aequaliter conveniunt omnibus nominibus mere absolutis, sive illa nomina significent substantias sive qualitates sive res quascumque. Praedicamento autem quantitatis correspondent ista distributiva `quantumcumque' et `quotcumque', loco quorum nonnumquam ponuntur `quantum' et `quot'.

||This, however, must be known, that such distributives apply equally to all merely absolute nouns, whether those nouns signify substances or qualities or things of any kind. Now these distributives correspond to the predicate of quantity, `however many' and `however much', in the place of which are sometimes put `how many' and `how much'.

|- valign = top
||Praedicamento qualitatis correspondet hoc signum `qualecumque'. Et praedicamento `ubi' hoc signum `ubicumque'. Et praedicamento `quando' hoc signum `quandocumque', et sic de aliis, nisi forte nomina nobis deficiant. Differt autem distributivum substantiae sive distributivum correspondens nominibus mere absolutis ab aliis, quia quandoque aequaliter contingit assumere sub nomina connotativa vel respectiva sicut nomina mere absoluta. Unde aequaliter valet iste modus arguendi `quidquid est homo, est animal; bicubitum est homo; igitur bicubitum est animal' sicut iste `quidquid est homo, est animal; Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes est animal', et hoc quia talis maior aequivalet isti `omnis homo est animal'.

||This term `whatever kind' corresponds to the predication of quality. And with the predicate `where' this term is `wherever'. And with the predicate `when' the term `whenever', and so on for the others, unless perhaps names fail us. Now the distributive of substance, or the distributive corresponding to merely absolute nouns, differs from others, because sometimes it is equally possible to assume under connotative or relative nouns as merely absolute nouns. Hence this method of arguing, `whatever man is, is an animal' is equally valid. `A man is sleeping; Therefore, an animal is sleeping', just as this, `whatever is a man, is an animal; `Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is an animal' and this because such a major is equivalent to this: `every man is an animal'.

|- valign = top
||Sed de aliis distributivis non est sic, quia sub aliis distributivis numquam contingit --- servando modum debitum arguendi --- sumere sub nisi incomplexa convenientia tali distributivo et propria sibi.

||But this is not the case with other distributives, because under other distributives it is never possible --- observing the modes required for arguing --- to subordinate things except the uncomplicated compatibility of such as is distributive and proper to itself.

|- valign = top
||Propter quod arguendo ex talibus necesse est scire naturas praedicamentorum, scilicet quid significant et quae significant et quomodo significant et quod non omnia praedicamenta significant unum, sed multa eorum significant plura, quamvis non omnia univoce nec eodem modo significandi.

||Therefore, in reasoning from such, it is necessary to know the nature of predicates, namely, what they signify and why they signify and how they signify, and that not all predicates signify one thing, but many of them signify several things, although not all of them univocally or in the same way.

|- valign = top
||Et qui hoc scit, est prope videre verum in multis, secundum Philosophum in libro Elenchorum.

||And he who knows this is close to seeing the truth in many things, according to the Philosopher in the Book of Lists.

|- valign = top
||Sciendum est igitur quod quandocumque sumpta maiore habente hoc signum distributivum `quantumcumque' vel `quotcumque', si sumatur sub aliquod incomplexum nisi per quod contingit respondere ad quaestionem factam per `quantum' vel `quot', est fallacia figurae dictionis propter distinctionem praedicamentorum.

||It must therefore be known that whenever the distributive sign `how many' or `how much' is taken as a major, if it is taken under some complex other than that by which it is possible to answer the question `how many?' or `how much?', it is a fallacy of the figure of speech due to the distinction of categories.

|- valign = top
||Et hoc, quia si assumeretur sub aliquod incomplexum per quod convenienter respondetur ad talem quaestionem, non esset aliqua fallacia. Et ideo si aliquis credat quod propter hoc contingit assumere sub in minore unum terminum sicut alium, secundum quod hoc contingit in multis aliis, decipietur per fallaciam figurae dictionis; sicut hic `quantum est a tantum est b; a est lignum; igitur b est lignum'.

||And this, because if it were supposed to be under some complex by which such a question is appropriately answered, there would not be any fallacy. And therefore if any one believes that for this reason it is possible to assume one term under the minor as another, according to the fact that this happens in many others, he will be deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech; as here: `as much as there is of a, there is so much of b; a is wood; therefore b is wood.

|- valign = top
||Et tamen si loco istius termini `lignum' poneretur iste terminus `tricubitum', esset bonum argumentum, sic arguendo `quantum est a tantum est b; tricubitum est a; igitur tricubitum est b'.

||And yet if instead of this term `wood' the term `three cubits' were put, it would be a good argument: `a is three cubits; therefore b is three cubits'.

|- valign = top
||Similiter, si post hoc signum `qualecumque' in maiore, accipiatur sub in minore aliquod incomplexum per quod non respondetur ad quaestionem factam per `quale', est fallacia figurae dictionis.

||Similarly, if after this sign `whatever kind' in the major, some complex is taken under the minor by which the question posed by `what kind' is not answered, it is a fallacy of the figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Et si accipiatur sub incomplexum per quod convenienter respondetur ad quaestionem factam per `quale', erit bonum argumentum. Sicut hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `qualecumque currit, disputat; Sortes currit; igitur Sortes disputat', et tamen non hic `qualecumque currit, disputat; nigrum currit; igitur nigrum disputat'.

||And if it is taken under the complex by which it is suitably answered to the question made by `how', it will be a good argument. Just as here is the fallacy of the figure of speech, `however he runs, he argues; Socrates is running; therefore, Socrates argues', and yet not here: `however he runs, a black thing runs; therefore, a black thing argues'.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quandocumque est accidens, tunc est suum subiectum; accidens est inhaerens; igitur subiectum est inhaerens', et non hic `quandocumque est accidens, est suum subiectum; accidens est in hoc tempore; igitur subiectum est in hoc tempore.

||Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech: `whenever there is an accident, then it is its subject; an accident is inherent; therefore, the subject is inherent', and not here, 'whenever there is an accident, it is its own subject; an accident is at this time; therefore, the subject is at this time'.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `ubicumque est substantia, ibi est quantitas; angelus est substantia; igitur angelus est quantitas', sed non hic `ubicumque est substantia, ibi est quantitas; substantia est in hoc loco; igitur quantitas est in hoc loco'.

||Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech: `wherever there is substance, there is quantity; An angel is substance; Therefore, an angel is a quantity', but not here: `wherever there is substance, there is quantity; there is substance in this place; therefore quantity is in this place'.

|- valign = top
||Et sic contingit arguere in aliis ubi ponitur signum distributivum correspondens interrogativo ad quod contingit convenienter respondere per incomplexa alicuius praedicamenti et non per alia.

||And so it is possible to argue in other cases where a distributive sign is placed corresponding to an interrogative, to which it is possible to answer conveniently by means of the incomplexes of some category and not by others.

|- valign = top
||Tamen de distributivis substantiae est difficultas specialis.

||However, there is a special difficulty about distributive substance.

|- valign = top
||Pro quo sciendum quod quando distributivum substantiae ponitur in propositione mere de praesenti et mere de inesse, non refert quodcumque accipere sub in minore. Et ideo talis modus arguendi valet `quidquid emis, comedis; carnes crudas emis; igitur carnes crudas comedis', `quidquid est substantia corporea, est quantitas; corpus Christi est substantia corporea; igitur corpus Christi est quantitas', et sic de aliis. Ita tamen quod in minore non accipiatur aliqua determinatio compositionis quae non accipiebatur in maiore et simul cum hoc quod non commutetur unus numerus in alium numerum, quia si alterum illorum fiat, accidet fallacia figurae dictionis, sicut ostendetur.

||For which reason it should be known that when the distributive of substance is placed in a proposition merely of the present and merely assertoric, it does not matter if one takes anything under the minor. And therefore this method of reasoning is valid: `whatsoever you buy, you eat; you buy raw meat; therefore eat raw meat', `whatsoever is a corporeal substance is a quantity; the body of Christ is a corporeal substance; therefore, the body of Christ is a quantity', and so of the others. Nevertheless, in the minor, no determination of composition is accepted which was not accepted in the major, and at the same time that one number is not changed into another number, because if one of them becomes another, a fallacy of the figure of speech will occur, as will be shown.

|- valign = top
||Unde pluribus modis, quando non accipiuntur praemissae dispositae in modo et in figura nec aequivalentes talibus, accidit fallacia figurae dictionis: vel sumendo aliud nomen quam per quod respondetur ad quaestionem factam per `quid est' de re una; quandoque enim hoc accidit arguendo ex propositionibus de praesenti, quandoque ex propositionibus de praeterito vel de futuro, quandoque ex propositionibus de modo. Si arguatur ex propositionibus de praesenti et de inesse, hoc potest contingere vel addendo aliquam determinationem per quam potest, partialiter saltem, responderi ad quaestionem factam per aliud interrogativum de re una quam per `quid est'. Sicut si arguatur `quidquid currit est corpus; homo velociter currit; igitur homo velociter est corpus', quia in minore additur `velociter', per quod respondetur aliquo modo ad aliam quaestionem quam ad quaestionem factam per `quid est', ideo est fallacia figurae dictionis. Et tamen si poneretur haec determinatio `realiter', esset bonum argumentum, sic arguendo

||Hence, in several ways, when the premises arranged in mode and form are not accepted, nor are they equivalent to such, the fallacy of the figure of speech occurs: either by taking a different name than that by which the question made by `what is?' about one thing is answered; for sometimes this happens by arguing from propositions about the present, sometimes from propositions about the past or the future, sometimes from propositions of a mode. If it is argued from propositions about the present and assertoric, this can happen either by adding some determination by which it is possible, at least partially, to answer the question made by another interrogative about the same thing than by `what is?'. Just as if it were argued that anything that moves is a body; a man runs fast; Therefore, man is quickly a body, because in the minor is added `quickly', by which it is answered in some way to a different question than to the question posed by 'what is?', therefore there is a fallacy of the figure of speech. And yet, if this determination were to be posited `really', it would be a good argument, arguing in this way:

|- valign = top
||'quidquid currit est corpus; homo realiter currit; ergo homo realiter est corpus'. Unde universaliter quando in tali modo arguendi additur in minore aliqua determinatio quae potest competere et non competere eidem, causatur fallacia figurae dictionis, et alia non causat fallaciam figurae dictionis.

||'whatever moves is a body; the man is really running; therefore man is really a body'. Hence, universally, when in such a way of arguing some minor determination is added which may and may not belong to the same person, a fallacy of the figure of speech is caused, and another does not cause a fallacy of the figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Tale tamen signum posset accipi in minore quod non foret ibi fallacia figurae dictionis. Sicut ponatur quod `qualiter' sit adverbium interrogativum ad quod convenienter respondetur per talia `cito', `velociter', `tarde', `violenter' et huiusmodi, et sibi correspondeat hoc signum `qualitercumque'; quo posito iste modus arguendi erit bonus `qualitercumque aliquid currit, est corpus; homo velociter currit; igitur homo velociter est corpus'. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `omnis substantia materialis habet partem distantem a parte; corpus Christi in sacramento Altaris est substantia materialis; igitur corpus Christi est in sacramento Altaris habens partem distantem a parte'. Similiter hic `omne corpus est quantum; corpus Christi est corpus in sacramento Altaris; igitur corpus Christi est quantum in sacramento Altaris'.

||Such a sign, however, might be taken in a lesser degree, as there would be no fallacy of the figure of speech. Just as it is assumed that `how' is an interrogative adverb to which it is suitably answered by such things as `quickly', `rapidly', `slowly', `violently' and the like, and the sign `however' corresponds to it; on the basis of which this method of reasoning will be good: `whatever way something runs, it is a body; a man runs fast; therefore man is a swift body'. Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `every material substance has a part distant from another part; the body of Christ in the sacrament of the Altar is a material substance; therefore, the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the Altar, having a part distant from another part. Similarly here, `every body is a quantity; the body of Christ is the body in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore, the body of Christ is a quantity in the sacrament of the Altar'.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic `omne corpus est circumscriptum loco; corpus Christi est corpus in sacramento

||Similarly here, every body is circumscribed by place; `the body of Christ is the body in the sacrament

|- valign = top
||Altaris; igitur corpus Christi est circumscriptum loco in sacramento Altaris'. Similiter hic, secundum unam opinionem, `omnis substantia materialis est quantitas; corpus Christi est substantia materialis in sacramento Altaris; igitur corpus Christi est quantitas in sacramento Altaris'.

||of the Altar; therefore the body of Christ is confined to a place in the sacrament of the Altar'. Similarly here, according to one opinion, `every material substance is a quantity; the body of Christ is the material substance in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore, the body of Christ is a quantity in the sacrament of the Altar'.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic `quidquid est substantia, est quantitas; corpus Christi est substantia in sacramento Altaris; igitur corpus Christi est quantitas in sacramento Altaris'. Et tamen sic arguendo `ubicumque aliquid est substantia, ibi illud est quantitas; corpus Christi est substantia in sacramento Altaris; igitur corpus Christi est quantitas in sacramento Altaris', est bonum argumentum.

||Similarly here, `whatever is a substance is a quantity; the body of Christ is the substance in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore the body of Christ is the quantity in the sacrament of the Altar'. And yet arguing thus, `wherever there is substance, there is that quantity; the body of Christ is the substance in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore the body of Christ is the quantity in the sacrament of the Altar', is a good argument.

|- valign = top
||Et ita patet quod ponendo hoc signum `ubicumque' loco istius signi `quidquid' non est aliqua fallacia sumendo sub aliquid per quod respondetur ad quaestionem factam per `ubi'. Propter quod summe necesse est scire qualia et quae significant praedicamenta et quomodo ad hoc quod sciatur de multis an sit ibi fallacia figurae dictionis.

||And so it is clear that by placing this sign `anywhere' in place of this sign `anything', there is no fallacy in taking something under it by which the question posed by `where' is answered. For this reason it is very necessary to know what kind the predicates are and what they signify, and how, in order that it may be known of many whether there is a fallacy of the figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Ex praedictis patet quod hic nulla est fallacia `ubicumque aliquid habet quantitatem inhaerentem sibi, ibi est quantum; substantia corporis Christi habet quantitatem inhaerentem sibi in sacramento Altaris; igitur substantia corporis Christi est quanta in sacramento Altaris'.

||It is clear from what has been said that there is no fallacy here: `wherever something has a quantity inherent in it, there is a quantity; The substance of Christ's body has an inherent quantity in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore, the substance of Christ's body is a quantity in the sacrament of the Altar.

|- valign = top
||Nec hic `ubicumque aliquid habet longitudinem, latitudinem et profunditatem inhaerentem sibi, ibi est longum, latum et profundum; sed substantia corporis Christi habet longitudinem, latitudinem et profunditatem inhaerentem sibi in sacramento Altaris; igitur substantia corporis Christi est in sacramento Altaris longa, lata et profunda'.

||Nor here, `wherever anything has length, breadth, and depth inherent in itself, there it is long, broad, and deep; but the substance of Christ's body has the length, breadth, and depth inherent in it in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore the substance of Christ's body in the sacrament of the Altar is long, wide and deep'.

|- valign = top
||Nec hic `ubicumque aliqua substantia habet extensionem inhaerentem sibi, ibi est extensa; substantia corporis Christi habet extensionem inhaerentem sibi in sacramento Altaris; igitur substantia corporis Christi est extensa in sacramento Altaris'.

||Nor here, `wherever any substance has extension inherent in itself, there it is extended; the substance of Christ's body has an inherent extension in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore, the substance of Christ's body is extended in the sacrament of the Altar'.

|- valign = top
||Aliter contingit peccare per fallaciam figurae dictionis in tali modo arguendi, commutando unum numerum in alium, puta numerum singularem in pluralem, sic `quidquid est scitum, est scitum per inventionem vel per doctrinam; ista sunt scita, --- demonstrando unum scitum per inventionem et aliud per doctrinam ---; igitur ista sunt scita per inventionem vel per doctrinam'.

||In another way, it is possible to err through the fallacy of the figure of speech in such a way of reasoning, as by exchanging one number for another, for example a singular number for a plural one, thus: `whatever is known is known by discovery or by teaching; these things are known, showing that one thing is known by discovery and another by teaching; therefore, these things are known by discovery or by teaching.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic `quaelibet persona divina est Deus; Pater et Filius sunt personae divinae; igitur

||Similarly here, ``every divine person is God; the Father and the Son are divine persons; therefore

|- valign = top
||Pater et Filius sunt dii'. Similiter hic `quaelibet persona divina producens personam est principium Spiritus Sancti; Pater et Filius sunt personae divinae producentes personam; igitur Pater et Filius sunt principia Spiritus Sancti'.

||the Father and the Son are Gods'. Similarly here, `every divine person producing a person is the principle of the Holy Spirit; the Father and the Son are divine persons producing a person; therefore, the Father and the Son are the principles of the Holy Spirit'.

|- valign = top
||Hoc tamen est sciendum quod vix aut numquam potest impediri talis modus arguendi ex talibus duabus propositionibus nisi ubi arguitur disiunctive et ubi accipitur terminus significans aliquam rem unam quae est plures personae, quo modo est de Deo, qui unus Deus est, et tamen est plures personae.

||This, however, must be known, that such a way of arguing from two such propositions can scarcely or never be prevented except where it is argued disjunctively, and where the term is taken to signify some one thing which is many persons, as it is of God, who is one God, and yet is many persons.

|- valign = top
||Similiter unum principium Spiritus Sancti est duae personae.

||Similarly, the one principle of the Holy Spirit is two persons.

|- valign = top
||Tamen, frequenter, arguendo enthymematice et commutando numerum singularem in numerum pluralem est fallacia figurae dictionis in aliis casibus quam in illis. Et hoc ubicumque terminus non significat plura; sicut non sequitur `sol est corpus, igitur soles sunt corpora'; nec sequitur `phoenix est animal, igitur phoenices sunt animalia', et hoc propter falsam implicationem in consequente. Et ideo hic est tantum consequentia ut nunc `homo est animal, igitur homines sunt animalia'.

||However, frequently, arguing enthymematically and changing the singular number into a plural number is the fallacy of figure of speech in other cases than in these. And this wherever the term does not signify more; just as it does not follow that `the sun is a body, therefore suns are bodies'; nor does it follow that `the phoenix is an animal, therefore phoenixes are animals,' and this because of a false implication in the consequent. And therefore, here is such a consequence that now 'man is an animal, therefore men are animals'.

|- valign = top
||Et tales falsae consequentiae possunt reduci ad primum modum, in quo oritur deceptio propter diversa accidentia grammaticalia diversarum dictionum. Aliter peccat talis modus arguendi penes fallaciam figurae dictionis, arguendo ex propositionibus de praeterito et de futuro, et hoc vel arguendo ex omnibus de praeterito vel ex una de praeterito et una de praesenti.

||And such false conclusions can be reduced to the first mode in which deception arises because of the different grammatical accidents of different expressions. In another way, such a way of reasoning is wrong, and is close to the fallacy of a figure of speech, by arguing from propositions about the past and the future, and this either by arguing from all the past or from one of the past and one of the present.

|- valign = top
||Et eodem modo, proportionaliter, dicendum est de illis de futuro. Si primo modo, aut assumptum in minori ponitur a parte subiecti aut a parte praedicati. Si primo modo, resolvendae sunt propositiones in propositiones aequivalentes quae possunt disponi in modo et in figura, et tunc utendum est arte quae data est de modo syllogizandi ex propositionibus de praeterito et de futuro.

||And in the same way, proportionally, it must be said of those of the future. If in the first mode, either the predicate is placed in the minor on the part of the subject or on the part of the predicate. If in the first way, the propositions must be resolved into equivalent propositions which can be arranged in mode and form, and then we must use the art that has been given on the mode of syllogizing from propositions about the past and the future.

|- valign = top
||Verbi gratia si arguatur sic `quidquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti; carnes crudas heri emisti; igitur carnes crudas hodie comedisti' resolvenda est maior in istam sibi aequivalentem `omne heri emptum fuit hodie comestum a te' et minor in istam aequivalentem sibi `carnes crudae fuerunt heri emptae' et conclusio in istam sibi aequivalentem `carnes crudae fuerunt hodie comestae a te'. Et subiectis in omnibus istis acceptis pro his quae fuerunt, tenet syllogismus. Sed si subiectum conclusionis sumatur pro his quae sunt, non valet, sed est tam fallacia accidentis quam fallacia figurae dictionis.

||For example, if it is argued that `whatever you bought yesterday, you ate today; You bought raw meat yesterday; therefore you have eaten raw meat today' is to be resolved into the major equivalent of `everything bought yesterday was eaten by you today' and the minor into its equivalent `raw meat was bought yesterday' and the conclusion into its equivalent `raw meat was eaten by you today'. And the syllogism holds that the subjects in all these are taken for what they were. But if the subject of the conclusion is taken for what it is, it does not hold, but is as much a fallacy of accident as a fallacy of figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Si autem ponatur assumptum a parte praedicati, semper est fallacia figurae dictionis. Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid heri emisti, hodie comedisti; tu emisti heri carnes crudas; ergo hodie comedisti carnes crudas'.

||But if the thing assumed is placed on the part of the predicate, there is always a fallacy of the figure of speech. Hence here is a fallacy of the figure of speech: `whatever you bought yesterday, you ate today; yesterday you bought raw meat; therefore, today you have eaten raw meat'.

|- valign = top
||Et multo magis erit fallacia figurae dictionis si maior sit de praesenti et minor de praeterito vel de futuro. Propter quod hic est fallacia figurae dictionis, secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quod quantitas non est alia res a substantia et qualitate, `quidquid fuit heri, est hodie; Sortes fuit heri bicubitalis quantitatis; igitur Sortes est hodie bicubitalis quantitatis'.

||And the fallacy of the figure of speech will be much greater if it is more about the present and less about the past or the future. Because of this, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, according to that opinion which posits that quantity is not a different thing from substance and quality, `whatever was yesterday is today; yesterday Socrates was two cubits in size; therefore Socrates is today two cubits in size.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; Sortes fuit triangularis figurae; igitur Sortes est triangularis figurae'. Similiter hic `quidquid fuit, est; ignis produxit vel calefecit; ergo ignis producit vel calefacit'. In omnibus enim talibus est fallacia figurae dictionis. Et tamen accipiendo sub nomina mere absoluta non est aliqua fallacia. Sicut hic est bonum argumentum `quidquid fuit, est; homo fuit; igitur homo est'. Et similiter hic `quidquid fuit est; albedo fuit; ergo albedo est'. Et similiter hic `quidquid fuit, est; Sortes fuit homo; igitur Sortes est homo'.

||Similarly here, `whatever was, is still; Socrates was triangular in shape; therefore Socrates is triangular in shape'. Similarly here, `whatever was, is; Fire produced or heated; therefore fire produces or heats'. For in all such there is a fallacy of the figure of speech. And yet there is no fallacy in accepting them under purely absolute names. As here is a good argument, `whatever was, is; he was a man; therefore he is a man'. And likewise here, `whatever was is; he was white; therefore he is white'. And likewise here, `whatever was, is; Socrates was a man; therefore Socrates is a man'.

|- valign = top
||Et similiter hic `quidquid fuit, est; haec albedo fuit color; igitur haec albedo est color'. Et tamen secundum illam opinionem quae ponit quantitatem non esse aliam rem a substantia et qualitate hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; haec substantia fuit quantitas; ergo haec substantia adhuc est quantitas'.

||And likewise here, `whatever was, is; this color was white; Therefore, this white is a color.' And yet according to that opinion which posits that quantity is not a different thing from substance and quality, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever was, still is; this substance was a quantity; therefore, this substance is still a quantity'.

|- valign = top
||Sed hic est bonum argumentum `quandocumque aliquid fuit substantia, tunc fuit quantitas; haec substantia fuit substantia; ergo haec substantia fuit quantitas'. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid est, fuit prius; a est simul cum b; igitur a fuit prius simul cum b'.

||But here is a good argument: `whenever there was a substance, then there was a quantity; this substance was substance; therefore, this substance was quantity`. Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `whatever is, was before; a is together with b; Therefore, a was first at the same time as b'.

|- valign = top
||Similiter est hic fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid fuit, adhuc est; hoc corpus fuit coniunctum illi corpori; igitur hoc corpus est adhuc coniunctum illi corpori'.

||Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `Whatever was, is still; this body was joined to that body; therefore, this body is still joined to that body.'

|- valign = top
||Et tamen hic est bonum argumentum `quidquid fuit, est; albedo fuit; igitur albedo est'. Et sicut dictum est de propositionibus de praeterito, ita, proportionaliter, dicendum est de propositionibus de futuro.

||And yet here is a good argument, `whatever was, is; whiteness existed; therefore, whiteness exists'. And as it was said of propositions concerning the past, so, proportionally, it must be said of propositions concerning the future.

|- valign = top
||Aliter contingit fallacia figurae dictionis ex diversitate praedicamentorum in propositionibus modalibus, sicut sic arguendo `quidquid potest Deus facere mediante causa secunda, potest facere se solo; sed Deus potest facere actum meritorium mediante causa secunda; igitur potest se solo facere actum meritorium'.

||In another way, the fallacy of the figure of speech occurs from the diversity of predicates in modal propositions, as in arguing that `whatever God can do by means of a second cause, He can do by Himself alone; but God can do a meritorious act by means of a second cause; therefore He can do a meritorious act by Himself.

|- valign = top
||Responsio: hic est fallacia figurae dictionis, quia si acciperetur sub nomen mere absolutum, esset bonum argumentum; sicut hic est bonum argumentum `quidquid potest Deus facere mediante causa secunda, potest facere se solo; sed Deus potest facere ignem mediante causa secunda; igitur etc.'.

||Response: Here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, because if it were taken under the mere name of the absolute, it would be a good argument; as here is a good argument, `whatever God can do by means of a second cause, he can do by himself alone; but God can make fire by means of a second cause; therefore, etc.'

|- valign = top
||Et ideo si propter similitudinem dictionum credat quis quod unum argumentum est bonum sicut aliud, decipietur per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Verumtamen sciendum est quod si `actum meritorium' poneretur a parte subiecti, non esset fallacia figurae dictionis.

||And therefore if, because of the similarity of the sayings, anyone believes that one argument is as good as another, he will be deceived by the fallacy of figure of speech. Nevertheless, it must be known that if a `meritorious act' were put on the part of the subject, it would not be a fallacy of a figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Unde hic non est fallacia figurae dictionis `quidquid Deus potest facere mediante causa secunda etc.; sed omnem actum meritorium potest Deus facere mediante causa secunda; igitur omnem actum meritorium potest Deus facere se solo', quia conclusio est vera si praemissae sunt verae, sive subiectum accipiatur pro his quae sunt sive pro his quae possunt esse.

||Hence there is no fallacy here of the figure of speech, `whatever God can do by means of a second cause, etc. but God can do every meritorious act by means of a second cause; therefore God alone can do every meritorious act', because the conclusion is true if the premises are true, whether the subject is taken for what is or for what may be.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `omnem rem potest Deus facere sine alia re distincta totaliter; album est res alia ab albedine; ergo Deus potest facere album sine albedine'.

||Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `God can do all things without another thing being completely distinct; white is something different from whiteness; therefore God can make white without whiteness'.

|- valign = top
||Et tamen ista conclusio bene sequitur `album Deus potest facere sine albedine', quia illam rem quae est alba potest Deus facere sine albedine; et tamen haec est impossibilis `album facit Deus sine albedine'.

||And yet this conclusion follows well, `God can make a white thing without whiteness', because that thing which is white can be made by God without whiteness; and yet this is impossible: `God makes a white thing without whiteness'.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `Deus potest causare omnem rem possibilem quae non est Deus; veritas istius propositionis ``Deus nihil causat potest esse; igitur Deus potest causare veritatem huius propositionis', propter hoc quod iste terminus `veritas istius propositionis' non est incomplexum mere absolutum.

||Similarly here is a fallacy of figure of speech, "God can cause every possible thing that is not God; the truth of that proposition, `God cannot cause anything'; therefore God can cause the truth of this proposition", for the reason that this term 'the truth of this proposition' is not a complex, merely absolute.

|- valign = top
||Oportet autem scire quod non solum iste modus fallaciae figurae dictionis est in talibus discursibus compositis ex pluribus praemissis, sed etiam accidit in consequentiis et enthymematibus; quia iste modus non est tantum ex hoc quod unum praedicamentum commutatur in aliud, hoc est ex hoc quod primo in maiore accipitur signum distributivum correspondens uni praedicamento et postea accipitur sub incomplexum alterius praedicamenti.

||Now it is necessary to know that not only is this mode of fallacious figure of speech in such discourses composed of several premisses, but it also occurs in inferences and enthymemes; because this method is not only from the fact that one predicate is changed into another, this is from the fact that first the distributive sign corresponding to one predicate is taken in the major and then it is taken under the complex of the other predicate.

|- valign = top
||Quia numquam dicit Philosophus quod figura dictionis est ex commutatione unius praedicamenti in aliud, sed dicit quod est ex hoc quod diversa sunt praedicamenta et easdem res diversimode significant, ideo frequenter non valent consequentiae ex incomplexis aliquorum praedicamentorum.

||Because the Philosopher never says that the figure of speech is from the exchange of one predicate for another, but says that it is from the fact that the predicates are different and signify the same thing in different ways, therefore the consequences from the complexities of some predicates are frequently not valid.

|- valign = top
||Et tamen si loco illorum ponerentur incomplexa alterius praedicamenti, essent consequentiae bonae; sicut hic est consequentia bona `homo fuit animal, igitur animal fuit homo'.

||And yet if, in their place, complexities of another category were put, the consequences would be good; as here is a good consequence, `man was an animal, therefore an animal was a man.'

|- valign = top
||Similiter `albedo fuit nigredo, ergo nigredo fuit albedo'. Similiter `albedo potest esse color, ergo color potest esse albedo'. Similiter tales consequentiae sunt bonae `albedo cessat esse albedo, igitur albedo cessat esse'; `homo desinit esse homo, igitur homo desinit esse' et huiusmodi. Quae ideo bonae consequentiae sunt quia termini ex quibus componuntur non significant aliquid in recto et aliquid in obliquo, nec significant aliquid primo et principaliter et aliquid secundario, nec significant aliquid affirmative et aliquid negative, sed eodem modo significant omnia sua significata. Quod secundum principia Aristotelis non est verum nisi de incomplexis in genere substantiae et de abstractis in genere qualitatis quibus correspondent concreta supponentia pro distinctis rebus ab illis pro quibus supponunt abstracta, et ideo tales consequentiae ex talibus terminis bonae sunt et non aliae.

||Similarly, `whiteness was blackness, therefore blackness was whiteness.' Similarly, `whiteness can be a color, therefore a color can be whiteness.' Similarly, such consequences are good: `whiteness ceases to be whiteness, therefore whiteness ceases to be'; `a man ceases to be a man, therefore a man ceases to be' and the like. Which therefore are good consequences, because the terms from which they are composed do not signify something directly and something obliquely, nor do they signify something first and principally and something secondary, nor do they signify something affirmatively and something negatively, but they signify in the same way all their signifieds. This, according to Aristotle's principles, is only true of complex things in the genus of substance, and of abstracts in the genus of quality, to which correspond concrete suppositions for distinct things from those for which they suppose abstract ones, and therefore such inferences from such terms are good and not others.

|- valign = top
||Propter quod si aliquis credat quod consequentiae consimiles valent ex aliis terminis sicut ex talibus, decipietur per fallaciam figurae dictionis. Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis penes istum modum `album desinet cras esse album, ergo album desinet cras esse'; `motus cessabit esse motus quando quiescet mobile, igitur motus cessabit esse quando quiescet mobile', sicut hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `forma partibiliter adquisita cessabit esse partibiliter adquisita quando quiescet mobile, ergo forma partibiliter adquisita cessabit esse quando quiescet mobile'.

||Because of this, if anyone believes that similar consequences are valid from other terms as from such, he will be deceived by the fallacy of figure of speech. Hence here is the fallacy of the figure of speech in this way: `a white thing will cease to be a white thing tomorrow, therefore a white thing will cease to be tomorrow'; `motion will cease to be motion when the mobile is at rest, therefore motion will cease to be when the mobile is at rest', as here is the fallacy of the figure of speech, `a partially acquired form will cease to be partially acquired when the mobile is at rest, therefore a partially acquired form will cease to be when the mobile is at rest'.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic `actum meritorium potest Deus facere sine voluntate efficiente, igitur Deus potest facere actum meritorium sine voluntate efficiente'. Similiter hic `istam veritatem potest Deus facere, --- demonstrando veritatem istius: Deus nihil facit ---, ergo Deus potest facere hanc veritatem'.

||Similarly here, `God can do a meritorious act without an efficient will, therefore God can do a meritorious act without an efficient will'. Similarly here, `God can make this truth,' by demonstrating the truth of this: God makes nothing, therefore God can make this truth.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic `homo ab aeterno fuit Deus, igitur Deus ab aeterno fuit homo'. Et pro isto exemplo et pro aliis praecedentibus est sciendum quod quamvis hoc nomen `homo' secundum usum philosophorum sit nomen mere absolutum, non plus significans unum significatum in recto quam aliud, tamen secundum usum theologorum non est ita mere absolutum, quia si sic, esset convertibile cum hoc nomine `humanitas'. Et tunc sicut haec est neganda `Filius Dei est humanitas,' ita esset haec neganda `Filius Dei est homo', quod falsum est. Et ideo secundum usum theologorum hoc nomen `homo' connotat vel consignificat, potentialiter saltem, suppositum divinum, quod quamvis non esset homo, posset tamen esse homo. Et propter hoc quando posui multa exempla de hoc nomine `homo', locutus sum secundum usum philosophorum. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `Filius Dei potest non esse homo, igitur homo potest non esse Filius Dei', propter eandem rationem.

||Similarly, here `man was God from eternity, therefore God was man from eternity'. And for this example and for others that precede it, it must be known that although this name `man' according to the usage of the philosophers is a purely absolute name, signifying no more one signified in the right than another, yet according to the usage of the theologians it is not so purely absolute, because if so, it would be convertible with the noun `humanity'. And then, just as this is to be denied, `The Son of God is humanity,' so it would be to deny that `The Son of God is man,' which is false. And therefore, according to the use of theologians, the word `man' connotes or signifies, at least potentially, the divine supposition that, although he was not a man, he could still be a man. And for this reason, when I set forth many examples of this noun `man,' I spoke according to the usage of the philosophers. Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `The Son of God may not be a man, therefore a man may not be the Son of God,' for the same reason.

|- valign = top
||Scire autem quare in praedictis est fallacia figurae dictionis non spectat ad logicum, sed spectat ad illum qui perfecte novit tam logicam quam alias artes sive scientias speciales, et ideo qui in omnibus argumentis novit artificialiter assignare fallaciam figurae dictionis est prope videre verum in omnibus scientiis.

||Now to know why there is a fallacy in the figure of speech in the aforesaid, do not look to the logician, but look to him who perfectly knows logic as well as other special arts or sciences, and therefore he who knows how to artificially assign in all arguments the fallacy of a figure of speech is close to seeing the truth in all sciences.

|- valign = top
||Est etiam sciendum quod quamvis tales consequentiae habeant talem defectum generalem, tamen quandoque aliquae gratia materiae possunt tenere. Et tunc ad ostendendum quod aliquae tales consequentiae tenent gratia materiae et aliquae non, oportet recurrere ad secundum modum principalem istius fallaciae et ad artem traditam ibi.

||It must also be known that although such consequences have such a general failure, they can still sometimes hold thanks to their subject matter. And then, in order to show that some of these consequences hold due thanks to the subject matter and some do not, we must return to the second principal mode of this fallacy and to the art which was handed down there.

|- valign = top
||Nec est inconveniens quod in eodem argumento concurrant aliquando duo modi eiusdem fallaciae. Ad istum etiam modum habent reduci omnes paralogismi in quibus arguitur a praemissis habentibus aliquam determinationem ad conclusionem sine illa determinatione, quamvis nonnulli tales possent reduci ad secundum modum principalem.

||Nor is it inconvenient that two modes of the same fallacy sometimes meet in the same subject. All paralogisms, in which it is argued from premises having some determination to a conclusion without that determination, can also be reduced to this mode, although some of these could be reduced to the second principal mode.

|- valign = top
||Unde hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `tu non habes denarium cum tristitia; et tu das denarium cum tristitia; ergo das quod non habes'. Similiter hic `tu non habes unum solum denarium; et das unum solum denarium; ergo das quod non habes'.

||Whence here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `You have not a penny with sorrow; and you give a penny with sadness; therefore you give what you do not have'. Similarly here, `you do not have a single penny; and you give only one penny; therefore you give what you do not have'.

|- valign = top
||Et causa quare in talibus est fallacia figurae dictionis est ista, quia si in talibus praemissis loco istorum terminorum `denarium cum tristitia', `unum solum denarium' ponerentur termini mere absoluti non esset aliqua fallacia respectu eiusdem conclusionis.

||And the reason why there is a fallacy of figure of speech in such cases is this, because if in such premisses, instead of these terms `a penny with sadness', `one penny only' were put as purely absolute terms, there would not be any fallacy with regard to the same conclusion.

|- valign = top
||Sicut hic nulla est fallacia `tu non habes animal rationale; tu das animal rationale; igitur tu das quod non habes'; nec hic `tu das bovem et non habes bovem, igitur das quod non habes'.

||Just as here there is no fallacy, `you have no rational animal; you give a rational animal; therefore you give what you do not have'; nor here, `you give an ox and have no ox, therefore you give what you do not have.'

|- valign = top
||Sed numquid est hic fallacia figurae dictionis `tu das bovem album; et non habes bovem album; igitur das quod non habes'? Dicendum est quod hic est bonum argumentum, quia non semper dimissio determinationis in conclusione facit fallaciam figurae dictionis, sed quando determinatio illa est in uno praedicamento tunc causat et quando est in alio tunc non causat fallaciam figurae dictionis.

||But is there a fallacy here in the figure of speech, `You give a white ox; and you have no white ox; So you give what you don't have'? It must be said that this is a good argument, because the omission of a determination in a conclusion does not always cause the fallacy of a figure of speech, but when that determination is in one category then it causes it and when it is in another then it does not cause the fallacy of a figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Unde bene sequitur `tu das unum denarium; et non habes unum denarium; igitur das quod non habes'; et tamen non sequitur `tu das bovem in isto loco; et non habes bovem in isto loco; igitur das quod non habes'.

||Whence it follows well, `You give one penny; and you have not one penny; therefore you give what you do not have'; and yet it does not follow that you give an ox in that place; and you have no ox in that place; therefore you give what you do not have'.

|- valign = top
||Nec potest dari regula generalis quando talis consequentia valet et quando non valet. Similiter potest accidere fallacia figurae dictionis propter hoc quod aliqui termini significant aliquid negative et aliquid affirmative, sicut in isto exemplo `tu das unum solum denarium; et non habes unum solum denarium; ergo das quod non habes'. Unde propter hoc quod `unum solum' significat plura negative, ideo talis consequentia non valet.

||Nor can a general rule be given when such a conclusion is valid and when it is not. In the same way, errors of the figure of speech can occur due to the fact that some terms mean something negatively and something else positively, as in this example: `You give only one penny; and you do not have one single penny; therefore, you give what you do not have'. Therefore, on account of the fact that `only one' signifies several things negatively, therefore such a conclusion is not valid.

|- valign = top
||Non solum autem accidit fallacia figurae dictionis propter hoc quod incomplexa categorematica et syncategorematica diversimode significant et propter hoc quod diversa praedicamenta significant diversimode et propter hoc quod aliqui termini significant aliquid negative et aliquid affirmative et aliquid affirmative et negative, sed etiam ex hoc quod aliqui sunt termini communes pluribus et aliqui sunt proprii, inter quos computanda sunt nomina propria et pronomina demonstrativa et relativa.

||Not only does the fallacy of figure of speech occur because of the fact that complex categorematics and syncategorematics mean things differently and because different predicates mean things differently and because some terms mean something negative and something positive and something affirmative and negative, but also from the fact that some terms are common to several and some are proper, among which are to be reckoned proper nouns and demonstrative and relative pronouns.

|- valign = top
||Et est iste modus quando aliquod argumentum teneret si loco termini communis, vel loco termini habentis terminum communem pro parte, poneretur nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum vel relativum; et tamen quia ponitur alius terminus quam pronomen demonstrativum vel relativum vel nomen proprium non valet argumentum, vel quando accidit e converso.

||And this is the mode when an argument would hold if instead of a common term, or instead of a term having a common term as part, a proper noun or a demonstrative or relative pronoun were put; and yet because a term other than a demonstrative or relative pronoun or a proper noun is used, the argument is not valid, or when it happens the other way around.

|- valign = top
||Verbi gratia si arguatur sic `Marcus potest esse alter a Tullio; Marcus est Tullius; igitur Marcus potest esse alter a se', hic est bonum argumentum si `Marcus' sit nomen proprium istius hominis et similiter `Tullius'.

||For example, if it is argued that 'Marcus may be different from Tullius; Marcus is Tullius; therefore Marcus can be different from himself', here is a good argument if 'Marcus' is the proper name of that man and likewise 'Tullius'.

|- valign = top
||Si tamen loco istius nominis `Tullius' poneretur hoc commune `musicum' vel sibi adderetur idem commune, argumentum non valeret; sicut non sequitur `Marcus potest esse alter a musico, vel a Tullio musico; Marcus est musicus, vel Tullius musicus; igitur Marcus potest esse alter a se'.

||If, however, instead of this name `Tullius' the common term `musician' were put, or the same common was added to it, the argument would not be valid; as it does not follow that `Marcus may be the other than a musician, or a musician from Tullius; Marcus is a musician, or Tullius a musician; Therefore Marcus can be different from himself'.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic est bonum argumentum `Marcus est tertius a Sorte et a Tullio, ergo Marcus est tertius a se'; et tamen hoc argumentum non valet `Marcus est tertius a Sorte et ab homine, ergo Marcus est tertius a se'.

||Similarly, here is a good argument, `Marcus is third from Socrates and from Tullius, therefore Marcus is third from himself'; and yet this argument is not valid, `Marcus is third from Socrates and from a man, therefore Marcus is third from himself.''

|- valign = top
||Et tamen non est differentia aliqua nisi in hoc quod in uno accipitur nomen commune et in alio loco termini communis accipitur nomen proprium. Propter hoc si aliquis credat quod illud argumentum valet ubi ponitur nomen commune sicut valet illud in quo ponitur nomen proprium, decipitur per fallaciam figurae dictionis, dum credit propter similitudinem dictionum unum valere sicut reliquum.

||And yet there is no difference except in the fact that in one place a common noun is taken and in another place a proper noun is taken as a common term. Because of this, if anyone believes that the argument in which a common noun is used is as valid as that in which a proper noun is used, he is deceived by the fallacy of figure of speech, while he believes that one is as valid as the other because of the similarity of the expressions.

|- valign = top
||Similiter hic est bonum argumentum `Marcus non est tertius a se et a Sorte; Marcus est

||Similarly, here is a good argument: `Marcus is not third from himself and from Socrates; Marcus is

|- valign = top
||Tullius; ergo Marcus non est tertius a Sorte et a Tullio'. Et tamen si loco istius nominis proprii `Tullius' poneretur hoc nomen commune `homo', argumentum non valeret, quia non sequitur `Marcus non est tertius a se et a Sorte; Marcus est homo; ergo Marcus non est tertius a Sorte et ab homine'.

||Tullius; therefore Marcus is not third from Socrates and from Tullius'. And yet if instead of this proper name `Tullius' the common name `man' were put, the argument would not be valid, because it does not follow that `Marcus is not third from himself and from Socrates; Marcus is a man; therefore Marcus is not third from Socrates and from a man.

|- valign = top
||Et ita patet quod aliquando ponendo nomen proprium est argumentum bonum et ponendo loco illius nomen commune non valet.

||And so it is clear that sometimes putting a proper name is a good argument, and putting a common name in its place is not valid.

|- valign = top
||Et iste est unus modus tertii modi principalis. Nec tamen est dicendum quod semper accipiendo nomen proprium loco nominis communis vel e converso est fallacia figurae dictionis.

||And this is one of the main modes of the third mode. And yet it must not be said that always taking a proper name instead of a common name, or vice versa, is a fallacy of a figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Unde errant dicentes quod hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `Coriscus est alter a Corisco musico; Coriscus est Coriscus musicus; ergo Coriscus est alter a se', si Coriscus sit nomen proprium et non aequivocum; quia si esset nomen aequivocum, esset ibi fallacia figurae dictionis.

||Hence they err in saying that here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `Coriscus is other than Coriscus the musician; Coriscus is Coriscus the musician; therefore Coriscus is other than himself', if Coriscus is a proper name and not equivocal; for if there were an equivocal name, there would be a fallacy of the figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Quod autem non sit ibi fallacia figurae dictionis, patet; nam sequitur `Coriscus est alter a Corisco musico, ergo Coriscus non est Coriscus musicus', et sequitur `Coriscus non est Coriscus musicus, ergo Coriscus musicus non est Coriscus'.

||Now that there is no fallacy in the figure of speech is evident; for it follows that `Coriscus is different from Coriscus the musician, therefore Coriscus is not Coriscus the musician', and it follows that `Coriscus is not Coriscus the musician, therefore Coriscus the musician is not Coriscus'.

|- valign = top
||Similiter sequitur `Coriscus est Coriscus musicus, ergo Coriscus musicus est Coriscus'. Ex istis duobus sequitur conclusio principalis, sic `Coriscus musicus non est Coriscus;

||Similarly, it follows that `Coriscus is Coriscus the musician, therefore Coriscus the musician is Coriscus'. From these two the main conclusion follows, thus `Coriscus the musician is not Coriscus;

|- valign = top
||Coriscus musicus est Coriscus; ergo Coriscus non est Coriscus', et ultra `ergo Coriscus est alter a se'. Nec valet dicere quod non sequitur `Coriscus est alter a Corisco musico, igitur Coriscus non est Coriscus musicus', quia sequitur `Coriscus est alter a Corisco musico, ergo Coriscus musicus est alter a Corisco'; et ultra `ergo Coriscus est alter a Corisco'; et ultra `ergo Coriscus non est Coriscus musicus'; igitur a primo ad ultimum.

||Coriscus the musician is Corsicus; therefore, Coriscus is not Coriscus', and further, 'therefore Coriscus is other than himself'. Nor is it worth saying that it does not follow that `Coriscus is other than Coriscus the musician, therefore Coriscus is not Coriscus the musician', because it follows that `Coriscus is other than Coriscus the musician, therefore Coriscus the musician is other than Coriscus'; and further, `therefore Coriscus is other than Coriscus'; and further, `therefore Coriscus is not Coriscus the musician'; therefore from the first to the last.

|- valign = top
||Dicendum est ergo quod talis discursus est bonus ex propositionibus mere de inesse et mere de praesenti. Sed iste discursus non valet `Coriscus potest esse alter a Corisco musico; Coriscus est Coriscus musicus; igitur Coriscus potest esse alter a se'; et tamen si loco istius termini `Coriscus musicus' poneretur aliquod pronomen demonstrativum vel relativum vel nomen proprium esset discursus bonus.

||It must be said, then, that such a discourse is good from propositions purely assertoric and only about the present. But this argument does not hold: `Coriscus may be different from Coriscus the musician; Coriscus is Coriscus the musician; therefore Coriscus can be another from himself'; and yet if instead of this term `Coriscus the musician' some demonstrative or relative pronoun or proper noun were put, the discussion would be good.

|- valign = top
||Et si quaeratur causa istius, dicendum est quod causa est quia affirmativae multae, in quibus ponuntur termini communes vel pronomina sive nomina propria cum terminis communibus, possunt habere plures causas veritatis quam si loco illorum poneretur nomen proprium vel pronomen.

||And if the reason for this is sought, it must be said that the reason is that many affirmatives, in which common terms or pronouns or proper nouns are put together with common terms, can have more grounds of truth than if a proper name or pronoun were put in their place.

|- valign = top
||Ista enim `Coriscus potest esse alter a Corisco musico' potest habere omnes istas causas veritatis `Coriscus potest esse alter a Corisco'; `Coriscus potest esse alter a musico'; `Coriscus potest non esse Coriscus musicus'.

||For the statement `Coriscus can be another from Coriscus the musician' can have all these reasons for the truth `Coriscus can be other than Coriscus'; `Coriscus can be different from a musician'; `Coriscus may not be Coriscus the musician'.

|- valign = top
||Et non omnes istas causas veritatis potest habere ista `Coriscus potest esse alter a se', nec ista `Coriscus potest esse alter a Corisco'. Et si dicatur quod tunc est ibi fallacia consequentis, dicendum est quod non est inconveniens ibi accidere fallaciam consequentis.

||And not all these causes of truth can have the statement `Coriscus can be other than himself', nor that `Coriscus can be other than Coriscus.' And if it is said that then there is a fallacy of the consequent, it must be said that it is not inconvenient for a fallacy of the consequent to occur there.

|- valign = top
||Si tamen quis decipiatur propter hoc quod videt quod talis modus arguendi tenet in consimilibus dictionibus, decipietur per fallaciam figurae dictionis.

||If, however, one is deceived because he sees that such a mode of reasoning holds in similar sayings, he will be deceived by the fallacy of the figure of speech.

|- valign = top
||Penes istum modum peccant talia sophismata `quandocumque aliqua sunt idem realiter, ubicumque aliquid est unum illorum, ibi illud est reliquum illorum; sed substantia corporis Christi et substantia corporis Christi habens partem distantem a parte sunt idem realiter, et corpus Christi est in sacramento Altaris substantia corporis Christi; igitur corpus Christi est in sacramento Altaris habens partem distantem a parte', quia si loco istius termini `substantia corporis Christi habens partem distantem a parte' poneretur nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrans illam rem quae est substantia corporis Christi habens partem distantem a parte, esset bonum argumentum. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `haec substantia est substantia habens partem distantem a parte; haec res est substantia in sacramento Altaris; ergo haec res est substantia habens partem distantem a parte in sacramento Altaris'. Et tamen si in conclusione poneretur loco istius termini `substantia habens partem distantem a parte' nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum, esset bonum argumentum. Et propter hoc est ibi fallacia figurae dictionis penes modum alium prius positum. Similiter hic est fallacia figurae dictionis `quando aliqua sunt idem realiter, unum non potest esse sine reliquo; sed Sortes et simile sunt idem realiter; ergo Sortes non potest esse nisi simile sit', quia si loco istius termini `simile' poneretur nomen proprium illius similis vel pronomen demonstrans ipsum simile, esset bonum argumentum. Similiter in talibus est fallacia figurae dictionis `mobile quando exsistet, potest non esse motus, igitur motus realiter distinguitur a mobili'. Similiter hic `ipsa substantia exsistente potest non esse quanta, igitur substantia distinguitur realiter a quantitate'. Similiter hic, secundum principia Aristotelis, `substantia, quamvis non desinat esse, potest non esse quantitas, ergo substantia non est eadem realiter quantitati'; `albedo, quamvis non desinat esse, potest non esse similitudo, igitur albedo non est eadem res cum similitudine'.

||It is in this way that such sophists err: whenever some things are really the same, wherever one of them is, there are the rest of them; but the substance of the body of Christ and the substance of the body of Christ having a part distant from that part are really the same, and the body of Christ in the sacrament of the Altar is the substance of the body of Christ; therefore the body of Christ is in the sacrament of the Altar having a part distant from a part, because if instead of this term `the substance of Christ's body having a part distant from a part' a proper noun or a pronoun was put, showing that thing which is the substance of the body of Christ having a part distant from the part, it would be a good argument. Similarly here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `this substance is a substance having a part distant from a part; this thing is the substance in the sacrament of the Altar; therefore this thing is a substance having a part distant from the part in the sacrament of the Altar'. And yet if, in the conclusion, a proper noun or a demonstrative pronoun were put instead of the term `a substance having a part distant from a part,' it would be a good argument. And for this reason there is a fallacy of the figure of speech, according to another mode previously set forth. Similarly, here is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `when some things are really the same, one cannot exist without the rest; but Socrates and the like are really the same thing; therefore Socrates cannot be unless he is similar', because if instead of this term 'similar' a proper noun or a pronoun indicating what is similar were put, it would be a good argument. Similarly, in such cases there is a fallacy of the figure of speech, `when a mobile thing exists, it may not be moving, therefore movement is really distinguished from a mobile thing'. Similarly, here `substance itself in existence may not be quantitative, therefore substance is really distinguished from quantity'. Similarly here, according to Aristotle's principles, `substance, although it does not cease to be, may not be quantity, therefore substance is not really the same as quantity'; `whiteness, although it does not cease to be, may not be likeness, therefore whiteness is not the same thing as likeness.'

|- valign = top
||Et tamen in omnibus istis si loco termini communis poneretur nomen proprium vel pronomen demonstrativum, esset bonum argumentum. Sciendum est tamen quod quamvis praedictae consequentiae non teneant ponendo terminos communes a parte praedicati in propositione categorica, tamen si ponerentur a parte subiecti in copulativa, essent consequentiae bonae.

||And yet in all these, if a proper noun or a demonstrative pronoun were put instead of a common term, it would be a good argument. It must be known, however, that although the aforesaid consequences do not hold by placing the common terms on the part of the predicate in a categorical proposition, yet if they were placed on the part of the subject in a copulative, the consequences would be good.

|- valign = top
||Sicut sequitur `mobile potest esse in a; et tunc motus potest non esse, quamvis mobile sit tunc; ergo motus non est idem realiter cum mobili'. Similiter sequitur `substantia potest esse in aliquo tempore; et tunc quantum potest non esse, quamvis substantia tunc exsistat; ergo quantum non est idem realiter cum substantia'.

||As it follows, `mobility can be in a; and then there may be no movement, although it is then mobile; therefore motion is not really the same as mobile'. Similarly, it follows that `substance can exist at any time; and then quantity can not be, although the substance then exists; therefore quantity is not really the same as substance.

|- valign = top
||Sed altera praemissarum tunc erit falsa. Et causa quare unus modus arguendi tenet et non alius, est quia `quantum' potest esse substantia quando ipsa substantia non erit quanta, sicut `album' erit Sortes quando Sortes non erit albus. Ponatur quod Sortes sit modo albus et quod fiet niger cras: tunc haec est vera `album cras erit Sortes' et haec falsa `Sortes cras erit albus'. Et ista est causa quare tenet unus modus arguendi et non alius. Et unde oritur ista causa? Dicendum est quod oritur ex hoc quod alium modum significandi habet hoc nomen `Sortes' et hoc nomen `album', quia `album' significat Sortem in recto quando Sortes est albus et significat in obliquo albedinem quae potest destrui Sorte manente.

||But the second of the premises will then be false. And the reason why one way of reasoning holds and not another is because a substance can be a quantum when the substance itself will not be quantitative, just as a white thing will be Socrates when Socrates will not be white. It is supposed that Socrates is only white and that he will become black tomorrow: then this is true: `A white thing will be Socrates tomorrow' and this is false: `Socrates will be white tomorrow'. And this is the reason why one way of reasoning holds and not another. And where does this cause arise? It must be said that it arises from the fact that this name `Socrates' and this name `white' have a different meaning, because `white'' signifies Socrates directly when Socrates is white and it signifies in the oblique the whiteness which can be destroyed although Socrates remains.

|- valign = top
||Similiter quod haec sit vera, secundum unam opinionem, `quantitas potest esse substantia quando substantia non erit quantitas', causa est, secundum eos, quia hoc nomen `quantitas' significat partem rei distare a parte, et Deus potest facere quod substantia maneat et tamen quod una pars non distet situaliter ab alia parte.

||In the same way that this is true, according to one opinion, `a quantity can be a substance when a substance will not be a quantity', the reason, according to them, is because this word `quantity' means that a part of a thing is distant from a part, and God can cause a substance to remain and yet that one part is not situationally distant from another part.

|- valign = top
||Et ita est de omnibus consimilibus quod diversus modus significandi causat fallaciam figurae dictionis in talibus sophismatibus. Propter quod ad cognoscendum istum tertium modum principalem figurae dictionis necesse est cognoscere quas res termini significant et qualiter significant eas, scilicet an in recto vel in obliquo, et an affirmative vel negative, et an tamquam termini categorematici vel syncategorematici, et an tamquam nomina propria vel communia, quamvis istud ultimum reduci posset ad secundum modum principalem.

||And so it is with all similar things that a different way of signifying causes the fallacy of figure of speech in such sophistry. Because of this, in order to know this third principal mode of figures of speech, it is necessary to know what things the terms signify and how they signify, that is, whether they are direct or oblique, and whether affirmative or negative, and whether as categorematic or syncategorematic terms, and whether as proper or common nouns, although this last could be reduced to the second principal mode.

|- valign = top
||Unde quidquid sit dicendum de distinctione illorum modorum, hoc tamen tenendum est, secundum doctrinam Aristotelis, quod tunc semper est fallacia figurae dictionis quando non similiter contingit arguere ex diversis terminis propter diversitatem dictionum quae videntur similes, propter quam similitudinem potest alicui videri quod arguendum est similiter ex illis.

||Hence, whatever may be said about the distinction of those modes, this must still be held, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, that then there is always a fallacy of figure of speech when it is not possible to argue in the same way from different terms because of the diversity of sayings which seem similar, because of which similarity it can appear to someone that it is to be argued in the same way as them.

|- valign = top
||Hoc tamen semper servandum est quod quandocumque praemissae sunt dispositae in modo et in figura, secundum regulas quae datae sunt in principio istius tractatus de syllogismis tam uniformibus quam mixtis, numquam est fallacia figurae dictionis.

||This, however, must always be observed, that whenever the premises are arranged in a manner and in a figure, according to the rules given at the beginning of this treatise on both uniform and mixed syllogisms, there is never a fallacy of figure of speech.
|}

==Notes==
<references/>
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 5

2025-04-26T13:01:53Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 4|Chapter 4]]|[[../Chapter 6|Chapter 6]]}}  

{| border="1" cellpadding=10
|-
! valign="top" width="45%" | Latin
! valign="top" width="55%" | English
|- valign="top"
| '''[CAP. 5. DE FALLACIA AMPHIBOLIAE]'''
| '''[Chapter 5. On the fallacy of amphiboly (first mode)]'''
|- valign="top"
| Post fallaciam aequivocationis sequitur fallacia amphiboliae. Circa quam primo sciendum est quod sicut fallacia aequivocationis accidit ex hoc quod aliqua dictio potest diversimode accipi, ita fallacia amphiboliae accidit ex hoc quod aliqua oratio potest diversimode accipi, absque hoc quod aliqua dictio primo diversimode accipiatur; ita quod sicut dictio est multiplex, ita tota oratio est multiplex.
| After the fallacy of equivocation there comes the fallacy of amphiboly.  Concerning which, first, it should be known that just as the fallacy of equivocation happens because some expression can be understood in diverse ways, so the fallacy of amphiboly happens because some sentence  can be understood in diverse ways, but without some expression first being understood in diverse ways. Thus, just as an expression has different meanings, so a whole sentence has different meanings. 
|- valign="top"
| Secundo sciendum est quod sicut aequivocationis sunt tres modi, ita amphiboliae sunt tres modi. Primus modus est quando aliqua oratio aeque primo et aeque proprie per se posita potest habere multos sensus. Quando autem hoc contingit, pro diversis casibus sunt diversae regulae dandae.
| Second, it should be known that, just as there are three modes of equivocation, so there are three modes of amphiboly.  [1] The first mode is when some sentence, equally primarily and equally properly per se posited, can have many senses. Now when this happens, there are diverse rules to be given for diverse cases.
|- valign="top"
| Potest autem una regula esse talis: quando aliqua nomina eiusdem casus praecedit verbum quod potest regere utrumque casum et inter illa ponitur aliquod aliud verbum infinitivi modi, illa oratio est ambigua et potest habere diversos sensus. Sicut accidit hic `audio Graecos vicisse Romanos'; nam unus sensus est iste `audio quod Romani vicerunt Graecos', et alius sensus est iste `audio quod Graeci vicerunt Romanos'.
| (i) One rule can be this: when to some names in the same case there precedes a verb that can govern both cases, and between them there is placed some other verb in the infinitive mode, the sentence is ambiguous and can have diverse senses. As happens in `I hear the Greeks the Romans have conquered'<ref>The Latin is ambiguous because, in the ambiguous sentence, the words `Greeks' and `Romans' are in the same accusative case, and because word order does not matter in an inflected language like Latin. I have tried to capture this by the odd English word order</ref>, for one sense is `I hear that the Romans have conquered the Greeks', and the other is `I hear that the Greeks have conquered the Romans'.
|- valign="top"
| Et ideo quando una dictio potest esse unius casus vel alterius, non est amphibolia, sicut dicunt aliqui, sed aequivocatio. Sed in tali casu quando in omni sensu est eiusdem casus, est amphibolia, sicut est in exemplo proposito.
| And therefore when one expression can be one case or another, it is not amphiboly, as some say, but equivocation.  But in such a case, when in every sense it is in the same case, it is amphiboly, as in the example put forward.
|- valign="top"
| Alia regula est quod oratio in qua ponitur ablativus casus absolutus est multiplex secundum amphiboliam, quia talis propositio potest aequivalere condicionali, temporali vel causali. Sicut ista est distinguenda `nullo currente crescunt tibi cornua fronte'; unus sensus est iste: si nullus currit, crescunt tibi cornua fronte; alius sensus est iste: quia nullus currit, crescunt tibi cornua fronte; tertius sensus est iste: dum nullus currit, crescunt tibi cornua fronte. Et quilibet istorum est falsus.
| (ii) Another rule is that a sentence in which the ablative absolute is given has multiple senses according to amphiboly, because such a proposition can be equivalent to a conditional, temporal or causal proposition.  For example, `with nothing running, horns grow on your forehead'.  One sense is `if nothing runs, horns grow on your forehead', another sense is `because nothing is running, horns grow on your forehead', the third is `when nothing runs, horns grow on your forehead'.  And all of these are false.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter ista est distinguenda `nullo homine exsistente homo non est animal'; unus sensus est iste: si nullus homo exsistit, homo non est animal. Et iste sensus est verus. Alius sensus est iste: quia nullus homo exsistit, homo non est animal. Et iste sensus est falsus. Tertius sensus est iste: dum nullus homo exsistit, homo non est animal. Qui similiter est falsus.
| Similarly `with no man existing, a man is not an animal'.  One sense is `if no man exists, a man is not an animal', and this sense is true.  Another is `because no man exists, a man is not an animal', and this sense is false.  The third sense is `when no man exists, a man is not an animal', which similarly is false.
|- valign="top"
| Notandum quod eadem regula est quando ponitur gerundivum cum aliqua propositione, sicut est hic: neutrum oculum habendo potes videre. Ista enim habet istos sensus: si neutrum oculum habes, potes videre; quia neutrum oculum habes, potes videre; dum neutrum oculum habes, potes videre. Alius sensus posset esse iste `quamvis nullum oculum haberes, posses videre', hoc est dictu, istae duae stant simul `nullum oculum habes' et `tu vides'.
| It should be noted that the same rule is when the gerundive is given with some proposition, as in `by having neither eye you can see'.  For this has the following senses: `if you have neither eye, you can see', `because you have neither eye, you can see', `while you have neither eye, you can see'. Another sense could be `although you had neither eye, you could see', that is to say, `you have no eye' and `you see' are consistent.
|- valign="top"
| Ex isto patet quod tales consequentiae non valent `isto currente non crescunt tibi cornua fronte, illo currente non crescunt tibi cornua fronte, et sic de singulis, ergo nullo currente crescunt tibi cornua fronte'; `istum oculum non habendo potes videre, illum oculum non habendo potes videre, igitur neutrum oculum habendo potes videre', quia sicut hypotheticae non possunt sic induci, ita tales aequivalentes hypotheticis non possunt sic induci.
| From this it is clear that consequences such as the following are not valid. `with this thing running, horns will not grow on your forehead, with that thing running, horns will not grow on your forehead etc, therefore with nothing running, horns will not grow on your forehead'; `not having this eye, you can see, not having that eye, you can see, therefore not having either eye, you can see', because, just as hypotheticals cannot be induced in this way, so propositions equivalent to hypotheticals cannot be induced in this way.
|- valign="top"
| Unde sicut non sequitur `si iste homo currit, non crescunt tibi cornua fronte, si ille homo currit non crescunt tibi cornua fronte, et sic de singulis, igitur si nullus homo currit, crescunt tibi cornua fronte', sic non sequitur `isto currente non crescunt tibi cornua fronte, et illo currente non crescunt etc., et sic de singulis, igitur nullo currente crescunt etc.'. Et eodem modo de consimilibus est dicendum.
| Hence, just as `if this man runs, horns will not grow on your forehead, if that man runs, horns will not grow on your forehead, etc., therefore if no man runs, horns will grow on your forehead' does not follow, so `with this thing running, horns will not grow on your forehead, and with that thing running, horns will not grow on your forehead, etc., therefore with nothing running, horns willgrow on your forehead' does not follow. And in the same way it should be said of similar propositions.
|- valign="top"
| Alia regula est: quando dictum exclusivae accipitur cum modo, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod potest denotare modum verificari de tota exclusiva vel potest denotare modum illum verificari de praeiacente exclusivae et de nullo alio. In primo sensu dictio exclusiva deservit primo subiecto praeiacentis, in secundo sensu facit exclusionem circa totam praeiacentem. Sicut ista est distinguenda secundum amphiboliam `tantum hominem esse Sortem est verum'; in primo sensu denotatur quod haec sit vera `tantum homo est Sortes', et iste sensus est verus. Et ita patet quod haec dictio `tantum' exercet exclusionem circa hoc subiectum `homo'.
| (iii) Another rule is that when the statement of an exclusive proposition is accepted modally, that proposition has distinct senses, in that it can denote that the mode is verified of the whole exclusive, or can denote that the mode is verified of the pre-adjoining exclusive and no other.  In the first sense, the exclusive expression serves the first subject of the preceding one., in the second sense it causes an exclusion around the whole preceeding.  For example, `only a man being Socrates is true' has distinct senses by amphiboly.  In the first sense it is denoted that `only a man is Socrates' is true, and this sense is true. And so it is clear that the expression `only' exercises exclusion with regard to the word `man'.
|- valign="top"
| In secundo sensu denotatur quod tantum ista propositio sit vera `homo est Sortes', et ita exercet exclusionem circa istam propositionem `homo est Sortes', et denotatur quod haec propositio sit vera et nulla alia.
| In the second sense, it is denoted that only the proposition `a man is Socrates' is true, and so it exercises exclusion with regard to the proposition `a man is Socrates', and it is denoted that this proposition is true and no other.
|- valign="top"
| Quarta regula est quod quando accipitur modus cum dicto, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod potest denotari modus competere toti propositioni cuius est dictum, vel propositioni de inesse in qua supponit pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium alicuius pro quo supponit subiectum respectu eiusdem praedicati mediante hoc verbo `est' de praesenti. Sicut ista est distinguenda secundum amphiboliam `contingit tacentem loqui'; unus sensus est iste `haec est contingens: tacens loquitur', et iste sensus est falsus.
| (iv) The fourth rule is that when a mode is taken with the statement, that proposition has distinct senses, in that the mode can be denoted to belong to the whole proposition of which it is said, or to an assertoric proposition in which it supposits a demonstrative pronoun or a proper name of something for which it supposits a subject with respect to the same predicate by means of the verb `is' in the present tense. For example, `it is contingent for a silent thing to speak' has distinct senses by amphiboly.  One sense is `this is contingent: a silent thing speaks', and this sense is false.
|- valign="top"
| Alius sensus est iste `aliqua talis est contingens: iste loquitur', demonstrando aliquem qui tacet. Intelligendum est quod tales propositiones de quibus dantur duae regulae immediate praecedentes, communiter distinguuntur secundum compositionem et divisionem, qua distinctione frequenter usus sum loquendo de eis.
| The other sense is `some such thing is contingent: this speaks', pointing to something which is silent.  It should be understood that such propositions of which the two immediately preceding rules are given, are commonly distinguished according to composition and division, by which distinction I am frequently used to speaking of them.
|- valign="top"
| Cum hoc tamen stat quod possint distingui secundum amphiboliam. Et mihi videtur quod facilius est distinguere eas secundum amphiboliam quam secundum compositionem et divisionem, quia a multis non potest videri quomodo in talibus propter solam punctuationem diversam, retentis eisdem dictionibus et eodem ordine, diversi sensus causantur. Sed si tales orationes distinguuntur secundum amphiboliam, faciliter sensus deprehenduntur, servata arte Boethii in libro Divisionum in assignatione orationum ambiguarum, quia talis assignatio facienda est aut per adiectionem aut per diminutionem aut per divisionem aut per aliquam transmutationem.
| It is consistent with this that the propositions could be distinguished by amphiboly. And it seems to me that it is easier to distinguish them by amphiboly than according to composition and division, for it cannot be seen by many how in such cases, because of diverse punctuation [parsing] alone, keeping the same expressions and in the same order, diverse senses are produced. But if such sentences are distinguished by amphiboly, the senses are easily perceived, by maintaining the art of Boethius (in the book of Division) of the assignation of ambiguous sentences, because such an assignation should be made either by diminution, or division, or by some other transformation.
|- valign="top"
| Et iste modus servandus est in talibus propositionibus, ut proposita ista oratione ambigua `album esse nigrum est possibile', determinantur sic sensus `haec est possibilis: album est nigrum', `album potest esse nigrum'.
| And this mode should be kept in such propositions, so that, given the ambiguous proposition `that a white thing is black is possible', the senses are determined as `this is possible: a white thing is black' and `a white thing can be black'.
|- valign="top"
| Et ita patet quod tales orationes sive distinguantur secundum compositionem et divisionem sive secundum amphiboliam, sensus non variantur. Secundo sciendum est quod duae praedictae regulae non tantum sunt intelligendae de quatuor modis famosis, sed etiam intelligendae sunt de omnibus modis.
| And so it is clear that whether such sentences are distinguished by composition and division, or by amphiboly, the senses are not varied. Second, you should know that the two previous rules should not only be understood of the four well-known modes, but should also be understood of all modes.
|- valign="top"
| Unde omnes tales sunt distinguendae `omnem hominem esse animal est scitum a te'; `album aedificare est per se verum'; `omnem triangulum habere tres etc. est demonstrabile', et ita de aliis.
| Hence, all such propositions are to be distinguished: `that every man is an animal is known by you', `that a white person builds is true per se', `that every triangle has three sides etc., is demonstrable' and so on.
|- valign="top"
| Tertio est sciendum quod ultima regula non tantum intelligenda est quando ponitur modus cum dicto propositionis, sed etiam locum habet quando coniungitur modus cum propositione mediante aliquo verbo et hac dictione `quod'.
| Third, it should be known that the last rule should not only be understood when the mode is given with the statement of the proposition, but also applies when the mode is joined with a proposition mediating some verb with the expression `that'.
|- valign="top"
| Unde omnes tales sunt praedicto modo distinguendae `scio quod omnis homo est animal', `possibile est quod album sit nigrum', et huiusmodi, puta tales `quod quilibet homo sit Sortes, est possibile', `quod nullum album sit homo, est necessarium.
| Hence, all such propositions should be distinguished in the previous mode: `I know that every man is an animal', `it is possible that a white thing is black' and so forth, such as `that any man is Socrates is possible', `that no white thing is a man is necessary'
|- valign="top"
| Nam prolata tali propositione `possibile est quod album sit nigrum', potest unus apprehendere talem sensum `haec propositio est possibilis: album est nigrum', alius autem potest intelligere talem sensum `possibile est quod aliquid, quod modo est album, fiat postea nigrum'.
| For when such a proposition as `it is possible that a white thing is black', one person can apprehend such a sense as `this proposition is possible: a white thing is black', but another can understand such a sense as `it is possible that something, which is now white, can later be black'.
|- valign="top"
| Et ita tales propositiones sunt distinguendae. Et quia tales sensus diversi possunt haberi sine diversitate punctuationis, ideo est ibi amphibolia, non obstante quod esset ibi compositio et divisio.
| And so such propositions should be distinguished. And because such diverse senses can be entertained without diversity of punctuation [parsing], therefore it is amphiboly, notwithstanding that there would be composition and division.
|- valign="top"
| Quarto notandum est quod ad istum modum habet reduci distinctio istius propositionis `quicumque dicit te esse animal, dicit verum', ut unus sensus sit iste: quicumque dicit hanc propositionem `tu est animal', dicit verum. Et iste sensus est verus. Alius sensus est iste: quicumque dicit aliquam propositionem ex qua sequitur quod tu es animal, dicit verum. Et iste sensus est falsus, quia omnes tales propositiones `tu es asinus', `tu es bos', `tu es capra' et consimiles, inferunt istam `tu es animal', et tamen non quicumque dicit eas, dicit verum.
| Fourth, it should be noted that the distinction of the proposition `whoever says you are an animal, speaks the truth' has to be reduced to that mode. And one sense is `whoever says the proposition "you are an animal" says the truth'. And that sense is true. Another sense is `whoever says a proposition from which it follows that you are an animal, speaks the truth'. And that sense is false, for such propositions as `you are a donkey', `you are an ox', `you are a goat', implies `you are an animal', and yet not any one who says them speaks the truth.
|- valign="top"
| Et si quaeratur quare tales propositiones sunt distinguendae, de quibus dantur praedictae regulae, dicendum est quod sicut non potest dari ratio quare aliqua dictio est aequivoca nisi voluntas utentium, ita non potest dari aliqua ratio quare oratio est aequivoca nisi voluntas utentium.
| And if it is asked why such propositions should be distinguished, of which the previous rules are given, it should be said that just as a reason cannot be given why some expression is equivocal, except by the wish of the users, so a reason cannot be given why some sentence is equivocal, except by the wish of the users.
|- valign="top"
| Et ideo quia diversi ex tali oratione prolata diversos sensus tales concipiunt, ideo talis oratio est distinguenda secundum amphiboliam, secundum doctrinam Boethii, in libro Divisionum, dicentis: In ambiguis uterque auditor rationabiliter se ipsum intellexisse arbitratur, ut cum dicit quis `audio Graecos vicisse Romanos', unus potest intelligere quod Graeci Romanos vicerunt, alius e converso.
| And therefore, because diverse persons conceive such diverse senses from such a sentence being uttered, therefore such a sentence should be distinguished by amphiboly, according to the teaching of Boethius, in the book of Division: With ambiguous sentences, both hearers can reasonably judge themselves to have understood, as when someone says `I hear the Greeks the Romans have conquered', one can understand that the Greeks have conquered the Romans, the other can understand the conversely.
|- valign="top"
| Ita est de talibus propositionibus, quod prolata hac propositione `scio quod omnis homo est animal', unus potest intelligere quod `scio istam propositionem: omnis homo est animal', alius potest intelligere `scio de quolibet homine quod ipse est animal'.
| So it is with such propositions, that when the proposition `I know that every man is an animal', one person can understand that `I know that proposition: every man is an animal', another can understand `I know, of every man, that he is an animal'.
|- valign="top"
| Quinta regula est: quando haec coniunctio `vel' ponitur inter duos vel plures terminos, illa est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse disiunctiva, et tunc disiungit inter propositiones, vel potest esse de disiuncto extremo, et tunc disiungit inter terminos, et est categorica.
| (v) The fifth rule is when the conjunction `or' occurs between two or more terms, then it can be distinguished, in that it can be disjunctive, and then it disjoins two propositions, or it can disjoin the extremes, in which case it disjoins terms, and is categorical.
|- valign="top"
| Unde ista `omnis homo est sanus vel aeger' est isto modo distinguenda, quia unus sensus est iste `omnis homo est sanus vel omnis homo est aeger', qui est falsus; alius sensus est iste `de quolibet homine dicitur hoc praedicatum: sanus vel aeger', qui verus est.
| Hence `every man is healthy or sick' should be distinguished, for one sense is `every man is healthy or every man is sick', which is false. The other sense is `of every man the predicate healthy or ill is predicated', which is true.
|- valign="top"
| Sexta regula est: quando haec coniunctio `et' ponitur inter duos terminos, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse copulativa vel de copulato extremo. Sicut haec est distinguenda `isti sunt Sortes et Plato', demonstratis Sorte et Platone; unus sensus est iste `isti sunt Sortes et isti sunt Plato', et iste sensus est falsus; alius sensus est iste `isti sunt isti homines', et iste sensus est verus.
| (vi) The sixth rule is when the conjunction `and' occurs between two terms, the proposition should be distinguished in that it can be a conjunction, or can be of a conjoined extreme. For example `these are Socrates and Plato' (pointing to Socrates and Plato): one sense is `these are Socrates and these are Plato', and this sense is false.  The other sense is `these are these men', and this sense is true.
|- valign="top"
| Septima regula est: quando haec coniunctio `si' ponitur inter duos terminos, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse condicionalis vel de condicionato extremo. Sicut haec est distinguenda `omne animal, si est rationale, est homo'; unus sensus est iste `si omne animal est rationale, omne animal est homo', et iste sensus est verus.
| (vii) The seventh rule is when the conjunction `if' occurs between two terms, the proposition should be distinguished, in that it can be conditional, or of a conditioned extreme.  For example, `every animal, if it is rational, is a man'.  One sense is `if every animal is rational, every animal is a man', and this sense is true.
|- valign="top"
| Alius sensus est iste: de quocumque dicitur hoc totum `animal si est rationale', de eodem dicitur hoc praedicatum `homo'; et iste sensus est falsus, nam de asino praedicatur hoc totum condicionatum `animal, si est rationale', et tamen de asino non praedicatur `homo'.
| Another sense is of whatever the whole expression `animal if it is rational' is predicated, of the same is predicated the predicate `man', and this sense is false, for if the whole condition `animal if it is rational' is predicated of a donkey, and yet `man' is not predicated of a donkey.
|- valign="top"
| Et per hoc possunt solvi talia sophismata `omne verum, si est necessarium, est verum; te esse asinum est verum, si est necessarium; igitur te esse asinum est verum', quia maior est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse condicionalis, et tunc est vera, sed discursus non valet, quia ex tali condicionali et tali categorica non sequitur conclusio categorica. Vel potest esse maior de condicionato subiecto, et tunc est consequentia bona, sed tunc maior est falsa.
| And by this can be resolved such sophisms as `every truth, if it is necessary, is true, it is true that you are a donkey, if it is necessary, therefore it is true that you are a donkey', for the major should be distinguished, in that it can be a conditional, and then it is true, but the argument is not valid, because from such a conditional and such a categorical such a conclusion does not follow. Or it can be a major of conditioned subject, and then the consequence is good, but then the major is false. 
|- valign="top"
| Octava regula est quod quando haec coniunctio `quia' ponitur inter duos terminos, illa est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse causalis vel de causali extremo.
| (viii) The eighth rule is when the conjunction `because' occurs between two terms, the proposition should be distinguished, in that it can be causal, or of a causal extreme.
|- valign="top"
| Nona regula est quod quando aliquod adverbium temporale ponitur inter duos terminos, illa oratio est distinguenda, eo quod potest esse temporalis vel de temporali extremo.
| (ix) The ninth rule is when some temporal adverb occurs between two terms, the sentence should be distinguished, in that it can be temporal, or of a temporal extreme. 
|- valign="top"
| Decima regula est quod quando aliquod adverbium locale ponitur inter duos terminos, illa oratio est distinguenda secundum amphiboliam, eo quod potest esse localis vel de locali extremo.
| (x) The tenth rule is when some local adverb occurs between two terms, the sentence should be distinguished by amphiboly, in that it can be local, or of a local extreme.
|- valign="top"
| Sciendum est quod orationes de quibus dantur sex ultimae regulae a multis ponuntur esse distinguendae secundum compositionem et divisionem; et sive dictum eorum sit verum sive falsum, non obstat quin sint distinguendae secundum amphiboliam.
| It should be known that sentences of which the last six rules are given are supposed by many to be distinguished by composition and division. And whether what they say is true or false, it does not prevent their being distinguished by amphiboly.
|- valign="top"
| Et quidquid sit de illo dicto, dico quod distinctio illarum secundum amphiboliam est manifestior quam distinctio secundum compositionem et divisionem, quia difficile vel impossibile est in talibus concipere diversos sensus propter solam diversam punctuationem earundem dictionum sub eodem ordine prolatarum.
| And whatever is said about that, I say that the distinction of those sentences by amphiboly is more manifest than distinction by composition and division, for in such cases it is difficult or impossible to conceive diverse senses because of the diverse punctuation alone of those expressions, uttered in the same order.
|- valign="top"
| Secundo sciendum est pro isto modo amphiboliae et pro sequentibus quod in assignando diversos sensus alicuius orationis multiplicis secundum amphiboliam, non debent assignari illi sensus sub eisdem dictionibus sed sub diversis, et hoc vel per additionem vel per diminutionem aut per divisionem aut per transmutationem, sicut docet Boethius in libro Divisionum.
| Second, it should be known that for this mode of amphiboly, and for the following, that in assigned diverse senses of some sentence that has multiple senses by amphiboly, those senses ought not be assigned under the same expressions but under diverse ones, and this is by addition or by diminution or by division or by transformation, as Boethius teaches in the book of Divisions.
|- valign="top"
| Per additionem, ut cum dicitur `audio Troianos vicisse Graecos' sensus potest sic assignari per additionem `audio Troianos vicisse, Graecos vinci'; `audio Troianos vinci, Graecos vicisse'.
| By addition, as when it is said `I hear that the Trojans the Greeks have conquered', the sense can be assigned by addition by `I hear that the Trojans have conquered, the Greeks have been conquered', or `I hear that the Trojans have been conquered, the Greeks have conquered'.
|- valign="top"
| Per diminutionem sic `audio Graecos vicisse'. Per divisionem sic ut `Graeci vicerunt, Troiani victi sunt'. Per transmutationem sic `audio quod Graeci vicerunt Troianos' vel `audio quod Troiani vicerunt Graecos'. Et sicut sensus istius propositionis multiplicis `audio Graecos vicisse Troianos' possunt diversis modis praedictis assignari, ita aliae orationes multiplices secundum amphiboliam possunt omnibus praedictis modis vel aliquibus illorum assignari. Et ideo non semper eiusdem orationis multiplicis ambiguae sensus sub eisdem verbis assignantur, quamvis diversae assignationes idem significent.
| By diminution, as in `I hear the Greeks have conquered'. By division, as in `the Greeks have conquered, the Trojans have been conquered'. By transformation as in `I hear that the Trojans have conquered the Greeks'. And just as the sense of the proposition `I hear that the Greeks the Trojans have conquered' can be assigned senses in the previous diverse modes, so that other sentences, with multiple senses by amphiboly, can be assigned in all the previous modes, or some of them. And therefore, the ambiguous senses of the same sentence with multiple senses are not always assigned under the same words, although the diverse assignations may signify the same.
|- valign="top"
| Hoc addidi de Boethio propter aliquas cavillationes quae possunt fieri contra aliqua dicta hic et contra aliqua quae dixi in diversis opusculis. Praeter istas etiam decem regulas possent dari aliae multae deservientes primo modo amphiboliae, de quibus propter brevitatem pertranseo.
| I added this about Boethius because of some cavils which can be made against some of the things said here, and against some things which I have said in diverse works. Also, beyond these ten rules there could be given many others serving the first mode of amphiboly, which I pass over by reason of brevity.
|}

== Notes ==

<references />

[[Category:Unchecked_translations]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-4/Chapter 4

2025-04-26T12:59:51Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 3|Chapter 3]]|[[../Chapter 5|Chapter 5]]}} 

{| border="1" cellpadding=10
|-
! valign="top" width="45%" | Latin
! valign="top" width="55%" | English
|- valign="top"
| '''[CAP. 4. DE TERTIO MODO AEQUIVOCATIONIS]'''
| '''[Chapter 4. On the third mode of equivocation]
|- valign="top"
| Circa tertium modum aequivocationis est primo sciendum quod tunc est tertius modus aequivocationis quando aliqua dictio non accipitur pro diversis significatis, sed ex hoc solum quod alicui comparatur quod non plus pertinet ad primarium significatum quam ad secundarium. Et iste modus non accidit ex hoc quod vox potest significare diversa, sicut contingit in duobus primis modis, sed ex hoc quod eadem vox potest supponere pro diversis. Et ideo pro isto modo dantur diversae regulae, quibus potest cognosci. Est autem una regula quod quando unum extremum propositionis est nomen primae intentionis, sumptum sine signo universali et particulari, et aliud extremum est nomen secundae intentionis, illa propositio est distinguenda penes tertium modum aequivocationis, eo quod nomen primae intentionis potest supponere simpliciter vel personaliter, et secundum hoc potest accidere in argumento fallacia aequivocationis.
| Concerning the third mode of equivocation it should first be known that it is the third mode of equivocation when some diction is not accepted for diverse significates, but rather, from this alone, that is is compared to something that is not more relevant to the primary significate than to the secondary.  And this mode does not happen because an utterance can signify diverse things, as happens in the first two modes, but because the same utterance can supposit for diverse things. And so there are diverse rules given for this mode, from which it can be recognized; Now there is one rule that when one extreme of the proposition is a name of first intention, taken without a universal or particular sign, and the other extreme is a name of second intention, that proposition is distinguished under the third mode of equivocation, in that the name of first intention can supposit simply and personally, and according to this as the fallacy of equivocation can happen in an argument.
|- valign="top"
| Et secundum istum modum peccant talia sophismata `attributa non sunt idem essentiae divinae; sapientia est attributum, et similiter iustitia est attributum; igitur sapientia et iustitia non sunt idem essentiae divinae'.
| And according to this mode err such sophisms as `attributes are not the same as the divine essence, wisdom is an attribute, and similarly justice is an attribute, therefore wisdom and justice are not the same as the divine essence'.
|- valign="top"
| Respondeo: ista propositio est distinguenda `sapientia est attributum', eo quod `sapientia' potest supponere simpliciter vel personaliter. Si primo modo, tunc est fallacia aequivocationis, quia in minore accipitur simpliciter et in conclusione personaliter, et per consequens aequivoce.
| I answer: this proposition is to be distinguished, `wisdom is an attribute,' by the fact that `wisdom' can be supposited simply or personally. If in the first way, then there is the fallacy of equivocation, because in the minor it is taken simply and in the conclusion personally, and consequently equivocally.
|- valign="top"
| Si supponat secundo modo, sic minor est falsa, quia tunc non denotatur quod ille conceptus qui attribuitur et concluditur de Deo sit attributum, sed quod illa res quam significat talis conceptus est attributum.
| If it supposits in the second mode, then the falsity is less, because then it is not denoted that the concept which is attributed and concluded of God is an attribute, but that the thing which such a concept signifies is an attribute.
|- valign="top"
| Quod falsum est, quia non plus est illa res quae est sapientia divina attributum quam illa res quae est essentia divina. Et per consequens accipiendo terminos personaliter et significative non plus est haec vera `sapientia est attributum' quam ista `essentia est attributum'.
| This is false, because that thing which is divine wisdom is no more an attribute than that thing which is divine essence. And consequently, taking the terms personally and meaningfully, this `wisdom is an attribute' is no more true than this `essence is an attribute'.
|- valign="top"
| Accipiendo tamen terminos simpliciter et pro intentionibus animae, est una vera et alia falsa. Similiter accidit hic `unum est passio entis; unum est idem realiter cum ente; igitur idem est passio sui ipsius'.
| However, taking the terms simply and for the intentions of the soul, one is true and the other is false. Similarly it happens here that one is an attribute of a being; one is really identical with being; therefore the attribute is the same as the self.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter hic `rationale et homo sunt idem realiter; sed ``rationale est differentia et ``homo est species; igitur species et sua differentia sunt idem realiter'. Similiter hic `homo et risibile sunt idem realiter; sed ``risibile est passio hominis et ``homo est subiectum; igitur passio et suum subiectum sunt idem realiter'.
| Similarly this: `rational and man are really the same; but rational is the difference, and man is the species; therefore, the species and its difference are really the same thing.' Similarly here, "man and something able to laugh are really the same thing; but man's attribute is the ability to laugh and man is the subject; therefore the attribute and its subject are really the same thing'.
|- valign="top"
| Responsio ad omnia ista patet: nam istae propositiones `unum est passio entis', `rationale est differentia hominis', `risibile est passio hominis', `homo est subiectum risibilis', non sunt verae nisi subiectis supponentibus simpliciter.
| The answer to all these is clear: for these propositions, `the attribute of being is one,' `man's difference is rational,' `man's attribute is the ability to laugh,' and `man is a subject that can laugh,' are not true unless the subjects supposit simply.
|- valign="top"
| Aliae autem praemissae non sunt verae nisi eisdem terminis acceptis personaliter. Et ideo manifestum est quod in illis est fallacia aequivocationis penes tertium modum. Similiter est hic `homo et animal rationale sunt idem realiter; homo et animal rationale differunt ratione; igitur aliqua quae differunt ratione sunt idem realiter'. Similiter est hic `sapientia et essentia differunt ratione, quia sunt distincti conceptus; sapientia et essentia sunt idem realiter; igitur aliqua quae sunt idem realiter differunt ratione'.
| But other premises are not true unless they are taken personally. And therefore, it is manifest that in them there is a fallacy of equivocation, according to the third mode. It is the same here, `man and rational animal are really the same; man and rational animal differ in reason; therefore some things that differ in reason are really the same. It is the same here, `wisdom and essence differ in reason, because they are distinct concepts; wisdom and essence are really the same; therefore, some things which are the same really differ in reason.'
|- valign="top"
| Similiter hic `homo et animal rationale sunt idem realiter; homo et animal rationale sunt definitio et definitum; igitur definitio et definitum sunt idem realiter'. Similiter hic `homo et animal sunt eadem res; homo est species, animal est genus; igitur genus et species sunt eadem res'.
| Similarly, this `man and rational animal are really the same; man and rational animal are the definition and the defined; therefore, the definition and the defined are really the same thing. Similarly this, `man and animal are the same thing; man is a species, animal is a genus; Therefore genus and species are the same thing'.
|- valign="top"
| Unde in istis et in infinitis consimilibus aliquae propositiones non possunt esse verae nisi terminis sumptis simpliciter et aliae non possunt esse verae nisi eisdem terminis sumptis personaliter.
| Hence, in these and in infinite similar propositions, some propositions cannot be true except in terms taken simply, and others cannot be true except in the same terms taken personally.
|- valign="top"
| Et ita patet quod si propositiones sunt verae, termini aequivoce accipiuntur, et per consequens nullam inferunt conclusionem. Alia regula est quod quando unum extremum propositionis est nomen primae impositionis et aliud extremum est nomen secundae impositionis, si nomen primae impositionis non sumatur cum signo universali vel particulari ista propositio est distinguenda, eo quod nomen primae impositionis potest accipi personaliter vel materialiter.
| And so it is clear that if the propositions are true, the terms are taken equivocally, and consequently they do not infer any conclusion. Another rule is that when one end of a proposition is the name of the first imposition and the other end is the name of the second imposition, if the name of the first imposition is not taken with a universal or particular sign, that proposition is to be distinguished by the fact that the name of the first imposition can be taken personally or materially.
|- valign="top"
| Sicut ista propositio est distinguenda `homo est nomen', eo quod `homo' potest accipi personaliter et significative, et sic est falsa, vel materialiter pro ista voce, et sic est vera. Et sic solvuntur talia sophismata: `Deus et deitas sunt idem realiter; et Deus et deitas sunt concretum et abstractum; igitur concretum et abstractum sunt idem realiter'.
| Just as this proposition is to be distinguished, `man is a noun,' by the fact that `man' can be taken personally and meaningfully, and thus it is false, or materially for that word, and thus it is true. And thus such sophisms are resolved: `God and deities are really the same; Both God and deity are concrete and abstract; therefore the concrete and the abstract are really the same thing'.
|- valign="top"
| Responsio: ista est distinguenda `Deus et deitas sunt concretum et abstractum', eo quod isti termini `Deus' et `deitas' possunt supponere materialiter, et sic est vera; et tunc aequivoce accipiuntur in maiore et in minore, et per consequens nullam inferunt conclusionem.
| Answer: this is to be distinguished, `God and deity are concrete and abstract,' by the fact that these terms 'God' and 'deity' can represent materially, and so it is true; and then they are taken equivocally in the major and in the minor, and in consequence lead to no conclusion.
|- valign="top"
| Vel possunt supponere personaliter, et tunc est ista propositio falsa.
| Or they may supposit personally, and then that proposition is false.
|- valign="top"
| Eodem modo fallit hoc argumentum `homo et risibile sunt idem realiter; homo et risibile sunt convertibilia; igitur convertibilia sunt idem realiter'. Et eodem modo est solvendum. Alia regula potest dari quod quando nomen primae intentionis comparatur alicui nomini communi praecise intentionibus animae et nominibus secundae impositionis, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod illud nomen potest supponere simpliciter vel personaliter vel materialiter, sicut patet in aliquibus exemplis praeadductis.
| In the same way this argument, `man and something able to laugh are really the same thing', fails. man and something able to laugh are convertible; therefore, they are really the same convertibles. And it must be solved in the same way. Another rule can be given that when the name of the first intention is compared to a common name, precisely the intentions of the soul and the names of the second imposition, that proposition is to be distinguished by the fact that that name can simply supposit either personally or materially, as is clear in some of the examples cited above.
|- valign="top"
| Et ista exempla adducta sunt tantum gratia exempli. Talia nomina, communia praecise intentionibus animae et nominibus secundae impositionis, sunt ista `universale', `commune', `praedicabile', `subicibile', `nomen' et huiusmodi multa.
| And these examples are given only for the sake of example. Such names, common precisely to the intentions of the soul and names of secondary imposition, are these: `universal', `common', `predicable', `submitable', `name' and many such things.
|- valign="top"
| Est etiam sciendum quod praecedentes regulae non tantum sunt intelligendae de nominibus sed etiam de omni parte orationis. Quarta regula est quod quando terminus communis supponit personaliter et subicitur respectu verbi de praeterito, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod terminus subiectus potest supponere pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae fuerunt.
| It must also be known that the previous rules are not only to be understood about nouns but also about every part of speech. The fourth rule is that when a common term supposits personally and is subordinated with respect to a verb about the past, that proposition is to be distinguished by the fact that the subject term can supposit for things that are or for things that were.
|- valign="top"
| Sicut haec est distinguenda `aliquis puer fuit senex', eo quod li puer potest supponere pro eo qui est puer, et tunc aequivalet isti `aliquis, qui modo est puer, fuit senex'; vel potest supponere pro eo qui fuit puer, et tunc est sensus `aliquis, qui fuit puer, fuit senex'.
| Just as this is to be distinguished, `someone who was a child was an old man', by the fact that a child can stand for someone who is a child, and then it is equivalent to this `someone who is only a child was an old man'; or it may stand for him who was a child, and then there is the sense of 'someone who was a child was old'.
|- valign="top"
| Et per istam distinctionem solvuntur talia sophismata `aliquod album fuit Sortes, igitur Sortes fuit albus', quia si subiectum antecedentis stet pro his quae sunt, consequentia non valet; si pro his quae fuerunt, consequentia est bona.
| And by this distinction are resolved such sophisms as `something white was Socrates, therefore Socrates was white', because if the subject of the antecedent stands for those things, the consequence is not valid; if for what they were, the consequence is good.
|- valign="top"
| Quinta regula est quod quando terminus communis supponens personaliter subicitur respectu verbi de futuro, illa propositio est distinguenda penes tertium modum aequivocationis, eo quod subiectum potest supponere pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae erunt.
| The fifth rule is that when a common suppositing term is suppositing personally with respect to a verb about the future, that proposition is to be distinguished according to the third mode of equivocation, in that the subject can supposit for things that are or for things that will be.
|- valign="top"
| Sexta regula est quod quando terminus communis supponens personaliter subicitur respectu verbi de possibili vel de contingenti, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod terminus subiectus potest stare pro his quae sunt vel pro his quae possunt esse vel pro his quae contingunt esse.
| The sixth rule is that when a common suppositing term is suppositing personally with respect to a de possibili or de contingenti word, that proposition is to be distinguished, in that the subject term can stand for things that are or for things that can be or for things that happen to be.
|- valign="top"
| Alia regula est quod quando eadem dictio potest esse diversorum casuum, generum vel numerorum vel aliorum accidentium grammaticalium, illa propositio est distinguenda penes tertium modum aequivocationis.
| Another rule is that when the same expression can be of different cases, genders or numbers or other grammatical accidents, that proposition is to be distinguished under the third mode of equivocation.
|- valign="top"
| Sicut ista `isti asini sunt episcopi', eo quod li episcopi potest esse nominativi casus vel genitivi. Verumtamen in tali paralogismo potest frequenter assignari primus modus aequivocationis; sed quando hoc habeat fieri et quando non, propter brevitatem omitto.
| Like these, `these donkeys are the bishop's [or - are bishops]', because bishops can either be in the nominative case or in the genitive case. Nevertheless, in such a paralogism, the first mode of equivocation can frequently be assigned; but when this should be done and when not, I omit it for the sake of brevity.
|- valign="top"
| Et est notandum quod iste tertius modus aequivocationis potest reperiri in propositione pure mentali, quamvis duo primi modi non habeant locum nisi in signis ad placitum institutis.
| And it must be noted that this third mode of equivocation can be found in a purely mental proposition, although the first two modes have no place except in the standards established by convention.
|- valign="top"
| Unde ista propositio mentalis `homo est species' distingui potest, eo quod subiectum potest supponere significative vel pro se ipso. Et sic de consimilibus est dicendum.
| Hence this mental proposition, `man is a species,' can be distinguished, by what the subject can supposit for significatively or for itself. And so it must be said of the like.
|}

== Notes ==

<references />

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 41

2025-04-26T12:51:35Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 40|Chapter 40]]|[[../Chapter 42|Chapter 42]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 41. DE TERTIA SPECIE OBLIGATIONIS, QUAE DICITUR POSITIO. QUOMODO DIFFERT A CASU?.
|Chapter 41. On the third type of obligation, which is called position. How is it different from case?
|- valign = top
|Tertia species obligationis vocatur positio. Circa quam est primo sciendum quod positio differt a casu, quia casus non obligat ad sustinendum aliquid tamquam verum.
|The third type of obligation is called position. Concerning which it is first to be known that position differs from case, because case does not oblige one to support something as true.
|- valign = top
|Unde et quandoque casus et positio sunt respectu oppositorum. Sicut sit Sortes in rei veritate albus, et ponatur ista `Sortes est niger'. Tunc enim est casus quod Sortes est albus, et positum est quod Sortes est niger; et ita positio obligat ad sustinendum istam tamquam veram `Sortes est niger', et casus tunc non obligat ad sustinendum istam tamquam veram `Sortes est albus'. Item, casus semper debet esse de re, et de re particulari, positio autem potest esse unius propositionis indefinitae vel particularis.
|Hence sometimes case and position are in respect of opposites. Just as when Socrates is in fact white, and it is posited that `Socrates is black.' For then it is the case that Socrates is white, and it is posited that Socrates is black; and thus the position obliges us to support this as true, `Socrates is black,' and the case then does not oblige us to support this as true, `Socrates is white.' Likewise, the case must always be about a subject, and about a particular subject, but a position can be a single indefinite or particular proposition.
|- valign = top
|Sicut si velim tibi ponere casum, non debeo dicere `ponatur quod homo currit', sed oportet certificare, puta quod iste homo currit vel ille, ita quod a currat. Sit a nomen proprium illius. Sed in positione possum tibi ponere istam `homo currit' vel istam `aliquis homo currit'.
|For example, if I wanted to put a case to you, I should not say `it is supposed that a man runs', but it is necessary to confirm, suppose that this man runs or that, so that A runs. Let A be his proper name. But in a position I can posit to you that `a man is running' or that `someone is running'.
|- valign = top
|Circa casum igitur sunt aliquae regulae. Una est quod casus numquam est recipiendus ad sustinendum nisi fiat certificatio de aliquo particulari.
|So there are some rules about a case. One thing is that a case is never accepted for support unless there is a certification of something particular.
|- valign = top
|Alia est quod numquam casus est recipiendus ad sustinendum nisi possibile.
|Another thing is that there is never an opportunity to receive support unless it is possible.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est quod numquam est casus recipiendus ad sustinendum {{p|736}} qui repugnat actui responsionis. Unde si aliquis velit tibi ponere istum casum quod tu sis mortuus et velit quod tu sustineas istum casum, non debes eum recipere, quia repugnat actui responsionis.
|Another rule is that there is never a case to be accepted for support that is inconsistent with the response action. Therefore, if someone wants to posit to you this case that you are dead and wants you to support this case, you should not accept it, because it is contrary to the act of response.
|- valign = top
|Non enim stant simul quod tu sis mortuus et quod tu sibi respondeas, et ideo talis casus non est admittendus, tamen tale ponibile est admittendum. Positio igitur obligat ad sustinendum aliquam propositionem eo modo quo propositio vera debet sustineri a respondente. Et consistit ars ista in hoc quod in principio debet aliqua propositio poni, deinde debent propositiones proponi secundum quod placet opponenti, ad quas debet respondens respondere concedendo vel negando vel dubitando vel distinguendo.
|For the fact that you are dead and that you answer to him do not stand true at the same time, and therefore such a case is not to be admitted, yet such a position is to be admitted. A position therefore obliges one to support a proposition in the way that a true proposition must be supported by the respondent. And this technique consists in the fact that at the beginning some proposition must be put forward, then propositions must be put forward according to what pleases the opponent, to which the respondent must respond by granting or denying or doubting or distinguishing.
|- valign = top
|Quibus responsionibus datis debet opponens, quando sibi placet, dicere: cedat tempus. Hoc est, cesset tempus obligationis. Et tunc videndum est an respondens bene responderit vel non. Sicut pono tibi istam propositionem `animal currit', deinde propono `homo currit'; si eam concedas, dico: cedat tempus.
|With these answers given, the opponent must, when it pleases him, say: let time yield. That is, the period of obligation will cease. And then it must be seen whether the answerer answered well or not. Just as I posit to you the statement `an animal runs', then I put forward `a man runs'; if you grant it, I say: let time yield.
|- valign = top
|Et probo quod male respondisti, quia concessisti falsum et impertinens, --- sit ita quod nullus homo currat ---, ergo male respondisti. Sed iste modus opponendi et respondendi non servatur quando ponitur casus, propter quod differt casus a positione. Scito tamen quomodo respondendum est facta aliqua positione, potest leviter sciri quomodo respondendum est posito aliquo casu, et ideo sufficiat pro nunc de positione tractare. Circa quam sciendum est quod positio quaedam est possibilis et quaedam impossibilis. Positio possibilis est quando ponitur propositio falsa contingens vel propositio contingens dubia.
|And I prove that you have answered wrongly, because you have conceded a false and irrelevant fact, --- let it be so that no man runs ---, therefore you have answered wrongly. But this mode of opposing and answering is not observed when a case is put, for which reason the case differs from the position. However, if you know how to respond to the facts of a certain position, it is possible to slightly know how to respond to a given case, and therefore it is sufficient for now to treat of the position. About which it is necessary to know that some positions are possible and some impossible. A position is possible when a false contingent proposition or a doubtful contingent proposition is put forward.
|- valign = top
|Et circa istam positionem dantur multae regulae. Una est quod omne positum in tempore positionis propositum, sci{{p|737}}tum esse tale, est concedendum absolute si ipso proposito non habeat plures sensus quam quando per se profertur. Et per hoc solvitur hoc sophisma: ponatur ista `alterum istorum est verum', demonstratis istis duobus `Ioannes est episcopus', `Ioannes sedet'. Deinde proponatur ista `unum istorum est verum'; haec est concedenda, quia sequens. Deinde proponatur ista copulativa `unum istorum est verum et alterum istorum est verum'. Si neges istam et concessisti istam partem `unum istorum est verum', igitur oportet te negare alteram partem, et ita negas positum. Si concedas, concedis tibi dubium. Dicendum est quod ista copulativa non est concedenda, sed est distinguenda, eo quod in secunda parte li alterum potest esse nomen infinitum, et tunc est copulativa vera et concedenda; vel potest esse relativum, et tunc est neganda. Et est hic tertius modus amphiboliae, quia oratio per se posita non est multiplex et posita cum alia est multiplex.
|And many rules are given about this position. One thing is that every proposition in the time of a proposition of a position, known to be such, must be admitted absolutely, if by the proposition itself it has no more meaning than when it is uttered by itself. And by this means this sophistry is solved: it is assumed that this is the truth of the others, when you show to these two that John is the bishop, John is sitting. Then it is proposed that one of these is true'; this must be granted, because it follows. Then put forward the conjunction `one of these is true and the other of these is true'. If you deny this and admit this part, `one of these is true,' then you must deny the other part, and so you deny the proposition. If you agree, you allow yourself to doubt. It must be said that this copulative is not to be granted, but is to be distinguished, because in the second part either the other can be an infinitive noun, and then the copulative is true and to be granted; or it may be relative, and then it must be denied. And this is the third mode of amphibolism, because a statement posited by itself is not complex, and when posited with another it is complex.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: omne sequens ad positum vel bene concessum vel bene concessa, vel oppositum vel opposita bene negatorum, scitum esse tale, est concedendum si proponatur. Verumtamen ista propositio `omne sequens ex posito est concedendum' non est semper concedenda; sicut si ponatur ista `nihil est tibi positum' et proponatur ista `omne sequens ex posito est concedendum', neganda est tamquam repugnans posito.
|There is another rule: everything that follows a thing that is posited, either well granted or well granted (plural), or the opposite or opposites of something well denied, known to be such, must be granted if it is proposed. However, this proposition, `everything that follows from the premise must be granted,' is not always granted; just as if it is posited that `nothing is posited for you' and it is posited that `everything that follows from what is posited must be granted', it must be denied as a contradictory posit.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: omne repugnans posito vel bene concesso vel bene concessis, vel opposito bene negati vel bene negatorum, in tempore positionis propositum est negandum, si non sit multiplex quando proponitur.
|Another rule is: every contradictory proposition, either well-granted or well-granted (plural), or the opposite of well-denied or well-denied (plural), is to be denied at the time of the proposed position, if it is not multiple when it is proposed.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: ad omnem propositionem impertinentem, hoc est quae nec est sequens nec repugnans posito vel alicui bene concesso vel {{p|738}} bene negato, respondendum est secundum sui qualitatem.
|There is another rule: to every proposition which is irrelevant, that is, which is neither subsequent to, nor inconsistent with, a proposition, either well granted or well denied, we must answer according to its own quality.
|- valign = top
|Hoc est, si sit vera, concedenda est; si falsa, neganda; si dubia, respondendum est dubie; si sit multiplex, distinguenda est. Ex praedictis regulis sequitur quod idem uno loco propositum est concedendum et si alio loco proponeretur esset negandum; sicut posita ista propositione `Sortes currit', et proponatur ista `tantum ista propositio est tibi posita', haec est concedenda, quia vera est et impertinens.
|This, if it be true, must be granted; if false, to be denied; if in doubt, it must be answered in doubt; if it is multiple, it must be distinguished. From the aforesaid rules it follows that the same proposition is to be granted in one place, and if it were proposed in another place it would be denied; just as the proposition `Socrates runs' is proposed, and the proposition `only this proposition is posited to you', this must be granted, because it is true and irrelevant.
|- valign = top
|Si autem primo proponeretur ista `aliqua propositio falsa est tibi posita', ista esset concedenda, quia vera est et impertinens. Et si postea proponeretur ista `tantum ista propositio est tibi posita', esset neganda, quia repugnat posito et bene concesso.
|If, however, it were first proposed that `some false proposition has been posited to you', this would have to be granted, because it is true and irrelevant. And if it were afterwards proposed that `only that proposition has been put to you,' it would have to be denied, because it contradicts what has been posited and well granted.
|- valign = top
|Et ita ordo propositionum propositarum in arte obligatoria est necessario attendendus.
|And so the order of propositions proposed in the art is necessarily to be attended to.
|- valign = top
|Ex praedictis etiam patet quod concessa una indefinita, non oportet concedere aliquam singularem primo loco propositam. Sicut posita ista `homo currit', non oportet aliquam singularem concedere primo loco propositam; immo omnes ordinate propositae negari possunt praeter unam, scilicet praeter ultimam, quia illa concedenda est, eo quod sequitur ex posito et oppositis bene negatorum. Sic etiam disiunctiva est concedenda, et tamen neutra pars eius primo loco proposita est concedenda.
|From the aforesaid it is also clear that, having granted an indefinite one, it is not necessary to grant any particular proposed in the first place. As these words, `a man runs,' it is not necessary to grant any particular proposed in the first place; nay, all the proposed propositions in order can be denied except one, that is, except the last, because that must be granted, by what follows from the proposition and the opposites of the well-negated. Thus also the disjunctive is to be conceded, and yet neither part of it is proposed to be conceded in the first place.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est quod posito possibili numquam est necessarium negandum nec impossibile concedendum. Quae intelligenda est de necessario quod semper fuit necessarium ante tempus obligationis et de impossibili quod fuit impossibile ante tempus obligationis et non de illo quod devenit necessarium vel impossibile infra tempus obligationis, quia tale necessarium potest negari et impossibile concedi, eo quod durante tempore obligationis est uniformiter respondendum ad eandem propositionem postquam semel est responsum ad eam.
|Another rule is that, assuming the possible, it is never necessary to deny, nor to admit the impossible. What is to be understood de necessario that was always necessary before the time of obligation and about the impossible that was impossible before the time of obligation and not about that which becomes necessary or impossible after the time of obligation, because such necessity can be denied and the impossible granted, because during the time of obligation one must uniformly respond to the same proposition after it has been answered once.
|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 36

2025-04-26T12:47:27Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 35|Chapter 35]]|[[../Chapter 37|Chapter 37]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 36. DE INDUCTIONE ILLARUM DE CONTINGENTI.
| Chapter 36. On the induction of those de contingenti.
|- valign = top
|Circa illas de contingenti est sciendum quod singulares de contingenti non inferunt universalem de contingenti, quia ista regula non valet `singulares sunt contingentes, igitur universalis est contingens'; quaelibet enim singularis istius universalis est contingens `omne verum contingens est verum', et tamen universalis est necessaria. Similiter ista est impossible's `nullum verum contingens est verum', et tamen quaelibet singularis est contingens; et ita talis inductio non valet `hanc propositionem veram contingentem esse veram est contingens, et illam, et sic de singulis, igitur omnem propositionem veram contingentem esse veram est contingens'.
| With regard to those propositions de contingenti, it must be known that the particulars de contingenti do not imply the universal de contingenti, because this rule does not apply: `the particulars are contingent, therefore the universal is contingent'; for every particular of this universal is contingent; 'every contingent truth is truth', and yet the universal is necessary. Similarly, this is impossible: `no contingent truth is truth,' and yet every singular thing is contingent; and thus, such an induction does not hold: `for this contingently true proposition to be true is contingent, and that, and so on of individuals, therefore for every contingently true proposition to be true is contingent'.
|- valign = top
|Similiter non sequitur e converso, quia haec regula falsa est `universalis est contingens, igitur quaelibet singularis', sicut prius dictum est. Per ista patet quod ambae istarum regularum sunt falsae `omnes singulares sunt impossibiles, igitur universalis est impossibilis'; `universalis est impossibilis, igitur omnes singulares sunt impossibiles', sicut patet per praedicta.
| Similarly, it does not follow the other way around, because this rule is false: `the universal is contingent, therefore every singular', as was said before. From these it is clear that both of these rules are false: `all particulars are impossible, therefore the universal is impossible'; `the universal is impossible, therefore all particulars are impossible', as is clear from what has been said.
|- valign = top
|Et eodem modo raro aliae propositiones modales sumptae in sensu compositionis inferunt suas singulares sumptas in eodem sensu; sicut non sequitur `omnem hominem esse risibilem est primo verum, igitur hunc hominem esse risibilem est primo verum'.
| And in the same way, other modal propositions taken in the sense of composition rarely infer their singulars taken in the same sense; just as it does not follow that it is first true that every man is able to laugh, therefore it is first true that this man is able to laugh.
|- valign = top
|Et tamen frequenter {{p|721}} est bona inductio ex singularibus ad universalem; unde bene sequitur `hunc hominem esse animal est per se verum, et illum hominem, et sic de singulis, igitur omnem hominem esse animal est per se verum'.
| And yet there is frequently a good induction from particulars to the universal; from which it well follows that `that this man is an animal is intrinsically true, and that man, and so on of individuals, therefore that every man is an animal is intrinsically true'.
|- valign = top
|Et ita est de multis aliis. Quando autem hoc sit et quando non, potest faciliter sciri per ea quae dicta sunt et sciendo quid requiritur ad hoc quod talis propositio modalis sit vera, et ideo ad praesens ista de inductione sufficiant.
| And so it is with many others. But when this is the case and when it is not, it can easily be known by what has been said and by knowing what is required for such a modal proposition to be true, and therefore for the present these things about induction are sufficient.
|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 35

2025-04-26T12:45:51Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 34|Chapter 34]]|[[../Chapter 36|Chapter 36]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 35. DE INDUCTIONE UNIVERSALIUM DE POSSIBILI.
| On the Induction of Universals de possibili.
|- valign = top
|Circa inductionem universalium de possibili est sciendum quod ex singularibus non sequitur universalis, quia ista regula non valet `omnes singulares sunt possibiles, igitur universalis est possibilis'. Sicut non sequitur `haec est possibilis: haec propositio contingens est vera; et haec est possibilis: ista propositio contingens est vera, et sic de singulis; igitur haec est possibilis: omnis propositio contingens est vera'.
| Regarding the induction of universals de possibili, it must be known that the universal does not follow from the particular, because this rule does not hold: `all particulars are possible, therefore the universal is possible'. Just as it does not follow that this is possible: this proposition is contingently true; and this is possible: this proposition is contingently true, and so on about individuals; therefore this is possible: every contingent proposition is true.
|- valign = top
|Et ita frequen{{p|719}}ter universalis est impossibilis, et tamen quaelibet singularis est possibilis. Et ideo talis consequentia non valet `secundum illud signum continuum esse actu divisum est possibile, et secundum illud signum continuum esse actu divisum est possibile, et sic de singulis, igitur secundum omne signum continuum esse actu divisum est possibile'.
| And so often the universal is impossible, and yet every particular is possible. And therefore such a conclusion does not hold: `According to that continuous sign it is possible to be actually divided, and according to that continuous sign it is actually possible to be divided, and so about each, therefore according to every continuous sign it is actually possible to be divided'.
|- valign = top
|Et hoc, accipiendo omnes propositiones in sensu compositionis; nam si acciperentur in sensu divisionis, conclusio esset vera, quia ista est vera `secundum omne signum potest continuum dividi'.
| And this is so, taking all propositions in the sense of composition; for if they were taken in the sense of division, the conclusion would be true, because this is true, `according to every sign a continuum can be divided.'
|- valign = top
|Et si dicatur quod sicut ex possibili non sequitur impossibile, ita ex possibilibus non sequitur impossibile, dicendum est quod ex possibilibus et compossibilibus non sequitur impossibile, tamen ex possibilibus et incompossibilibus bene sequitur impossibile.
| And if it is said that just as the impossible does not follow from the possible, so the impossible does not follow from possibles, it must be said that the impossible does not follow from possibles and compatibles, yet the impossible does well follow from possibles and the mutually incompatibles.
|- valign = top
|Et ita est in proposito, quia singulares talium propositionum universalium impossibilium etsi sint possibiles sunt tamen simul cum hoc incompossibiles.
| And so it is in a proposition, because the particulars of such universal impossible propositions, even if they are possible, are nevertheless at the same time incompatible.
|- valign = top
|Est tamen hic notandum quod quandoque unius universalis sunt infinitae singulares. Et quando sic est, possibile est quod universalis sit impossibilis et quaelibet singularis possibilis, et tamen nullae duae singulares sunt incompossibiles, immo nullae singulares finitae sunt incompossibiles, sed quaelibet una accepta est incompossibilis omnibus aliis simul sumptis.
| It must be noted here, however, that sometimes there are infinite particulars of one universal. And when this is so, it is possible for the universal to be impossible and every singular possible, and yet no two particulars are incompatible, indeed no finite singulars are incompatible, but each one taken alone is incompatible with all the others taken together.
|- valign = top
|Quandoque autem unius universalis singulares sunt finitae; et tunc si universalis sit impossibilis, necesse est quod aliqua singularis sit impossibilis vel quod aliquae singulares in numero certo sint incompossibiles. Notandum est etiam quod ista regula non est vera `universalis est possibilis, igitur suae singulares sunt possibiles'; sicut si nullus homo sit albus et multi asini sint albi, haec universalis est possibilis `omne album est homo', et tamen nulla singularis est possibilis, quia quocumque albo {{p|720}} demonstrato haec est impossibilis `hoc album est homo'. Tamen si universalis sit possibilis, oportet quod possit habere omnes singulares possibiles; sicut, illo posito, ista `omne album est homo' nullam habet singularem possibilem, et tamen potest habere, quia posito quod nihil esset album nisi homo, tunc istius `omne album est homo' omnes singulares essent possibiles.
| And sometimes the particulars of one universal are finite; and then if the universal is impossible, it is necessary that some particular be impossible, or that some particulars in a certain number be incompatible. It must also be noted that this rule is not true: `the universal is possible, therefore its particulars are possible'; just as if no man were white and many donkeys were white, this universal statement is possible, `every white man is a man,' and yet no singular is possible, because wherever white is pointed out, this statement is impossible, `this white man is a man.' . However, if the universal is possible, it must be able to have all possible particulars; just as, on that positing, the statement `all white is man' has no singular possibility, and yet it can have, because if it were posited that nothing was white but man, then all singulars would be possible for this `all white is man'.
|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 33

2025-04-26T12:43:24Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 32|Chapter 32]]|[[../Chapter 34|Chapter 34]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 33. DE INDUCTIONE PROPOSITIONUM UNIVERSALIUM DE MODO.
| Chapter 33. On the induction of Universal Propositions of Mode.
|- valign = top
|Circa inductionem propositionum universalium de modo est primo sciendum quod si propositiones universales accipiuntur in sensu divisionis vel aequivalentes eis, eodem modo inducuntur sicut universales de inesse. Et ideo omnes tales inductiones sunt bonae: iste homo contingenter est animal, et ille homo contingenter est animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo contingenter est animal; iste homo non de necessitate est animal, ille homo non de necessitate est animal, et sic de singulis, ergo nullus homo de necessitate est animal.
| Regarding the induction of universal propositions, it must first be known that if universal propositions are taken in the sense of division or equivalent to them, they are induced in the same way as universal assertoric propositions. And therefore, all such inductions are good: this man is tangentially an animal, and that man is tangentially an animal, and so on about individuals, therefore every man is tangentially an animal; This man is not of necessity an animal, that man is not of necessity an animal, and so on of individuals, therefore no man is necessarily an animal.
|- valign = top
|Et est aliud intelligendum, quod sicut in illis de inesse, ita in talibus de modo ad veritatem inductionis non refert in singularibus ponere pro subiectis vel pronomina demonstrativa praecise, vel pronomina demonstrativa cum subiecto propositionis universalis, vel nomina propria significatorum illius termini communis.
| And there is another thing to be understood, that, as in the assertoric, so in such matters of the mode of induction to the truth it does not matter in the particulars to put either precise demonstrative pronouns for subjects, or demonstrative pronouns with the subject of a universal proposition, or the proper names of the things signified by that common term.
|- valign = top
|Unde sicut omnes istae tres inductiones sunt bonae: iste homo currit et ille homo currit, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo currit; iste currit et ille currit, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo currit; Sortes currit, Plato currit, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo currit; --- et eodem modo est de quacumque universali de inesse ---; ita omnes tales inductiones sunt bonae: iste contingenter est animal, denotato aliquo homine, et ille contingenter est {{p|715}} animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo contingenter est animal; iste homo contingenter est animal et ille homo contingenter est animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo contingenter est animal; Sortes contingenter est animal, Plato contingenter est animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo contingenter est animal.
| Hence, just as all these three inductions are good: this man runs and that man runs, and so on about individuals, therefore every man runs; this one runs and that one runs, and so on with respect to each, therefore every man runs; Socrates runs, Plato runs, and so on about individuals, therefore every man runs; --- and in the same way it is about any universal assertoric ---; so all such inductions are good: this one is contingently an animal, denoted by some man, and that one is contingently an animal, and so about individuals, therefore every man is contingently an animal; this man is contingently an animal, and that man is contingently an animal, and so on about individuals, therefore every man is contingently an animal. Socrates is contingently an animal; Plato is contingently an animal, and so on about individuals, therefore every man is contingently an animal.
|- valign = top
|Ex isto patet quod omnes tales inductiones sunt bonae: hoc per se est animal, demonstrato aliquo albo, et illud per se est animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omne album per se est animal.
| From this it is clear that all such inductions are good: this is in itself an animal, pointing to some white thing, and that is in itself an animal, and so of each, therefore every white thing is in itself an animal.
|- valign = top
|Et ex isto et ista regula, quae vera est, `quando singulares sufficienter sumptae inferunt aliquam universalem, una singularis per se sumpta infert particularem vel indefinitam illius universalis' sequitur quod omnes tales consequentiae sunt bonae: iste per se aedificat, demonstrato aliquo qui in rei veritate est albus, igitur album per se aedificat; iste, demonstrato Deo, necessario est Deus, igitur creans de necessitate est Deus, et hoc quando Deus est creans; iste, demonstrato Filio Dei, per se est Deus, igitur homo per se est Deus.
| And from this and that rule, which is true, 'when particulars taken sufficiently lead to some universal, one particular taken by itself leads to the particular or indefinite of that universal', it follows that all such consequences are good: the latter builds per se, by pointing to something that per se is white in truth, therefore it builds up white per se; this, being pointed to God, is necessarily God, therefore the creator is of necessity God, and this when God is the creator; this, being shown to be the Son of God, is in himself God, therefore man is in himself God.
|- valign = top
|Immo, generaliter, ex tali singulari in qua subicitur pronomen demonstrativum vel pronomen demonstrativum sumptum cum quocumque termino communi, qui praedicatur de illo pronomine demonstrante illud quod prius, vel etiam in qua subicitur nomen proprium, ad talem particularem est bona consequentia.
| Nay, in general, from such a singular in which a demonstrative pronoun is submitted, or a demonstrative pronoun taken with any common term, which is predicated of that pronoun demonstrating that which preceded it, or even in which a proper noun is submitted, there is a good consequence to such a particular.
|- valign = top
|Et ideo omnes tales consequentiae sunt bonae: haec res per se aedificat, demonstrato aliquo quod in rei veritate est album, igitur album per se aedificat; iste homo non est aggregatum per accidens, demonstrato aliquo homine qui in rei veritate est albus, igitur homo albus non est aggregatum per accidens; iste homo albus est aggregatum per accidens, ergo homo est aggregatum per accidens.
| And therefore all such consequences are good: this thing per se builds, by showing something that is white in truth of the thing, therefore a white thing per se builds; This man is not aggregated by accident, when some man is pointed out who in truth is white, therefore a white man is not aggregated by accident. This white man is aggregated by accident, therefore a man is aggregated by accident.
|- valign = top
|Et sic de multis aliis.
| And so for many others.
|- valign = top
|Hic tamen est advertendum quod tales consequentiae non sunt semper simplices, sed frequenter sunt ut nunc solum. Unde ista consequentia `Sortes per se est animal, igitur album per se est animal' non est consequentia simplex sed tantum ut nunc, quia numquam valet {{p|716}} nisi dum Sortes est albus; quando enim Sortes non est albus, tunc non valet consequentia. Similiter ista consequentia `Filius Dei de necessitate est Deus, igitur homo de necessitate est Deus' est solum bona ut nunc, quia non valet nisi dum Filius Dei est homo.
| Here, however, it must be noted that such consequences are not always simple, but are frequently for now only. Whence this conclusion 'Socrates is in himself an animal, therefore a white thing is in itself an animal' is not a simple consequence, but only for now, because it is never valid except while Socrates is white; for when Socrates is not white, then the consequence does not hold. Similarly, this conclusion, 'The Son of God is necessarily God, therefore a man is necessarily God' is only good for now, because it is valid only while the Son of God is man.
|- valign = top
|Unde ante incarnationem consequentia non valuit; similiter, si Filius Dei deponeret naturam assumptam, non valeret.
| Hence, before the incarnation, the consequence was not valid; in the same way, if the Son of God were to lay aside the nature he assumed, it would not be valid.
|- valign = top
|Similiter talis consequentia est bona `haec res potest assumi a Verbo, denotando naturam humanam quae est Ioannes, igitur homo potest assumi, immo, igitur suppositum potest assumi', quia per istam `suppositum potest assumi' non plus denotatur nisi quod illa res, quae est modo suppositum, potest assumi.
| Similarly, such a conclusion is good: 'this thing can be assumed from the Word, denoting the human nature which is John, therefore a man can be assumed, indeed, therefore a supposition can be assumed', because by this 'supposition can be assumed' nothing more is denoted than that thing which is only supposited, that it can be assumed.
|- valign = top
|Et hoc est verum, sicut est verum quod `album potest esse nigrum'. Et ideo sicut haec est vera `album potest esse nigrum', non obstante quod haec sit impossibilis `album est nigrum', sic haec est vera `suppositum potest assumi', non obstante quod haec sit impossibilis `suppositum assumitur'; ita si haec sit vera `aedificator per se aedificat', haec est vera `album per se aedificat', si idem sit aedificator et albus, non obstante quod haec esset per se `aedificator aedificat' et haec per accidens `album aedificat'. Aliud etiam est advertendum quod omnes praedictae consequentiae et consimiles sunt verae quando termini accipiuntur personaliter et significative; quia si aliquis terminus acciperetur simpliciter vel materialiter, possent deficere, sicut frequenter dictum est prius de aliis regulis.
| And this is true, just as it is true that 'a white thing can be black'. And therefore, just as this is true, `a white thing can be black', despite the fact that this is impossible: `white is black', so this is true: 'the supposition can be assumed', despite the fact that this is impossible: 'the supposition is assumed'; so if this is true, 'a builder builds per se,' this is true, `a white thing builds per se,' if the builder and the white thing are the same, despite the fact that this was essentially the 'the builder builds,' and this incidentally, 'the white thing builds.' It is also another thing to notice that all the aforesaid and similar consequences are true when the terms are taken personally and meaningfully; for if any term were accepted simply or materially, they might fail, as has frequently been said before of other rules.
|- valign = top
|Et ideo tales consequentiae non valent `iste homo albus significat aggregatum per accidens, igitur homo significat aggregatum per accidens', quia antecedens non est verum nisi sumpto subiecto antecedentis materialiter vel simpliciter.
| And therefore such inferences are not valid: 'this white man signifies an aggregate by accident, therefore man signifies an aggregate by accident', because the antecedent is not true unless the subject of the antecedent is taken materially or simply.
|- valign = top
|Similiter non sequitur `de isto albo praedicatur per accidens aedificare, igitur de homine vel de aedificatore praedicatur per accidens aedificare'. Et ita est de multis aliis.
| Similarly, it does not follow that 'it is predicated of this white person to build by accident; therefore, it is predicated of man or a builder to build by accident.' And so it is with many others.
|- valign = top
|Et ista de inductione propositionum universalium de modo sumptarum in sensu divisionis et eis aequivalentium ad praesens sufficiant.
| And these things about the induction of universal propositions taken in the sense of division and their equivalents suffice for the present.
|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 33

2025-04-26T12:41:57Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 32|Chapter 32]]|[[../Chapter 34|Chapter 34]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 33. DE INDUCTIONE PROPOSITIONUM UNIVERSALIUM DE MODO.
| Chapter 33. On the induction of Universal Propositions of Mode.
|- valign = top
|Circa inductionem propositionum universalium de modo est primo sciendum quod si propositiones universales accipiuntur in sensu divisionis vel aequivalentes eis, eodem modo inducuntur sicut universales de inesse. Et ideo omnes tales inductiones sunt bonae: iste homo contingenter est animal, et ille homo contingenter est animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo contingenter est animal; iste homo non de necessitate est animal, ille homo non de necessitate est animal, et sic de singulis, ergo nullus homo de necessitate est animal.
| Regarding the induction of universal propositions, it must first be known that if universal propositions are taken in the sense of division or equivalent to them, they are induced in the same way as universal propositions of inherence. And therefore, all such inductions are good: this man is tangentially an animal, and that man is tangentially an animal, and so on about individuals, therefore every man is tangentially an animal; This man is not of necessity an animal, that man is not of necessity an animal, and so on of individuals, therefore no man is necessarily an animal.
|- valign = top
|Et est aliud intelligendum, quod sicut in illis de inesse, ita in talibus de modo ad veritatem inductionis non refert in singularibus ponere pro subiectis vel pronomina demonstrativa praecise, vel pronomina demonstrativa cum subiecto propositionis universalis, vel nomina propria significatorum illius termini communis.
| And there is another thing to be understood, that, as in those of inherence, so in such matters of the mode of induction to the truth it does not matter in the particulars to put either precise demonstrative pronouns for subjects, or demonstrative pronouns with the subject of a universal proposition, or the proper names of the things signified by that common term.
|- valign = top
|Unde sicut omnes istae tres inductiones sunt bonae: iste homo currit et ille homo currit, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo currit; iste currit et ille currit, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo currit; Sortes currit, Plato currit, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo currit; --- et eodem modo est de quacumque universali de inesse ---; ita omnes tales inductiones sunt bonae: iste contingenter est animal, denotato aliquo homine, et ille contingenter est {{p|715}} animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo contingenter est animal; iste homo contingenter est animal et ille homo contingenter est animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo contingenter est animal; Sortes contingenter est animal, Plato contingenter est animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omnis homo contingenter est animal.
| Hence, just as all these three inductions are good: this man runs and that man runs, and so on about individuals, therefore every man runs; this one runs and that one runs, and so on with respect to each, therefore every man runs; Socrates runs, Plato runs, and so on about individuals, therefore every man runs; --- and in the same way it is about any universal being ---; so all such inductions are good: this one is contingently an animal, denoted by some man, and that one is contingently an animal, and so about individuals, therefore every man is contingently an animal; this man is contingently an animal, and that man is contingently an animal, and so on about individuals, therefore every man is contingently an animal. Socrates is contingently an animal; Plato is contingently an animal, and so on about individuals, therefore every man is contingently an animal.
|- valign = top
|Ex isto patet quod omnes tales inductiones sunt bonae: hoc per se est animal, demonstrato aliquo albo, et illud per se est animal, et sic de singulis, igitur omne album per se est animal.
| From this it is clear that all such inductions are good: this is in itself an animal, pointing to some white thing, and that is in itself an animal, and so of each, therefore every white thing is in itself an animal.
|- valign = top
|Et ex isto et ista regula, quae vera est, `quando singulares sufficienter sumptae inferunt aliquam universalem, una singularis per se sumpta infert particularem vel indefinitam illius universalis' sequitur quod omnes tales consequentiae sunt bonae: iste per se aedificat, demonstrato aliquo qui in rei veritate est albus, igitur album per se aedificat; iste, demonstrato Deo, necessario est Deus, igitur creans de necessitate est Deus, et hoc quando Deus est creans; iste, demonstrato Filio Dei, per se est Deus, igitur homo per se est Deus.
| And from this and that rule, which is true, 'when particulars taken sufficiently lead to some universal, one particular taken by itself leads to the particular or indefinite of that universal', it follows that all such consequences are good: the latter builds per se, by pointing to something that per se is white in truth, therefore it builds up white per se; this, being pointed to God, is necessarily God, therefore the creator is of necessity God, and this when God is the creator; this, being shown to be the Son of God, is in himself God, therefore man is in himself God.
|- valign = top
|Immo, generaliter, ex tali singulari in qua subicitur pronomen demonstrativum vel pronomen demonstrativum sumptum cum quocumque termino communi, qui praedicatur de illo pronomine demonstrante illud quod prius, vel etiam in qua subicitur nomen proprium, ad talem particularem est bona consequentia.
| Nay, in general, from such a singular in which a demonstrative pronoun is submitted, or a demonstrative pronoun taken with any common term, which is predicated of that pronoun demonstrating that which preceded it, or even in which a proper noun is submitted, there is a good consequence to such a particular.
|- valign = top
|Et ideo omnes tales consequentiae sunt bonae: haec res per se aedificat, demonstrato aliquo quod in rei veritate est album, igitur album per se aedificat; iste homo non est aggregatum per accidens, demonstrato aliquo homine qui in rei veritate est albus, igitur homo albus non est aggregatum per accidens; iste homo albus est aggregatum per accidens, ergo homo est aggregatum per accidens.
| And therefore all such consequences are good: this thing per se builds, by showing something that is white in truth of the thing, therefore a white thing per se builds; This man is not aggregated by accident, when some man is pointed out who in truth is white, therefore a white man is not aggregated by accident. This white man is aggregated by accident, therefore a man is aggregated by accident.
|- valign = top
|Et sic de multis aliis.
| And so for many others.
|- valign = top
|Hic tamen est advertendum quod tales consequentiae non sunt semper simplices, sed frequenter sunt ut nunc solum. Unde ista consequentia `Sortes per se est animal, igitur album per se est animal' non est consequentia simplex sed tantum ut nunc, quia numquam valet {{p|716}} nisi dum Sortes est albus; quando enim Sortes non est albus, tunc non valet consequentia. Similiter ista consequentia `Filius Dei de necessitate est Deus, igitur homo de necessitate est Deus' est solum bona ut nunc, quia non valet nisi dum Filius Dei est homo.
| Here, however, it must be noted that such consequences are not always simple, but are frequently for now only. Whence this conclusion 'Socrates is in himself an animal, therefore a white thing is in itself an animal' is not a simple consequence, but only for now, because it is never valid except while Socrates is white; for when Socrates is not white, then the consequence does not hold. Similarly, this conclusion, 'The Son of God is necessarily God, therefore a man is necessarily God' is only good for now, because it is valid only while the Son of God is man.
|- valign = top
|Unde ante incarnationem consequentia non valuit; similiter, si Filius Dei deponeret naturam assumptam, non valeret.
| Hence, before the incarnation, the consequence was not valid; in the same way, if the Son of God were to lay aside the nature he assumed, it would not be valid.
|- valign = top
|Similiter talis consequentia est bona `haec res potest assumi a Verbo, denotando naturam humanam quae est Ioannes, igitur homo potest assumi, immo, igitur suppositum potest assumi', quia per istam `suppositum potest assumi' non plus denotatur nisi quod illa res, quae est modo suppositum, potest assumi.
| Similarly, such a conclusion is good: 'this thing can be assumed from the Word, denoting the human nature which is John, therefore a man can be assumed, indeed, therefore a supposition can be assumed', because by this 'supposition can be assumed' nothing more is denoted than that thing which is only supposited, that it can be assumed.
|- valign = top
|Et hoc est verum, sicut est verum quod `album potest esse nigrum'. Et ideo sicut haec est vera `album potest esse nigrum', non obstante quod haec sit impossibilis `album est nigrum', sic haec est vera `suppositum potest assumi', non obstante quod haec sit impossibilis `suppositum assumitur'; ita si haec sit vera `aedificator per se aedificat', haec est vera `album per se aedificat', si idem sit aedificator et albus, non obstante quod haec esset per se `aedificator aedificat' et haec per accidens `album aedificat'. Aliud etiam est advertendum quod omnes praedictae consequentiae et consimiles sunt verae quando termini accipiuntur personaliter et significative; quia si aliquis terminus acciperetur simpliciter vel materialiter, possent deficere, sicut frequenter dictum est prius de aliis regulis.
| And this is true, just as it is true that 'a white thing can be black'. And therefore, just as this is true, `a white thing can be black', despite the fact that this is impossible: `white is black', so this is true: 'the supposition can be assumed', despite the fact that this is impossible: 'the supposition is assumed'; so if this is true, 'a builder builds per se,' this is true, `a white thing builds per se,' if the builder and the white thing are the same, despite the fact that this was essentially the 'the builder builds,' and this incidentally, 'the white thing builds.' It is also another thing to notice that all the aforesaid and similar consequences are true when the terms are taken personally and meaningfully; for if any term were accepted simply or materially, they might fail, as has frequently been said before of other rules.
|- valign = top
|Et ideo tales consequentiae non valent `iste homo albus significat aggregatum per accidens, igitur homo significat aggregatum per accidens', quia antecedens non est verum nisi sumpto subiecto antecedentis materialiter vel simpliciter.
| And therefore such inferences are not valid: 'this white man signifies an aggregate by accident, therefore man signifies an aggregate by accident', because the antecedent is not true unless the subject of the antecedent is taken materially or simply.
|- valign = top
|Similiter non sequitur `de isto albo praedicatur per accidens aedificare, igitur de homine vel de aedificatore praedicatur per accidens aedificare'. Et ita est de multis aliis.
| Similarly, it does not follow that 'it is predicated of this white person to build by accident; therefore, it is predicated of man or a builder to build by accident.' And so it is with many others.
|- valign = top
|Et ista de inductione propositionum universalium de modo sumptarum in sensu divisionis et eis aequivalentium ad praesens sufficiant.
| And these things about the induction of universal propositions taken in the sense of division and their equivalents suffice for the present.
|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 33

2025-04-26T12:41:49Z

Ragnarr49:

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 32

2025-04-26T12:38:18Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 31|Chapter 31]]|[[../Chapter 33|Chapter 33]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
|-
! valign="top" width="45%" | Latin
! valign="top" width="55%" | English
|- valign="top"
| '''[CAP. 32. QUO MODO IN PROPOSITIONIBUS DE INESSE FIT INDUCTIO]'''
| '''[Chapter 32. How induction comes about in assertoric propositions]'''
|- valign="top"
| His visis videndum est quomodo diversae propositiones universales inducuntur ex suis singularibus et quomodo universales inferunt singulares. Et primo de illis de praesenti et de inesse.
| Having looked at these things, we should see how diverse universal propositions are induced<ref>I.e. derived by induction</ref> from their singulars, and how universals imply singulars. And first, of present tense assertoric propositions. 
|- valign="top"
| Et est sciendum quod quandoque talis universalis habet singulares et quandoque non habet singulares. Quando enim subiectum verificatur de aliquo, tunc habet singulares, quando autem non verificatur de aliquo, tunc non habet singulares.
| And it should be known that sometimes such a universal has singulars and sometimes it does not have singulars. For when the subject is verified of something, then it has singulars, but when it is not verified of something, then it does not have singulars.
|- valign="top"
| Et ideo si nullus homo esset albus, ista `omnis homo albus est homo' non haberet aliquam singularem; quando autem aliquis homo est albus, tunc habet singularem.
| And therefore if no man were white, the proposition 'every white man is a man' would not have any singular, but when some man is white, then it has a singular.
|- valign="top"
| Et ita est de aliis. Et ideo aliquando etiam eadem universalis potest inferri ex suis singularibus, quando scilicet habet singulares, et quandoque non potest induci ex suis singularibus, quando scilicet non habet singulares.
| And so for others. And therefore sometimes also the same universal can be inferred from its singulars, namely when it has singulars, and sometimes it cannot be induced from its singulars, namely when it does not have singulars.
|- valign="top"
| Sunt autem istae regulae.
| And there are these rules.
|- valign="top"
| Una est quod quaelibet universalis vera, affirmativa, de praesenti, non aequivalens propositioni de futuro, et {{p|709}} de inesse habet aliquam singularem veram. Si autem sit falsa, non oportet quod habeat aliquam singularem falsam, sed sufficit quod nullam singularem habeat, et tamen quod denotetur habere; sicut per istam `omnis chimaera est' denotatur quod habeat aliquam singularem veram, et nullam habet, ideo est falsa.
| One is that any true affirmative present tense universal proposition, not equivalent to a future tense proposition, and assertoric, has some true singular. But if it is false, it does not have to have any false singular, but it is sufficient that it has no singular, and still it is denoted to have one. For example, by the proposition 'every chimera exists', it is denoted that it has a true singular, and it has none, therefore it is false.
|- valign="top"
| Alia regula est: si omnes singulares alicuius propositionis universalis sint verae, universalis est vera.
| Another rule is that if all singulars of any universal proposition are true, the universal is true.
|- valign="top"
| Et ista regula est generalis tam de affirmativa quam de negativa. Alia regula est: si universalis negativa sit falsa, oportet quod aliqua singularis sit falsa; sicut si haec sit falsa `nullum animal est asinus', oportet quod aliqua eius singularis sit falsa.
| And this rule is common to negatives as well as affirmatives. Another rule is that if the universal negative is false, some singular has to be false. For example, if 'no animal is a donkey' is false, it has to be that one of its singulars is false.
|- valign="top"
| Sed ad veritatem universalis negativae non oportet quod aliqua singularis sit vera, quia non oportet quod habeat aliquam singularem; sicut si nihil sit album, haec est vera `nullum album est coloratum', et tamen nulla singularis eius est vera.
| But for the truth of the universal negative it does not have to be that any singular is true, for it does not have to have any singular. For example, if nothing is white, 'no white thing is coloured' is true, and yet none of its singulars is true.
|- valign="top"
| Si dicatur quod hoc posito haec est vera `hoc album non est coloratum', demonstrato quocumque, dicendum quod quamvis talis sit vera `hoc album non est coloratum', demonstrato quocumque, ista tamen non est singularis huius universalis `nullum album est coloratum'.
| If it is said that, in that case, 'this white thing is not coloured', pointing to anything, it should be said that such a proposition as 'this white thing is not coloured' is true, pointing to anything, that proposition is not a singular of the universal proposition 'no white thing is coloured'.
|- valign="top"
| Nam ad hoc quod aliqua singularis sit singularis alicuius universalis, requiritur quod subiectum universalis vere praedicetur de subiecto singularis. Sic autem non est in proposito; haec enim non est vera, illo posito, `hoc album est album', demonstrato quocumque.
| For, in order that any singular proposition is the singular of some universal proposition, it is required that the subject of the universal is truly predicated of the subject of the singular.  But it is not the case here, for given that, 'this white thing is white' is not true - pointing to anything.
|- valign="top"
| Et si dicatur quod quaelibet singularis est singularis alicuius universalis, dicendum quod hoc non est verum. Unde ista `iste homo est animal', demonstrando asinum, non est singularis alicuius universalis.
| And if it is said that any singular is the singular of some universal, it should be said that this is not true.  Hence 'this man is an animal' - pointing to a donkey - is not the singular of any universal.
|- valign="top"
| Sed quaelibet singularis, in qua non demonstratur aliquid de quo falsificatur terminus communis sibi additus, est singularis alicuius universalis. Non sic autem est hic: hoc album non est coloratum.
| But any singular in which something is pointed to, of which a common term added to it is not falsified, is the singular of some universal.  But this is not the case with 'this white thing is not coloured'.
|- valign="top"
| Circa universalem de praeterito intelligendae sunt regulae sicut de universali de praesenti. {{p|710}} Sed circa inductionem propositionis universalis de futuro est primo sciendum quod dicendum est eodem modo de inductione propositionis universalis de futuro necessariae et impossibilis sicut de illis de praesenti et de praeterito.
| Concerning a universal [proposition] in the past tense, the rules are to be understood just as for a universal in the present tense.  But concerning the induction of a future tense universal proposition, it should be known first that we should speak in the same way of the induction of a future tense proposition of the necessary and of the impossible, as of those of past and present tense.
|- valign="top"
| Sed circa inductionem propositionis universalis de futuro in materia contingenti aliter dicendum est secundum veritatem et aliter secundum intentionem Aristotelis. Et oritur ista diversitas ex hoc quod aliter sentiendum est de veritate propositionis contingentis de futuro secundum veritatem et fidem et aliter secundum intentionem Aristotelis.
| But concerning the induction of a universal proposition in the future tense in contingent material, we must speak in one way according to truth and in another way according to the intention of Aristotle.  And that diversity arises from the fact that we must judge the truth of a future contingent proposition in one way according to truth (and faith), and in another way according to the intention of Aristotle.
|- valign="top"
| Nam Aristoteles ponit quod nulla propositio contingens talis de futuro est vera vel falsa, ita quod secundum intentionem Aristotelis una pars contradictionis in talibus non est magis vera quam alia.
| For Aristotle proposes that no such future contingent proposition is true or false, so that according to the intention of Aristotle, one part of a contradiction involving such propositions is no more true than the other.
|- valign="top"
| Et propter hoc, secundum eum, una pars contradictionis non est magis scita a quocumque intellectu quam alia, quia quod non est magis verum, non est magis scibile. Et propter hoc Aristoteles non posuisset aliquod futurum contingens esse scitum a Deo, cum nullum tale, secundum eum, sit verum, et nihil est scitum nisi verum.
| And because of this, according to him, one part of the contradiction is no more known by any understanding than another, because what is not more true, is not more knowable.  And because of this, Aristotle did not suppose that any future contingent proposition is known by God, since no such proposition, according to him, is true. But nothing is known except what is true.
|- valign="top"
| Sed veritas fidei ponit quod futura contingentia sunt scita a Deo, ita quod una pars contradictionis est scita a Deo et alia non est scita a Deo. Sicut Deus ab aeterno scivit istam `Beata Virgo est salvanda' et numquam scivit istam `Beata Virgo non est salvanda', sicut nec unquam scivit istam `Beata Virgo est damnanda'.
| But the truth of faith supposes that future contingents are known by God, so that one part of a contradiction is known by God, and the other part is not known by God.  For example, God has known from eternity the proposition 'the blessed Virgin is to be saved', and has never known the proposition 'the blessed Virgin is to be damned'
|- valign="top"
| Et propter hoc una pars contradictionis est scita et non alia; ideo una pars est vera, puta illa quae est scita, et alia non est vera, quia non est scita a Deo. Secundum igitur intentionem Aristotelis universalis affirma{{p|711}}tiva de futuro poterit esse vera, quamvis nulla singularis sit vera.
| And because of this, one part of the contradiction is known, and not the other, therefore one part is true, namely that which is known, and the other is not true, because it is not known by God.  Therefore, according to the intention of Aristotle, a future tense universal affirmative proposition could be true, although no singular is true.
|- valign = top
|Sicut ista universalis, secundum eum, est vera `omne futurum contingens erit'; immo, secundum eum, est necessaria. Et tamen, secundum eum nulla singularis eius est vera, quia demonstrato quocumque, haec non est vera, secundum eum, `hoc futurum contingens erit', quia infert istam `hoc est futurum contingens', quae nec est vera nec falsa, secundum eum.
|For example, the universal proposition 'every future contingent will exist' is true, indeed it is necessary. And yet, according to him, none of its singulars is true because by any demonstration, this is not true, according to him: 'this future contingent will exist', because it implies 'this is a future contingent', which is neither true nor false, according to him.
|- valign = top
|Similiter, secundum eum, universalis de futuro poterit esse falsa, quamvis non habeat aliquam singularem falsam. Sicut haec universalis est falsa `nullum futurum contingens erit'; et tamen non habet aliquam singularem falsam, quia quocumque demonstrato, haec non est eius singularis `hoc futurum contingens non erit', secundum eum, propter causam praedictam.
|Similarly, according to him, a universal future tense proposition could be true, even though it does not have any false singular. For example, the universal 'no future contingent will exist' is false, and yet it does not have any false singular, because whatever is pointed to, 'this future contingent will not exist' is not one of its singulars, according to him, on account of the reason given above.
|- valign = top
|Et sicut aliquando talis universalis affirmativa est vera, et tamen nulla singularis, ita aliquando particularis affirmativa est vera, et tamen nulla eius singularis est vera, secundum eum. Et per hoc solveret talia argumenta: probatur enim quod haec est vera `Sortes erit cras', sic 'haec est vera: in aliquo instanti Sortes erit'. Et ista propositio debet concedi, secundum eum, si Sortes sit, quia ponit quod non est dare ultimum rei permanentis in esse.
|And just as sometimes such a universal affirmative is true, and yet no singular is true, so sometimes a particular affirmative is true, and yet none of its singulars is true, according to him. And by this certain arguments would be resolved, for it is proved that 'Socrates will exist tomorrow', thus 'this is true: in some instant Socrates will exist'. And that proposition ought to be conceded, according to him, if Socrates exists, because it is not possible to allow the last instant of a thing in permanent being<ref>I.e. it is not possible for there to be a ''limit'' of an event which is in continuous existence?"Aristotle, and most medievals following him, contended that all motions, as well as the times and distances and the ranges of powers and resistances that might be involved in them, are absolutely ''continuous''. ''Science in the Middle Ages'', David Lindberg, 1978, p. 241</ref>.
|- valign = top
|Si igitur haec sit vera `in aliquo instanti Sortes erit', sit illud instans a. Tunc haec est vera `Sortes erit in a', et ultra `igitur erit in aliquo instanti post a'. Detur illud et sit b; et ultra arguetur, ut prius, `igitur erit in aliquo instanti post b', quia aliter b esset ultimum eius, quod non est possibile. Detur etiam illud et sit c. Et sic tandem devenietur ad diem crastinum: Diceret ad hoc Philosophus quod haec est vera `in aliquo instanti erit Sortes', sed nulla eius singularis est vera, et ideo non est {{p|712}} dandum illud instans in quo erit Sortes. Unde, secundum eum, ista est vera `in aliquo instanti erit Sortes', et tamen nulla istarum est vera `in a erit Sortes', `in b erit Sortes', et sic de singulis. Et ideo nulla istarum est danda.
|Therefore, if 'in some instant Socrates will exist' is true, let that instant be A. Then 'Socrates will exist at A' is true, and also 'therefore he will exist in some instant after A'. Grant that, and let it be B, and further let it be argued, as before, 'therefore he will exist in some instant after B', because otherwise B would be his last instant, which is not possible. Grant that, and let it be C. And so at last we would arrive at the next day. The philosopher would say to this that 'in some instant Socrates will exist' is true, but none of its singulars is true, and therefore that instant in which Socrates will exist should not be granted. Hence, according to him, 'in some instant Socrates will exist' is true, and none of the propositions 'Socrates will exist at A', 'Socrates will exist at B' etc is true. And therefore none of those propositions should be granted.
|- valign = top
|Et eodem modo dicendum est, secundum eum, ad consimilia argumenta. Sed secundum veritatem fidei talis universalis affirmativa, si sit vera et scita a Deo, habet aliquam singularem veram, et hoc quia semper altera pars contradictionis est vera et scita a Deo. Tamen advertendum est quod aliquando aliter est universalis vel particularis vera et aliter singularis.
|And in the same way it should be replied, according to him, to similar arguments. But according to the truth of faith, such a universal affirmative, if it is true and known by God, has some true singular, and this is because one or the other part of a contradiction is true and known by God. Yet it should be noted that a universal or particular is true in one way, and singular in another way.
|- valign = top
|Aliquando enim, secundum unam opinionem, universalis est necessaria et tamen nulla singularis est necessaria, immo quaelibet singularis sic est vera quod quaelibet illarum potest esse falsa et potest numquam fuisse vera.
|For sometimes, according to one opinion, a universal is necessary and yet no singular is necessary, indeed any singular is true in such a way that any of them can be false and can never have been true.
|- valign = top
|Haec enim est necessaria `quodlibet verum futurum contingens est verum', et tamen nulla singularis est ita vera quin potuit numquam fuisse vera. Similiter poterit esse quod particularis sit inevitabiliter vera et tamen quaelibet singularis sit evitabiliter vera. Et in hoc est aliqualis similitudo inter opinionem Aristotelis et veritatem fidei.
|For the proposition 'any true future contingent is true' is necessary, and yet none of its singulars is true in such a way that it could never have been true [false?]. Similarly, it could be the case that a particular could be inescapably true, and yet any singular could be escapably true. And in this there is some kind of similarity between the opinion of Aristotle and the truth of faith.
|- valign = top
|Et sicut dictum est de propositionibus de futuro, ita dicendum est de propositionibus de praeterito et de praesenti, aequivalentibus propositionibus de futuro. Unde sicut ista est vera `iste salvabitur', et tamen possibile est quod numquam fuerit vera, quia sequitur `iste peccabit finaliter, igitur damnabitur'; et ultra `igitur iste non salvabitur'; et ultra `igitur ista numquam fuit vera: iste salvabitur'.
|And just as was said about future tense propositions, so it should be said about propositions of the past and present, equivalent to future tense propositions. Hence 'that person will be saved' is true, and yet it is possible that it was never true, because he will finally sin, therefore he will be damned', and further more 'therefore that person will not be saved', and further 'therefore it was never true that this person will be saved'
|- valign = top
|Et antecedens est possibile, manifestum est, igitur consequens est possibile. Ita ista est modo vera `iste fuit praedestinatus ab aeterno', et tamen possibile est quod numquam fuerit praedestinatus; et hoc est, quia ista `iste fuit praedestinatus ab aeterno' aequivalet isti de futuro `iste salvabitur', et ideo sicut una potest numquam fuisse vera, ita possibile est quod alia numquam fuerit vera.
|And it is manifest that the antecedent is possible, therefore the consequent is possible. So the proposition 'that person was predestined from eternity' is now true, and yet it is possible that he was never predestined, and this is because the proposition 'that person was predestined from eternity' is equivalent to the future tense proposition 'that person will be saved', and therefore, just as one can never have been true, so it is possible that the other was never true.
|- valign = top
|Et ista est differentia inter veritatem propositionum de futuro et eis aequivalentium et veritatem propositionum de praeterito et de prae{{p|713}}senti, quae non aequivalent illis de futuro: quia si aliqua propositio sit vera de praesenti, necessario semper postea erit verum dicere quod illa propositio fuit vera. Sicut si haec sit modo vera `Sortes sedet', haec semper erit postea necessaria `haec fuit vera: Sortes sedet', ita quod impossibile est quod ista tota propositio `haec fuit vera: Sortes sedet' sit unquam postea falsa.
|And that is the difference between the truth of future tense propositions and of propositions equivalent to them, and the truth of past and present tense propositions, which are not equivalent to future tense ones. For if some present tense proposition is true, necessarily it will always be true afterwards to say that it was true. For example, if 'Socrates is sitting' is now true, 'this was true: Socrates sits' will always be necessary afterwards, so that it is impossible that the whole proposition 'this was true: Socrates sits', be ever false afterwards.
|- valign = top
|Et similiter est de propositione de praeterito: nam si haec sit modo vera `Sortes fuit albus', haec semper erit postea necessaria `haec fuit vera: Sortes fuit albus'. Sed secus est de propositione de futuro: nam quantumcumque haec sit modo vera `Ioannes salvabitur', tamen haec erit postea contingens `haec fuit vera: Ioannes salvabitur'.
|And it is similarly the case with past tense propositions. For if 'Socrates was white' is now true, the proposition 'this was true: Socrates was white' will always be necessary afterwards. But it is a different case with a future tense proposition, for however much 'John will be saved' is now true, still 'this was true: John will be saved' will be contingent afterwards.
|- valign = top
|Et per hoc potest patere quod praedestinatio vel reprobatio vel aliquid huiusmodi non potest esse relatio realis inhaerens creaturae praedestinatae vel reprobatae, sicut aliqui dicunt.
|And through this it can be clear that predestination or reprobation or something of that sort cannot be a real relation, inhering in the predestined creature or reprobate, as some say.
|- valign = top
|Nam si esset talis res, sequeretur quod iste qui est praedestinatus non posset damnari. Nam si praedestinatio sit talis res, tunc ista erit vera `iste est praedestinatus propter talem rem sibi inhaerentem'; sicut ista est vera `Sortes est albus propter albedinem sibi inhaerentem', et per consequens haec erit postea necessaria `ista fuit vera: iste est praedestinatus'. Et si hoc, sequitur quod ista sit modo necessaria `iste salvabitur'. Nam sequitur `ista fuit vera: iste est praedestinatus; igitur ista fuit vera: iste salvabitur'. Et antecedens est necessarium, igitur consequens est necessarium, et ex hoc sequitur quod ista est modo necessaria `iste salvabitur'.
|For if there were such a thing, it would follow that a person who is predestined [for salvation] could not be damned. For if predestination is such a thing, then 'this person is predestined on account of some thing inhering in him' will be true, just as 'Socrates is white because of whiteness inhering in him', and as a consequence 'this was true: this person is predestined' will be necessary afterwards. And if this is the case, it follows that 'this person will be saved' is now necessary. For 'this was true: this person is predestined; therefore this was true: this person will be saved'. And the antecedent is necessary, therefore the consequent is necessary, and from this it follows that 'this person will be saved' is now necessary.
|- valign = top
|Per ista etiam potest patere quod propositione aliqua contingente exsistente vera in aliquo instanti, nullo modo potest esse falsa in eodem instanti. Sicut si haec sit modo vera `iste habet actum bonum', impos{{p|714}}sibile est quod in isto instanti sit haec falsa `iste habet actum bonum'.
|From this it can also be clear that when a contingent proposition is true in some instant, it can in no way be false in the same instant. For example, if 'that person has done a good act' is now true, it is impossible that 'that person has done a good act' is false in that instant
|- valign = top
|Cuius ratio est quia propter positionem possibilis in esse numquam negandum est necessarium. Sed posito in esse quod iste peccet, negandum est hoc necessarium post illud instans `ista fuit vera: iste habet actum bonum in a'; et per consequens a exsistente, et illo habente bonum actum in a, haec est impossibilis `iste non habet bonum actum in a', et tamen ante fuit possibilis, sed ex quo positum est in actu non est amplius possibilis.
|The reason of this is that because of a proposition being posited as possible, a necessary should never be denied. But with it being supposed that this person commits a sin, the necessary proposition 'this was true: that person had done a good act at A' should be denied, and as a consequence, with it being at A, and with that person having done a good act at A, the proposition 'that person has not done a good act at A' is impossible, and yet it was possible before, but since it has been actualized, it is no longer possible.
|}
== Notes ==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 30

2025-04-26T11:09:33Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 29|Chapter 29]]|[[../Chapter 31|Chapter 31]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 30. DE REGULIS DESERVIENTIBUS CONSEQUENTIIS QUAE SUNT DE EODEM ET DIVERSO.
|Chapter 30. On the rules governing consequences that are the same and different.
|- valign = top
|Istis visis ponendae sunt aliquae regulae Aristotelis de `eodem'. Et est una talis: si principale est idem principali, et coniugatum est idem coniugato, et casus casui.
|As these have been seen, some of Aristotle's rules about 'the same' must be put in place. And there is one such: if the principal is the same as the principal, the conjugate is the same as the conjugate, and the case is (the same as) the case.
|- valign = top
|Ista regula tenet e converso sicut sic, quamvis ista regula non sit ita generalis sicut `si coniugatum de coniugato et principale de principali'. Nam non sequitur `album est dulce, {{p|698}} igitur albedo est dulcedo', sed bene sequitur `album et dulce sunt idem, hoc est, habent eandem definitionem vel unum est definitio alterius; igitur albedo et dulcedo sunt idem, hoc est, habent eandem definitionem'.
|This rule holds the other way around, even though this rule is not as general, as 'if the conjugate is of the conjugate, so also is the principal of the principal'. For it does not follow that 'a white thing is sweet, therefore whiteness is sweet', but it follows well that 'white and sweet are the same,' that is, they have the same definition, or one is the definition of the other; Therefore, whiteness and sweetness are the same, that is, they have the same definition.
|- valign = top
|Sciendum est tamen quod ista regula non valet nisi quando coniugatum non mutat significationem principalem.
|It must be known, however, that this rule is valid only when the conjugate does not change the main meaning.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: si oppositum est idem opposito, et propositum est idem proposito. Alia regula est: si sint eaedem generationes et corruptiones, effectiva et corruptiva sunt eadem, hoc est, nomina eis correspondentia habent eandem definitionem.
|Another rule is: if the opposite is the same as the opposite, so also the premise is the same as the premise. Another rule is: if there are the same generations and corruptions, the productive and the corruptive are the same, that is, the names corresponding to them have the same definition.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: si aliquid dicitur de duobus per superabundantiam, oportet illa esse idem numero vel oportet unum contineri sub altero.
|Another rule is: if something is said about two by superabundance, they must be the same in number, or one must be contained under the other.
|- valign = top
|Sciendum quod aliter accipit hic Philosophus `idem numero' et in I Topicorum. Accipit enim `idem numero' hic pro synonymis, ibi autem accipit `unum numero' pro uno quod non est multa.
|It should be noted that the Philosopher takes this 'same number' differently in Topics I. For he takes 'the same number' here for synonyms, but there he takes 'one number' for one, which is not many.
|- valign = top
|Pro quo est intelligendum quod aliqua esse idem, hoc est, aliqua habere eandem definitionem, contingit dupliciter: vel quod habeant eandem definitionem convertibilem cum utroque, et illa dicuntur esse `unum numero' in proposito, et sunt synonyma.
|For which it is to be understood that some things are the same, that is, some things have the same definition, it happens in two ways: either that they have the same definition which is convertible with both, and otherwise they are said to be 'one in number' in the proposition, and are synonymous.
|- valign = top
|Vel possunt aliqua habere eandem definitionem, ita tamen quod est convertibilis cum uno et non cum reliquo; sicut `homo' et `animal' habent eandem definitionem, ita tamen quod est convertibilis cum uno et non cum reliquo, et talia sunt ordinata secundum superius et inferius.
|Or some things may have the same definition, yet so that it is convertible with one and not with the rest; just as 'man' and 'animal' have the same definition, yet so it is convertible with one and not with the other, and such are ordered according to the superior and the inferior.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: quae non sunt eadem eidem, non sunt eadem inter se.
|Another rule is that things which are not the same in relation to the same thing are not the same among themselves.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: quando illa quibus aliqua accidunt non sunt idem vel e converso, ipsa non sunt eadem inter se. Alia regula est: quae non sunt in eodem praedicamento, ipsa non {{p|699}} sunt eadem; sicut `homo' et `albedo' non sunt idem, quia non sunt in eodem praedicamento. Notandum est hic quod quamvis illa quae sunt in diversis praedicamentis de se mutuo praedicentur, sicut tales sunt verae `homo est pater', `animal est quantitas', `Sortes et Plato sunt duo', et sic de aliis, tamen numquam talia sunt idem, hoc est, numquam habent eandem definitionem. Quamvis enim homo sit pater et similiter paternitas, si paternitas supponat pro aliqua una re, tamen alia est definitio hominis et patris sive paternitatis. Et ita ista regula est generalis, quod numquam illa quae sunt in diversis praedicamentis sunt idem, non obstante quod unum talium vere praedicetur de reliquo et universaliter sumpto. Ex quo sequitur quod ex ista regula non potest argui quod unum praedicamentum non praedicetur de reliquo. Unde sicut homo et album non sunt idem, loquendo de `eodem' sicut accipitur in proposito, et tamen hoc non obstante homo vere est albus, nec album est alia res ab homine, ita non obstante quod substantia et quantitas non sunt idem accipiendo `idem' sicut hic accipitur, quia scilicet non habent eandem definitionem, tamen substantia vere et realiter est quantitas, secundum principia Aristotelis. Ita est etiam de linea, superficie et corpore quod non sunt idem, et tamen vere linea est corpus et superficies et e converso. Notandum est etiam quod ista regula intelligenda est de illis quae sunt in praedicamento. Si enim aliqua non sunt in praedicamento, tunc non sequitur `non sunt in eodem praedicamento, igitur non sunt idem'. Alia regula est: illa quae non habent idem genus proximum, non sunt idem.
|Another rule is: when those things to which things happen are not the same, or vice versa, they are not the same with each other. Another rule is: things which are not in the same category are not the same; just as 'man' and 'whiteness' are not the same, because they are not in the same category. It must be noted here that although those things which are in different categories are mutually predicated of each other, such as such truths as 'a man is a father', 'an animal is quantity', 'Socrates and Plato are two', and so on of others, yet such things are never the same, that is, they never have the same definition. For although a man is a father and so is paternity, if paternity presupposes a single thing, yet the definition of man and father or paternity is different. And so this is a general rule, that things which are in different categories are never the same, notwithstanding that one such thing is truly predicated of the rest and taken universally. From which it follows that from this rule it cannot be argued that one category is not predicated of the rest. Hence, just as man and white are not the same, speaking of the same thing as it is taken in the proposition, and yet notwithstanding this man is truly white, and the white thing is not a different thing from the man, so notwithstanding that substance and quantity are not the same by taking 'the same' as here understood, because of course they do not have the same definition, yet substance is truly and really quantity, according to the principles of Aristotle. It is the same with line, surface, and body, that they are not the same, and yet really line is body and surface, and vice versa. It must also be noted that this rule is to be understood in terms of what is in the category. For if some are not in a category, then it does not follow that they are not in the same category, therefore they are not the same. There is another rule: those things which do not have the same neighboring species are not the same.
|- valign = top
|Et debet ista regula intelligi sicut prior. Alia regula est: illa quae non habent eandem differentiam, non sunt idem. Et intelligitur sicut duae praecedentes. Alia regula est: illa quorum unum suscipit magis et minus et reliquum non suscipit magis et minus, non sunt idem. {{p|700}} Notandum quod ista regula intelligenda est sicut praecedentes, videlicet quando unum suscipit magis et minus et non reliquum non sunt idem, hoc est, non habent eandem definitionem. Hoc tamen non obstante unum poterit vere praedicari de reliquo. Nam album suscipit magis et minus et homo non suscipit magis et minus, et tamen homo vere est albus. Similiter ignis non suscipit magis et minus et calidum suscipit magis et minus, et tamen omnis ignis est calidus; sed ignis et calidum non sunt idem, hoc est, non habent eandem definitionem. Per istud patet quod talia argumenta non valent `homo non est magis et minus substantia et est magis et minus quantus, igitur homo est alia res a quanto'; sed sequitur `igitur homo et quantum non sunt idem, hoc est, non habent eandem definitionem'. Alia regula est: quando aliqua suscipiunt magis et minus sed non simul, non sunt idem; sicut album et simile suscipiunt magis et minus sed tamen non simul, quia aliquando ex hoc quod aliquid fit albius, fit minus simile minus albo, ideo album et simile non sunt idem.
|And this rule must be understood as before. Another rule is that things that do not have the same difference are not the same. And it is understood like the two preceding ones. Another rule is: those of which one receives more and less and the other does not receive more and less are not the same. It should be noted that this rule is to be understood like the previous ones, that is to say, when one receives more and less and not the rest, they are not the same, that is, they do not have the same definition. Yet notwithstanding this, the one may truly be predicated of the rest. For white receives more and less, and man does not receive more and less, and yet man is truly white. Similarly, fire does not receive more and less, and heat receives more and less, and yet all fire is hot; but fire and heat are not the same, that is, they do not have the same definition. From this it is clear that such arguments are not valid: 'man is not more or less substance and is more or less a quantity, therefore man is a different thing from a quantity'; but it follows that 'man and quantity are not the same, that is, they do not have the same definition.' Another rule is: when some things receive more and less but not at the same time, they are not the same; just as white and similar receive more and less, but still not at the same time, because sometimes from the fact that something becomes more white, it becomes less similar to a less white thing, therefore white and similar are not the same.
|- valign = top
|Et est ista regula intelligenda sicut priores, scilicet quod non habent eandem definitionem; tamen cum hoc stat quod unum vere praedicetur de reliquo et quod nulla res importetur per unum quin importetur per reliquum.
|And this rule is to be understood like the previous ones, namely that they do not have the same definition; yet when this stands, that one thing is truly predicated of the rest, and that no thing is imported by one without being imported by the other.
|- valign = top
|Sed in tali casu requiritur quod aliquid significetur vel consignificetur per unum quod non eodem modo importetur per reliquum; sicut se habent `album' et `simile' sive `quale' et `simile'.
|But in such a case it is required that something be signified or connoted by one thing which is not in the same way imputed by the rest; just as 'white' and 'similar' or 'such' and 'similar' are related.
|- valign = top
|Nam nihil importatur per `quale' quin importetur per `simile' et e converso. Non tamen eodem modo; nam `quale' importat omne subiectum qualitatis praecise in recto, `simile' importat subiectum tam in recto quam in obliquo, et hoc saltem aequivalenter. Quod patet per definitionem `similis'. Nam `simile' definitur sic, vel est definitio aequivalens suae definitioni: simile est quale coexsistens, hoc est simul tempore exsistens, cum alio habente qualitatem eiusdem speciei specialissimae. Hoc patet, quod {{p|701}} in ista definitione ponitur unum nomen in recto, significans subiectum qualitatis, et aliud in obliquo, similiter significans subiectum qualitatis.
|For nothing is implied by 'such' (quale) without being implied by 'like' (simile) and vice versa. However, not in the same way; for 'such' implies every subject of quality precisely and directly, 'like' implies a subject both directly and obliquely, and this at least equivalently. This is clear from the definition of 'like'. For 'like' (simile) is defined as follows or it is a definition equivalent to its own definition: like is coexisting with such, that is, existing at the same time, with another having the quality of the same very special species. This is clear, because in this definition one noun is placed directly, signifying the subject of quality, and another obliquely, similarly signifying a subject of quality.
|- valign = top
|Ex isto patet quod per istam regulam non potest probari quod `simile' importet aliam rem a re importata per `quale', et ita non potest probari per istam regulam quod relatio est alia res ab absoluto.
|From this it is clear that it cannot be proved by this rule that 'like' imports another thing from the thing imported by 'such', and so it cannot be proved by this rule that a relation is another thing from the absolute.
|- valign = top
|Per idem etiam patet quomodo linea, superficies et corpus sunt idem realiter, hoc est, quod realiter linea est superficies et corpus et e converso. Et tamen aliquando eadem linea est maior et superficies minor et corpus minus, sine additione omnis novae rei inhaerentis vel facientis unum cum priori, et e converso contingit similiter.
|By the same thing it is also clear how line, surface and body are really the same, that is, that really line is surface and body and vice versa. And yet sometimes the same line is larger and the surface smaller and the body smaller, without the addition of any new thing inherent in or forming one with the former, and the reverse is likewise the case.
|- valign = top
|Unde si aliqua res, puta corpus, trahatur in longum et non in latum, linea est modo maior quam prius et superficies non est maior, sed poterit esse minor, et tamen eadem res est linea et superficies.
|Hence, if a thing, such as a solid body, is pulled lengthwise and not in breadth, the line is only greater than before, and the surface is not greater, but may be smaller, and yet the line and the surface are the same thing.
|- valign = top
|Nec aliqua res est addita, nec aliqua res quae fuit pars est deperdita, sed solum dicitur ista linea maior quia illud corpus modo coexsistit corpori longiori, vel coexsisteret si aliud corpus illud ambiret.
|Neither is any thing added, nor is any thing that was a part lost, but that line is said to be greater only because that body merely coexists with a longer body, or would coexist if another body surrounded it.
|- valign = top
|Dicitur autem superficies minor, quia coexsistit corpori minus lato; nam quamvis sequatur `latitudo a est minor latitudine b, igitur latitudo a non est latitudo b', non tamen sequitur `latitudo a fuit minor latitudine b, igitur latitudo a non fuit latitudo b', quia eadem latitudo aliquando fuit maior, aliquando minor.
|Now the surface is said to be smaller, because it coexists with a less wide body; for although it follows that the latitude of a is less than the latitude of b, therefore the latitude of a is not the latitude of b, it does not follow that the latitude of a was less than the latitude of b, therefore the latitude of a was not the latitude of b, because the same latitude was sometimes greater, sometimes less.
|- valign = top
|Et ita patet quod idem aliquando est latius, aliquando brevius et quandoque longius, et tamen longitudo non est alia res a latitudine; sed non habent eandem definitionem, et ad hoc sufficit diversitas connotatorum.
|And so it is clear that the same thing is sometimes wider, sometimes shorter, and sometimes longer, and yet length is not a different thing from width; but they do not have the same definition, and for this the diversity of the connotatives is sufficient.
|- valign = top
|Et ideo notandum est quod Aristoteles et alii philosophi et etiam Sancti frequenter quando dicunt aliqua non esse idem vel distingui vel esse distincta, non intendunt unum removere ab alio, ita quod unum non praedicetur vere de reliquo, sed intendunt dicere quod habent diversam definitionem et quod frequenter vere poterit unum removeri {{p|702}} a reliquo.
|And therefore it is to be noted that Aristotle and other philosophers and also the Saints frequently when they say that something is not the same or is distinguished or distinct, they do not intend to remove one from another, so that one cannot be truly predicated of the rest, but they intend to say that they have a different definition and that frequently one can truly be removed from the rest.
|- valign = top
|Quod potest frequenter contingere sine mutatione ipsius de quo praedicatur, propter mutationem alicuius alterius. Et etiam potest hoc aliquando contingere propter solum motum localem, per quem nihil adquiritur inhaerens, quamvis frequenter locus ambiens adquiratur.
|This can often happen without a change in the thing about which it is predicated, because of a change in something else. And this may also sometimes happen because of a local movement alone, by which nothing inherent is acquired, although the surrounding place is frequently acquired.
|- valign = top
|Et sic dicit Philosophus quod motus et tempus non sunt idem, nec punctus et linea, nec homo et album, nec Deus et creare sunt isto modo idem; et ita est de multis aliis auctoritatibus, quae praedicto modo glossari debent.
|And so the Philosopher says that motion and time are not the same, nor point and line, nor man and white, nor God and creation are in this way the same; and so it is with many other authorities, which must be glossed in the manner aforesaid.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: illa non sunt idem quae non faciunt idem ex hoc quod apponuntur eidem. Alia regula est: illa non sunt idem quando remanent idem quocumque istorum ablato.
|Another rule is: those things are not the same which do not make the same thing because they are attached to the same thing. Another rule is: they are not the same when they remain the same no matter where they are removed.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: si ex quacumque positione sequatur interemptio unius et non alterius, illa non sunt idem realiter. Verbi gratia posito quod nihil esset albedo, sequeretur quod albedo non esset, et tamen non sequeretur ex hoc quod homo non esset, et ideo homo et albedo non sunt idem.
|Another rule is: if from any position the destruction of one and not the other follows, they are not really the same. For example, supposing that there was nothing white, it would follow that there was no white thing, and yet it would not follow from the fact that man was not, and therefore man and white are not the same.
|- valign = top
|Et est ista regula intelligenda sicut priores. Nam ex hoc quod aliqua positione facta sequitur quod esse negatur ab uno et non ab alio, non sequitur quod unum vere negetur a reliquo, sed sequitur quod non sunt idem definitione. Verbi gratia per hoc quod aliqua positione facta sequitur quod quantitas non sit, et tamen ex eadem positione non se{{p|703}}quitur quod substantia non sit, et tamen ex hoc non potest inferri quod substantia non sit quantitas, sed potest inferri quod substantia et quantitas non habent eandem definitionem.
|And this rule is to be understood like the previous ones. For from the fact that in a given proposition it follows that a thing is denied by one and not by another, it does not follow that one is really denied by the other, but it follows that they are not the same by definition. For example, from the fact that in a given proposition it follows that quantity is not, and yet from the same position it does not follow that substance is not, and yet it cannot be inferred from this that substance is not quantity, but it can be inferred that substance and quantity do not have the same definition.
|- valign = top
|Et si hoc sequatur ex positione possibili, potest inferri quod haec sit possibilis `substantia non est quantitas', cum quo tamen stat quod substantia vere et realiter sit quantitas, sicut ex aliqua positione sequitur quod creans non sit, et tamen ex tali positione non sequitur quod Deus non sit.
|And if this follows from a proposition of posibility, it can be inferred that this is possible: 'substance is not quantity', with which it stands that substance is truly and really quantity, just as it follows from a certain position that there is no creator, and yet it does not follow from such a position that God is not.
|- valign = top
|Et propter hoc potest inferri quod alia est definitio Dei et creantis, sed ex hoc non potest concludi quod Deus sit alia res a creante. Sed quia hoc potest inferri ex positione possibili, puta ponendo quod nulla creatura sit, ideo bene contingit inferre quod haec est possibilis `Deus non est creans' et e converso.
|And for this reason it can be inferred that there is a different definition of God and the creator, but it cannot be concluded from this that God is a different thing from the creator. But since this can be inferred from a proposition of possibility, for example by positing that there is no creature, it is therefore possible to infer that this is possible, 'God is not a creator' and vice versa.
|- valign = top
|Similiter ex hoc quod aliqua positione facta sequitur formaliter quod Deus non est iustus, et tamen ex eadem positione non sequitur ita formaliter quod Deus non est intelligens, non potest inferri quod iustitia Dei non est intelligentia Dei; nec etiam potest inferri quod iustitia Dei non sit formaliter intelligentia Dei sive sapientia Dei, sed bene potest inferri quod iustitia et sapientia non sunt idem, hoc est, quod isti termini non habent eandem definitionem.
|Similarly, from the fact that it formally follows from a given proposition that God is not just, and yet from the same proposition it does not follow formally that God is not intelligent, it cannot be inferred that God's justice is not God's intelligence. Nor can it be inferred that the justice of God is not formally the intelligence of God or the wisdom of God, but it may well be inferred that justice and wisdom are not the same, that is, that these terms do not have the same definition.
|- valign = top
|Quod verum est.
|Which is true.
|- valign = top
|Et tamen iustitia et sapientia Dei, sumptis terminis personaliter et significative, sunt idem omnibus modis. Alia regula est: si unum praedicetur de aliquo et non aliud, vel e converso, illa non sunt idem.
| And yet the justice and wisdom of God, taken in personal and significant terms, are the same in all ways. Another rule is: if one thing is said about some thing and not about another, or vice versa, they are not the same.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est quod illa non sunt idem quorum unum potest esse sine altero sive altero non exsistente. Sciendum quod ista regula valet semper ad probandum aliqua non esse idem, hoc est non habere eandem definitionem, sed non valet semper ad probandum unum vere negari ab alio, ipsis terminis personaliter et significative acceptis.
|Another rule is that those things are not the same, one of which can exist without the other or if the other does not exist. It should be known that this rule is always valid for proving that some things are not the same, that is, that they do not have the same definition, but it is not always valid for proving that one thing is really denied by another, when the terms are taken in themselves personally and meaningfully.
|- valign = top
|Pro quo sciendum quod quamvis talis modus arguendi valeat `omne a est; b non est; igitur b non est a'; et similiter talis modus arguendi valet `hoc a est; hoc b non est; igitur hoc b non est hoc a', arguendo sic ex {{p|704}} singularibus.
|For which reason it must be known that although such a method of reasoning is valid, 'every a exists'; b does not exist; therefore b is not a'; and similarly this mode of reasoning is valid: 'this a exists; this b does not exist; therefore this b is not this a', arguing thus from particulars.
|- valign = top
|Tamen talis modus arguendi non valet `possibile est quod haec sit vera: hoc a est, dum haec est vera: hoc b non est; igitur hoc b non est hoc a'. Sicut non sequitur, posito quod Sortes sit albus, `possibile est quod haec sit vera: Sortes est, dum haec est vera: hoc album non est; igitur hoc album non est Sortes'.
|However, such a way of arguing is not valid: 'it is possible that this is true: this a exists, while this is true: this b does not exist; therefore this b is not this a'. As it does not follow, supposing that Socrates is white, 'it is possible that the following may be true: Socrates exists, while this is true: this white thing does not exist; so this white thing is not Socrates'.
|- valign = top
|Sed bene sequitur ista conclusio quod `haec est possibilis: hoc album non est Sortes'; quod est verum, quia posito quod Sortes non sit albus, tunc haec est vera `hoc album non est Sortes'; et bene sequitur etiam quod `hoc album' importat sive connotat aliquid quod non est eodem modo connotatum vel importatum per `Sortes' vel e converso.
|But it follows well that 'this conclusion is possible: this white thing is not Socrates'; which is true, because if we assume that Socrates is not white, then this is true: 'this white thing is not Socrates'; and it also follows that 'this white thing' implies or connotes something which is not connoted or implied in the same way by 'Socrates' or vice versa.
|- valign = top
|Per ista patet quod talis modus arguendi non valet `possibile est quod album sive albedo sit, et tamen quod nulla similitudo sit, igitur similitudo est alia res ab albedine'. Immo etiam non sequitur ex hoc quod similitudo non sit albedo; sicut non sequitur `possibile est quod album sit et tamen quod simile non sit, igitur simile non est album'.
|From these it is clear that such a method of reasoning is not valid: 'it is possible that a white thing or whiteness exists, and yet that there be no similarity, therefore similarity is a different thing from whiteness'. Nay, it also does not follow from this that there is no similarity to whiteness; just as it does not follow that 'it is possible that a white thing exists and yet that it is not similar, therefore similar is not white'.
|- valign = top
|Eodem modo non sequitur `possibile est quod substantia exsistente quantitas vel figura triangularis non sit, igitur quantitas vel figura triangularis non est substantia'; sed bene sequitur quod `haec est possibilis: quantitas non est substantia'.
|In the same way it does not follow that 'it is possible that for an existing substance, either a quantity or a triangular figure does not exist, therefore a quantity or a triangular figure is not a substance'; but it follows well that 'this is possible: quantity is not substance'.
|- valign = top
|Et tamen in rei veritate quantitas est substantia, secundum principia Aristotelis. Sed numquid ista forma arguendi valet: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent quod unum illorum manet altero non exsistente, illa sunt distincta realiter; sed albedo potest manere similitudine non exsistente sive non manente; igitur album et similitudo distinguuntur realiter? Dicendum quod talis forma arguendi non valet generaliter. Unde non sequitur: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent etc.; sed Deus potest manere sive exsistere chimaera non exsistente; igitur chimaera et Deus distinguuntur realiter. Sed numquid ex talibus praemissis sequitur quod non sunt idem realiter? Dicendum quod non sequitur, quia non se{{p|705}}quitur: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent etc.; sed Deus potest esse creante non existente; igitur Deus et creans non sunt idem realiter.
|And yet in the truth of the matter quantity is substance, according to the principles of Aristotle. But nevertheless this form of argument is valid: whenever things are in such a way that one of them remains when the other is non-existent, they are really distinct; but whiteness can remain when a similarity does not exist or does not remain; so are a white thing and similarity really distinct? It must be said that this form of argument does not apply in general. Hence it does not follow: 'whenever things behave like this, etc.; but God can remain whether or not a chimera exists; therefore the chimera and God are really distinct'. But does it follow from such premises that they are not really the same? It must be said that it does not follow, because it does not follow: 'whenever things behave like this, etc.; but God can be by creating not by existing; therefore God and the creator are not really the same'.
|- valign = top
|Sed numquid adhuc ex talibus praemissis sequitur quod possunt distingui vel non esse idem realiter? Dicendum quod nulla talis conclusio de inesse vel de possibili sumpta in sensu divisionis vel aliqua aequivalens ei sequitur ex talibus praemissis generaliter. Aliquando tamen sequitur tam conclusio de inesse quam conclusio de possibili, et ideo in tali modo arguendi aliquando est figura dictionis et aliquando non.
|But does it still follow from such premises that they can be distinguished or really not the same? It should be said that no such assertoric conclusion or de possibili taken in the sense of division or something equivalent to it generally follows from such premises. Sometimes, however, there follows both an assertoric conclusion and a conclusion de possibili, and therefore in such a way of reasoning there is sometimes a figure of speech and sometimes not.
|- valign = top
|Pro quo sciendum quod quandocumque sub tali maiore accipiuntur sub in minore aliqua non connotativa, nec relativa, nec duo ordinata secundum superius et inferius, semper sequitur conclusio de praesenti: quod non sunt idem realiter, et per consequens quod possunt non esse idem realiter.
|For which reason it is to be known that whenever something not connotative, not relative, or two ordered according to superior and inferior, under such a superior one are taken under an inferior one, the conclusion always follows from the present: that they are not really the same, and consequently that they cannot really be the same.
|- valign = top
|Et ideo bene sequitur: illud absolutum quod est scientia illius conclusionis potest esse sine absoluto quod est scientia alterius conclusionis; igitur illud absolutum quod est scientia istius et illud absolutum quod est scientia alterius non sunt idem realiter.
|And therefore, it follows well: that absolute which is the knowledge of that conclusion can be without the absolute which is the knowledge of another conclusion; therefore, the absolute which is the knowledge of this and the absolute which is the knowledge of another are not really the same.
|- valign = top
|Sed si sumantur sub connotativa vel relativa vel ordinata secundum superius et inferius, est frequenter fallacia figurae dictionis. Patet in exemplo de relativis; nam hic est fallacia figurae dictionis: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent quod unum potest esse alio non exsistente, illa sunt distincta realiter; sed Deus potest esse creante non exsistente, --- istae enim duae possunt esse simul verae `Deus est' et `nullum creans est' ---; igitur Deus et creans possunt non esse idem realiter.
|But if they are taken under the connotative or relative or ordered according to superior and inferior, there is frequently a fallacy of the figure of speech. It is clear in the example of relatives; for here is the fallacy of the figure of speech: whenever things are in such a way that one thing can exist in another that does not exist, they are really distinct; but God can be existing without creating, --- for these two can be true at the same time: 'God is' and 'there is no creator' ---; therefore God and the creator may not be really the same.
|- valign = top
|Quia praemissae sunt verae conclusione exsistente falsa, sicut manifeste patet. De connotativis etiam patet exemplum, quia non sequitur: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent etc.; sed homo potest esse musico non exsistente; igitur homo et musicus possunt distingui realiter vel non sunt idem realiter. De aliis ordinatis secundum superius et inferius patet exemplum; nam posito quod nullum animal sit nisi homo, non sequitur: quandocumque aliqua sic se habent etc.; sed animal potest esse nullo homine exsistente; {{p|706}} igitur homo et animal non sunt idem realiter vel possunt distingui realiter.
|Because the premises are true while the existing conclusion is false, as is plainly evident. The example of connotatives is also clear, because it does not follow: whenever some things behave like this, etc.; but a man can be a musician who does not exist; Therefore, man and musician can be really distinguished or they are not really the same. Of other orders according to superior and inferior, the example is clear; for supposing that there is no animal but man, it does not follow that whenever things behave in this way, etc.; but an animal can exist without any man existing; Therefore, man and animal are not really the same or can really be distinguished.
|- valign = top
|Sciendum est quod aliquando sequitur conclusio de possibili, sumpto subiecto pro eo quod potest esse, vel altero termino sumpto pro eo quod potest esse, et hoc respectu huius `non esse idem realiter' et aliquando respectu huius `distingui realiter'.
|It must be known that sometimes a conclusion follows de possibili, taking the subject for what it can be, or another term taken for what it can be, and this with respect to this 'not really being the same' and sometimes with respect to this 'really distinct'.
|- valign = top
|Sciendum quod ista propositio `quandocumque' etc. potest habere bonum intellectum et malum. Accipio tamen eam in proposito secundum bonum intellectum, sive ille intellectus sit de virtute sermonis sive non, non curo ad praesens.
|It should be known that this proposition 'whenever' etc. it is possible to have a good understanding and a bad one. However, I accept it in the proposition according to the good understanding, whether that understanding is about the power of speech or not, I do not care for the present.
|- valign = top
|Sciendum est etiam quod aliquando sumendo sub connotativa vel relativa, est fallacia figurae dictionis et aliquando non. Quando autem hoc sit et quo modo praedicta propositio debeat intelligi, et quando sequitur una conclusio et non alia, ostendetur quando tractabitur de fallacia figurae dictionis.
|It must also be known that sometimes by taking it under the connotative or relative, there is a fallacy of figure of speech and sometimes not. Now when this is the case, and in what manner the aforesaid proposition ought to be understood, and when it follows from one conclusion and not another, will be shown when we treat of the fallacies of figure of speech.
|- valign = top
|Hoc autem sufficiat scire ad praesens quod talis modus arguendi non valet: possibile est quod album sit et quod nulla similitudo sit, igitur album et similitudo distinguuntur realiter; possibile est quod substantia sit et quod nulla quantitas si, igitur quantitas et substantia distinguuntur realiter; possibile est quod absolutum sit et quod nulla relatio sit, igitur relatio et absolutum distinguuntur realiter; possibile est quod Deus sit dum haec est vera: creatio non est, igitur Deus et creatio non sunt idem realiter.
|Now this is sufficient to know for the present that such a method of reasoning is not valid: it is possible that a white thing exists and that there is no similitude, therefore whiteness and similitude are really distinguished; If it is possible that there is substance and that there is no quantity, then quantity and substance are really distinguished; it is possible that there is an absolute and that there is no relation, therefore relation and absolute are really distinguished; it is possible for God to exist as long as this is true: there is no creation, therefore God and creation are not really the same.
|- valign = top
|Sicut non sequitur, secundum omnes: possibile est quod album sit dum simile non est, hoc est dum haec est vera: simile non est, igitur simile non est album; et per consequens non sequitur: igitur simile et album distinguuntur realiter.
|As it does not follow, according to all: it is possible for a white thing to exist, although it is not similar, that is, as long as this is true: it is not similar, therefore a similar thing is not a white thing; and consequently it does not follow: therefore similar and white are really distinguished.
|- valign = top
|Verumtamen ista conclusio sequitur: haec est possibilis `album non est realiter simile' vel e converso quod `simile non est realiter album'.
|Nevertheless, this conclusion follows: this is possible 'a white thing is not really similar' or conversely that 'a similar thing is not really white'.
|- valign = top
|Quod dico propter cavillationem quae posset fieri. Et eodem modo ex antecedentibus aliarum consequentiarum sequuntur istae conclusiones, videlicet quod: haec est possibilis `similitudo {{p|707}} non est album' vel e converso; et quod haec est possibilis `quantitas non est substantia' vel e converso; et quod haec est possibilis `relatio non est absolutum' vel e converso; et quod haec est possibilis `creatio non est Deus' vel e converso, saltem si propositiones possunt esse talibus rebus non exsistentibus.
|I say this because of the cavilling that might occur. And in the same way these conclusions follow from the antecedents of other consequences, namely that: this is possible 'similarity is not white' or vice versa; and that this is possible 'quantity is not substance' or vice versa; and that this is possible 'relation is not absolute' or vice versa; and that this is possible 'creation is not God' or vice versa, at least if there can be propositions for such non-existent things.
|- valign = top
|Et sicut ex isto antecedente `possibile est quod haec sit vera: album est, dum haec est vera: nullum simile est', sequitur quod `simile' aliquid connotat vel significat quod non eodem modo connotat vel significat `album' vel e converso, --- nam `simile' connotat tam qualitatem quam subiectum et `album' non connotat eodem modo illud subiectum et illam qualitatem; quod potest patere ex definitionibus exprimentibus quid nominis ipsius `albi' et ipsius `similis' ---, ita ex isto antecedente `possibile est quod substantia sit et quod nulla quantitas sit, hoc est, possibile est quod istae duae sint simul verae: substantia est, et: nulla quantitas est' sequitur quod iste terminus `quantitas' aliquid significat vel connotat vel consignificat quod non significat hoc nomen `substantia' vel non consignificat eodem modo.
|And as from the foregoing, 'it is possible for this to be true: a white thing exists, while this is true: there is nothing similar', it follows that 'similar' connotes or signifies something which does not connote or signify in the same way as 'white', or vice versa, --- for 'similar' connotes both a quality and a subject, and 'white' does not connote that subject and that quality in the same way; which can be clear from the definitions expressing what the name 'white' and 'similar' mean, thus from this antecedent 'it is possible that there is substance and that there is no quantity, that is, it is possible that these two are true at the same time: there is substance, and: there is no quantity' it follows that this term 'quantity' signifies or connotes or represents something which the name 'substance' does not signify or does not connote in the same way.
|- valign = top
|Quod verum est; nam hoc nomen `quantitas' connotat partes, quod non connotat
|Which is true; for this word 'quantity' connotes parts, which neither
|- valign = top
|'substantia' nec `qualitas'. Et propter hoc ista habent diversas definitiones; cum hoc tamen stat quod unum vere praedicatur de alio, sicut `homo' et `album' diversas habent definitiones et `album' aliquid connotat vel significat quod non connotat vel significat `homo'.
|'substance' nor 'quality' connotes. And for this reason, these have different definitions; however, it stands that one thing is really predicated of another, just as 'man' and 'white' have different definitions and 'white' connotes or signifies something which 'man' does not connote or signify.
|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 20

2025-04-26T10:46:01Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 19|Chapter 19]]|[[../Chapter 21|Chapter 21]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 20. DE REGULIS PER QUAS INFERTUR ALIQUID ESSE VEL NON ESSE PROPRIUM ALICUIUS.
|Chapter 20. On the rules by which it is inferred that something is or is not a property of something else.
|- valign = top
|Istis visis ponendae sunt aliquae regulae quibus potest probari aliquid esse proprium vel non esse proprium alicuius. Et primo ad probandum proprium de aliquo, accipiendo proprium pro illo quod convenit omni et soli et semper et distinguitur ab omni genere, differentia et definitione et accidente et composito ex his; secundo circa proprium quod componitur ex genere et differentia etc..
|Having seen these, some rules must be laid down by which it can be proved that something is a property or not a property of something else. And first, to prove a property of something, by taking the property for that which belongs to each and every thing and always and is distinguished from every genus, difference, definition and accident and is composed from them; secondly, about a property which is composed of genus and difference, etc.
|- valign = top
|Est igitur una regula ad probandum aliquid non esse proprium alicuius, talis: quod non est convertibile cum aliquo, non est proprium illius; sicut sequitur `posse movere se non est convertibile cum homine, igitur posse movere se non est proprium hominis'.
|There is therefore one rule for proving that something is not a property of something, such that what is not convertible with something is not its property; as it follows, 'to be able to move oneself is not interchangeable with man, therefore, to be able to move oneself is not a property of man.'
|- valign = top
|Sciendum quod in isto consequente `posse movere se non est proprium hominis' subiectum non supponit personaliter, sed supponit pro uno praedicabili, sive illud sit intentio animae sive vox vel aliud signum ad placitum institutum, ideo vel supponit simpliciter vel materialiter.
|It should be known that in this consequence, 'it is not the property of a man to be able to move himself,' the subject does not supposit personally, but it supposits as one predicable, whether it be the intention of the soul or the voice or some other sign established by convention, therefore it supposits either simply or materially.
|- valign = top
|Potest tamen inferri ex antecedente in quo omnes termini supponunt personaliter et significative, sic `aliud ab homine potest movere se, igitur {{p|674}} posse movere se non est proprium hominis'; et sic `non omnis homo potest movere se, igitur posse movere se non est proprium hominis'.
|It may, however, be inferred from the antecedent in which all the terms supposit personally and meaningfully, thus 'something other than man can move itself, therefore being able to move itself is not a property of man'; and thus 'not every man can move himself, therefore, to be able to move himself is not a property of man.'
|- valign = top
|Et etiam potest inferri ex antecedente in quo idem supponit simpliciter vel materialiter, sicut dictum est, <sic> `posse movere se non est convertibile cum homine, igitur posse movere se non est proprium hominis'.
|And it can also be inferred from the antecedent in which the same thing supposits simply or materially, as it has been said, 'to be able to move oneself is not interchangeable with man, therefore to be able to move oneself is not the property of man.'
|- valign = top
|Et tenet quaelibet praedictarum consequentiarum per istam regulam `quod non est convertibile cum aliquo, non est proprium ipsius'. Et sicut est de ista regula, ita est de omnibus aliis circa proprium, quod quaelibet potest deservire uni consequentiae in qua omnes termini antecedentis supponunt personaliter et significative, et alteri in qua idem termini supponunt simpliciter vel materialiter in consequente sicut in antecedente.
|And every one of the aforesaid consequences holds by this rule, 'that which is not convertible with something, is not a property of it.' And as it is with this rule, so it is with all others concerning property, that each may serve one consequence in which all the terms of the antecedent supposit personally and significantly, and another in which the same terms supposit simply or materially in the consequent as in the antecedent.
|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: illud quod significat vel consignificat vel connotat pauciora non est proprium illius quod significat vel connotat plura; sicut sequitur `homo connotat vel significat pauciora quam risibile, igitur homo non est proprium risibilis'.
|Another rule is: that which signifies or consigns or connotes fewer is not a property of that which signifies or connotes more; as it follows, 'man connotes or signifies less than something that can laugh, therefore man is not the characteristic of something that can laugh'.
|- valign = top
|Ratio istius regulae est quod semper proprium magis natum est praedicari de illo cuius est proprium quam e converso et est magis propria praedicatio illa quam e converso. Nunc autem illud quod pauciora significat, --- accipiendo `significare' communiter, scilicet pro significare principaliter vel connotare vel consignificare ---, magis natum est subici quam illud quod plura significat.
|Another rule is: that which signifies or conveys or connotes fewer is not proper to that which signifies or connotes more; as it follows, 'man connotes or signifies fewer than something that can laugh, therefore man is not the characteristic of something that can laugh'.
|- valign = top
|Et ideo illud quod pauciora significat numquam est proprium illius quod plura significat; et propter hoc `creativum' est proprium Dei, `creabile' est proprium creaturae, et sic de aliis. Alia quae sunt necessaria in scientiis specialibus circa naturam proprii sciri possunt per illas regulas quae dictae sunt, ubi dictum est de regulis deservientibus consequentiis in quibus omnes termini suppo{{p|675}}nunt personaliter et significative.
|And therefore that which signifies fewer is never a property of that which signifies more; and for this reason 'creative' is a property of God, 'creatable' is a property of creatures, and so on. Other things which are necessary in the specialized sciences concerning the nature of a property may be known by those rules which have been said, where it has been said about the rules governing the consequences in which all the terms supposit personally and meaningfully.
|- valign = top
|Ideo ista ad praesens de proprio, isto modo dicto, sufficiant ad probandum aliquid non esse proprium alicuius. Sed ad probandum aliquid esse proprium sufficit probare quod propositio in qua praedicatur de subiecto sit necessaria, et quod non sit per se primo modo dicendi per se, et quod sit convertibile cum subiecto, et quod praedicatum importet plura quam subiectum.
|Therefore, for the present, these things about property, said in this mode, are sufficient to prove that something is not the property of something else. But in order to prove that something is a property, it is sufficient to prove that the proposition in which the subject is predicated is necessary, and that it is not per se in the first mode of saying per se, and that it is convertible with the subject, and that the predicate implies more than the subject.
|- valign = top
|Ut sic ista possit esse descriptio proprii: proprium est praedicabile necessario de subiecto per se secundo modo, plura importans quam subiectum convertibile cum eodem. Per primam particulam excluditur accidens, quod vocatur contingenter praedicabile; per secundam excluditur tam genus quam differentia; per tertiam excluditur quodlibet subiectum respectu proprii; per quartam excluditur proprium communioris.
|So that this can be a description of property: a property is necessarily predicable of the subject in itself in the second mode, importing more than the subject that is convertible with the same. By the first particle an accident is excluded, which is called contingently predicable; by the second both genus and difference are excluded; by the third every subject is excluded with respect to itself; by the fourth the property of a commoner thing is excluded.
|- valign = top
|Et est notandum quod proprium hic definitum et propria passio convertuntur, et tamen proprium alicuius et passio eiusdem non convertuntur. Unde aliquid est passio hominis, et tamen non est proprium hominis; sicut propria passio animalis est etiam passio hominis, et tamen non est proprium hominis.
|And it must be noted that the property defined here and that the properties attribute are converted, and yet a property of something and an attribute of the same are not converted. Hence something is an attribute of man, and yet it is not a property of man; just as the properties attribute of an animal is also the attribute of man, and yet it is not a property of a man.
|- valign = top
|Et si dicatur quod tunc divisio universalium non est sufficiens in genus, differentiam, speciem, proprium et accidens, quia aliquid est praedicabile de homine quod neque est accidens homini, neque proprium, neque genus, neque species, neque differentia ipsius: Dicendum quod ista divisio bene intellecta est sufficiens.
|And if it be said that then the division of universals into genus, difference, species, property, and accident is not sufficient, because there is something predicable of man which is neither accidental to man, nor a property, nor a genus, nor a species, nor his difference: it must be said that this division is well understood and sufficient.
|- valign = top
|Unde omne praedicabile de homine, commune omnibus hominibus, est genus vel differentia vel species vel proprium vel accidens; non tamen ex hoc sequitur quod omne tale sit genus hominis vel species hominis vel differentia hominis vel proprium hominis vel accidens hominis, quia proprium animalis praedicatur de homine, et est proprium, quamvis non sit proprium hominis, est tamen passio hominis.
|Hence everything that can be predicated of man, common to all men, is a genus, or difference, or species, or property, or accident; yet it does not follow from this that every such thing is the genus of man, or the species of man, or the difference of man, or the property of man, or the accident of man, because a property of an animal is predicated of man, and is a property, although it is not a property of man, yet it is an attribute of man.
|- valign = top
|Et ita proprium et passio convertuntur, et tamen proprium hominis et passio hominis non {{p|676}} convertuntur. Aliter potest dici quod ibi accipitur proprium large pro passione praedicabili per se secundo modo.
|And thus property and attribute are converted, and yet a property of a man and an attribute of a man are not converted. In another way it may be said that there property is taken freely for an attribute predicable by itself in the second mode.
|- valign = top
|Ex praedictis potest patere quod omnia talia sunt propria Dei `creativum', `gubernativum',
|From the aforesaid it is clear that all such things are properies of God, 'creative', 'governing',
|- valign = top
|'redemptivum', `beatificativum' et huiusmodi. Similiter omnia talia `posse peccare', `posse mereri', `posse recipere beatitudinem', `posse damnari' et huiusmodi sunt propria creaturae rationalis.
|'redemptive', 'beatificative' and the like. Similarly, all such things as 'able to sin,' 'able to earn,' 'able to receive happiness,' 'able to be damned,' and the like are proper to rational creatures.
|- valign = top
|Est autem notandum quod ista non dicuntur propria rerum extra, sed sunt propria intentionum seu conceptuum animae vel vocum seu aliorum signorum ad placitum institutorum, quia cum talibus terminis convertuntur et de eis convertibiliter praedicantur, et de quocumque dicitur unum et reliquum.
|Now it is to be noted that these are not said to be properties of external things, but are properties of the intentions or concepts of the soul or to words or other signs established by convention, because they are converted with such terms and are reversibly predicated of them, and of whatever is said one and all.
|- valign = top
|Et hoc est verum quando omnes termini istarum propositionum supponunt personaliter et significative. Ultimo sciendum quod proprium incomplexum aliquando sumitur large, et tunc non requiritur quod necessario praedicetur de suo subiecto, sed sufficit quod non sit possibile simul esse exsistere verificari de suo subiecto et ipsum negari a suo subiecto.
|And this is true when all the terms of these propositions supposit personally and meaningfully. Finally, it must be known that a complex property is sometimes taken for granted, and then it is not required that it necessarily be predicated of its subject, but it is sufficient that it is not possible for it to be verified to exist for its subject and at the same time for the same thing to be denied for its subject.
|- valign = top
|Et sic `creari' potest dici proprium entis ut ens est praecise commune creaturis, quia quamvis haec non sit necessaria `ens creatur', tamen ista non stant simul `ens est' --- accipiendo ens praecise pro creaturis sive aliis a Deo --- et `ens non est creatura'.
|And thus 'to be created' can be said to be a property of being, as being is precisely common to creatures, because although this is not necessary, 'a being is created', yet these do not stand at the same time: 'a being is' --- taking a being precisely for creatures or others from God --- and 'a being is not a creature'.
|- valign = top
|Sic etiam `maius sua parte' potest dici proprium `totius', quia quamvis haec non sit necessaria `omne totum est maius sua parte', quia si nullum totum esset, --- quod est possibile per potentiam divinam ---, nullum totum esset maius sua parte; tamen ista non stant simul `aliquod totum est' et `totum non est maius sua parte'.
|Thus also 'greater in its own part' can be called the property 'whole', because although this is not necessary, 'every whole is greater in its own part', because if there were no whole, which is possible through divine power, no whole would be greater in its own part; yet these things do not stand at the same time as 'something is a whole' and 'a whole is not greater than its part.'
|- valign = top
|Similiter, `habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis' dicitur esse passio trianguli, et tamen haec non est necessaria `triangulus habet tres' etc.. Unde breviter dicendo: frequenter per tales propositiones quae ponuntur necessariae intelliguntur propositiones condicionales vel propositiones de possibili vel aequivalentes eis, quae necessariae sunt.
|Similarly, 'having three angles equal to two right angles' is said to be an attribute of a triangle, and yet this is not necessary: 'a triangle has three' etc. Hence, briefly speaking, frequently by such propositions which are considered necessary are meant conditional propositions or propositions de possibili or equivalent to those that are necessary.
|- valign = top
|Ali{{p|677}}quando autem accipitur proprium stricte, et sic definitur prius, quod est `necessario praedicabile' etc.. Et si quaeratur an proprium sive passio possit esse sine suo subiecto, dicendum est quod de virtute sermonis debet concedi quod subiectum potest esse naturaliter sine sua propria passione et similiter propria passio potest esse sine suo subiecto, quia passio non est nisi intentio sive conceptus animae vel signum ad placitum institutum.
|Sometimes, however, property is taken strictly, and is thus defined first, which is 'necessarily predicable', etc. And if it is asked whether a property or an attribute can exist without its subject, it must be said that from the power of speech it must be granted that a subject can naturally exist without its own attribute, and similarly the properties attribute can exist without its subject, because an attribute is nothing but an intention or concept of the soul or a sign instituted by convention.
|- valign = top
|Et similiter est de subiecto.
|And the same is true of the subject.
|- valign = top
|Et manifestum est quod haec intentio potest esse sine illa et e converso et similiter hoc signum ad placitum institutum potest esse sine illo et e converso. Sed quod auctores dicunt quod subiectum non potest esse sine sua propria passione nec e converso, debet sic intelligi, quod scilicet propositio non potest esse falsa in qua praedicatur proprium vel passio de suo subiecto, omnibus terminis supponentibus personaliter et significative, si sit passio primo modo dicta.
|And it is clear that this intention can be without it and vice versa, and similarly this sign can be established at will without it and vice versa. But what the authors say, that the subject cannot be without its own attribute, and vice versa, must be understood in this way, namely, that a proposition cannot be false in which a property or attribute is predicated of its subject, with all the terms suppositing personally and significantly, if the attribute is said in the first mode.
|- valign = top
|Si autem sit passio secundo modo dicta, tunc non poterit talis propositio esse falsa si esse exsistere verificetur de suo subiecto supponente personaliter. Sicut quamvis haec intentio `rudibilis' possit esse in anima nullo asino exsistente et etiam hac intentione `asinus' non existente in anima et e converso, tamen impossibile est quod haec sit falsa `omnis asinus est rudibilis' dum haec est vera `asinus est'.
|But if the attribute is said in the second mode, then such a proposition cannot be false if it is verified that it exists in relation to its suppositing subject personally. Just as although this intention 'tamable' can exist in the soul without a donkey existing and also this intention be 'donkey' does not exist in the soul and vice versa, it is still impossible for this to be false 'every donkey is tamable' while this is true 'a donkey exists'.
|- valign = top
|Et isto modo debent glossari omnes auctoritates quae dicunt quod subiectum non potest esse sine proprio vel sine sua propria passione et e converso.
|And in this way must be glossed all the statements which say that a subject cannot exist without its property attribute or vice versa.
|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 16

2025-04-26T10:41:35Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 15|Chapter 15]]|[[../Chapter 17|Chapter 17]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 16. DE AEQUIPOLLENTIA PROPOSITIONUM DE IMPOSSIBILI.
|Chapter 16. On the equivalence of propositions de impossibili.
|- valign = top
|Circa propositiones de impossibili est primo sciendum quod nulla earum est prima, quia quaelibet illarum aequipollet opposito alicuius propositionis de possibili, et ideo de qualibet quaerendum est cui aequipolleat.
|Regarding propositions de impossibili, it must first be known that none of them is first, because each of them is equivalent to the opposite of some proposition de possibili, and therefore we must inquire about each one to which it is equivalent.
|- valign = top
|Et cum dictum sit quod `impossibile' aequivalet isti `non possibile', faciliter potest sciri per praedicta cui aequipollet propositio de impossibili, ponendo `non possibile' loco istius modi `impossibile'.
|And since it has been said that 'impossible' is equivalent to 'not possible', it can easily be known from the above to what the proposition de impossibili is equivalent, by putting 'not possible' in the place of that mode 'impossible'.
|- valign = top
|Est igitur sciendum quod quandoque iste modus est affirmatus, ita scilicet quod negatio non negat eum; sicut hic `impossibile est omne animal esse hominem', `impossibile est aliquod animal esse hominem'.
|It should therefore be known that sometimes this mode is affirmed, namely in such a way that the negation does not negate it; as here: 'it is impossible for every animal to be a man', 'it is impossible for any animal to be a man'.
|- valign = top
|Quandoque autem est negatus per aliam negationem, sicut hic: `non impossibile est omne animal esse hominem', `non impossibile est omnem hominem currere'.
|But sometimes it is negated by another negation, as here 'it is not impossible for every animal to be a man', 'it is not impossible for every man to run'.
|- valign = top
|In primo casu, quando scilicet nulla negatio negat modum impossibilitatis, tunc illa de impossibili aequipollet uni de ne{{p|649}}cessario, sicut illa de possibili, in qua modus negatur, aequipollet uni de necessario.
|In the first case, namely when no negation denies the mode of impossibility, then that de impossibili is equivalent to one of necessity, just as that de possibili, in which the mode is denied, is equivalent to one de necessario.
|- valign = top
|Unde ista `impossibile est omne animal esse hominem' aequipollet isti `necesse est aliquod animal non esse hominem'; et ista `impossibile est nullum animal esse hominem' aequipollet isti `necesse est aliquod animal esse hominem'; et ista `impossibile est aliquod animal esse hominem' aequipollet isti `necesse est nullum animal esse hominem'; et ista `impossibile est aliquod animal non esse hominem' aequipollet isti `necesse est omne animal esse hominem'.
|Hence, 'it is impossible for every animal to be a man' is equivalent to 'it is necessary for some animal not to be a man'; and 'it is impossible for no animal to be a man' is equivalent to 'it is necessary for some animal to be a man'; and 'it is impossible for any animal to be a man' is equivalent to 'it is necessary for no animal to be a man'; and 'it is impossible for any animal not to be a man' is equivalent to 'it is necessary for every animal to be a man'.
|- valign = top
|Si autem modus impossibilitatis sit negatus, tunc mutabitur modus impossibilitatis in modum possibilitatis; sicut ista `non impossibile est omne animal esse hominem' aequipollet isti `possibile est aliquod animal esse hominem'.
|But if the mode of impossibility is denied, then the mode of impossibility will be changed into the mode of possibility; just as `it is not impossible for every animal to be a man' is equivalent to `it is possible for some animal to be a man'.
|- valign = top
|Ex quo enim modus possibilitatis, quando negatur, debet mutari in modum necessitatis, et modus necessitatis, quando negatur, debet mutari in modum possibilitatis affirmatum, necesse est quod impossibile, quando negatur, mutetur in modum possibilitatis.
|For since the mode of possibility, when denied, must be changed into the mode of necessity, and the mode of necessity, when denied, must be changed into the mode of possibility affirmed, it is necessary that the impossible, when denied, be changed into the mode of possibility.
|- valign = top
|Per praedicta, et per illam regulam de aequipollentiis propositionum de inesse prae contradic, post contra; prae-post que subalter potest faciliter aequipollentia propositionum modalium sciri. Et ideo ista de aequipollentis earum sufficiant.
|By the above, and by that rule about the equivalences of assertoric propositions before <contradic>, after <contra>; and pre--post subordination, the equivalence of modal propositions can easily be known. And therefore, these things about their equivalences suffice.
|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 15

2025-04-26T01:54:11Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 14|Chapter 14]]|[[../Chapter 16|Chapter 16]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|{{p|647}} CAP. 15. DE OPPOSITIONE ET CONTINGENTIA PROPOSITIONUM DE CONTINGENTI.

|Chapter 15. On the opposition and contingency of propositions de contingenti.

|- valign = top
|Circa propositiones de contingenti oportet primo scire quod istarum propositionum `contingit omnem hominem esse animal', `contingit omnem hominem non esse animal', `contingit aliquem hominem esse animal', `contingit aliquem hominem non esse animal' non est quaerenda aequipollentia, eo quod sunt primae.

|Regarding propositions de contingenti, we must first know that the equivalents of these propositions: 'it happens that every man is an animal', 'it happens that every man is not an animal', 'it happens that some man is an animal', 'it happens that some man is not an animal' are not to be sought, as they are primary.

|- valign = top
|Possunt tamen tales propositiones exponi, quia quaelibet illarum aequivalet uni copulativae ex duabus propositionibus de possibili; sicut ista `contingit omnem hominem esse animal' aequivalet isti `possibile est omnem hominem esse animal et possibile est nullum hominem esse animal'.

|However, such propositions can be explained, because each of them is equivalent to one of two propositions de possibili. just as this, 'it happens that every man is an animal' is equivalent to these, 'it is possible for every man to be an animal' and 'it is possible for no man to be an animal'.

|- valign = top
|Et ita est de aliis. Et ideo semper negativa et affirmativa de contingenti, modo contingentiae remanente affirmato, convertuntur; sicut istae duae `contingit omnem hominem esse animal', `contingit nullum hominem esse animal' convertuntur. Et sic de aliis.

|And so it is with others. And therefore, the negative and the affirmative de contingenti are always reversed, as long as the contingency remains affirmed; just as these two, 'it happens that every man is an animal', 'it happens that no man is an animal' are reversed. And this is so of others.

|- valign = top
|Et ex istis faciliter potest sciri aequipollentia propositionum de contingenti. Sicut enim ipsa aequivalet uni copulativae, ita sua repugnans aequivalet uni disiunctivae compositae ex repugnantibus partibus illius copulativae.

|And from these the equivalence of propositions de contingenti can easily be known. For just as it is equivalent to the one of the copulative, so its contradictory is equivalent to the one of the disjunctive composed of the contradictory parts of that copulative.

|- valign = top
|Et ideo inquirendo aequipollentiam propositionis de contingenti, resolvenda est illa in unam copulativam ex duabus de possibili; quo facto videndum est cui aequipollet una pars et alia, et ex illis formanda est una disiunctiva cui aequipollebit illa de contingenti. Hoc tamen non est faciendum nisi quando modus contingentiae est negatus.

|And therefore, by inquiring into the equivalence of a proposition de contingenti, it must be resolved into one copulative from two de possibili; in which case it must be seen that one part and the other are equivalent, and from them one disjunctive must be formed to which those de contingenti are equivalent. This, however, is to be done only when the mode of contingency is denied.

|- valign = top
|Verbi gratia si accipiatur ista `non contingit omne animal esse hominem', ista affirmativa 'contingit omne animal esse hominem' resolvenda est in istam copulativam cui aequivalet `omne animal potest esse homo et omne animal potest non esse homo' et utrique illarum praeponenda est negatio sub disiunctione, sic `non omne animal potest esse homo vel non omne animal potest non esse homo'.

|For example, if we take the statement 'not every animal happens to be a man', this affirmative 'every animal happens to be a man' must be resolved into this copulative which is equivalent to 'every animal can be a man and every animal can be not a man' and both of them must be preceded by a negation under disjunction, thus, 'not every animal can be a man or not every animal can be not a man'.

|- valign = top
|Et accipienda est aequipollens isti disiunctivae per regulam datam in praecedenti capitulo, scilicet ista `necesse est aliquod animal non esse hominem vel necesse est aliquod animal esse hominem'.

|And it is to be taken as equivalent to these disjunctives by the rule given in the preceding chapter, namely, that 'it is necessary for some animal not to be a man, or it is necessary for some animal to be a man'.

|- valign = top
|Et ista ultima disiunctiva aequipollebit isti `non contingit omne animal esse hominem'. {{p|648}} Eodem modo ista, per easdem regulas, `nullus homo contingenter est animal' aequipollebit isti de disiuncto praedicato `omnis homo de necessitate est animal vel de necessitate non est animal'.

|And this last disjunctive will be equivalent to this 'it does not happen that every animal is a man'. In the same way, by the same rules, 'no man is contingently an animal' will be equivalent to the disjunctive predicate 'every man is necessarily an animal or necessarily not an animal.'

|- valign = top
|Non enim in isto casu potest aequipollere disiunctivae, sicut patet de ista `nulla persona divina contingenter est Pater'; sed aequipollebit uni universali de disiuncto praedicato, ita tamen quod in utraque parte disiuncti addatur modus necessitatis.

|For in this case it cannot be equivalent to disjunctives, as is clear from the fact that 'no divine person is contingently the Father'; but it will be equivalent to the one universal of the separated predicate, so that the mode of necessity is added to each separated part.

|- valign = top
|Quando autem dictum propositionis de contingenti vel aequivalens ei mutatur in contradictorium, tunc particularis aequipollebit uni disiunctivae; et hoc, quia propositio particularis et indefinita disiunctiva et de disiuncto praedicato convertuntur.

|But when the statement of the proposition de contingenti or a mode equivalent to it is changed into the contradictory, then the particular will be equivalent to one of the disjunctive; and this, because the particular proposition and the indefinite are disjunctive and converted from the disjunctive predicate.

|- valign = top
|Oportet autem scire quod quando modus contingentiae est affirmatus, accipienda est aequipollentia servato eodem modo ex parte residui, et eodem modo proportionaliter sicut dictum est de praecedentibus.

|Now it is necessary to know that when the mode of contingency is affirmed, the equivalence must be taken, provided in the same way from the remaining part, and in the same way proportionally as was said about the previous ones.

|- valign = top
|Unde ista `contingit non omnem hominem currere' aequipollet isti `contingit aliquem hominem currere', et sic de aliis.

|Hence this: 'it happens that not every man runs' is equivalent to this: 'it happens that some man runs', and so on for the others.

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 14

2025-04-26T01:49:54Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 13|Chapter 13]]|[[../Chapter 15|Chapter 15]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 14. DE AEQUIPOLLENTIIS PROPOSITIONUM IN QUIBUS PONITUR ISTE MODUS `NECESSARIUM'.

|Chapter 14. Concerning equivalent propositions in which the 'necessary' mode is placed.

|- valign = top
|Istis praemissis, tamquam quibusdam praeambulis, videndum est de aequipollentiis istarum propositionum. Et causa brevitatis tantum dicendum est de modalibus famosis, quia ex istis potest studiosus conicere quid de aliis est dicendum.

|With these premises, and some preambles, it is necessary to see the equivalence of these propositions. And for the sake of brevity it is necessary to say only about the well-known modalities, because from these the student can guess what is to be said about the others.

|- valign = top
|Primo autem videndum est de propositione in qua ponitur iste modus `necessarium'. De qua dicendum est quod negatio aut non negat modum aut negat modum.

|First, however, we must look at the proposition in which this 'necessary' mode is used. Of which we must say that negation either does not negate the mode or negates the mode.

|- valign = top
|Si primo modo, semper talis propositio aequivalet alicui primae de necessario, quia in tali casu, retento eodem modo, dicendum est consimiliter de aequipollentia illius et de aequipollentia suae de inesse. Unde sicut ista `non omne animal est homo' aequipollet isti `aliquod animal non est homo', ita ista `necesse est non omne animal esse hominem' aequivalet isti `necesse est aliquod animal non {{p|645}} esse hominem'. Et ita est generaliter de omnibus talibus.

|If, in the first mode, such a proposition is always equivalent to something first de necessario, because in such a case, retained in the same way, it must be said similarly about the equivalence of that and the equivalence of its assertoric. Hence, just as this, 'not every animal is a man', is equivalent to 'some animals are not man', so this , 'it is necessary that not every animal is a man' is equivalent to 'it is necessary that some animal is not a man'. And so it is generally with all such things.

|- valign = top
|Si autem modus necessitatis negetur et etiam signum, si habeat signum, tunc modus negatus mutandus est in modum quem infert, scilicet in possibile affirmatum et residuum in contradictorium; sicut ista `non necesse est omne animal esse hominem' aequipollet isti `possibile est aliquod animal non esse hominem'. Si autem modus negetur et non signum, solum modus mutabitur in possibile affirmatum; unde ista `nullus homo de necessitate est animal' aequipollet isti `omnis homo potest non esse animal'. Et ideo non est quaerendum cui aequipollet ista `omnis homo de necessitate non est animal', sed cui aequipollet ista `nullus homo de necessitate est animal'. Et est dicendum sicut nunc dictum est. Et hoc, quia istae aequipollent `omnis homo de necessitate non est animal' et `necesse est nullum hominem esse animal'; ista autem `non omnis homo de necessitate est animal' aequivalet isti `aliquis homo potest non esse animal'. Et ita est de aliis.

|Now if the mode of necessity is denied and also the sign, if it has a sign, then the negated mode must be changed into the mode which it implies, that is, the affirmative in the possible and the remainder into the contradictory; just as this 'it is not necessary for every animal to be a man' is equivalent to this 'it is possible for some animal not to be a man'. But if the mode is denied and not the sign, only the mode will be changed in the affirmative; whence the statement 'no man is necessarily an animal' is equivalent to these 'it is possible for every man to not be an animal'. And therefore, it is not necessary to ask to whom the statement 'every man is not necessarily an animal' is equivalent, but to whom the statement `no man is necessarily an animal' is equivalent. And it must be said as it has now been said. And this, because these are equivalent to 'every man is not necessarily an animal' and `it is necessary for no man to be an animal'; But this statement 'not every man is necessarily an animal' is equivalent to this `some man may not be an animal.' And so it is with others.

|- valign = top
|Et sicut dictum est de propositionibus de necessario respectu propositionum de possibili, ita est dicendum, proportionaliter, de propositionibus de possibili respectu propositionum de necessario. Nam quando modus possibilitatis remanet affirmatus, non est mutandus modus, sed quantum ad residuum accipienda est proportionaliter aequipollentia sicut in illis de inesse. Unde ista `possibile est non omnem hominem esse animal' aequipollet isti `possibile est aliquem hominem non esse animal'.

|And just as it was said of propositions de necessario with respect to propositions de possibili, so it must be said, proportionally, of propositions de possibili with respect to propositions de necessario. For when the mode of possibility remains affirmed, there is no need to change the mode, but as to the remainder it is to be taken proportionally equivalent as in those assertoric. Hence this statement 'it is possible that not every man is an animal' is equivalent to 'it is possible that some man is not an animal'.

|- valign = top
|Quando autem tam signum quam modus negatur, tunc modus possibilitatis mutandus est in modum necessitatis et reliquum in contradictorium, sicut sua de inesse. Unde ista `non est possibile omne animal esse hominem' aequivalet isti `necesse est aliquod animal non esse hominem'.

|But when both the sign and the mode are denied, then the mode of possibility must be changed into the mode of necessity, and the rest into a contradictory one, as of its assertoric. Hence this statement: 'it is not possible for every animal to be a man' is equivalent to this: 'it is necessary for some animal not to be a man'.

|- valign = top
|Quando autem signum non negatur sed tantum modus possibilitatis, tunc praecise mutandus est modus possibilitatis in modum necessitatis et non signum universale in signum particulare, nec e converso.

|But when the sign is not negated but only the mode of possibility, then precisely the mode of possibility must be changed into the mode of necessity and not a universal sign into a particular sign, nor vice versa.

|- valign = top
|Sicut ista `nullus homo potest esse animal' aequipollet isti `omnis homo de necessitate non est animal'. Et tunc, quamvis modus universalis non mutetur in modum particularem nec e converso, tamen modus univer{{p|646}}salis negativus mutandus est in modum universalem affirmativum, non negatum sed affirmatum, sicut patet in exemplo proposito.

|Just as the statement 'no man can be an animal' is equivalent to 'every man is necessarily not an animal'. And then, although the universal mode is not changed into a particular mode, nor vice versa, yet the negative mode of the universal must be changed into the universal affirmative mode, not denied but affirmed, as is evident in the proposed example.

|- valign = top
|Ex istis faciliter patere possunt aequipollentiae propositionum in quibus ponuntur isti modi 'necessarium', `possibile'. Ex quibus etiam faciliter patere potest quae propositiones repugnant, scito quae propositiones primae repugnant et quae non.

|From these it can easily be seen that the equivalence of propositions in which the terms 'necessary' and 'possible' are placed. From which it is also easily evident which propositions are contradictory, knowing which propositions are incompatible with the first and which are not.

|- valign = top
|Unde sciendum est quod istae propositiones `omnis homo de necessitate est animal', `omnis homo de necessitate non est animal' repugnant contrarie, sicut istae `necesse est omnem hominem esse animal', `necesse est nullum hominem esse animal'.

|Hence it must be known that these propositions, 'every man is necessarily an animal', 'every man is not necessarily an animal,' are mutually contradictory, just as these propositions, 'it is necessary for every man to be an animal,' and 'it is necessary for no man to be an animal'.

|- valign = top
|Istae etiam sunt repugnantes `omnis homo de necessitate est animal', `aliquis homo de necessitate non est animal'; non tamen proprie contrarie, eo quod non utraque est universalis.

|These are also contradictory: 'every man is necessarily an animal', 'some man is not necessarily an animal'; not, however, properly in the contrary, inasmuch as both are not universal.

|- valign = top
|Nec sunt contradictoriae, quia possunt simul esse falsae; et ita plus conveniunt cum contrariis, eo quod possunt simul esse falsae, sed non possunt simul esse verae. Eodem modo dicendum est de istis `omnis homo de necessitate non est animal', `aliquis homo de necessitate est animal'.

|Nor are they contradictory, because they can be false at the same time; and thus they agree more with their opposites, in that they can be false at the same time, but they cannot be true at the same time. In the same way it must be said of these: 'every man is not of necessity an animal', 'some man is of necessity an animal'.

|- valign = top
|Istae autem propositiones `omnis homo de necessitate est animal', `aliquis homo potest non esse animal' sunt contradictoriae. Et similiter istae `omnis homo de necessitate non est animal', `aliquis homo potest esse animal'.

|But these propositions, 'every man is necessarily an animal', 'some man may not be an animal' are contradictory. And in the same way as these: 'every man is not necessarily an animal', 'some man can be an animal'.

|- valign = top
|Istae autem propositiones `omnis homo potest esse animal' `omnis homo potest non esse animal' non repugnant. Nec istae `omnis homo potest non esse animal', `aliquis homo potest esse animal'. Nec istae `omnis homo potest esse animal', `aliquis homo potest non esse animal'.

|But these propositions, 'every man can be an animal,' and 'every man can not be an animal,' do not contradict each other. Nor are these 'every man may not be an animal', 'any man may be an animal'. Nor are these 'every man can be an animal', 'some man can not be an animal'.

|- valign = top
|Sed istae contradicunt `omnis homo potest esse animal', `aliquis homo de necessitate non est animal'; et similiter `omnis homo potest non esse animal' et `aliquis homo de necessitate est animal'.

|But these are contradictory: 'every man can be an animal', 'some man is necessarily not an animal'; and likewise, "every man may not be an animal," and "some man is of necessity an animal."

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 13

2025-04-26T01:45:09Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 12|Chapter 12]]|[[../Chapter 14|Chapter 14]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP 13. DE COMPARATIONE MODORUM AD INVICEM.

|Chapter 13. On the comparison of the modes for conversion.

|- valign = top
|Quia circa propositionum modalium aequipollentias et repugnantias sunt variae difficultates, ideo ad istius negotii completionem est de eis breviter tractandum.

|Since there are various difficulties concerning the equivalence and incompatibility of modal propositions, therefore for the completion of this business it is necessary to treat of them briefly.

|- valign = top
|Oportet autem scire quod modorum quidam sunt repugnantes, quidam sunt secundum superius et inferius se habentes, quidam sunt disparati.

|It is necessary to know that some of the methods are contradictory, some are according to the superior and inferior, and some are disparate.

|- valign = top
|Repugnantes sunt sicut necessarium et impossibile, possibile et impossibile, necessarium et contingens ad utrumlibet, contingens ad utrumlibet et impossibile, necessarium et inopinabile, demonstrabile et indemonstrabile, et tales multi.

|Contradictory are those such as necessary and impossible, possible and impossible, necessary and contingent to each other, contingent and impossible to each other, necessary and unexpected, demonstrable and indemonstrable, and many such.

|- valign = top
|Secundum superius et inferius se habentes sunt sicut necessarium et possibile; nam omne necessarium est possibile, et non e converso. Similiter contingens et possibile; nam omne contingens est possibile, et {{p|643}} non e converso. Similiter se habent necessarium et scibile, et necessarium et demonstrabile.

|According to superior and inferior, there are pairs such as necessary and possible; for everything necessary is possible, and not vice versa. Similarly contingent and possible; for every contingency is possible, and not the other way around. Necessary and knowable, and necessary and demonstrable, have the same relation.

|- valign = top
|Disparati sunt sicut possibile et dubitabile et huiusmodi.

|Those are disparate such as possible and doubtful and the like.

|- valign = top
|Secundo notandum est quod modorum repugnantium quidam sunt immediati, ita quod de qualibet propositione verificatur alter eorum; sicut se habent possibile et impossibile, quia omnis propositio est possibilis vel impossibilis.

|Secondly, it must be noted that some of the contradictory modes are immediate, so that one of them is verified for every proposition; as the possible and the impossible are related, because every proposition is either possible or impossible.

|- valign = top
|Quidam sunt mediati, sicut necessarium et impossibile; nam impossibile est quod aliqua propositio, saltem non multiplex, simul et semel sit necessaria et impossibilis, et tamen aliqua propositio nec est necessaria nec impossibilis.

|Some are intermediate, as the necessary and the impossible; for it is impossible for any proposition, at least not a multiple one, to be both necessary and impossible at the same time, and yet some proposition is neither necessary nor impossible.

|- valign = top
|Tertio oportet scire quod quandoque unus modus repugnat pluribus modis; sicut contingens repugnat tam necessario quam impossibili, quia propositio contingens ad utrumlibet nec est necessaria nec impossibilis. Similiter necessarium repugnat tam contingenti quam impossibili.

|Thirdly, it is necessary to know that sometimes one method conflicts with several methods; just as the contingent contradicts both necessity and impossibility, because a proposition that is contingent on something is neither necessary nor impossible. Similarly, the necessary is opposed both to the contingent and to the impossible.

|- valign = top
|Quarto oportet scire quod modorum quidam sunt simpliciter affirmativi, sicut necessarium, possibile, scibile, demonstrabile et huiusmodi. Quidam sunt simpliciter negativi, sicut impossibile, quia impossibile idem est quod non possibile. Similiter est de inopinabili et indemonstrabili et huiusmodi.

|Fourthly, we must know that some of the modes are simply affirmative, such as necessary, possible, knowable, demonstrable, and the like. Some are simply negative, such as impossible, because impossible is the same as not possible. The same is true of the unthinkable and the undemonstrable, and the like.

|- valign = top
|Quidam nec sunt simpliciter affirmativi nec simpliciter negativi, sed quasi aequivalenter sunt affirmativi et negativi, pro quanto simpliciter negant unum modum affirmativum et alium simpliciter inferunt; sicut est de contingenti, nam contingens repugnat necessario et absolute infert possibile. Unde `contingens' aequivalet isti `propositio possibilis non necessaria'.

|Some are neither simply affirmative nor simply negative, but are, as it were, equivalently affirmative and negative, inasmuch as they simply negate one affirmative mode and simply infer another; just as it is de contingenti, for the contingent contradicts the necessary and absolutely entails the possible. Hence 'contingent' is equivalent to this: 'possible proposition not necessary'.

|- valign = top
|Quinto sciendum est quod in modalibus quaedam sunt propositiones simpliciter primae, quarum aequipollentiae non sunt quaerendae; et sunt omnes propositiones in quibus ponuntur modi simpliciter affirmativi vel non simpliciter affirmativi, tamen non negativi, et de quarum praeiacentibus non est quaerenda aequipollentia.

|Fifthly, it must be known that in the modals there are certain propositions that are simply first, the equivalences of which are not to be sought; and such are all propositions in which modes are posited that are simply affirmative or not simply affirmative, yet not negative, and of whose predicates it is not necessary to seek equivalence.

|- valign = top
|Cuiusmodi sunt tales `possibile est omnem hominem currere'; `possibile est nullum hominem currere': `possibile est aliquem hominem currere'; {{p|644}} `possibile est aliquem hominem non currere'. 'Necesse est omne ens esse in actu'; `necesse est nullum ens esse in actu'; `necesse est aliquod ens esse in actu'; `necesse est aliquod ens non esse in actu'. `Non contingit omnem hominem currere'; `contingit nullum hominem currere'; `contingit aliquem', `contingit aliquem non', et sic de aliis.

|They are of such a kind as 'it is possible for every man to run'; 'it is possible for no man to run': 'it is possible for any man to run'; 'it is possible for some man not to run'. 'It is necessary for every being to be actual'; 'it is necessary that there be no being in action'; `It is necessary for some being to exist in an act'; `It is necessary that some being not be actual.' 'It is not possible for every man to run'; 'It happens that no man runs'; 'it happens to someone', 'it happens to no one', and so on about others.

|- valign = top
|De aliis autem propositionibus modalibus quaerendae sunt earum aequipollentiae. Unde de omni propositione in qua ponitur iste modus `impossibile' quaerendum est cui aequipollet.

|As for other modal propositions, their equivalence must be sought. Therefore, in every proposition in which this mode of 'impossible' is used, it is necessary to seek which is equivalent to it.

|- valign = top
|Sexto oportet scire quod in propositione cuius quaeritur aequipollentia quandoque modus affirmatur et quandoque negatur; sicut patet in istis `necesse est nullum hominem non currere'; `non necesse est nullum hominem currere'.

|Sixth, we must know that in the proposition whose equivalence is sought, the mode is sometimes affirmed and sometimes denied; as it is clear in these, 'it is necessary for no man not to run'; 'it is not necessary for any man to run'.

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 12

2025-04-26T01:41:29Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 11|Chapter 11]]|[[../Chapter 13|Chapter 13]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 12. DE REGULIS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE FACTAE EX PROPOSITIONIBUS DIVERSORUM MODORUM.

|Chapter 12. On the rules by which the consequences hold that are made from propositions of different modes.

|- valign = top
|Post haec videndum est de consequentiis ex propositionibus diversorum modorum. Unde sciendum est primo quod illa de necessario semper infert illam de possibili, ita scilicet quod ambae sumantur in sensu compositionis vel ambae in sensu divisionis vel aequivalentes talibus.

|After this we must consider the consequences of propositions of different modes. Wherefore it must first be known that a premise de necessario always implies that de possibili, that is to say, that both are taken in the sense of composition, or both in the sense of division, or equivalent to such.

|- valign = top
|Unde bene sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium, ergo omnem hominem esse animal est possibile'. Similiter bene sequitur `omnis homo de necessitate est animal, igitur omnis homo potest esse animal'; sed e converso non sequitur, sicut non sequitur `omnis homo potest esse albus, igitur omnis homo de necessitate est albus'.

|From which it follows well that 'it is necessary for every man to be an animal, therefore it is possible for every man to be an animal'. Similarly, it follows well that 'every man is of necessity an animal, therefore every man can be an animal'; but it does not follow on the contrary, just as it does not follow that 'every man can be white, therefore every man is necessarily white'.

|- valign = top
|Secundo sciendum quod illa de necessario non infert illam de contingenti, modo contingentiae remanente affirmato, nec e converso, sed infert contradictoriam illius de contingenti; sicut bene sequitur `omnis homo de necessitate est animal, igitur non contingit omnem hominem esse animal'.

|Secondly, it must be known that a premise de necessario does not infer that de contingenti, with the mode of contingency remaining affirmed, nor vice versa, but it infers the contradictory of the premise de contingenti; as it follows well that 'every man is of necessity an animal, therefore it does not happen that every man is an animal'.

|- valign = top
|Similiter bene sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium, igitur omnem hominem esse animal non est contingens'. {{p|640}} Sed non sequitur e converso; non enim sequitur `omnem hominem esse asinum non est contingens, igitur omnem hominem esse asinum est necessarium'; nec sequitur `non contingit Deum esse albedinem, igitur Deus de necessitate est albedo'.

|Similarly, it follows well that 'it is necessary for every man to be an animal, therefore it is not contingent that every man is an animal'. But it does not follow the other way around; for it does not follow that 'it is not contingent that every man be a donkey, therefore it is necessary that every man be a donkey'; nor does it follow that 'it does not happen that God is white, therefore God is necessarily white'.

|- valign = top
|Tertio sciendum quod illa de necessario infert contradictoriam illius de impossibili; sicut sequitur `omnis homo de necessitate est animal, igitur omnis homo non impossibiliter est animal'. Similiter bene sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium, ergo non est impossibile omnem hominem esse animal'; sed e converso non sequitur.

|Thirdly, it must be known that a premise de necessario implies the contradiction of that de impossibili; as it follows that 'every man is necessarily an animal, therefore every man is not impossibly an animal'. Similarly, it follows well that 'it is necessary for every man to be an animal, therefore it is not impossible for every man to be an animal'; but the reverse does not follow.

|- valign = top
|Quarto sciendum quod multae propositiones de aliis modis inferunt illas de necessario et non e converso; sicut sequitur `omnem hominem esse risibilem est demonstrabile, igitur omnem hominem esse risibilem est necessarium'.

|Fourthly, it must be known that many propositions about other modes infer those de necessario and not the other way around; as it follows, 'it is demonstrable that every man is laughable, therefore it is necessary that every man be laughable.'

|- valign = top
|Aliquae autem inferuntur ex illis de necessario et non e converso; sicut sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium, igitur omnem hominem esse animal est scibile', large accipiendo `scibile'.

|Some, however, are inferred from those de necessario and not the other way around; as it follows, 'it is necessary for every man to be an animal, therefore it is knowable that every man is an animal', taking 'knowable' loosely.

|- valign = top
|Aliquae autem non inferuntur ex illis de necessario nec inferunt eas; sicut non sequitur omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium, igitur omnem hominem esse animal est evidenter notum a te', nec etiam sequitur e converso, ut patet.

|Some, however, are not inferred from those de necessario, nor do they infer them; Just as it does not follow that 'every man is an animal is necessary, so it is evidently known to you that every man is an animal', nor does it follow the other way around, as is clear.

|- valign = top
|Circa propositiones de possibili est notandum quod illa de possibili non infert illam de contingenti sed e converso. Bene enim sequitur `contingit Sortem esse album, igitur Sortes potest esse albus', et non e converso, quia non sequitur `possibile est Deum esse, igitur contingit Deum esse'.

|Regarding propositions de possibili, it should be noted that those de possibili do not imply those de contingenti, but vice versa. For it follows well that 'it happens that Socrates is white, therefore Socrates can be white', and not the other way around, because it does not follow that 'it is possible that there is a God, therefore it happens that there is a God'.

|- valign = top
|Et non solum illa de contingenti infert unam de possibili sed etiam duas, scilicet affirmativam et negativam. Sed e converso non sequitur: non enim sequitur `homo potest esse Deus, igitur contingit hominem esse Deum'.

|And not only the proposition de contingenti infers one de possibili, but also two, namely the affirmative and the negative. But it does not follow the other way around: for it does not follow that 'A man can be God, therefore it happens that a man is God'.

|- valign = top
|Secundo notandum quod illa de possibili infert oppositum illius de impossibili; sicut sequitur `hominem currere est possibile, igitur hominem currere non est impossibile'; et e converso etiam sequitur {{p|641}} `hominem currere non est impossibile, igitur hominem currere est possibile'.

|Secondly, it is to be noted that a proposition de possibili implies the opposite of a proposition de impossibili; as it follows, 'it is possible for a man to run, therefore it is not impossible for a man to run'; and on the contrary it also follows 'it is not impossible for a man to run, therefore it is possible for a man to run'.

|- valign = top
|Tertio notandum quod omnis propositio in qua ponitur aliquis modus qui non potest competere nisi propositioni verae, infert illam de possibili; sicut sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est scitum, igitur omnem hominem esse animal est possibile'. Sed e converso non sequitur, nisi aliquando gratia materiae.

|Thirdly, it is to be noted that every proposition in which some mode is placed which can only belong to a true proposition, implies a proposition de possibili; as it follows that 'every man is known to be an animal, therefore it is possible for every man to be an animal'. But the reverse does not follow, except sometimes by thanks to the matter.

|- valign = top
|Si autem talis modus possit competere propositioni falsae, tunc non infert illam de possibili, quamvis aliquando sequatur e converso. Unde non sequitur `intellectum non esse animam intellectivam est opinabile, igitur intellectum non esse animam intellectivam est possibile'; sed e converso bene sequitur, quia omne possibile est opinabile.

|Now, if such a mode can correspond to a false proposition, then it does not infer a proposition de possibili, although sometimes the converse follows. Hence it does not follow that 'it is conceivable that the intellect is not the intellectual soul, therefore it is possible that the intellect is not the intellectual soul'; but the converse follows well, because everything that is possible is conceivable.

|- valign = top
|Ad videndum autem quando tales consequentiae sunt bonae et quando non, videndum est quo modo tales modi se habent ad invicem secundum praedicationem: utrum videlicet tales propositiones sint verae vel falsae `omne necessarium est possibile'; `omnis propositio scita est propositio possibilis'; `omnis propositio demonstrata est propositio possibilis'; `omnis propositio credita est propositio possibilis'; `nulla propositio impossibilis est propositio possibilis'; `nulla propositio per se nota est propositio demonstrabilis'; `nulla propositio per se est propositio per accidens'; et sic de consimilibus.

|In order to see when such consequences are good and when they are not, we must see how such modes relate to each other according to predication: namely, whether such propositions are true or false, 'everything necessary is possible'; 'every known proposition is a possible proposition'; 'every demonstrated proposition is a possible proposition'; 'every proposition believed is a possible proposition'; 'no impossible proposition is a possible proposition'; 'no proposition in itself is known as a demonstrable proposition'; 'no proposition in itself is a proposition by accident'; and so on the like.

|- valign = top
|Unde regulariter a propositione de uno modo ad propositionem de alio est semper bona consequentia quando modus consequentis praedicatur de modo antecedentis universaliter sumpto.

|Hence, as a rule, from a statement of one mode to a statement of another, there is always a good consequence when the mode of the consequent is predicated of the mode of the antecedent taken universally.

|- valign = top
|Similiter, numquam talis consequentia valet quando modus consequentis non praedicatur universaliter de modo antecedentis. Similiter, semper a propositione de uno modo ad propositionem de alio modo negato est bona consequentia quando modus consequentis universaliter removetur a modo antecedentis.

|Similarly, such a conclusion is never valid when the mode of the consequent is not universally predicated of the mode of the antecedent. Similarly, a good consequence is always denied from a proposition about one mode to a proposition about another mode when the mode of the consequent is universally removed from the mode of the antecedent.

|- valign = top
|Unde ista consequentia est bona `omnem hominem currere est necessarium, igitur omnem hominem currere non est contingens', quia ista propositio est vera `nulla propositio necessaria est propositio contingens'.

|Whence this conclusion is good, 'It is necessary for every man to run, therefore it is not contingent that every man run', because this proposition is true, 'no necessary proposition is a contingent proposition'.

|- valign = top
|{{p|642}} Hic tamen advertendum est quod semper oportet quod ambae propositiones ex talibus propositionibus modalibus sint sumptae in sensu compositionis vel eis aequivalentes, vel quod ambae sumantur in sensu divisionis vel eis aequivalentes.

|Here, however, it must be noted that both propositions must always be taken of such modal propositions in the sense of composition or equivalent to them, or that both be taken in the sense of division or equivalent to them.

|- valign = top
|Et ex istis potest elici quid dicendum est de consequentiis ex talibus propositionibus modalibus. Notandum quod omnes regulae supra positae de modalibus intelligendae sunt quando omnes termini supponunt personaliter et significative, quia si acciperentur materialiter vel simpliciter non tenerent praedictae regulae.

|And from these it is possible to elicit what is to be said about the consequences of such modal propositions. It should be noted that all the rules set forth above concerning modals are to be understood when all the terms supposit personally and significantly, because if they were taken materially or simply the aforesaid rules would not hold.

|- valign = top
|Ut autem habeatur completus tractatus de istis modalibus, dicendum est aliquid de aequipollentiis earum.

|But in order to have a complete discussion of these modes, something must be said about their equivalences.

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 11

2025-04-22T22:29:43Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 10|Chapter 10]]|[[../Chapter 12|Chapter 12]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 11. DE REGULIS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE EX UNA DE INESSE ET ALIA DE MODO.

|Chapter 11. On the rules that govern consequences from one assertoric proposition and another of a mode.

|- valign = top
|Circa consequentias ex una de inesse et alia de modo est primo sciendum quod illa de necessario, sive sumatur in sensu compositionis sive in sensu divisionis, semper infert illam de inesse; sed non e converso, nisi forte aliquando gratia materiae.

|With regard to the consequences from one assertoric proposition and another of a mode, it is first to be known that the one de necessario, whether taken in the sense of composition or in the sense of division, always entails the assertoric; but not the other way round, except perhaps sometimes thanks to the matter.

|- valign = top
|Circa illas de possibili est primo sciendum quod illa de possibili, sive sumatur in sensu divisionis sive in sensu compositionis, non infert suam de inesse. Non enim sequitur `haec est possibilis: homo est albus, igitur homo est albus'; nec sequitur `homo potest esse albus, igitur homo est albus'.

|With regard to propositions de possibili, it must first be known that a proposition de possibili, whether taken in the sense of division or in the sense of composition, does not infer its assertoric. For it does not follow that 'this is possible: a man is white, therefore a man is white'; nor does it follow that 'a man can be white, therefore a man is white'.

|- valign = top
|Sed illa de inesse semper infert suam de possibili, quia {{p|638}} sequitur `Sortes est albus, igitur haec est possibilis: Sortes est albus'; et similiter `igitur Sortes potest esse albus'. Et hoc est verum, sive subiectum consequentis sumatur pro eo quod est sive pro eo quod potest esse.

|But that assertoric always infers that de possibili, because it follows that 'Socrates is white, therefore this is possible: Socrates is white'; and similarly 'therefore Socrates can be white'. And this is true, whether the subject of the consequent is taken for what it is or for what it may be.

|- valign = top
|Circa propositiones de contingenti est sciendum quod si illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu compositionis vel aliqua aequivalens ei, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `haec est contingens: Sortes est albus, ergo Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, ergo haec est contingens: Deus est immortalis'.

|With regard to propositions de contingenti, it must be known that if the proposition de contingenti is taken in the sense of composition or something equivalent to it, it does not infer its assertoric, nor vice versa. For it does not follow that 'this is contingent: Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that 'God is immortal, therefore this is contingent: God is immortal.'

|- valign = top
|Similiter si sumatur in sensu divisionis, non infert suam de inesse nec e converso. Non enim sequitur `contingit Sortem esse album, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Deus est immortalis, igitur contingit Deum esse immortalem'.

|Similarly, if it is taken in the sense of division, it does not infer its assertoric, nor vice versa. For it does not follow that 'It happens that Socrates is white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that 'God is immortal, therefore it happens that God is immortal.'

|- valign = top
|Circa illas de impossibili est sciendum quod illa de impossibili in sensu compositionis non infert suam de inesse sed semper contradictoriam suae de inesse; sicut non sequitur `omnem hominem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur omnis homo est asinus', sed sequitur `ergo aliquis homo non est asinus'. Illa autem de inesse non infert illam de impossibili.

|With regard to the impossible, it must be known that the impossible in the sense of composition does not imply its assertoric, but always contradicts its assertoric. just as it does not follow that 'it is impossible for every man to be a donkey, therefore every man is a donkey', but it follows that 'therefore some man is not a donkey'. But that assertoric does not infer that which is impossible.

|- valign = top
|Similiter illa de impossibili, si sumatur in sensu divisionis et modus possibilitatis sit negatus, infert suam de inesse et non e converso; sicut sequitur `homo non potest esse asinus, ergo homo non est asinus', sed non e converso. Si autem ponatur ibi `impossibile' vel eius adverbium, non infert suam de inesse sed contradictoriam ipsius. Sicut non sequitur `Sortem esse asinum est impossibile, igitur Sortes est asinus', nec sequitur `Sortes impossibiliter est asinus, igitur Sortes est asinus', sed magis sequitur `ergo Sortes non est asinus'. E converso autem non sequitur, sicut manifeste patet.

|Similarly, that of the impossible, if it is taken in the sense of division and the mode of possibility is denied, infers its assertoric and not the other way around; as it follows, `a man cannot be a donkey, therefore a man is not a donkey', but not the other way around. But if 'impossible' or its adverb is placed there, it does not infer its assertoric but its contradictory. Just as it does not follow that 'It is impossible for Socrates to be a donkey, therefore Socrates is a donkey', nor does it follow that 'Socrates is impossible to be a donkey, therefore Socrates is a donkey', but rather it follows that 'Therefore Socrates is not a donkey.' But the converse does not follow, as is plainly evident.

|- valign = top
|Circa alias modales sciendum quod raro vel numquam illae de inesse inferunt illas de modo; sicut non sequitur `homo est albus, ergo homo per se est albus'; `homo est albus, ergo homo scitur esse albus'; `homo est animal, igitur homo per accidens est animal'. Tamen frequenter illae de modo inferunt illas de inesse; sicut sequitur `homo per se est animal, {{p|639}} igitur homo est animal'; `album scitur esse homo, igitur album est homo'. Et sic de multis aliis.

|With regard to other modals, it is to be known that the assertoric rarely or never infers those of the mode; just as it does not follow that 'man is white, therefore man is white per se'; 'a man is white, therefore a man is known to be white'; 'A man is an animal, therefore a man is an animal by accident'. However, a modal proposition frequently infers the assertoric; as it follows, 'a man is inherently an animal, therefore a man is an animal'; 'a white thing is known to be a man, therefore a white thing is a man'. And so about many others.

|- valign = top
|Aliquae tamen non inferunt suas de inesse; sicut non sequitur `Sortes creditur esse albus, igitur Sortes est albus'; nec sequitur `Sortes opinatur hominem esse album, igitur homo est albus'. Ad sciendum autem quando talis consequentia est bona et quando non, utendum est ista regula: quia si sit talis modus qui non potest competere nisi propositioni verae, consequentia est bona ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse. Si autem sit talis modus qui possit competere propositioni falsae, consequentia ab illa de modo ad suam de inesse non valet.

|Some, however, do not infer their assertoric; just as it does not follow that 'Socrates is believed to be white, therefore Socrates is white'; nor does it follow that 'Socrates thinks that a man is white, therefore a man is white'. In order to know when such a consequence is good and when it is not, we must use this rule: if there is such a mode that can only correspond to a proposition of truth, the consequence is good from that mode to its assertoric. But if there is such a mode as can be appropriate to a false proposition, the inference from that mode to its assertoric is invalid.

|- valign = top
|Huiusmodi sunt tales: creditum, opinatum, concessum, dubitatum et huiusmodi.

|They are of this kind: believed, thought, granted, doubted, and the like.

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 10

2025-04-22T00:21:42Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 9|Chapter 9]]|[[../Chapter 11|Chapter 11]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|{{p|631}} CAP. 10. DE REGULIS DESERVIENTIBUS CONSEQUENTIIS EX PROPOSITIONIBUS DE MODO; ET PRIMO QUANDO TAM ANTECEDENS QUAM CONSEQUENS SUNT DE EODEM MODO.

|Chapter 9. On the rules governing consequences following from modal propositions; and first when both the antecedent and the consequence are in the same mode.

|- valign = top
|Visum est de regulis deservientibus consequentiis ex propositionibus de inesse, nunc videndum est de quibusdam regulis deservientibus consequentiis ex propositionibus de modo. Et primo, quando tam antecedens quam consequens sunt de eodem modo; secundo, quando altera propositionum est de modo et altera de inesse; tertio, quando una est de uno modo et alia de alio modo.

|It has been seen about the rules governing the consequences from assertoric propositions, now we must see about certain rules governing the consequences from modal propositions. And first, when both the antecedent and the consequent are of the same mode; secondly, when one of the propositions is modal and the other assertoric; thirdly, when one is of one mode and the other of another mode.

|- valign = top
|Circa primum primo dicendum est de consequentiis ex propositionibus de necessario, circa quas est una regula talis: ab inferiori ad superius sine distributione tam a parte subiecti quam a parte praedicati affirmative est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `Sortes de necessitate est animal, igitur Sortes de necessitate est substantia'; `homo de necessitate est substantia, igitur animal de necessitate est substantia'.

|Regarding the first, the first thing to be said is about consequences from propositions of necessity, about which there is one rule: from the inferior to the superior, without distribution both on the part of the subject and on the part of the predicate, a positive conclusion is good; as it follows, 'Socrates is necessarily an animal, therefore Socrates is necessarily a substance'; 'a man is of necessity a substance, therefore an animal is of necessity a substance'.

|- valign = top
|Sciendum quod fere omnes regulae praedictae et prius positae sunt intelligendae circa propositiones de necessario quando sumuntur in sensu divisionis. Veritatem etiam habent circa propositiones de necessario quando sumuntur in sensu compositionis, si sint consequentiae simplices ex illis de inesse.

|It should be known that almost all the rules mentioned and previously laid down are to be understood in connection with propositions of necessity when they are taken in the sense of division. They also have truth about propositions of necessity when they are taken in the sense of composition, if there are simple consequences from the assertoric.

|- valign = top
|Si autem sint consequentiae ut nunc, non oportet quod teneant. Et ideo quamvis sequatur `omne ens est in actu, igitur omnis homo est in actu', non tamen sequitur `omne ens esse in actu est necessarium, ergo omnem hominem esse in actu est necessarium'; ita quod consequentia ex illis de inesse est bona ut nunc, illa vero ex necessariis correspondentibus nec est simplex nec ut nunc.

|But if there are consequences for now, it is not necessary that they hold. And therefore, although it follows that 'every being is actual, therefore every man is actual', it does not follow that 'it is necessary for every being to be actual, therefore it is necessary for every man to be actual'; so that the inference from them concerning the assertoric is good for now, but that from corresponding necessities is neither simple nor for now.

|- valign = top
|Sciendum est etiam quod quamvis a superiori sine distributione ad inferiora sub disiunctione sit bona consequentia arguendo a parte subiecti, non tenet tamen talis consequentia arguendo a parte praedicati.

|It must also be known that although there is a good consequence from the superior without distribution to the inferior under dissociation, arguing on the part of the subject, such a consequence does not hold when arguing on the part of the predicate.

|- valign = top
|Unde bene sequitur `corpus de necessitate est coloratum, igitur hoc corpus de necessitate est coloratum vel illud corpus vel illud' et sic de singulis. Non tamen sequitur formaliter `corpus de necessitate est colo{{p|632}}ratum, igitur corpus de necessitate est album vel corpus de necessitate est nigrum', et sic de singulis.

|From which it follows well that 'a body is necessarily colored, therefore this body is necessarily colored, or that body or that' and so on about individuals. However, it does not follow formally that 'the body is necessarily colored, therefore the body is necessarily white or the body is necessarily black', and so on about individuals.

|- valign = top
|Sicut, secundum opinionem Aristotelis, non sequitur `materia de necessitate est sub forma, ergo materia de necessitate est sub hac forma vel materia de necessitate est sub illa forma', et sic de singulis.

|Just as, according to Aristotle's opinion, it does not follow that 'matter is necessarily in a form, therefore matter is necessarily in this form or matter is necessarily in that form', and so on about individuals.

|- valign = top
|Verumtamen talis consequentia semper vel frequenter bona est secundum veritatem, nisi praedicatum aequivaleat in significando duobus contradictoriis. Et ex isto patet quod praedicatum in tali particulari de necessario supponit confuse tantum, quia scilicet non contingit descendere ad inferiora nec per disiunctivam nec per copulativam.

|Nevertheless, such a conclusion is always or frequently good according to truth, unless the predicate is ambivalent in signifying two contradictory things. And from this it is clear that the predicate in such a particular presupposes the necessity only confusedly, because of course it does not happen to descend to inferior things either by the disjunctive or by the copulative.

|- valign = top
|Circa consequentias ex una de necessario, sumpta in sensu compositionis vel ei aequivalente, et alia de necessario, sumpta in sensu divisionis vel ei aequivalente, est sciendum quod semper ab illa de necessario in sensu compositionis vel aequivalente ei ad aliam de necessario in sensu divisionis vel ei aequivalente est bona consequentia et e converso, si tam antecedens quam consequens sit singulare de subiecto quod sit nomen proprium, vel de subiecto quod sit praecise pronomen demonstrativum.

|Regarding the consequences from one of necessity, taken in the sense of composition or its equivalent, and another of necessity, taken in the sense of division or its equivalent, it is to be known that always from that necessity in the sense of composition or its equivalent to another necessity in the sense of division or its equivalent is a good consequence, and vice versa, if both the antecedent and consequent are singular of a subject which is a proper noun, or from a subject which is precisely a demonstrative pronoun.

|- valign = top
|Sicut bene sequitur `Sortes de necessitate est homo, ergo haec est necessaria: Sortes est homo' et e converso; similiter bene sequitur `hoc de necessitate est animal, --- quocumque demonstrato ---, igitur haec est necessaria: hoc est animal' et e converso.

|As it well follows, 'Socrates is of necessity a man, therefore this is necessary: Socrates is a man,' and vice versa; Similarly, it follows well that 'this is of necessity an animal, whatever is shown, therefore this is necessary: this is an animal', and vice versa.

|- valign = top
|Sed si antecedens sit universale vel particulare vel de subiecto composito ex pronomine demonstrativo et termino communi, non valet consequentia; sicut non sequitur `omnis homo de necessitate est Deus, igitur haec est necessaria: omnis homo est Deus'; nec sequitur `haec est necessaria: omne verum est verum, igitur omne verum de necessitate est verum'.

|But if the antecedent be universal or particular, or of a subject composed of a demonstrative pronoun and a common term, the consequence is invalid; just as it does not follow that 'every man is necessarily God, therefore this is necessary: every man is God'; nor does it follow that 'this is necessary: all truth is truth, therefore all truth is necessarily truth'.

|- valign = top
|Ita etiam ex particularibus non sequitur; sicut non sequitur `iste creans de necessitate est Deus, ergo haec est necessaria: iste creans est Deus'.

|Even so it does not follow from particulars; just as it does not follow that 'this creator is necessarily God, therefore this is necessary: this creator is God'.

|- valign = top
|Tamen in isto ultimo casu bene sequitur e converso. Bene enim sequitur `ista est necessaria: iste creans est Deus, igitur iste creans de necessitate est Deus'.

|However, in this last case, the opposite is true. For it follows well that 'this is necessary: this creator is God, therefore this creator is of necessity God'.

|- valign = top
|{{p|633}} Et hoc semper est verum, arguendo ex affirmativis. Si enim argueretur ex negativis, non valeret consequentia. Non enim sequitur `haec est necessaria: hoc album non est nigrum, igitur hoc album de necessitate non est nigrum'.

|And this is always true, arguing from the affirmative. For if it were argued from the negative, the conclusion would not be valid. For it does not follow that 'this is necessary: this white thing is not black, therefore this white thing is of necessity not black'.

|- valign = top
|Circa illas de possibili est sciendum quod singularis de subiecto quod est nomen proprium vel praecise pronomen demonstrativum, sumpta in sensu divisionis infert illam de possibili sumptam in sensu compositionis et e converso; sicut bene sequitur `haec est possibilis: Sortes est albus, igitur Sortes potest esse albus', et e converso. Similiter sequitur `hoc potest esse nigrum, igitur haec est possibilis: hoc est nigrum', et e converso.

|With regard to those de possibili, it must be known that the singular of the subject, which is a proper noun, or precisely a demonstrative pronoun, taken in the sense of division, implies that de possibili taken in the sense of composition, and vice versa; as it follows well that this is possible: Socrates is white, therefore Socrates can be white, and vice versa. Similarly, it follows that `this can be black, therefore this is possible: this is black', and vice versa.

|- valign = top
|Sed si subiectum illarum propositionum fuerit terminus communis vel pronomen demonstrativum cum termino communi, tunc subiectum in illa de possibili, sumpta in sensu divisionis vel aequivalente sibi, vel stat pro eo quod est vel pro eo quod potest esse.

|But if the subject of those propositions was a common term or a demonstrative pronoun with a common term, then the subject in that de possibili, taken in the sense of division or equivalent to itself, either stands for what is or for what can be.

|- valign = top
|Si pro eo quod est, tunc praedicatum vel est terminus communis, vel pronomen demonstrativum solum, vel nomen proprium, vel pronomen demonstrativum cum termino communi.

|If for what it is, then the predicate is either a common term, or a demonstrative pronoun alone, or a proper noun, or a demonstrative pronoun with a common term.

|- valign = top
|Si praedicatum sit terminus communis vel pronomen demonstrativum cum termino communi sive nomen proprium, non valet consequentia ab una ad aliam; sicut non sequitur `hoc album potest esse nigrum, igitur haec est possibilis: hoc album est nigrum'.

|If the predicate is a common term or a demonstrative pronoun with a common term or a proper noun, the inference from one to the other is invalid; just as it does not follow that 'this white thing can be black, therefore this is possible: this white thing is black'.

|- valign = top
|Nec sequitur `haec est possibilis: hoc album est Sortes, igitur hoc album potest esse Sortes', propter falsam implicationem in consequente. Multo magis si praedicatum esset terminus communis vel sumptus cum termino communi, non valeret consequentia.

|Nor does it follow that 'this is possible: this white thing is Socrates, therefore this white thing can be Socrates', because of a false implication in the consequent. Much more, if the predicate were a common term or taken with a common term, the consequence would not be valid.

|- valign = top
|Si autem stet pro eo quod potest esse, ab illa in sensu divisionis ad aliam in sensu compositionis non valet consequentia; sicut non sequitur `album potest esse nigrum, igitur haec est possibilis: album est nigrum'.

|But if it stands for what can be, the consequence from a premise in the sense of division to another in the sense of composition is invalid; just as it does not follow that 'a white thing can be black, then this is possible: a white thing is black'.

|- valign = top
|Sed e converso, ex indefinita sequitur indefinita et ex singulari sequitur singularis, sed ex universali non sequitur universalis; bene enim sequitur `haec est possibilis: album est dulce, ergo aliquid quod potest esse album, potest esse dulce'.

|But on the contrary, the indefinite follows the indefinite, and the singular follows the singular, but the universal does not follow the universal; for it follows well that this is possible: 'a white thing is sweet, therefore something that can be white can be sweet'.

|- valign = top
|Ista consequentia patet; nam sequitur `haec est possibilis: album est dulce', ergo duae propositiones sunt possibiles in quibus de pronomine demonstrante idem praedicantur ista duo `album' et {{p|634}} `dulce'; et ultra: igitur duae de possibili habentes idem subiectum, scilicet idem pronomen demonstrans idem pro subiecto, sumpto in sensu divisionis, sunt verae, puta tales duae `hoc potest esse dulce', `hoc potest esse album'.

|This consequence is clear; for it follows that 'this is possible: a white thing is sweet', therefore two propositions de possibili in which the two 'white' and 'sweet' are predicated of the same demonstrative pronoun; and further: therefore two of the possible having the same subject, that is, the same pronoun showing the same thing as the subject, taken in the sense of division, are true, for example two such as 'this can be sweet' and 'this can be white'.

|- valign = top
|Quia sicut dictum est, illa de possibili habens pro subiecto pronomen demonstrativum praecise, sumpta in sensu compositionis, infert illam de possibili in sensu divisionis; igitur istae duae `haec est possibilis: hoc est dulce', `haec est possibilis: hoc est album' inferunt istas duas `hoc potest esse dulce', `hoc potest esse album'.

|Because, as has been said, a proposition de possibili having as its subject a demonstrative pronoun precisely, taken in the sense of composition, implies that de possibili in the sense of division; therefore these two statements 'this is possible: this is sweet', 'this is possible: this is white' imply these two statements 'this can be sweet', 'this can be white'.

|- valign = top
|Nunc autem sequitur `hoc potest esse dulce, hoc potest esse album, igitur album potest esse dulce', sumpto subiecto pro eo quod potest esse; igitur a primo ad ultimum sequitur `haec est possibilis: album est dulce, igitur album potest esse dulce'.

|But now it follows, 'this can be sweet, this can be white, therefore a white thing can be sweet', taking the subject for what it can be; therefore, from the first to the last, 'this is possible: a white thing is sweet, therefore a white thing can be sweet'.

|- valign = top
|Sed universalis non infert universalem; non enim sequitur `haec est possibilis: omne album est homo, ergo omne quod potest esse album potest esse homo'. Nec potest talis consequentia probari, sicut praecedens, eo quod per syllogismum expositorium quamvis inferatur indefinita particularis vel singularis, non tamen universalis.

|But the universal does not imply the universal; for it does not follow that 'this is possible: every white thing is a man, therefore everything that can be white can be a man'. Nor can such a consequence be proved, like the preceding one, by the fact that, although the indefinite of the particular or singular is inferred by the expository syllogism, it is not yet universal.

|- valign = top
|Circa propositiones de contingenti sciendum est quod illa de contingenti sumpta in sensu compositionis et illa sumpta in sensu divisionis convertuntur si subiectum sit pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium; sicut istae convertuntur `hoc contingit esse album' et `haec est contingens: hoc est album'.

|Regarding de contingenti propositions, it must be known that those taken de contingenti in the sense of composition and those taken in the sense of division are converted if the subject is a demonstrative pronoun or a proper noun; just as these are converted into 'this happens to be white' and 'this is contingent: this is white'.

|- valign = top
|Sed si subiectum sit terminus communis vel includens terminum communem vel participium, non oportet; non enim sequitur `haec est contingens: hic creans est Deus; igitur hunc creantem contingit esse Deum'.

|But if the subject is a common term or includes a common term or a participle, it is not necessary; for it does not follow that `this is contingent: this is God who creates; therefore this creator happens to be God'.

|- valign = top
|Nec sequitur e converso `hoc album contingit esse nigrum, igitur haec est contingens: hoc album est nigrum'. Ex quo patet quod differentia est inter illas de contingenti et illas de possibili quantum ad consequentias inter eas.

|Nor does it follow on the contrary that 'this white thing happens to be black, therefore this is contingent: this white thing is black'. From this it is clear that there is a difference between those de contingenti and those de possibili as regards the consequences between them.

|- valign = top
|Nam illa de possibili habens pro subiecto terminum communem vel includens terminum communem vel participium, sumpta in sensu compositionis, infert illam de possibili in sensu divisionis.

|For that de possibili having for its subject a common term or including a common term or participle, taken in the sense of composition, implies that de possibili in the sense of division.

|- valign = top
|Sed sic non contingit in illis de contingenti. Non enim sequitur `haec est contingens: Deus est creans; igitur quod contingit esse Deum contingit esse creantem'; nec etiam sequitur `ergo quod est Deus, contingit esse creans'.

|But this is not the case with those de contingenti. For it does not follow that 'this is contingent: God is the creator; therefore what happens to be God happens to be the creator'; nor does it follow that 'therefore, because God is, he happens to be the creator.'

|- valign = top
|{{p|635}} Circa illas de impossibili est sciendum quod quando subiectum est pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium, illa in sensu compositionis et <illa> in sensu divisionis aequipollent; sicut istae aequipollent `haec est impossibilis: hoc est album' et `hoc non potest esse album'.

|Concerning those of impossibility it must be known that when the subject is a demonstrative pronoun or a proper noun, they are equivalent in the sense of composition and in the sense of division; just as these are equivalent: 'this is impossible: this is white' and 'this cannot be white'.

|- valign = top
|Sed si subiectum sit terminus communis vel includens terminum communem vel participium, non aequipollent; unde non sequitur `haec est impossibilis: album est nigrum, ergo album non potest esse nigrum'.

|But if the subject is a common term or includes a common term or a participle, they are not equivalent; whence it does not follow that 'this is impossible: white is black, therefore a white thing cannot be black'.

|- valign = top
|Nec sequitur `album non potest esse homo, igitur haec est impossibilis: album est homo'. Tamen sciendum quod quando accipitur aliqua de impossibili in qua negatur modus possibilitatis, sicut hic `album non potest esse nigrum', si sumatur in sensu divisionis, si subiectum suum non sit pronomen demonstrativum tantum nec proprium nomen, illa propositio est distinguenda, eo quod subiectum potest accipi pro eo quod est vel pro eo quod potest esse. Si primo modo, sic nec universalis infert universalem nec particularis particularem nec singularis singularem; si secundo modo, particularis non infert particularem, sed universalis infert universalem. Unde non sequitur `aliquid, quod potest esse album, non potest esse homo, igitur haec est impossibilis: album est homo; sed bene sequitur `omne, quod potest esse album, non potest esse homo, igitur haec est impossibilis: omne album est homo'.

|Nor does it follow that 'a white thing cannot be a man, therefore this is impossible: a white thing is a man'. However, it should be known that when something is taken as impossible in which the mode of possibility is denied, as here 'a white thing cannot be black', if it is taken in the sense of division, if its subject is not only a demonstrative pronoun nor a proper noun, that proposition is to be distinguished by the fact that the subject can be taken for what it is or for what it can be. If in the first mode, then neither the universal implies the universal, nor the particular the particular, nor the singular the singular; if, in the second way, the particular does not imply the particular, but the universal implies the universal. Whence it does not follow that 'something that can be white cannot be a man, therefore this is impossible: a white thing is a man'; but it follows well that 'everything that can be white cannot be a man, therefore this is impossible: every white thing is a man'.

|- valign = top
|Circa alias modales est sciendum quod quando subiectum est pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium, illa in sensu compositionis et illa in sensu divisionis convertuntur; sicut istae convertuntur `hoc est per se animal' et `haec est per se: hoc est animal'; et istae `hoc scitur esse album' et `haec est scita: hoc est album'; et istae `hoc creditur esse asinus' et `haec est credita: hoc est asinus'.

|With regard to other modals, it must be known that when the subject is a demonstrative pronoun or a proper noun, the former are converted in the sense of composition and the latter in the sense of division; just as these are turned into 'this is in itself an animal' and `this is in itself: this is an animal'; and these 'this is known to be white' and 'this is known: this is white'; and these 'this is believed to be a donkey' and 'this is believed: this is a donkey'.

|- valign = top
|Sed si subiectum sit terminus communis vel includens terminum communem tamquam partem vel participium, non convertuntur. Unde istae non convertuntur `album scitur esse homo' et `haec est scita: album est homo'; nec istae `album per se aedificat' et `haec est per se: album aedificat'; nec istae `album creditur esse homo vel Sortes' et `haec est credita: album est homo vel Sor{{p|636}}tes'.

|But if the subject is a common term or includes a common term as part or participant, they are not converted. Hence these are not converted: 'a white thing is known to be a man' and 'this is known: a white thing is a man'; nor are these 'a white thing builds per se' and 'this is per se: a white thing builds'; nor these 'a white thing is believed to be man or Socrates' and 'this is what is believed: a white thing is a man or Socrates'.

|- valign = top
|Similiter istae non convertuntur `creans scitur esse Deus' et `haec est scita: creans est Deus', nam semper de istis una est vera et altera falsa.

|In the same way, these are not converted, 'it is known that God is the creator' and 'this is known: God is the creator', for one of these is always true and the other false.

|- valign = top
|Et ratio omnium istorum dicta est prius, videlicet quod per propositionem de modo sumptam in sensu divisionis et per sibi aequivalentem non denotatur quod ille modus verificetur de sua praeiacente, sed quod verificetur de alia propositione in qua praedicatum praedicatur et pronomen demonstrativum vel nomen proprium subicitur et hoc verbum `est' sit tertio adiacens.

|And the reason of all these has been said before, namely, that by a proposition taken from a mode in the sense of division and by its equivalent, it is not denoted that that mode is verified from its precedent, but that it is verified from another proposition in which the predicate is predicated and a demonstrative pronoun or proper noun is submitted, and this word 'is' is adjacent to the third.

|- valign = top
|Sicut per istam `creans de necessitate est Deus', --- sumpta in sensu divisionis ---, non denotatur quod sua praeiacens, scilicet ista `creans est Deus', sit necessaria, sed denotatur quod haec sit necessaria `hoc est Deus', denotando illud pro quo `creans' supponit in ista `creans de necessitate est Deus'. Et similiter per istam `album per se aedificat' non denotatur quod sua de inesse, scilicet ista `album aedificat' sit per se, sed quod aliqua talis sit per se `hoc aedificat', denotando aliquid pro quo `album' supponit in ista `album per se aedificat'.

|Just as by this 'God is the creator of necessity,' --- taken in the sense of division ---, it is not denoted that what precedes itself, that is, 'the creator is God,' is necessary', but it is denoted that the latter is necessary, 'this is God,' by denoting that for which 'creating' supposits in these 'a creating thing of necessity is God.' And likewise, by this: 'a white thing builds per se', it is not denoted that it is of its assertoric, that is, that 'a white thing builds' is per se, but that something such as this 'this builds' per se, denoting something for which 'white' stands in that 'a white thing builds per se'.

|- valign = top
|Ex istis et praedictis patet quod tales sunt concedendae, secundum principia Aristotelis, `homo de necessitate est Deus', `album per se aedificat', `creans scitur esse Deus' et huiusmodi, si tales sint verae `Filius Dei de necessitate est Deus', `aedificator per se aedificat', `Deus scitur esse Deus'; et hoc quia subiecta istarum et illarum supponunt pro eisdem, et ideo dum supponunt pro eisdem, si istae sunt verae, illae erunt verae et e converso.

|From these and the aforesaid, it is clear that such things must be granted, according to Aristotle's principles, 'a man is necessarily God,' 'he builds per se,' 'the creator is known to be God,' and the like, if such are true, 'the Son of God is necessarily God,' 'a builder builds per se,' 'God is known to be God.' and this because the subjects of these and those supposit for the same, and therefore while they supposit to be the same, if these are true, the others will be true and vice versa.

|- valign = top
|Et hoc quia de tota propositione in qua praedicatur praedicatum unius et alterius de pronomine demonstrante illud pro quo subiectum supponit, verificatur talis modus, quia eadem est illa propositio, quamvis aliae sint diversae.

|And this, because of the whole proposition in which the predicate of one and the other is predicated of the pronoun showing that for which the subject stands, such a manner is verified, because that proposition is the same, although the others are different.

|- valign = top
|Dicunt tamen aliqui quod ista est falsa `homo de necessitate est Deus', quia per talem de necessario implicatur quod aliquid sit necessario homo; et hoc est falsum, et ideo ista est falsa. Similiter per istam `album scitur esse homo' implicatur quod aliquid scitur esse album.

|Some say, however, that this is false: 'a man is necessarily God,' because by such a necessity it is implied that something is necessarily man; and this is false, and therefore that is false. Similarly, by this 'a white thing is known to be a man,' it is implied that something is known to be white.

|- valign = top
|Sed illud non est bene dictum, quia tales modi, eo quod {{p|637}} sequuntur subiecta, non implicant subiecta dici de aliquo cum tali modo, sicut nec iste modus `contingenter' nec iste modus `per accidens', et sic de aliis.

|But that is not well stated, because such modes, by the fact that they are subjects, do not imply that the subjects are said of someone with such a mode, just as neither is this mode 'by contingency' nor is this mode `by accident', and so on.

|- valign = top
|Et ideo sicut per istam `Deus contingenter creat' non implicatur quod aliquid sit contingenter Deus et quod illud creat, nec per istam `Deus per accidens creat' implicatur quod aliquid sit per accidens Deus et quod ille per accidens creat, sed praecise ponitur quod aliquid sit Deus et ille contingenter vel per accidens creat; ita per istam `homo de necessitate est Deus' non denotatur nisi quod aliquis sit homo et quod ille de necessitate est Deus. Et hoc verum est.

|And therefore, just as by this 'God creates contingently' it is not implied that something is contingently God and that he creates, nor by this 'God creates by accident' is it implied that something is accidentally God and that he creates by accident, but it is precisely stated that something is God and he creates contingently or by accident; Thus, by this 'a man is necessarily God,' nothing is denoted except that someone is a man and that he is necessarily God. And this is true.

|- valign = top
|Similiter per istam `album scitur esse homo' non denotatur nisi quod aliquid sit album et quod illud sciatur esse homo, quod poterit esse verum, quamvis nesciatur illud esse album. Et sub isto sensu concessum est prius quod tales sunt verae `tres personae sciuntur esse Deus', quia scilicet aliquid, puta Deus, est tres personae, et illud scitur esse Deus, quamvis nesciatur illud esse `tres personae'. Eodem modo est de ista `Pater scitur esse immortalis', quia scilicet hoc est Pater, demonstrando Deum, et hoc scitur esse immortale.

|Similarly, by this 'a white thing is known to be a man,' nothing is denoted except that something is white and that it is known to be a man, which may be true, although it is not known that it is white. And in this sense it was previously granted that there are such truths as 'three persons are known to be God,' because of course something, say God, is three persons, and it is known to be God, although it is not known that it is 'three persons.' In the same way it is about this, 'The Father is known to be immortal,' because of course this is the Father, showing God, and this is known to be immortal.

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 6

2025-04-22T00:13:03Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 5|Chapter 5]]|[[../Chapter 7|Chapter 7]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|{{p|600}} CAP. 6. DE REGULIS QUAE DESERVIUNT CONSEQUENTIIS INTER PARTICULARES SIVE INDEFINITAS.

|Chapter 6, On the rules that govern the consequences between particulars or indefinites.

|- valign = top
|Post haec restaret dicere quomodo universalis affirmativa infertur ex negativa et e converso; sed quia ista, sicut aliqua praedicta, possunt patere ex dicendis, ideo dicendum est de consequentiis inter particulares et indefinitas.

| After this it remains to say how the universal positive is inferred from the negative and vice versa; but since these things, like some of the foregoing, may be evident from what has been said, the consequences between particulars and indefinites must therefore be told.

|- valign = top
|Et quia, sicut dictum est prius, particularis et indefinita convertuntur semper quando termini supponunt personaliter et significative, et quia omnes fere regulae quae deserviunt enthymematibus ex particularibus et indefinitis deserviunt etiam consequentiis ex singularibus, ideo dicendum est de eis communiter; et aliquando ponuntur exempla de istis, aliquando de illis.

| And since, as was said before, the particular and the indefinite are always converted when the terms assume a personal and significative meaning, and since nearly all the rules which serve enthymemes from particulars and indefinites also serve consequences from singulars, I must therefore discuss them in general; and sometimes examples are set of the latter, sometimes of the former.

|- valign = top
|Est autem primo dicendum de illis quae tenent per medium intrinsecum.

| Now the first thing to be said is about those things which hold through an intrinsic medium.

|- valign = top
|Et est prima regula talis, quod a definitione ad definitum est consequentia bona tam a parte subiecti quam a parte praedicati affirmative, et e converso; sicut sequitur `Sortes est homo, igitur Sortes est animal rationale'. Et est talis consequentia simplex.

| And the first rule is this, that from the definition to the defined there is a positive consequence both on the part of the subject and on the part of the predicate, and vice versa; as it follows, `Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is a rational animal.' And it is such a simple consequence.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: a descriptione ad descriptum est consequentia bona et e converso.

| Another rule is: from the description to the described is a good consequence and vice versa.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: a nominis interpretatione ad interpretatum est bona consequentia et e converso.

| Another rule is: from the interpretation of the name to the interpreted is a good consequence and vice versa.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: ab inferiori ad superius sine distributione et affirmative est bona consequentia et simplex.

| Another rule is: from the inferior to the superior without distribution and affirmatively is a good and simple consequence.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula: ab inferiori ad superius postposita negatione est bona consequentia, sed non simplex, nisi quando praedicatio superioris de inferiori est necessaria. Unde ista consequentia est simplex `homo albus currit, igitur homo currit'; sed ista consequentia solum est ut nunc `homo non currit, igitur animal non currit', quia dum homo est animal, consequentia est bona, quando autem homo non est animal, consequentia non valet.

| Another rule: from the inferior to the superior by postponing negation is a good consequence, but not a simple one, except when the predication of the superior from the inferior is necessary. Whence this conclusion is simple, `a white man runs, therefore a man runs'; but the following consequence is only for now: 'man does not run, therefore an animal does not run', because when man is an animal, the consequence is good, but when man is not an animal, the consequence is invalid.

|- valign = top
|{{p|601}} Ex isto patet quod omnes tales sunt falsae `homo albus est aggregatum per accidens'; `asinus intellectus est ens diminutum'; `materia privata caret forma'; `homo albus differt ab homine'; `intellectio creaturarum divina est posterior persona'; `essentia divina in Filio est posterior Patre'; `homo intellectus fuit ab aeterno'; `lapis intellectus est Deus', et huiusmodi, quia istae inferunt istas falsas `homo est aggregatum per accidens'; `asinus est ens diminutum'; `materia caret forma'; `homo differt ab homine'; `intellectio divina est posterior persona'; `essentia divina est posterior Patre'; `homo fuit ab aeterno'; `lapis est Deus', per istam regulam, quae numquam deficit: ab inferiori ad superius sine distributione est bona consequentia si termini supponant personaliter et significative. Si autem aliqua praedictarum propositionum, vel aliqua consimilis, inveniatur in aliquo auctore, exponendus est: quod non loquitur de virtute sermonis sed aliter, vel quod terminus talis non accipitur personaliter sed simpliciter vel materialiter.

| From this it is clear that all such are false: 'the white man is an aggregate by accident'; 'the donkey's intellect is a diminished being'; 'private matter lacks form'; 'the white man differs from man'; 'the divine understanding of creatures is a posterior person'; 'the divine essence in the Son is posterior to the Father'; 'Man was an intellect from eternity'; 'the foundation of understanding is God' and the like, because these introduce these falsities, 'man is an aggregate by accident'; 'the donkey is a diminutive being'; 'matter lacks form'; 'man differs from man'; 'divine understanding is a posterior person'; 'the divine essence is posterior to the Father'; 'Man was from eternity'; 'the stone is God', by that rule, which never fails: from the lower to the higher without distribution is a good consequence if the terms assume a personal and significant meaning. But if any of the aforesaid propositions, or something similar is found in any author, it must be explained that he does not speak of the power of speech but in another way, or that such a term is not taken personally but simply or materially.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula est quod ab uno convertibilium ad reliquum est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `homo currit, ergo risibile currit'. Intelligendum est quod omnes praedictae regulae intelligendae sunt quando omnes termini supponunt personaliter et significative, quia si termini supponant simpliciter vel materialiter, non valet; vel etiam si ille terminus ratione cuius teneret consequentia supponat aliter quam personaliter, non oportet consequentias valere. Et ideo tales consequentiae non valent `animal rationale est definitio, igitur homo est definitio'; `animal gressibile bipes est descriptio, igitur homo est descriptio'; `homo est definitum, igitur animal rationale est definitum'; `homo est species, igitur animal est species'; `homo non est genus, igitur animal non est genus'; `risibile est passio hominis, igitur homo est passio hominis' et huiusmodi.

| Another rule is that there is a good consequence from one convertible to the other; as it follows, 'a man runs, therefore a thing that can laugh runs'. It is to be understood that all the aforesaid rules are to be understood when all the terms assume a personal and significant meaning, because if the terms assume simply or materially, it does not apply; or even if that term presupposes consequences other than personally by the reason of which it holds, the consequences need not be valid. And therefore such conclusions do not hold: 'a rational animal is a definition, therefore a man is a definition'; 'A bipedal animal is a description, therefore a man is a description'; 'man is defined, therefore the rational animal is defined'; 'man is a species, therefore an animal is a species'; 'man is not a genus, therefore animal is not a genus'; 'Man's attribute is the ability to laugh, therefore man is man's attribute' and the like.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: ab aliquo sumpto cum determinatione ad ipsum sumptum sine determinatione est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `homo albus currit, igitur homo currit'. {{p|602}} Notandum est quod aliquando de toto aggregato ex determinatione et determinabili praedicatur altera pars, aliquando utraque pars, aliquando neutra. Verbi gratia de isto toto `homo albus' praedicatur utraque pars; haec enim est vera `homo albus est homo' et similiter haec est vera `homo albus est albus', et si `homo albus' sit, oportet quod utraque istarum sit vera. Aliquando autem altera pars solum praedicatur de illo toto; ut de isto toto `homo mortuus' praedicatur altera pars, puta haec pars `mortuus' et non haec pars `homo', nam haec est vera `homo mortuus est mortuus' et haec est falsa `homo mortuus est homo'. Similiter haec est vera `falsus syllogismus est falsus' et tamen haec non est vera `falsus syllogismus est syllogismus'. Similiter est de talibus `falsum argumentum', `syllogismus sophisticus' et huiusmodi. Aliquando autem neutra pars praedicatur de toto, quamvis totum praedicetur de toto, sicut est de isto `album secundum dentes'. Neutra enim istarum est vera `album secundum dentes est album', `album secundum dentes est dentes', quamvis haec vera possit esse `album secundum dentes est album'; et quando contingit, non erit nisi gratia materiae. Dicendum est ergo quod quando utraque pars praedicatur de toto, semper a tali toto ad quamcumque partem est consequentia bona. Unde haec consequentia est bona `homo albus currit, igitur album currit' et similiter `igitur homo currit'. Ex quo patet quod tales consequentiae sunt bonae `homo albus est ens per accidens, igitur homo est ens per accidens'; `intellectio creaturarum est posterior Patre, igitur intellectio est posterior Patre'; `lapis intellectus est realiter Deus, igitur lapis est realiter Deus'.

| Another rule is: from something taken with determination to the same taking without determination is a good consequence; as it follows, 'a white man runs, therefore a man runs'. It should be noted that sometimes the second part is predicated of the whole aggregate from determination and determinable, sometimes both parts, sometimes neither. For example, both parts are predicated of this whole 'white man'; for this is true, 'a white man is a man,' and likewise this is true, 'a white man is white,' and if 'a white man' is true, both of these must be true. Sometimes, however, the second part alone is predicated of that whole; so that the other part is predicated of this whole: 'a dead man,' suppose this part is 'dead,' and not this part, 'a man,' for this is true, 'a dead man is dead,' and this is false, 'a dead man is a man.' Similarly, this is true: 'a false syllogism is false' and yet this is not true: 'a false syllogism is a syllogism'. The same applies to such things as 'false argument', 'sophisticated syllogism' and the like. Sometimes, however, neither part is predicated of the whole, although the whole is predicated of the whole, as it is of this 'white according to the teeth'. For neither of these is true: 'white according to teeth is white', 'white according to teeth is teeth', although the latter may be true, 'white according to teeth is white'; and when it happens, it will be nothing but the grace of matter. It must therefore be said that when each part is predicated of a whole, there is always a good consequence from such a whole to whatever part it may be. Hence this conclusion is good: 'a white man runs, therefore a white thing runs' and similarly, 'therefore a man runs.' From this it is clear that such conclusions are good: 'a white man is a being by accident, therefore man is a being by accident'; 'The understanding of creatures is posterior to the Father, therefore the understanding is posterior to the Father'; 'the foundation of understanding is really God, therefore the foundation is really God'.

|- valign = top
|Similiter ista consequentia est bona `lapis intellectus fuit ab aeterno, igitur lapis fuit ab aeterno'. Quando autem altera pars tantum praedicatur de toto, tunc a toto ad illam partem est bona consequentia.

| Similarly, this conclusion is good: 'the foundation of understanding was from eternity, therefore the foundation was from eternity.' But when the second part is only predicated of the whole, then there is a good consequence from the whole to that part.

|- valign = top
|Unde ista consequentia est bona `Sortes est homo mortuus, igitur Sortes est mortuus'.

| Whence this conclusion is good, 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore Socrates is dead.'

|- valign = top
|{{p|603}} Sed ad alteram partem non valet consequentia; unde non sequitur `Sortes est homo mortuus, igitur Sortes est homo'. Quando autem neutra pars praedicatur de toto, ad neutram partem valet consequentia; et ideo ista consequentia non valet `Aethiops est albus secundum dentes, igitur Aethiops est albus' vel `ergo Aethiops est dentes'. Ex istis patet quod istae consequentiae non valent `iste est albus monachus, igitur est albus', quia ista stant simul `aliquis est albus monachus' et tamen quod `nullus albus monachus est albus'.

| But the consequence does not apply to the other side; whence it does not follow that 'Socrates is a dead man, therefore Socratesis a man'. But when neither part is predicated of the whole, the consequence applies to neither part; and therefore, this conclusion does not hold: 'The Ethiopian is white according to his teeth, therefore the Ethiopian is white' or 'therefore the Ethiopian is the teeth.' From these it is clear that the following conclusions are not valid: 'This is a white monk, therefore he is white', because they stand the same as 'someone is a white monk' and yet that 'no white monk is white'.

|- valign = top
|Similiter non sequitur `iste est tuus pater, igitur est tuus', quia ista stant simul quod `iste est tuus pater' et tamen `tuus pater non est tuus', si `tuus' in praedicato dicat circumstantiam possessionis.

| Similarly, it does not follow that 'this is your father, therefore he is yours', because these things stand together as 'this is your father' and yet `your father is not yours', if 'yours' in the predicate indicates the circumstance of possession.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: a propositione sumpta cum adverbio determinante compositionem ad ipsam sine tali determinatione sumpta est consequentia bona affirmative; sicut sequitur ` Sortes velociter currit, igitur Sortes currit'; `Sortes male disputat, igitur Sortes disputat'.

| Another rule is: taken from a proposition with an adverb determining the composition to itself without such a determination, the consequence is good in the affirmative; as it follows, 'Socrates runs fast, therefore Socrates runs'; 'He disputes Socrates badly, therefore he disputes Socrates'.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: a propositione sumpta cum praepositione et suo casuali, vel alia determinatione aequivalente adverbio vel praepositioni et suo casuali, ad ipsam sine tali addito est consequentia bona.

| Another rule is: taken from a proposition with a preposition and its casual, or another determination equivalent to an adverb or preposition and its casual, to it without such addition is a good consequence.

|- valign = top
|Sicut sequitur `homo de necessitate est animal, igitur homo est animal'; `homo dat denarium cum tristitia, igitur homo dat denarium'; `homo per se est animal, igitur homo est animal'; `homo, in quantum albus, differt ab homine, igitur homo differt ab homine'; `essentia divina et sapientia divina differunt ratione, igitur essentia divina et sapientia divina differunt'.

| As it follows, 'man is of necessity an animal, therefore man is an animal'; 'a man gives a penny when he is sad, therefore a man gives a penny'; 'man is essentially an animal, therefore man is an animal'; 'man, in so far as he is white, differs from man, therefore man differs from man'; 'Divine essence and divine wisdom differ in reason, therefore divine essence and divine wisdom differ.'

|- valign = top
|Ex isto patet quod omnes tales de virtute sermonis sunt falsae `quaelibet creatura de se est non-ens'; `quaelibet materia de se caret forma'; `passivum de se caret actu'; `idem sub una ratione est prius et sub alia ratione est posterius'; `idem sub una ratione est inferius et sub alia est superius'; `idem ut sic est album et ut sic est nigrum'; `idem secundum {{p|604}} quod consideratur ut sic, est tale, et ut sic, non est tale'.

| From this it is clear that all such sayings about the power of speech are false: 'every creature is of itself a non-being'; 'every matter of itself lacks form'; 'the passive actually lacks itself'; 'The same thing is before under one reason, and after under another reason'; 'the same thing is inferior under one reason and superior under another'; 'the same thing as such is white and as such is black'; 'the same thing according to that which is considered as such, is such, and as such, is not such'.

|- valign = top
|Unde quidquid affirmatur de aliquo cum aliquo adverbio vel cum praepositione et suo casuali vel aliqua determinatione aequivalente adverbio vel tali praepositioni cum suo casuali, debet absolute concedi de eo.

| Therefore, whatever is asserted about something with some adverb or with a preposition and its casual, or with some determination equivalent to an adverb or such a preposition with its casual, must be absolutely granted about it.

|- valign = top
|Quidquid etiam praedicatur de aliquo cum dictione reduplicativa, absolute sine tali dictione vel aliquo aequivalenti praedicatur de eodem. Ex quo patet quod omnes tales consequentiae sunt bonae `natura specifica est realiter differentia individualis, igitur natura specifica est differentia individualis'; `genus et species sunt idem realiter, igitur genus et species sunt idem'; `homo est realiter humanitas, igitur homo est humanitas'; `intellectus est realiter voluntas, igitur intellectus est voluntas'; `agens est realiter passum, igitur agens est passum'; `album per accidens non est idem homini, igitur album non est idem homini'.

|Whatever is also predicated of something with a reduplicative expression is absolutely predicated of the same without such an expression or something equivalent. From this it is clear that all such consequences are good: 'specific nature is really individual difference, therefore specific nature is individual difference'; 'genus and species are really the same, therefore genus and species are the same'; 'man is really human, therefore man is human'; 'the understanding is really the will, therefore the understanding is the will'; 'the agent is really the object, therefore the agent is the object'; 'white is not the same as man by accident, therefore white is not the same as man'.

|- valign = top
|Et sic de aliis multis, quae tamen a modernis negantur.

|And so about many others, which, however, are denied by the moderns.

|- valign = top
|Notandum quod istae regulae intelligendae sunt quando per talem additionem non datur intelligi propositio condicionalis. Et per hoc solvitur instantia quae posset adduci. Nam non sequitur `vellem esse in luto cum centum marchis, igitur vellem esse in luto'; nam per istam propositionem `vellem esse in luto cum centum marchis' intelligitur ista condicionalis `vellem esse in luto, si possem lucrari per hoc vel habere centum marchas'. Secundo notandum est quod ista regula habet intelligi --- et praecedentes aliae --- quando nulla est variatio in antecedente et consequente nisi quod ista determinatio ponitur in antecedente et non in consequente.

|It should be noted that these rules are to be understood when a conditional proposition is not understood by such an addition. And by this the instance which might be brought is resolved. For it does not follow that 'I would like to be in the mud with a hundred marks, therefore I would like to be in the mud'; for by this proposition 'I would like to be in the mud with a hundred marks' is meant the conditional 'I would like to be in the mud if I could gain by this or have a hundred marks'. Secondly, it must be noted that this rule is to be understood --- and other preceding ones --- when there is no variation in the antecedent and the consequent except that this determination is placed in the antecedent and not in the consequent.

|- valign = top
|Per hoc possunt solvi istae instantiae quae possent fieri de II Elenchorum, ubi videtur

|By this means those instances which might be made of Lists II can be solved, where it seems

|- valign = top
|Philosophus in tali modo arguendi assignare fallaciam secundum quid et simpliciter. Unde in talibus assignat fallaciam secundum quid et simpliciter `amittere aegritudinem est bonum, igitur aegritudo est bona'; `quod non vult sapiens, est malum; sapiens non {{p|605}} vult amittere bonum; igitur bonum est malum'.

|the philosopher in such a way of arguing assigns a fallacy in a certain and simple way. Hence in such cases he assigns a fallacy in the sense and simply that 'losing sickness is good, therefore sickness is good'; 'What the wise man does not will is evil; the wise man does not want to lose the good; therefore good is evil.'

|- valign = top
|Patet manifeste quod in istis et multis aliis non servatur modus arguendi de quo ponuntur praedictae regulae. Sciendum est etiam quod si istae regulae alicubi patiantur instantiam, tunc patiuntur instantiam quando participium verbi non praedicatur de toto aggregato ex eodem participio et illa determinatione adiuncta; et ideo quandocumque tale participium praedicatur de tali aggregato, regulae sunt verae.

|It is manifestly clear that in these and many others the method of reasoning about which the aforesaid rules are laid down is not observed. It must also be known that if these rules admit of instance anywhere, then they admit of instance when the participle of the verb is not predicated of the whole aggregate from the same participle and that determination attached; and therefore whenever such a participle is predicated of such an aggregate, the rules are true.

|- valign = top
|Possunt enim omnia talia enthymemata reduci in syllogismum per assumptionem talis propositionis quae est medium intrinsecum talis consequentiae. Unde sicut ista consequentia est bona `omnis homo currit, igitur Sortes currit', quia per assumptionem istius medii `Sortes est homo' reducitur in syllogismum, sic arguendo `omnis homo currit; Sortes est homo; igitur Sortes currit', similiter ista consequentia est bona `Sortes currit velociter, igitur Sortes currit', quia iste syllogismus est bonus `omne currens velociter est currens; Sortes currit velociter; igitur Sortes currit'.

|For all such enthymemes can be reduced to a syllogism by the assumption of such a proposition which is the intrinsic means of such a conclusion. Hence, just as this conclusion is good, 'every man runs, therefore Socrates runs', because by the assumption of this middle 'Socrates is man' is reduced to a syllogism, thus arguing that 'every man runs; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates runs', similarly this conclusion is good 'Socrates runs fast, therefore Socrates runs', because this syllogism is good, 'everything that runs fast is running; Socrates is running fast; So Socrates runs.

|- valign = top
|Et ita est de aliis.

|And so it is with others.

|- valign = top
|Et ista regula generalis intelligenda est quando participium verbi praedicatur universaliter de participio eodem, sumpto cum tali determinatione; et quando non, non.

|And this general rule is to be understood when the participle of a word is universally predicated of the same participle, taken with such determination; and when not, no.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula est ista: a propositione universali affirmativa ad quamlibet eius indefinitam, particularem vel singularem, de cuius subiecto vere praedicatur subiectum universalis, est bona consequentia respectu eiusdem praedicati, nulla variatione exsistente a parte determinationis; sicut sequitur `omnis homo currit, igitur album currit', quando haec est vera `aliquod album est homo'.

|Another rule is this: from a universal affirmative proposition to any of its indefinites, particular or singular, of whose subject the universal subject is truly predicated, is a good consequence with respect to the same predicate, without any variation existing on the part of the determination; as it follows that 'every man runs, therefore a white thing runs', when this is true 'some man is white'.

|- valign = top
|Similiter sequitur `omnis homo est animal, igitur substantia est animal', ex quo haec est vera `substantia est homo'. Notandum est quod ista regula non habet locum quando subiectum vel praedicatum universalis importat aliquam rem unam numero quae est plures res numero vel importat aliquam rem quae est eadem realiter {{p|606}} cum tali re quae est plures res.

|Similarly, it follows that 'every man is an animal, therefore a substance is an animal', whence this is true: 'a substance is man.' It should be noted that this rule does not apply when the universal subject or predicate conveys some single thing in number which is several things in number, or it conveys some thing which is really the same with such a thing which is several things.

|- valign = top
|Et propter hoc ista consequentia non valet `omnis persona producta distinguitur realiter a persona producente, igitur essentia divina distinguitur realiter a persona producente', quantumcumque haec sit vera `essentia divina est persona producta'.

|And for this reason this conclusion does not hold: "Every produced person is really distinguished from the producing person, therefore the divine essence is really distinguished from the producing person", no matter how true this may be, that the "divine essence is a produced person".

|- valign = top
|Nec ista consequentia valet `omnis essentia divina est Pater, igitur Filius est Pater', quamvis haec sit vera `Filius est essentia'. Est tamen advertendum quod haec regula non fallit semper quando tale praedicatum vel subiectum sumitur, immo aliquando non fallit.

|Nor is this conclusion valid, 'the Father is the divine essence of all, therefore the Son is the Father,' although this is true, 'the Son is the essence.' However, it must be noted that this rule does not always fail when such a predicate or subject is taken, indeed sometimes it does not fail.

|- valign = top
|Unde ista consequentia est bona `omne ens est creatum vel increatum, igitur essentia divina est creata vel increata'; similiter `omnis persona divina est producens vel producta, igitur Pater est producens vel productus'.

|Whence this consequence is good: 'every being is created or uncreated, therefore the divine essence is created or uncreated'; similarly, 'every divine person is the producer or the product, therefore the Father is the producer or the product'.

|- valign = top
|Quando autem valeat talis consequentia in talibus terminis et quando non, potest sciri per illa quae dicta sunt in materia de uniformi generatione syllogismorum de inesse et per ea quae dicta sunt super Sententias.

|But when such a conclusion is valid in such terms and when it is not, it can be known by what has been said in the matter of the uniform generation of assertoric syllogisms and by what has been said about Sentences.

|- valign = top
|Sed in omnibus aliis terminis est regula generaliter vera, sine instantia, si termini supponant personaliter et nullus eorum includat aliquod syncategorema vel aequivalens. Ideo ista consequentia est bona, et omnes tales sunt bonae: `omne animal est ens per se, igitur homo albus est ens per se'; `quaelibet persona divina de necessitate est Deus, igitur homo de necessitate est Deus'; `quaelibet persona divina fuit ab aeterno, igitur homo fuit ab aeterno'; `omnis aedificator per se aedificat, igitur album per se aedificat'; `omne album per accidens aedificat, ergo aedificator per accidens aedificat', ex quo istae propositiones sunt verae `homo albus est animal', `homo est persona divina', `aliquod album est aedificator', `aliquis aedificator est albus'.

|But in all other terms it is a generally true rule, without exception, if the terms stand personally and none of them include any syncategorematic word or equivalent. Therefore this conclusion is good, and all such are good: "Every animal is a being in itself, therefore a white man is a being in itself." 'every divine person is necessarily God, therefore man is necessarily God'; 'Every divine person was from eternity, therefore man was from eternity'; 'every builder builds by himself, therefore a white thing builds by itself'; 'everything white builds by accident, therefore the builder builds by accident', whence these propositions are true: 'a white man is an animal', 'a man is a divine person', 'something white is a builder', 'some builder is white'.

|- valign = top
|Et ideo ista consequentia est bona `omnis natura specifica de se est communicabilis, igitur differentia individualis de se est communicabilis', si haec sit vera `differentia individualis est natura specifica', quae sequitur ex ista `differentia indivi{{p|607}}dualis est realiter natura specifica', sicut patet per regulam supra positam.

|And therefore this conclusion is good, 'every specific nature is communicable of itself, therefore individual difference is communicable of itself', if this is true, 'individual difference is specific nature', which follows from this 'individual difference is really specific nature', as is clear from the rule stated above.

|- valign = top
|Similiter ista consequentia est bona `omnis differentia individualis de se est incommunicabilis, igitur natura specifica de se est incommunicabilis', si haec sit vera `natura specifica est differentia individualis'.

|Similarly, this conclusion is good: 'every individual difference is incommunicable of itself, therefore specific nature is incommunicable of itself', if this is true 'specific nature is individual difference'.

|- valign = top
|Similiter ista consequentia est bona `omne genus praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie, ergo species praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie', si haec sit vera `species est realiter genus'.

|Similarly, this conclusion is good: 'every genus is predicated of several different species, therefore a species is predicated of several different species', if this is true, 'a species is really a genus'.

|- valign = top
|Similiter omnes tales consequentiae sunt bonae `omnis intellectio divina est prior actu generandi, igitur intellectio creaturarum est prior actu generandi', ex quo haec est vera `intellectio creaturarum est intellectio divina'; `omnis intellectus est intellectus speculativus, igitur intellectus practicus est intellectus speculativus'; `omnis habitus speculativus est in intellectu speculativo, igitur habitus practicus est in intellectu speculativo', vel sic `igitur habitus speculativus est in intellectu practico', si omnis intellectus sit intellectus practicus.

|Similarly, all such consequences are good: "the divine understanding of everything is prior to the act of begetting, therefore the understanding of creatures is prior to the act of begetting," whence this is true: "the understanding of creatures is the divine understanding"; 'every intellect is a speculative intellect, therefore the practical intellect is a speculative intellect'; 'every speculative attitude is in the speculative understanding, therefore there is a practical attitude in the speculative understanding', or so 'therefore the speculative attitude is in the practical understanding', if every intellect is a practical intellect.

|- valign = top
|Similiter haec est bona consequentia `omnis essentia divina est principium producendi Verbum, igitur intellectio creaturarum est principium producendi Verbum'. Et si dicatur quod talis consequentia non valet, quia si intellectio creaturarum esset principium producendi Verbum, igitur Pater prius intelligeret creaturas quam produceret Verbum, ex quo principium producendi est prius producto: Hoc non obstat.

|Similarly, this is a good consequence: "every divine essence is the principle of producing the Word, therefore, the understanding of creatures is the principle of producing the Word." And if it is said that such a conclusion does not hold, because if the understanding of creatures were the principle of producing the Word, then the Father would understand creatures before he produced the Word, from which the principle of production is first produced: This does not stand in the way.

|- valign = top
|Unde quo modo intellectio creaturarum est prior Verbo et quo modo non, et quo modo Pater prius intelligit creaturas quam producat Verbum et quo modo non, dictum est super Sententias, ideo de illis ad praesens pertranseo.

|Hence, in what way the understanding of creatures is prior to the Word and in what way not, and in what way the Father understands creatures before he produces the Word and in what way not, was said in the Sentences above, therefore I will pass on them for the present.

|- valign = top
|Sed ad istam formam arguendi `intellectio creaturarum est prior in Patre quam producat Verbum, igitur Pater prius producit creaturas quam producat Verbum', dicendum quod ista forma arguendi non valet, sicut non valet `Sortes albus fuit prior Platone, igitur Sortes fuit albus antequam Plato fuit albus'.

|But to this form of argument, 'The understanding of creatures is prior to the Father producing the Word, therefore the Father produces creatures before the Word produces', we must say that this form of argument does not hold, just as it does not hold: 'Socrates was white before Plato, therefore Socrates was white before Plato was white.'

|- valign = top
|Nam posito quod Plato sit filius Sortis et quod Sortes nunc primo vel hodie primo sit albus, haec tunc est vera `Sortes albus fuit {{p|608}} prior Platone vel ante quam Plato', quia Sortes fuit prior, et Sortes est Sortes albus, igitur Sortes albus fuit prior, et tamen haec est falsa `Sortes fuit albus ante quam Plato'.

|For supposing that Plato were the son of Socrates, and that Socrates is now the first or today the first to be white, then this is true: 'Socrates was white before Plato or prior to Plato', because Socrates was before, and Socrates is white Socrates, therefore Socrates was white first, and yet this is false: 'Socrates was white before Plato''.

|- valign = top
|Immo etiam haec poterit esse falsa `Sortes fuit albus ante quam Plato fuit albus', posito quod Sortes hodie primo fuit albus et quod Plato a principio nativitatis fuerit albus. Et notandum est hic quod aliquae talium consequentiarum sunt solum ut nunc et aliquae sunt simplices.

|Nay, even this may be false, 'Socrates was white before Plato was white,' on the supposition that Socrates was first white today and that Plato was white from the beginning of his birth. And it is to be noted here that some of these consequences are only for now and some are simple.

|- valign = top
|Quando enim praedicatio subiecti antecedentis de subiecto consequentis est necessaria, tunc est consequentia simplex, quando autem talis categorica est contingens et non necessaria, tunc est consequentia ut nunc solum.

|For when the predication of the antecedent subject is necessary from the subject of the consequent, then it is a simple consequence, but when such a categorical one is contingent and not necessary, then it is a consequence for now only.

|- valign = top
|Unde ista consequentia est simplex `quaelibet persona divina fuit ab aeterno, igitur immortale fuit ab aeterno', quia haec est necessaria `aliquod immortale est persona divina'. Haec autem consequentia est ut nunc solum `quaelibet persona divina fuit ab aeterno, igitur creans fuit ab aeterno', accipiendo subiectum consequentis pro eo quod est, quia haec est contingens `creans est Deus'.

|Whence this conclusion is simple, 'every divine person was from eternity, therefore he was immortal from eternity,' because this is necessary, 'something immortal is a divine person.' Now this is the consequence that now only 'every divine person was from eternity, therefore he was creative from eternity', taking the subject of the consequence for what it is, because this is the contingent 'creator is God'.

|- valign = top
|Si autem subiectum consequentis accipiatur pro eo quod fuit, consequentia est modo simplex, quia haec est necessaria `creans fuit Deus', accipiendo subiectum pro eo quod fuit, quia haec est necessaria sicut haec est necessaria `Deus fuit creans'.

|But if the subject of the consequent is taken for what was, the consequence is only simple, because this is necessary, 'the creator was God,' taking the subject for what was, because this is necessary, just as this is necessary, 'God was the creator.'

|- valign = top
|Intelligendum est tamen quod quando arguitur in tali modo arguendi ab inferiori ad superius, est consequentia simplex, quamvis talis categorica non sit necessaria.

|It must be understood, however, that when it is argued in such a manner of reasoning from the inferior to the superior, it is a simple consequence, although such a categorical one is not necessary.

|- valign = top
|Unde haec est consequentia simplex `omnis homo est animal, igitur aliqua substantia est animal', quamvis haec non sit necessaria `aliqua substantia est homo'. Notandum quod omnes regulae praedictae sunt intelligendae quando termini supponunt personaliter, quia si aliquis terminus supponeret aliter quam personaliter, non oporteret consequentiam valere.

|Whence this is a simple consequence, 'every man is an animal, therefore some substance is an animal', although this is not necessary, 'some substance is a man.' It should be noted that all the aforesaid rules are to be understood when the terms supposit personally, because if any term supposited otherwise than personally, the conclusion would not have to be valid.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: a nomine numerali respectu huius verbi `est' ad {{p|609}} nomen partis est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `quatuor sunt, ergo duo sunt'.

|Another rule is: from the numerical noun in relation to this word 'is' to the noun of its part is a good consequence; as it follows, 'there are four, therefore there are two.'

|- valign = top
|Alia regula: a nomine collectivo ad nomen partis est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `populus est, igitur homo est'.

|Another rule: from the collective name to the name of its part is a good consequence; as it follows, 'there is a people, therefore there is a man.'

|- valign = top
|Et debet ista regula intelligi quando tale totum non potest esse sine parte illa, sicut exercitus non potest esse sine homine, ideo bene sequitur `exercitus est, igitur homo est'; sed quia exercitus potest esse sine equo, ideo non sequitur `exercitus est, igitur equus est', quamvis equi aliquando sint pars exercitus.

|And this rule must be understood when such a whole cannot exist without that part, just as an army cannot exist without a man, therefore it follows well that 'there is an army, therefore there is a man'; but since an army can exist without a horse, it does not follow that 'there is an army, therefore there is a horse,' although horses are sometimes part of an army.

|- valign = top
|Et ideo notandum quod duae regulae praedictae debent intelligi quando termini supponunt personaliter et respectu istius verbi `est' quando praedicatur secundum adiacens, quia respectu aliorum praedicatorum non valet consequentia talis.

|And therefore, it is to be noted that the two aforesaid rules must be understood when the terms supposit personally and with respect to that word 'is' when it is predicated according to the adjacent, because with respect to other predicates such a consequence does not hold.

|- valign = top
|Non enim sequitur `quatuor excedunt tria, igitur duo excedunt tria; nec sequitur `populus est plures homines, igitur homo est plures homines'.

|For it does not follow that four exceed three, therefore two exceed three; nor does it follow that 'a people is a plurality of men, therefore a man is a plurality of men.'

|- valign = top
|Tamen respectu aliquorum praedicatorum tenet consequentia. Bene enim sequitur `populus est hic intus, igitur homo est hic intus'; `quatuor sunt homines, igitur duo sunt homines'; `quatuor sunt hic, ergo duo sunt hic'; `quatuor sunt alba, igitur duo sunt alba'.

|However, with respect to some of the predicates, the conclusion holds. For it follows well that 'the people are here within, therefore a man is here within'; 'there are four men, therefore there are two men'; 'there are four here, therefore there are two here'; 'There are four white things, therefore there are two white things'.

|- valign = top
|Unde quando praedicatum non potest competere toti nisi competat alicui parti, tunc semper vel frequenter est consequentia bona respectu talis praedicati a toto numerali et collectivo ad partem, aliter non.

|Hence, when a predicate cannot belong to the whole unless it belongs to a part, then there is always or frequently a good consequence with respect to such a predicate from the numerical and collective whole to the part, otherwise not.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: quando sunt duae contrarietates, si unum extremum unius contrarietatis praedicatur de uno extremo alterius contrarietatis, reliquum extremum praedicabitur de reliquo; sicut sequitur `iustitia est virtus, igitur iniustitia est vitium'.

|Another rule is: when there are two contraries, if one extremity of one contrariety is predicated of one extremity of the other contrariety, the other extremity shall be predicated of the rest; as it follows, `justice is a virtue, therefore injustice is a vice'.

|- valign = top
|Sciendum est quod ista regula habet veritatem quando neutra contrarietatum habet medium; si enim altera habet medium, non valet; sicut non sequitur `prodigalitas est vitium, igitur illiberalitas est virtus'.

|It must be known that this rule has truth when neither of the opposites has a mean; for if the other has a mean, it is not valid; just as it does not follow that 'prodigality is a vice, therefore illiberality is a virtue'.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: si generatio alicuius est bona, ipsum est bonum; et ideo sequitur `generatio hominis est bona, igitur homo est bonus'.

|Another rule is: if the generation of something is good, it is good itself; and therefore, it follows that 'the generation of a man is good, therefore a man is good'.

|- valign = top
|Alia regula est: si generatio alicuius est mala, ipsum est malum; et ideo sequitur `generatio hominis est mala, igitur homo est malus'.

|Another rule is: if the generation of something is evil, it is itself evil; and therefore, it follows that 'the generation of a man is evil, therefore a man is evil.'

|- valign = top
|{{p|610}} Alia regula: si corruptio alicuius est bona, ipsum est malum, et si corruptio alicuius est mala, ipsum est bonum. Notandum quod bonum est duplex, scilicet naturale et morale; similiter malum est duplex, naturale et morale; et de bono et malo primo modo dicto sunt regulae intelligendae.

|Another rule: if the corruption of something is good, it is itself evil, and if the corruption of something is evil, it is itself good. It should be noted that good is twofold, namely, natural and moral; Similarly, evil is twofold, natural and moral; and of good and evil are the rules to be understood in the first mode said.

|- valign = top
|Sed de hoc dicetur alias, ideo pertranseo.

|But this will be discussed elsewhere, so I will pass on.

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 2

2025-04-22T00:10:00Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 1|Chapter 1]]|[[../Chapter 3|Chapter 3]]}}

{| border="1" cellpadding="10"
|-
! valign="top" width="45%" | Latin
! valign="top" width="55%" | English
|- valign="top"
|{{p|591}} CAP. 2. DE REGULIS GENERALIBUS PER QUAS TENENT CONSEQUENTIAE PER MEDIUM INTRINSECUM ET CONCLUDUNT UNIVERSALEM.
| Chapter 2. On the general rules by which consequences hold through an intrensic medium and conclude a universal.
|- valign="top"
| Istis visis dicendum est de regulis generalibus per quas tenent consequentiae. Et primo de regulis per quas tenent consequentiae quae tenent per medium intrinsecum. Circa quod primo dicendum est de regulis per quas tenent consequentiae concludentes conclusionem universalem affirmativam ex affirmativa, in qua termini praecise supponunt significative et personaliter. Est autem prima regula talis `a superiori distributo ad inferius distributum est consequentia bona', sicut sequitur `omne animal currit, igitur omnis homo currit'.
| With these views it is necessary to speak of the general rules by which the consequences hold. And in the first place concerning the rules by which the consequences which they hold by internsic means. Concerning the first thing we must say about the rules by which the inferences hold, concluding a universal affirmative conclusion from the affirmative, in which terms they supposit precisely in a significant and personal way. Now the first rule is as follows: `distributed from the superior to the inferior is a good consequence', as it follows that `every animal runs, therefore every man runs'. 
|- valign="top"
| Circa istam regulam est primo sciendum quod ista regula debet intelligi quando illa universalis affirmativa non est exceptiva nec aequivalens ei. Et ideo ista consequentia non valet `omne animal praeter hominem currit, igitur omnis homo currit'.
| Regarding this rule it is first to be known that this rule must be understood when the universal affirmative is neither exceptional nor equivalent to it. And therefore this conclusion does not hold: 'every animal runs except man, therefore every man runs'. 
|- valign="top"
| Tamen contingit inferre omne aliud inferius praeter partem extra captam et praeter contenta sub parte extra capta; et ideo bene sequitur `omne animal praeter hominem currit, igitur omnis asinus currit'.
| However, it is possible to bring everything else inferior except the part taken outside, and besides the contents under the part taken outside; and therefore it follows well that every animal except man runs, therefore every donkey runs. 
|- valign="top"
| Secundo sciendum quod talis consequentia tenens per istam regulam aliquando est consequentia simplex, aliquando consequentia ut nunc. Quando enim praedicatio superioris de inferiori est necessaria, tunc est consequentia simplex; quando autem praedicatio superioris de inferiori est contingens, tunc est consequentia ut nunc solum.
| Secondly, it must be known that such a consequence holding by this rule is sometimes a simple consequence, sometimes a consequence for now. For when the predication of the superior from the inferior is necessary, then the consequence is simple; But when the predication of the superior is contingent on the inferior, then the consequence is for now only.
|- valign="top"
| Unus casus excipitur, scilicet quando tam antecedens quam consequens sunt de possibili vel de contingenti, accepto subiecto utriusque pro eo quod potest vel pro eo quod contingit; quia in tali generaliter est consequentia simplex, quia quando illa propositio in qua praedicatur superius de inferiori est vera, {{p|592}} tunc est consequentia bona, quando illa propositio est falsa, tunc consequentia non valet.
| One case is accepted, namely, when both the antecedent and the consequent are de possibili or de contingenti, the subject of both being accepted for that which is possible or for that which happens; because in such a case the conclusion is generally simple, because when that proposition in which the superior is predicated of the inferior is true, then the inference is good, when that proposition is false, then the inference is invalid.
|- valign="top"
| Unde tales consequentiae sunt simplices `omne ens est in actu, igitur omnis Deus est in actu'; `omne suppositum est substantia, igitur omne divinum suppositum est substantia', quia omnes tales sunt necessariae `omnis Deus est ens', `omne suppositum divinum est suppositum'.
| Whence such simple consequences are, `every being is actual, therefore every God is actual'; `every suppositum is substance, therefore every divine suppositum is substance', because all such things are necessary.
|- valign="top"
| Sed tales consequentiae sunt ut nunc solum `omne animal est substantia, igitur omnis homo est substantia'; `omnis homo currit, igitur omnis homo albus currit', quia tales sunt contingentes `homo est animal', `homo albus est homo' et huiusmodi.
| But the consequences are such that now only 'every animal is substance, therefore every man is substance'; `every man runs, therefore every white man runs', because such are the contingents `a man is an animal', `a white man is a man' and the like.
|- valign="top"
| Ex isto sequuntur aliqua.
| From this other things follow.
|- valign="top"
| Unum est quod non magis est haec consequentia simplex `omne animal currit, igitur omnis homo currit' quam ista `omne animal currit, igitur omnis homo albus currit', nisi forte quia in pluribus est una bona quam alia.
| One thing is that this simple conclusion, `every animal runs, therefore every man runs,' is no more true than that `every animal runs, therefore every white man runs,' unless perhaps because in more there is one good than the other.
|- valign="top"
| Aliud sequitur: quod omnes tales consequentiae sunt bonae `omne animal est ens per se, igitur omnis homo albus est ens per se'; `omnis materia est prior forma, igitur omnis materia informata forma ignis est prior forma ignis'; `omnis homo potest esse sine albedine, igitur omnis homo albus potest esse sine albedine'; `omne ens est per se in genere, igitur omne album est per se in genere' et huiusmodi, quae tamen negantur a multis modernis.
| Another thing follows: that all such inferences are good: 'every animal is a being in itself (per se), therefore every white man is a being in itself'; "every matter has a prior form; therefore, every matter formed into the form of fire is a prior form of fire"; `every man can be without whiteness, therefore every man can be white without whiteness'; `every being is by itself in a genus, therefore every white thing is by itself in a genus' and the like, which, however, are denied by many moderns.
|- valign="top"
| Alia regula est quod a definito distributo ad definitionem distributam est bona consequentia et e converso; sicut sequitur `omne animal rationale mortale est animal, ergo omnis homo est animal', et e converso.
| Another rule is that from the defined distributed to the distributed definition there is a good consequence and vice versa; as it follows that every rational animal is a mortal animal, therefore every man is an animal, and vice versa.
|- valign="top"
| Alia regula est quod a descriptione distributa ad descriptum distributum est bona consequentia et e converso; sicut sequitur `omne animal gressibile bipes est substantia, igitur omnis homo est substantia', et e converso.
| Another rule is that from the distributed description to the distributed described there are good consequences and vice versa; just as it follows that 'every moving animal is a substance, therefore every man is a substance', and vice versa.
|- valign="top"
| {{p|593}} Alia regula est quod a nominis interpretatione distributa ad nomen distributum est bona consequentia et e converso; sicut sequitur `omnis amator sapientiae est studiosus, igitur omnis philosophus est studiosus'.
| Another rule is that from the interpretation of the distributed name to the distributed name there is a good consequence and vice versa; as it follows, `every lover of wisdom is a student, therefore every philosopher is a student'.
|- valign="top"
| Sciendum est quod omnes praedictae regulae intelligendae sunt quando nulla determinatio ponitur in antecedente nisi quae ponitur in consequente et e converso. Aliud est sciendum: quod praedictae regulae intelligendae sunt quando termini supponunt personaliter et significative.
| It must be known that all the aforementioned rules are to be understood when no determination is placed in the antecedent except that which is placed in the consequent and vice versa. Another thing is to be known: that the aforesaid rules are to be understood when the terms assume a personal and significative meaning.
|- valign="top"
| Et ideo tales consequentiae non valent `‘‘omne animal est unum compositum ex signo universali et genere', igitur ``omnis homo est unum compositum ex signo universali et genere'; `‘‘omne animal rationale est unum compositum ex signo universali et definitione, igitur ``omnis homo est unum compositum etc.', et sic de consimilibus, si subiecta antecedentium non supponant personaliter et significative sed materialiter vel simpliciter.
| And therefore such conclusions are not valid: ``every animal is one composite of universal sign and genus'', therefore, ``every man is one composite of universal sign and genus''; ``every rational animal is one compound from a universal sign and definition, therefore ``every man is one compound, etc.'', and so on of the like, if the subjects of the preceding ones do not stand personally and significantly but materially or simply.
|- valign="top"
| Et ideo omnes consequentiae tales non sunt simplices. Alia regula est quod ab uno convertibilium distributo ad relinquunt distributum est bona consequentia et e converso; sicut sequitur `omne creativum est, igitur omnis Deus est' et e converso. Sciendum est quod ista debet intelligi, sicut ceterae, quando scilicet termini supponunt personaliter et significative. Secundo sciendum est quod `proprium' non est nisi unum praedicabile de altero, et tale praedicabile praedicatur aliquando tam de ente quam de non ente; sicut si `risibile' sit idem quod `potens ridere', praedicabitur de homine, sive homo sit sive non sit. Unde sicut haec est vera homine exsistente `homo est risibilis' vel `homo potest ridere', ita erit haec vera homine non exsistente `homo est risibilis', sumpto subiecto pro eo quod potest esse. Aliquando autem proprium non potest prae{{p|594}}dicari nisi de ente, nec supponere nisi pro ente.
| And therefore all such consequences are not simple. Another rule is that from one of the convertibles distributed to the remaining distributed is a good consequence and vice versa; as it follows, `everything is creative, therefore everything is God' and vice versa. It must be known that these must be understood, like the others, when of course the terms assume a personal and significative meaning. Secondly, it must be known that 'property' is only one predicate of another, and such a predicate is sometimes predicated both of a being and of a non-being; just as if `capable of laughing' is the same as `able to laugh,' it will be predicated of a man, whether he exists or not. Hence, just as this is true of an existing man, `man is capable of laughing,' or `man can laugh,' so this will be true of a non-existent man, `man is capable of laughing,' taking the subject for what he can be. Sometimes, however, the property cannot be predicated except of a being, nor can it be supposited except for a being.
|- valign="top"
| Primo modo accipiendo proprium, verum est quod ab uno convertibilium distributo ad aliud distributum est bona consequentia, sed ab uno est consequentia simplex et ab alio consequentia `ut nunc'.
| Taking the property in the first way, it is true that there is a good consequence from the distribution of convertibles from one to another, but from one it is a simple consequence and from another a consequence 'for now'.
|- valign="top"
| Sicut haec est consequentia simplex `omnis homo potest esse, igitur omne risibile potest esse'; haec autem est consequentia ut nunc `omne risibile est possibile, igitur omnis homo est possibilis'.
| Just as this is a simple consequence, `everything can be a man, therefore everything can be able to laugh'; and this is the consequence that now 'everything that is able to laugh is possible, therefore every man is possible'.
|- valign="top"
| Tamen omnes consequentiae in quibus praedicatum non potest competere non-enti sed solum enti sunt simplices. Primum autem, quod dictum est, intelligendum est si subiectum in tali propositione non potest accipi nisi pro his quae sunt, aliter non esset verum; sed loquendo de proprio secundo modo dicto, sic est consequentia utraque simplex.
| However, all the consequences in which the predicate cannot apply to a non-being but only to a being are simple. But first, which has been said, is to be understood if the subject in such a proposition cannot be taken except for what it is, otherwise it would not be true; but speaking of the property in the second mode, so the consequence is simple either way.
|- valign="top"
| Sciendum est etiam quod istae regulae habent intelligi in propositionibus de inesse et de modo sumptis in sensu divisionis vel eis aequivalentibus et non in illis de modo sumptis in sensu compositionis.
| It must also be known that these rules are to be understood in assertoric propositions and of a mode taken in the sense of division or their equivalents, and not in those of a mode taken in the sense of composition.
|- valign="top"
| In talibus enim non sunt generaliter verae; sicut non valet `omne ens esse in actu est necessarium, igitur omnem hominem esse in actu est necessarium'; nec sequitur `omne animal esse asinum est contingens, igitur omnem hominem esse asinum est contingens'; nec sequitur `omne verum esse necessarium est impossibile, igitur omne necessarium esse verum est impossibile'; nec sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est per se primo modo, igitur omne risibile esse animal est per se primo modo; nec sequitur `omnem figuram planam etc. habere tres etc. est indemonstrabile, igitur triangulum habere tres etc. est indemonstrabile', nam in omnibus praedictis antecedentia sunt vera et consequentia falsa.
| For in such cases they are not generally true; just as it does not hold that `every being is necessary to be in actual, therefore it is necessary for every man to be in actual'; nor does it follow that every animal is contingent to be a donkey, therefore every man is contingent to be a donkey; nor does it follow that 'it is impossible for everything true to be necessary, therefore it is impossible for everything necessary to be true'; nor does it follow that every human being is in itself an animal in the first mode, therefore every being that can laugh is an animal in itself in the first mode; nor does it follow that every figure is flat, etc. To have three etc. is indemonstrable, therefore, that a triangle has three, etc. is indemonstrable, for in all the aforesaid the antecedents are true and the consequent false.
|- valign="top"
| Verumtamen sciendum est quod aliquando tales consequentiae sunt bonae et aliquando non; ad quod sciendum, videndum est an modus {{p|595}} non possit competere antecedenti nisi competat consequenti.
| Nevertheless, it must be known that sometimes such consequences are good and sometimes not; for this to be known, we must see whether the mode cannot be appropriate to the antecedent or it is appropriate to the consequent.
|- valign="top"
| Et tunc est consequentia talis bona et cum modo veritatis tenet, non autem cum modo necessitatis vel possibilitatis; et hoc quia consequentia ut nunc ex necessario potest sequi contingens et ex possibili impossibile.
| And then such a consequence good and holds with the mode of truth, but not with the mode of necessity or possibility; and this is because now, the contingent can follow from the necessary, and the impossible from the possible.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter, videndum est an talis modus possit competere uni convertibilium nisi conveniat reliquo; quia si non, a definitione distributa ad definitum distributum et e converso cum tali modo est bona consequentia.
| Similarly, it must be seen whether such a mode can be appropriate to one of the convertibles or it is appropriate to the rest; for if not, from the distributed definition to the distributed defined and vice versa, and in such a way is a good consequence.
|- valign="top"
| Unde sequitur `omnem hominem esse animal est necessarium, igitur omne animal rationale mortale esse hominem est necessarium'. Si autem possit talis modus competere uni convertibilium ita quod non reliquo, non valet talis consequentia formaliter et universaliter.
| Hence it follows that 'it is necessary for every man to be an animal, therefore it is necessary for every rational mortal animal to be a man'. Now, if such a mode can belong to one of the convertibles in such a way that it does not belong to the rest, such a consequence does not hold formally and universally.
|- valign="top"
| Unde per ista duo potest sciri quando tales consequentiae ex talibus modalibus valent et quando non.
| Hence by means of these two things it is possible to know when such consequences from such modals are valid and when they are not.
|- valign="top"
| Alia regula est: a differentia superioris distributa ad inferius distributum est bona consequentia; sicut sequitur `omne sensibile est substantia, igitur omnis homo est substantia'.
| There is another rule: from the difference of the superior distribution to the inferior distribution is a good consequence; as it follows, `everything sensible is a substance, therefore every man is a substance'.
|- valign="top"
| Alia regula est: a convertibili cum superiori distributo ad inferius distributum est bona consequentia; sicut si vigilans vel dormiens sit convertibile cum animali, ista consequentia est bona `omne vigilans vel dormiens est coloratum, igitur omnis homo est coloratus'.
| Another rule is: from the convertible with the superior distribution to the inferior distribution is a good consequence; just as if waking or sleeping is convertible with an animal, this consequence is good: `everything awake or sleeping is colored, therefore every man is colored.'
|- valign="top"
| Alia regula est: a definitione superioris distributa --- et descriptione et nominis interpretatione --- ad inferius distributum est consequentia bona. Alia regula est quod quando contingit inferre definitum vel descriptum vel interpretatum cum distributione, contingit inferre definitionem, descriptionem et nominis interpretationem cum distributione.
| Another rule is: from the superior distributed definition---and the description and the interpretation of the name---to the inferior distributed is a good consequence. Another rule is that when it happens to infer the defined or described or interpreted with distribution, it happens to infer the definition, description and interpretation of the name with distribution.
|- valign="top"
| Et sunt istae regulae intelligendae sicut priores, ita scilicet quod omnes termini supponant personaliter et significative.
| And these rules are to be understood in the same way as the previous ones, so of course that all the terms assume a personal and significant meaning.
 

|}

== Notes ==

{{reflist}}

[[Category:Translated but not checked]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 1

2025-04-21T23:45:20Z

Ragnarr49:

'''GUILLELMI DE OCKHAM SUMMA TOTIUS LOGICAE: PARS III-3''' {{Nextpage||[[../Chapter 2|Chapter 2]]}}

{| border="1" cellpadding="10"
|-
! valign="top" width="45%" | Latin
! valign="top" width="55%" | English
|- valign="top"
| {{p|587}} '''[CAP. 1. DE MODO ARGUENDI PER CONSEQUENTIAS ET ARGUMENTA QUAE NON HABENT FORMAM SYLLOGISTICAM. ET PRIMO: QUOT MODIS DICITUR CONSEQUENTIA?]'''
| '''[Chapter 1. Of the mode of arguing by consequences, and arguments which do not have syllogistic form. And first, how many modes are there of so-called consequences?]'''
|- valign="top"
| Habito de syllogismo in communi et de syllogismo demonstrativo, agendum est de argumentis et consequentiis quae non servant formam syllogisticam. Et primo ponam aliquas distinctiones quae sunt communes aliis consequentiis multis, quamvis non sint enthymemata, ex quibus omnibus faciliter patere poterit studioso quid de omnibus syllogismis non demonstrativis est tenendum.
| Having dealt with the syllogism in general, and with the demonstrative syllogism, we should deal with arguments and consequences which do not conserve the form of the syllogism. And first, let me give some distinctions which are common to many other consequences, although they are not ''enthymeme'', from all of which one could easily show the student what should be held of all non-demonstrative syllogisms.
|- valign="top"
| Prima distinctio est ista quod consequentiarum quaedam est `ut nunc', quaedam est simplex.
| The first distinction is that some consequences are 'as for now', others are absolute.
|- valign="top"
| Consequentia `ut nunc' est quando antecedens pro aliquo tempore potest esse verum sine consequente sed non pro isto tempore. Sicut ista consequentia est ut nunc solum `omne animal currit, igitur Sortes currit', quia pro isto tempore pro quo Sortes est animal, non potest antecedens esse verum sine consequente; et tamen pro aliquo tempore poterit antecedens esse verum sine consequente, quia {{p|588}} quando Sortes erit mortuus, poterit antecedens esse verum consequente exsistente falso.
| An 'as for now' consequence is when the antecedent can be true for some time, without the consequent being true, but not for this time. For example, the consequence 'every animal runs, therefore Socrates runs' is as for now only, because it is true for the time for which Socrates is an animal, the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent being true. And yet for some time the antecedent could be true without the consequent, for when Socrates is dead, the antecedent could be true while the consequent is false.
|- valign="top"
| Consequentia simplex est quando pro nullo tempore poterit antecedens esse verum sine consequente. Sicut ista consequentia est simplex `nullum animal currit, ergo nullus homo currit', quia numquam poterit haec esse vera `nullum animal currit' nisi ista sit vera `nullus homo currit', si formetur.
| An absolute consequence is when there is no time for which the antecedent could be true without the consequent. For example, the consequence 'no animal runs, therefore no man runs' is absolute, for 'no animal runs' could never be true unless 'no man runs' were true, if that proposition were made.
|- valign="top"
| Alia distinctio est quod aliquando consequentia tenet per medium extrinsecum, aliquando per medium intrinsecum.
| Another distinction is that sometimes a consequence holds by an 'extrinsic middle', sometimes by an 'intrinsic middle'.
|- valign="top"
| Illa consequentia tenet per medium intrinsecum quando tenet virtute alicuius propositionis formatae ex eisdem terminis. Sicut ista `Sortes non currit, igitur homo non currit' tenet virtute istius medii `Sortes est homo'; unde nisi haec esset vera `Sortes est homo', non valeret consequentia.
| A consequence holds by an intrinsic middle when it holds by virtue of some proposition formed from the same terms. For example, the consequence 'Socrates does not run, therefore a man does not run' holds in virtue of the middle 'Socrates is a man'. Hence, unless 'Socrates is a man' were true, the consequence would not be valid.
|- valign="top"
| Consequentia autem quae tenet per medium extrinsecum est quando tenet per aliquam regulam generalem quae non plus respicit illos terminos quam alios. Sicut ista consequentia `tantum homo est asinus, igitur omnis asinus est homo' non tenet per aliquam propositionem veram formatam ex istis terminis `homo' et `asinus', sed per istam regulam generalem `exclusiva et universalis de terminis transpositis idem significant et convertuntur'.
| But a consequence which holds by an extrinsic middle is when it holds by some general rule which does not respect those terms any more than any others. For example, 'only a man is a donkey, therefore every donkey is a man' does not hold by some true proposition formed from the terms 'man' and 'donkey', but rather by the general rule 'an exclusive, and a universal proposition made from the transposed terms signify the same thing, and are convertible'.
|- valign="top"
| Et per talia media tenent omnes syllogismi. Et si dicatur contra istam distinctionem quod ista consequentia `Sortes non currit, ergo homo non currit' tenet per istud medium extrinsecum `a singulari ad indefinitam postposita negatione est bona consequentia', quod est medium extrinsecum: Dicendum est quod tenet per istud medium extrinsecum remote et mediate et insufficienter, quia praeter istam regulam generalem requiritur plus, scilicet quod Sortes sit homo; et ideo magis immediate et {{p|589}} magis sufficienter tenet per istud medium `Sortes est homo', quod est medium intrinsecum.
| And all syllogisms hold through such middles. And if it is said, against that distinction, that the consequence 'Socrates does not run, therefore a man does not run' holds through the extrinsic middle 'from a singular to a negation, which negation placed after [the copula] is a good consequence', which is an extrinsic middle, it should be said that it holds by that extrinsic middle remotely, and indirectly, and insufficiently, for beyond that general rule there is more required, namely that Socrates is a man, therefore it more immediately and more sufficiently holds by the middle 'Socrates is a man', which is an intrinsic middle.
|- valign="top"
| Alia distinctio est ista quod consequentiarum quaedam est materialis et quaedam formalis.
| Another distinction is that some consequences are material, others formal.
|- valign="top"
| Consequentia formalis est duplex, quia quaedam tenet per medium extrinsecum, quod respicit formam propositionis. Sicut sunt tales regulae `ab exclusiva ad universalem de terminis transpositis est bona consequentia'; `ex maiore de necessario et minore de inesse sequitur conclusio de necessario' et huiusmodi. Quaedam tenet per medium intrinsecum immediate, et mediate per medium extrinsecum respiciens generales condiciones propositionum, non veritatem vel falsitatem, nec necessitatem vel impossibilitatem, cuiusmodi est ista `Sortes non currit, igitur homo non currit'.
| A formal consequence is of two sorts, for some hold by an extrinsic middle, which respects the form of the proposition. For example, such rules are 'from an exclusive to a universal with transposed terms is a good consequence'; 'from a major de necessario and an assertoric minor there follows a conclusion de necessario', and so on. Some hold by an intrinsic middle directly, and indirectly by an extrinsic middle respecting the general conditions of propositions, not truth or falsity, nor necessity nor impossibility. For example, 'Socrates does not run, therefore a man does not run'.
|- valign="top"
| Consequentia materialis est quando tenet praecise ratione terminorum et <s>non</s><ref>Franz Schupp argues, in 'Zur Textrekonstruktion der formalen und materialen Folgerung in der kritischen Ockham-Ausgabe' (in Jacobi, K., editor, Argumentationstheorie, 213–21) that 'non' should be deleted before 'ratione'. Hat tip to Stephen Read</ref> ratione alicuius medii extrinseci respicientis praecise generales condiciones propositionum; cuiusmodi sunt tales `si homo currit, Deus est'; `homo est asinus, igitur Deus non est' et huiusmodi.
| A material consequence is when it holds precisely by reason of the terms, and by reason of some extrinsic middle respecting precisely the general conditions of propositions. Of this sort are 'if a man runs, God exists', 'a man is a donkey, therefore God does not exist', and so on.
|- valign="top"
| {{p|590}} Quarta distinctio est ista quod aliquando concluditur praecise praedicatum de subiecto, non determinando an praedicatum sit genus vel species vel differentia vel proprium vel aliquid huiusmodi respectu subiecti; sicut quando consequens est tale `homo est animal', `Sortes est albus', `homo est animal rationale'.
| A fourth distinction is that sometimes the predicate is concluded precisely of the subject, not by determining whether the predicate is genus or species or difference or property or something of the sort respecting the subject. For examples, when the consequent is such as 'a man is an animal', 'Socrates is white', 'a man is a rational animal'.
|- valign="top"
| Aliquando concluditur cum tali additione; sicut sunt talia consequentia `animal est genus hominis', `risibile est proprium homini', `animal rationale est definitio hominis' et huiusmodi. Alia distinctio potest esse, et multum convenit cum praecedenti, quia aliquando infertur consequens in quo subiectum supponit personaliter et significative et aliquando infertur consequens in quo subiectum supponit simpliciter vel materialiter et non significative.
| Sometimes it is concluded with such an addtion. For example, consequences such as 'animal is the genus of man', 'being capable of laughter is a property of a man', 'rational animal is the definition of a man', and so on. Another distinction can be, and it greatly agrees with the precedent, because sometimes a consequent is inferred in which the subject supposits personally and significatively, and sometimes a consequent is inferred in which the subject supposits absolutely and materially, and not significatively.
|- valign="top"
| Alia distinctio est quod aliquando infertur consequens quae est propositio universalis, aliquando particularis.
| Another distinction is that sometimes a consequent is inferred which is a universal proposition, sometimes a particlar proposition.
|- valign="top"
| Alia distinctio est quod aliquando infertur consequens quae est propositio negativa, aliquando affirmativa. Alia distinctio est quod consequentiarum quaedam est ex antecedente affirmativo et consequente affirmativo, quaedam ex utroque negativo, quaedam ex antecedente affirmativo et consequente negativo, quaedam e converso.
| Another distinction is that sometimes a consequent is inferred which is a negative proposition, sometimes affirmative. Another distinction is that some consequences are from an affirmative antecedent and an affirmative consequent, some with both negative, some from an affirmative antecedent and an negative consequent, sometimes the other way round.
|- valign="top"
| Alia distinctio est quod aliquando consequens est propositio de inesse, aliquando de modo.
| Another distinction is that sometimes the consequent is an assertoric proposition, sometimes of a mode. 
|}

== Notes ==

{{reflist}}

[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 26

2025-04-21T23:32:09Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 25|Chapter 25]]|[[../Chapter 27|Chapter 27]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 26. QUOD PROPOSITIONES DUBITABILES DE INESSE, HABENTES PRO SUBIECTO NOMEN CONNOTATIVUM VEL RESPECTIVUM VEL HUIUSMODI, QUANDOQUE POSSUNT DEMONSTRARI QUANDOQUE NON.

|Chapter 26. That doubtful assertoric propositions, having for subject a connotative or respective noun or of such a mode, when they can be demonstrated and when not.

|- valign = top
|{{p|552}} Si autem propositio dubitabilis in qua praedicatur esse exsistere per propositionem de inesse vel de possibili habeat pro subiecto nomen connotativum vel respectivum vel negativum vel unum compositum ex multis nominibus, quandoque potest demonstrari, quandoque non.

|Now if there is a dubitable proposition in which existential being is predicated by an assertoric or de possibili proposition, and the proposition has for a subject a connotative, relative, or negative name, or one composed from many names, sometimes it can be demonstrated and sometimes it cannot.

|- valign = top
|Talis enim propositio semper aequivalet uni propositioni in qua praedicatur passio de subiecto, saltem large sumendo passionem. Sicut ista proposito ‘eclipsis est’ aequivalet isti ‘aliquid eclipsatur’; et ista ‘calefactivum est’ aequivalet isti ‘aliquid est calefactivum’; et ista ‘habens tres angulos aequales duobus rectis’ aequivalet isti ‘aliquid est habens tres angulos aequales duobus rectis’.

|For such a proposition is always equivalent to a single proposition in which an attribute is predicated of a subject, at least when we take "attribute" broadly. Thus the proposition, "An eclipse exists" is equivalent to "Something is eclipsed"; and "A heatable thing exists," is equivalent "Something is heatable"; and "Something having three angles equal to two right angles exists," is equivalent to "Something is a thing having three angles equal to two right angles."

|- valign = top
|Et ideo sicut dicendum est de propositionibus quibus aequivalent, quod sunt demonstrabiles vel non sunt demonstrabiles, ita dicendum est de istis. Et si, large accipiendo demonstrationem, dicatur quod quaelibet talis habens pro subiecto aliquid communius quam sit subiectum primum talis passionis est syllogizabilis per primum subiectum tamquam per medium, et per consequens demonstrabilis, potest dici quod quaelibet talis est demonstrabilis, saltem large accipiendo demonstrationem.

|And therefore, just as it is to be said of the propositions to which they are equivalent, that they are demonstrable or not demonstrable, so it is to be said of these. And if, taking demonstration broadly, it is said that every such proposition having for its subject something more common than the first subject of such an attribute is syllogizable through the first subject as through a medium, and consequently demonstrable, it can be said that every such is demonstrable, at least taking demonstration broadly.

|- valign = top
|Si tamen dicatur quod nulla est demonstratio nisi quando maior potest prius tempore cognosci quam conclusio, ita quod maior potest esse nota et conclusio potest ignorari et tamen apprehendi, potest dici quod aliquae tales propositiones sunt demonstrabiles et aliquae non.

|If, however, it is said that there is no demonstration except when the greater can be known prior in time to the conclusion, so that the greater can be known and the conclusion can be ignored and yet apprehended, it can be said that some such propositions are demonstrable and some not.

|- valign = top
|Puta, quando passiones sunt demonstrabiles de suis primis subiectis, tunc sunt tales propositiones demonstrabiles, quando autem passiones non sunt demonstrabiles de suis subiectis primis, tunc non sunt demonstrabiles.

|For example, when attributes are demonstrable from their first subjects, then such propositions are demonstrable, but when attributes are not demonstrable from their first subjects, then they are not demonstrable.

|- valign = top
|Unde ista ‘calefactivum est vel esse potest’ demonstrari non potest, sed tantum scitur per experientiam, sine syllogismo in quo potest maior esse nota et conclusio apprehendi et ignorari.

|Whence this 'heat is or can be' cannot be demonstrated, but is only known through experience, without a syllogism in which the greater known and the conclusion can be grasped and ignored.

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}} [[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 25

2025-04-21T23:28:23Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 24|Chapter 24]]|[[../Chapter 26|Chapter 26]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 25. QUOMODO DIVERSAE QUAESTIONES DIVERSIMODE POSSUNT TERMINARI?.

|Chapter 25. How different questions may be settled in different ways

|- valign = top
|Viso numero quaestionum videndum est quomodo diversae quaestiones diversimode terminari possunt et quomodo illa quae per diversas quaestiones quaeruntur diversimode possunt fieri nota. Et quia, sicut patet ex praecedentibus, quaestio si est est prima quaestio, ideo videndum est prius de quaestione si est. Est autem primo sciendum quod quaestio si est terminatur per hoc quod evidenter cognoscitur quod res est.

|By looking at the number of questions it is necessary to see how different questions can be concluded in different ways and how what is asked by different questions can be known in different ways. And since, as is clear from what has gone before, the question, if there is, is the first question, therefore we must first look at the question, if there is. But it must first be known that the question, if there is one, is terminated by the fact that it is clearly known what the matter is.

|- valign = top
|Quod fit si sciatur propositio in qua esse exsistere per propositionem de inesse vel de possibili praedicatur de subiecto, ideo videndum est quomodo talis propositio evidenter cognosci potest.

|This happens if a proposition is known in which being to exist is predicated of the subject through an assertoric or de possibili proposition, therefore we must see how such a proposition can be clearly known.

|- valign = top
|Et oportet scire quod talis propositio dubitabilis vel habet pro subiecto nomen mere absolutum affirmativum vel habet aliud nomen pro subiecto, puta nomen negativum vel connotativum vel respectivum.

|And it is necessary to know that such a doubtful proposition either has for its subject a merely absolute positive noun or has another noun for its subject, for example a negative or connotative or relative noun.

|- valign = top
|Et propositio mentalis, vel vocalis tali mentali correspondens, in qua subicitur nomen mere absolutum affirmativum, nullo modo cognosci potest evidenter nisi res importata per subiectum intuitive et in se cognoscatur, puta nisi aliquo sensu particulari sentiatur, vel nisi sit intelligibile et non sensibile et ab intellectu videatur illo modo, proportionaliter, quo potentia visiva exterior videt visibile.

|And a mental proposition, or a vocal proposition corresponding to such a mental one, in which a merely absolute affirmative noun is submitted, can in no way be clearly known unless the thing implied by the subject is known intuitively and in itself, for example unless it is felt by some particular sense, or unless it is intelligible and not sensible and is seen by the intellect in that way, proportionally, in which the external visual power sees the visible.

|- valign = top
|Unde nullus potest evidenter cognoscere quod albedo est vel esse potest nisi viderit aliquam albedinem, et sic de aliis. Et propter hoc, quamvis credere possim narrantibus quod leo est vel quod struthio est, et sic de aliis, tamen talia evidenter non cognosco.

|Hence no one can clearly know that he is white or can be unless he sees some whiteness, and so on of others. And for this reason, although I may believe those who tell me that it is a lion or that it is an ostrich, and so on about others, I do not clearly know such things.

|- valign = top
|{{p|551}} Verumtamen ad sciendum evidenter tales propositiones, non oportet sic apprehendere omnia significata per subiectum, sed quandoque sufficit unum solum apprehendere et quandoque plura; et ita talis quaestio si est non poterit terminari nisi per experientiam, hoc est nisi per notitiam visivam, quae est principium experientiae.

|Nevertheless, in order to clearly know such propositions, it is not necessary to grasp everything signified by the subject, but sometimes it is sufficient to grasp only one, and sometimes several; and so, if such a question exists, it cannot be resolved except through experience, that is, except through visual knowledge, which is the principle of experience.

|- valign = top
|Et de tali loquitur Philosophus quando dicit: ‘‘Quemadmodum habemus quia est, sic habemus et quid est.

|And the Philosopher speaks of such when he says: "As we have if it is, so we also have what it is."

|- valign = top
|Unde quantum aliquis scit de aliquo tali quid est, tantum scit si est et e converso. Verbi gratia si sit aliquod compositum ex pluribus partibus et per notitiam intuitivam seu visivam in particulari sciatur quod una pars est et non alia, tantum scitur quod illa pars est pars quidditatis et essentiae rei et non alia; quando autem sentiuntur omnes partes rei, tunc scitur perfecte quod res illa est et quid est res illa.

|Hence, in so far as someone knows what something is like, he only knows if it is, and vice versa. For example, if something is composed of several parts, and through intuitive or visual knowledge it is known in particular that there is one part and not another, it is only known that that part is part of the reality and essence of the thing and not another. but when all the parts of a thing are sensed, then it is perfectly known that the thing is and what that thing is.

|- valign = top
|Et si dicatur quod de Deo scimus quod est et tamen nescimus quid est, dicendum est quod nullam propositionem mentalem in qua subicitur terminus omnino simplex et mere absolutus conveniens Deo vel supponens pro Deo possumus pro statu isto habere; quod si possemus, sciremus de Deo quid est si sciremus si est.

|And if it is said that we know of God that he exists and yet we do not know what he is, it must be said that we cannot have any mental proposition in which a completely simple and merely absolute term appropriate to God or supposing it to be for God is supposited to this state; that if we could, we should know what God is if we knew if he exists.

|- valign = top
|Possumus tamen habere propositionem mentalem in qua subicitur terminus communis Deo et aliis, et ideo de aliquo contento possumus scire si est et quid est, et quantum scimus si est tantum scimus quid est et e converso.

|We can, however, have a mental proposition in which a common term is assigned to God and to others, and therefore we can know about some content if it is and what it is, and as much as we know if it is, we know what it is and vice versa.

|- valign = top
|Ex quibus patet quod talis propositio nullo modo demonstrari potest, nec a priori nec a posteriori; nisi forte dicatur quod propositio particularis, large sumendo demonstrationem, dicatur posse demonstrari.

|From which it is clear that such a proposition cannot be demonstrated in any way, neither a priori nor a posteriori; unless perhaps it is said that a particular proposition, taking demonstration broadly, can be said to be demonstrable.

|- valign = top
|Sicut si haec sit nota praedicto modo ‘omnis albedo est vel esse potest’ et arguatur sic ‘omnis albedo est vel esse potest; aliquis color est albedo; igitur aliquis color est vel esse potest’.

|Just as if this is known in the aforementioned way, 'everything is white or can be', and it is argued thus that 'everything is white or can be; white is some color; therefore there is, or can be, a color.

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}} [[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 25

2025-04-21T23:26:27Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 24|Chapter 24]]|[[../Chapter 26|Chapter 26]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|CAP. 25. QUOMODO DIVERSAE QUAESTIONES DIVERSIMODE POSSUNT TERMINARI?.

|Chapter 25. How different questions may be settled in different ways

|- valign = top
|Viso numero quaestionum videndum est quomodo diversae quaestiones diversimode terminari possunt et quomodo illa quae per diversas quaestiones quaeruntur diversimode possunt fieri nota. Et quia, sicut patet ex praecedentibus, quaestio si est est prima quaestio, ideo videndum est prius de quaestione si est. Est autem primo sciendum quod quaestio si est terminatur per hoc quod evidenter cognoscitur quod res est.

|By looking at the number of questions it is necessary to see how different questions can be concluded in different ways and how what is asked by different questions can be known in different ways. And since, as is clear from what has gone before, the question, if there is, is the first question, therefore we must first look at the question, if there is. But it must first be known that the question, if there is one, is terminated by the fact that it is clearly known what the matter is.

|- valign = top
|Quod fit si sciatur propositio in qua esse exsistere per propositionem de inesse vel de possibili praedicatur de subiecto, ideo videndum est quomodo talis propositio evidenter cognosci potest.

|This happens if a proposition is known in which being to exist is predicated of the subject through a proposition de inesse or de possibili, therefore we must see how such a proposition can be clearly known.

|- valign = top
|Et oportet scire quod talis propositio dubitabilis vel habet pro subiecto nomen mere absolutum affirmativum vel habet aliud nomen pro subiecto, puta nomen negativum vel connotativum vel respectivum.

|And it is necessary to know that such a doubtful proposition either has for its subject a merely absolute positive noun or has another noun for its subject, for example a negative or connotative or relative noun.

|- valign = top
|Et propositio mentalis, vel vocalis tali mentali correspondens, in qua subicitur nomen mere absolutum affirmativum, nullo modo cognosci potest evidenter nisi res importata per subiectum intuitive et in se cognoscatur, puta nisi aliquo sensu particulari sentiatur, vel nisi sit intelligibile et non sensibile et ab intellectu videatur illo modo, proportionaliter, quo potentia visiva exterior videt visibile.

|And a mental proposition, or a vocal proposition corresponding to such a mental one, in which a merely absolute affirmative noun is submitted, can in no way be clearly known unless the thing implied by the subject is known intuitively and in itself, for example unless it is felt by some particular sense, or unless it is intelligible and not sensible and is seen by the intellect in that way, proportionally, in which the external visual power sees the visible.

|- valign = top
|Unde nullus potest evidenter cognoscere quod albedo est vel esse potest nisi viderit aliquam albedinem, et sic de aliis. Et propter hoc, quamvis credere possim narrantibus quod leo est vel quod struthio est, et sic de aliis, tamen talia evidenter non cognosco.

|Hence no one can clearly know that he is white or can be unless he sees some whiteness, and so on of others. And for this reason, although I may believe those who tell me that it is a lion or that it is an ostrich, and so on about others, I do not clearly know such things.

|- valign = top
|{{p|551}} Verumtamen ad sciendum evidenter tales propositiones, non oportet sic apprehendere omnia significata per subiectum, sed quandoque sufficit unum solum apprehendere et quandoque plura; et ita talis quaestio si est non poterit terminari nisi per experientiam, hoc est nisi per notitiam visivam, quae est principium experientiae.

|Nevertheless, in order to clearly know such propositions, it is not necessary to grasp everything signified by the subject, but sometimes it is sufficient to grasp only one, and sometimes several; and so, if such a question exists, it cannot be resolved except through experience, that is, except through visual knowledge, which is the principle of experience.

|- valign = top
|Et de tali loquitur Philosophus quando dicit: ‘‘Quemadmodum habemus quia est, sic habemus et quid est.

|And the Philosopher speaks of such when he says: "As we have if it is, so we also have what it is."

|- valign = top
|Unde quantum aliquis scit de aliquo tali quid est, tantum scit si est et e converso. Verbi gratia si sit aliquod compositum ex pluribus partibus et per notitiam intuitivam seu visivam in particulari sciatur quod una pars est et non alia, tantum scitur quod illa pars est pars quidditatis et essentiae rei et non alia; quando autem sentiuntur omnes partes rei, tunc scitur perfecte quod res illa est et quid est res illa.

|Hence, in so far as someone knows what something is like, he only knows if it is, and vice versa. For example, if something is composed of several parts, and through intuitive or visual knowledge it is known in particular that there is one part and not another, it is only known that that part is part of the reality and essence of the thing and not another. but when all the parts of a thing are sensed, then it is perfectly known that the thing is and what that thing is.

|- valign = top
|Et si dicatur quod de Deo scimus quod est et tamen nescimus quid est, dicendum est quod nullam propositionem mentalem in qua subicitur terminus omnino simplex et mere absolutus conveniens Deo vel supponens pro Deo possumus pro statu isto habere; quod si possemus, sciremus de Deo quid est si sciremus si est.

|And if it is said that we know of God that he exists and yet we do not know what he is, it must be said that we cannot have any mental proposition in which a completely simple and merely absolute term appropriate to God or supposing it to be for God is supposited to this state; that if we could, we should know what God is if we knew if he exists.

|- valign = top
|Possumus tamen habere propositionem mentalem in qua subicitur terminus communis Deo et aliis, et ideo de aliquo contento possumus scire si est et quid est, et quantum scimus si est tantum scimus quid est et e converso.

|We can, however, have a mental proposition in which a common term is assigned to God and to others, and therefore we can know about some content if it is and what it is, and as much as we know if it is, we know what it is and vice versa.

|- valign = top
|Ex quibus patet quod talis propositio nullo modo demonstrari potest, nec a priori nec a posteriori; nisi forte dicatur quod propositio particularis, large sumendo demonstrationem, dicatur posse demonstrari.

|From which it is clear that such a proposition cannot be demonstrated in any way, neither a priori nor a posteriori; unless perhaps it is said that a particular proposition, taking demonstration broadly, can be said to be demonstrable.

|- valign = top
|Sicut si haec sit nota praedicto modo ‘omnis albedo est vel esse potest’ et arguatur sic ‘omnis albedo est vel esse potest; aliquis color est albedo; igitur aliquis color est vel esse potest’.

|Just as if this is known in the aforementioned way, 'everything is white or can be', and it is argued thus that 'everything is white or can be; white is some color; therefore there is, or can be, a color.

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}} [[Category:Untranslated]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 7

2025-04-21T23:10:53Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 6|Chapter 6]]|[[../Chapter 8|Chapter 8]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
|-
! valign="top" width="45%" | Latin
! valign="top" width="55%" | English
|- valign="top"
|{{p|515}} '''CAP. 7. QUOMODO PROPOSITIONES REQUISITAE AD DEMONSTRATIONEM DICUNTUR PER SE?.'''
| '''In what way are propositions required for demonstration called '''''per se''?
|- valign="top"
| Non solum autem quaelibet propositio requisita ad demonstrationem est necessaria vel de omni, sed etiam quaelibet est per se vera. Ut autem sciatur quae propositio est per se vera et quae non, videnda est multiplicitas et aequivocatio huius termini ‘per se’.
| Now not only is every proposition required for a demonstration necessary or ‘of all’, but also every one is true ''per se''. And in order that it be known what proposition is true ''per se'' and what one is not, we should look at the multiplicity and equivocation of the term ''per se''.
|- valign="top"
| Est autem sciendum, secundum Lincolniensem, quod distinctio est inter modos dicendi per se et modum essendi per se et modum causandi per se. Aliquid enim esse per se tripliciter dicitur, eo quod ‘per se’ vel excludit omnem causam, et sic solus Deus est per se, hoc est, solus Deus non habet causam per quam sit; vel excludit causam materialem, et sic intelligentiae carentes materia sunt per se, hoc est, non habent materiam in qua forma earum subsistat; vel excludit subiectum, et sic substantia est per se, hoc est, substantia non habet subiectum in quo subsistat.
| It should be known, according to [[Robert_Grosseteste|Grosseteste]] (Lincoln), that there is a distinction between the modes of saying something ''per se'' and the way of being ''per se'', and the way of causing ''per se''. For anything is said to be ''per se'' in three ways, in that "per se" either excludes all causes, and thus only God is ''per se'', i.e., God alone does not have a cause through which he is; or it excludes a material cause, and thus intelligences lacking matter are ''per se'', i.e., they do not have matter in which their form subsists; or it excludes the subject, and thus substance is ''per se'', i.e., a substance does not have a subject in which it may subsist.
|- valign="top"
| Et si quaeratur, quare tot modis dicitur aliquid esse per se, dicendum quod causa huius non potest assignari nisi voluntarius usus loquentium. Alius est modus causandi per se, quando scilicet aliquid est causa per se alicuius, sicut interfectio est causa per se quare iste intereat.
| And if it is asked why anything is said to be ''per se'' in so many ways, it should be replied that the cause of this cannot be assigned to anything other than the voluntary usage of the speakers. There is another mode of ''per se'', namely when something is a cause of something ''per se'', as the killing is the cause ''per se'' why this person perishes.
|- valign="top"
| Et potest iste modus non tantum competere causae efficienti sed etiam causae finali.
| And this mode can belong not only to an efficient cause, but also with an ultimate cause.
|- valign="top"
| Praeter istos modos ‘per se’ sunt aliqui alii modi dicendi per se, scilicet quando aliquid praedicatur per se de altero. Et sunt duo modi, quorum unus est quando praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti, alius quando subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati.
| Beyond these ways are some other modes of saying ''per se'', namely, when something is predicated ''per se'' of another. And there are two ways: of which one is when the predicate is given in the definition of the subject, the other when the subject is given in the definition of the predicate.
|- valign="top"
| Circa istos autem modos est primo advertendum quod iste terminus ‘per se’, secundum quod praedicatur de propositione, dupliciter accipitur, scilicet stricte et large. Large dicitur propositio per se quando {{p|516}} subiectum cadit in definitione praedicati vel e converso et per se superius ad unum definit reliquum vel definitur per reliquum. Et isto modo haec est per se ‘omnis homo est animal’, et ista ‘omnis homo est rationalis’, et ista ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, et ceterae huiusmodi.
| But concerning these ways it should first be noted that the term ''per se'', according as it is predicated of a proposition, is taken in two ways, namely strictly and broadly. A proposition is called ''per se'' broadly when the subject falls in the definition of the predicate or the converse, and ''per se'' superior to one thing that defines another or is defined by the other. And in this mode this is ''per se'': "Every man is an animal", and "Every man is rational," and "Every man is capable of laughter," and others of this sort.
|- valign="top"
| Aliter accipitur ‘per se’ stricte.
| In the other way, ''per se'' is taken strictly.
|- valign="top"
| Et sic, cum prioribus condicionibus, ad hoc quod propositio sit per se, requiritur quod ipsa sit simpliciter necessaria, ita quod nec potest nec potuit nec poterit esse falsa. Et sic accepto ‘per se’, quamvis secundum opinionem Aristotelis, qui ponit quod generatio et corruptio rerum est perpetua, multae propositiones categoricae et de inesse et de praesenti sint per se, tamen secundum veritatem tales de terminis importantibus praecise res corruptibiles sive creatas non sunt per se, quia non sunt necessariae, sicut dictum est.
| And so, with the prior conditions, for a proposition to be ''per se'' in this way it is required that it be simply necessary, so that it cannot be, never could have been, and never can be false. And taking "per se" in this sense, although according to the opinion of Aristotle (who assumes that generation and destruction of realities are perpetual) many categorical assertoric propositions and the present are ''per se'', still according to the truth, such propositions from terms precisely conveying destructible or created realities are not ''per se'', for they are not necessary, as was said.
|- valign="top"
| Unde sic accepto ‘per se’, haec non est per se ‘omnis homo est animal’, quia potest esse falsa, puta posito quod nullus homo sit. Verumtamen propositiones de possibili et eis aequivalentes, compositae ex talibus terminis, sunt per se.
| Hence, taking "per se" in this sense, the proposition "Every man is an animal," is not ''per se'',  for it can be false - for instance, if it is assumed that no man exists. But still propositions concerning possible things, and propositions equivalent to them, composed from such terms, are ''per se''.
|- valign="top"
| Unde ista est per se ‘omnis homo potest esse animal’, sumpto subiecto pro eo quod potest esse. Viso igitur quod ad hoc quod propositio sit per se, requiritur quod sit necessaria, est ulterius sciendum quod ad hoc quod propositio sit per se, strictissime sumpto hoc termino ‘per se’, requiritur quod sit praedicatio propria et directa.
| Hence "Every man can be an animal," is per se, when the subject is taken to stand for what can be. Therefore, now that we have seen that if a proposition is to be per se it is required that it be necessary, it should be known next that for a proposition to be per se, taking the term "per se" in the strictest sense, it is required that it be a proper and direct predication.
|- valign="top"
| Per quod excluduntur propositiones ubi praedicantur inferiora de superioribus particulariter sumptis et subiecta de suis passionibus et una passio de alia passione.
| Through this are excluded those propositions where the inferior are predicated of the superior taken as particulars, and subjects are predicated of their attributes, and one attribute is predicated of another attribute.
|- valign="top"
| Propter quod tales, quamvis sint necessariae, non sunt per se, strictissime sumpto ‘per se’. Cuiusmodi sunt tales ‘aliquod animal est homo’ vel ‘aliquod animal potest esse homo’; ‘omne risibile est homo vel potest esse homo’; ‘omne risibile est susceptibile disciplinae’ et huiusmodi, quamvis essent necessariae.
| Because of this, such propositions, though they are necessary, are not ''per se'', taking "per se" in the strictest sense. And of this sort are such as "Some animal is a man," or "Some animal can be a man," "Everything that is capable of laughter is a man or can be a man," "Everything that is capable of laughter is capable of being taught" and the like, even though they are necessary.
|- valign="top"
| {{p|517}} Ulterius sciendum est quod aliquid potest cadere in definitione alterius vel in recto vel in obliquo, et secundum hoc potest praedicari vel in recto vel in obliquo. Istis visis dicendum est quod sola illa propositio est per se quae est necessaria, in qua praedicatum definit subiectum vel aliquid per se superius ad subiectum, vel subiectum definit praedicatum vel aliquid per se superius ad praedicatum.
| Next it should be known that something can fall in the definition of another either directly or obliquely, and accordingly it can be predicated directly or obliquely. Having looked at these things, it should be said that a proposition is only ''per se'' necessary, in which the predicate defines the subject or something ''per se'' superior to the subject, or the subject defines the predicate or something ''per se'' superior to the predicate.
|- valign="top"
| Et hoc intelligit Lincolniensis quando dicit: ‘‘Dicitur per se alterum de altero cum quidditas unius essentialiter et non per accidens a quidditate alterius egreditur. Non enim intendit quod praedicatum realiter egrediatur a subiecto vel e converso, illo modo quo effectus efficitur realiter a sua causa, cum subiectum et praedicatum sint termini, quorum neuter est causa alterius.
| And Grosseteste (Lincoln) means this when he says "one thing is predicated ''per se'' of another when the essence (quiddity) of one inherently, and not accidentally, proceeds from the essence of the other," For he does not mean that the predicate really proceeds from the subject, or conversely, in the way in which an effect is really brought about by its cause, since the subject and predicate are terms, of which neither is the cause of the other.
|- valign="top"
| Sed ‘egredi’ hic a quidditate alterius vocat declarare et importare sive significare aliquid quod significatur per reliquum. Est igitur, breviter, intentio Lincolniensis, et etiam Aristotelis quod quando praedicatum per se definit subiectum vel aliquid per se superius ad subiectum, sive sicut definitio sive sicut pars definitionis vel e converso, tunc est propositio per se.
| But he says "proceeds from the quiddity of the other" to explain and convey or signify something that is signified through the other. It is, therefore, briefly, the meaning of Grosseteste, and also of Aristotle, that when the predicate defines the subject ''per se'', or something ''per se'' superior to the subject, either as a definition or as a part of the definition or conversely, then the proposition is ''per se''.
|- valign="top"
| Et est primus modus quando praedicatum definit subiectum vel per se superius ad subiectum. Propter quod tales, si essent necessariae, essent per se ‘omnis homo est animal rationale’, ‘omnis homo est animal’, ‘omnis homo est rationalis’, ‘omnis homo componitur ex corpore et anima’, quia in omnibus istis praedicatum definit subiectum.
| And the first way is when the predicate defines the subject or something ''per se'' superior to the subject. Because of this, such propositions, if they were necessary, would be ''per se'': "Every man is a rational animal," "Every man is an animal," "Every man is rational," "Every man is composed of body and soul," for in all these the predicate defines the subject.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter tales, si essent necessariae, essent per se ‘omnis homo est corpus’, ‘omnis homo est substantia’, ‘omnis homo componitur ex materia et forma’, ‘omnis homo habet materiam’, quia quamvis ista praedicata non definirent istud subiectum, definirent tamen per se superius ad subiectum, et ideo essent per se.
| Similarly, such propositions as these, if they were necessary, would be ''per se'': "Every man is a body," "Every man is a substance," "Every man is composed of matter and form " "Every man has matter." For although these predicates do not define this subject, still they define something ''per se'' superior to the subject, and therefore they would be ''per se''.
|- valign="top"
| {{p|518}} Secundus autem modus est quando subiectum vel per se superius ad subiectum definit praedicatum vel per se inferius ad praedicatum. Unde ista est per se, si sit necessaria, ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, quia in definitione exprimente quid nominis ipsius ‘risibilis’ ponitur ‘homo’.
| But the second mode occurs when the subject or something ''per se'' superior to the subject defines the predicate or something ''per se'' inferior to the predicate. Hence this would be ''per se'', if it were necessary: "Every man is capable of laughter," for "man" is placed in the definition expressing the nominal essence of "something capable of laughter."
|- valign="top"
| Similiter haec est per se, si sit necessaria, ‘omnis homo est susceptibilis contrariorum’, quia in definitione praedicati ponitur ‘substantia’ vel ‘corpus’, quod est per se superius ad hominem; et quia ‘homo’ definit hoc praedicatum ‘esse susceptibile talium contrariorum’, demonstratis aliquibus quae non possunt competere nisi homini, et illud est per se inferius ad hoc commune ‘susceptibile contrariorum’, ideo haec est per se ‘omnis homo est susceptibilis contrariorum’.
| Similarly this is ''per se'', if it is necessary: "Every man is susceptible of contraries" for "substance" or "body," which is ''per se'' superior to man, is given in the definition of the predicate. And it is also ''per se'' since "man" defines the predicate, "being susceptible of such contraries," some contraries being indicated that cannot belong except to man, and "susceptible of such contraries" is ''per se'' inferior to this general term, "susceptible of contraries," therefore the proposition "Every man is susceptible of contraries” is ''per se''.
|- valign="top"
| Ex praedictis claret quod omnes tales sunt per se ‘omnis homo potest dealbari’, ‘omnis materia potest suscipere formam’, ‘omnis creatura potest a Deo creari’, ‘Deus est creativus’, ‘calor est calefactivus’, et ceterae huiusmodi.
| From the abovementioned it is clear that all such as these are ''per se'': "Every man can become pale," "All matter can be susceptible of form " "Every creature can be created by God" "God is capable of creating," "Heat is capable of heating," and others of this sort.
|- valign="top"
| Oportet autem scire quod ista quae dicta sunt, intelligenda sunt de propositionibus affirmativis, nam aliquae negativae sunt per se, in quibus tamen praedicatum non definit subiectum nec e converso.
| But you have to know that what has been said is to be understood concerning affirmative propositions, for some negative propositions are ''per se'', in which, nonetheless, the predicate does not define the subject nor vice versa.
|- valign="top"
| Est autem sciendum quod omnis negativa necessaria, in qua terminus subiectus et praedicatus sunt mere absoluti et non relativi nec connotativi, est per se. Unde haec est per se ‘omnis homo non est asinus’ et haec similiter ‘omnis homo non est albedo’, quamvis secundum opinionem Aristotelis haec non sit per se ‘omnis homo non est quantitas’.
| Now it should be known that every necessary negative proposition in which the subject term and predicate are purely absolute and not relative, nor connotative is ''per se''. Hence, the proposition "Every man is not a donkey" is ''per se'', and similarly "Every man is not a whiteness," though, in Aristotle's opinion, "Every man is not a quantity" is not ''per se''.
|- valign="top"
| Similiter, quando aliqua talis negativa est per se, illud quod per se tamquam proprium praedicatur de uno illorum affirmative, per se praedicatur negative de reliquo. Unde si haec sit per se ‘nullus homo est asinus’ et haec sit per se et primo vera ‘omnis homo est risibilis’, haec erit per se ‘nullus asinus est risibilis’.
| Similarly, when some such negative proposition is ''per se'', that which is ''per se'' predicated as a property and affirmatively of one of these is also predicated ''per se'' negatively of the other. Hence if "no man is a donkey," is ''per se'', and "every man can laugh" is ''per se'' and a first truth, then "no donkey can laugh” will be ''per se''.
|- valign="top"
| Si autem tale praedicatum praedicetur de uno illorum non tamquam proprium sibi, non oportet quod {{P|519}} de alio praedicetur negative, neque per se neque vere. Unde quamvis haec sit per se ‘nullus homo est asinus’, non oportet propter hoc quod haec sit per se ‘nullus homo est susceptibilis contrariorum’ quia haec est per se ‘omnis asinus est susceptibilis contrariorum’.
| But if such a predicate is predicated of one of these not as its property, it does not have to be predicated of the other negatively either ''per se'' or even truly. Hence even though "no man is a donkey" is ''per se'', it is not necessary that "no man is susceptible of contraries" be ''per se'', because "every donkey is susceptible of contraries" is ''per se''.

|}

==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 5

2025-04-21T23:08:58Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 4|Chapter 4]]|[[../Chapter 6|Chapter 6]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
|-
! valign="top" width="45%" | Latin
! valign="top" width="55%" | English
|- valign="top"
| '''CAP. 5. DE PROPRIETATIBUS PROPOSITIONUM AD DEMONSTRATIONEM REQUISITARUM; ET QUOMODO EST EX INCORRUPTIBILIBUS.'''
| '''Chapter 5. On the properties of propositions required for demonstration, and how this is from indestructible things.'''
|- valign="top"
| Istis praemissis videndum est de proprietatibus propositionum ad demonstrationem requisitarum.
| After these preliminaries, we must look at the properties of propositions required for demonstration.
|- valign="top"
| Illarum autem proprietatum quaedam sunt communes omnibus propositionibus requisitis ad demonstrationem, quaedam sunt propriae conclusionibus, quaedam sunt propriae praemissis, quaedam sunt propriae principiis non ingredientibus demonstrationem.
| And of those properties, certain ones are common to all propositions required for demonstration, others are proper to conclusions, others are proper to premisses, and others are proper to principles not involved in demonstration.
|- valign="top"
| Una proprietas communis omni propositioni requisitae ad de{{p|512}}monstrationem est necessitas.
| One property common to every proposition required for demonstration is necessity.
|- valign="top"
| Nulla enim propositio requisita ad demonstrationem est contingens vel impossibilis, sed quaelibet est necessaria. Quod enim conclusio sit necessaria, patet ex definitione demonstrationis, quia demonstratio est syllogismus faciens scire propositionem necessariam, igitur conclusio est necessaria. Sed necessarium, quamvis possit inferri ex contingentibus vel impossibilibus, non tamen potest sciri per contingentia vel impossibilia, igitur necessario praemissae, propter quas scitur conclusio, sunt necessariae.
| For no proposition required for demonstration is contingent or impossible, but every one is necessary. For that the conclusion is necessary, is clear from the definition of demonstration, for demonstration is a syllogism producing knowledge of necessary propositions. Therefore the conclusion is necessary. But the necessary, although it could be inferred from contingent or impossible [propositions], still cannot be known from contingent or impossible [propositions], therefore necessarily the premisses, on account of which the conclusion is known, are necessary.
|- valign="top"
| Sed propositiones rectificantes demonstrationem sunt priores et notiores praemissis, igitur illae sunt necessariae, et ita patet quod omnes propositiones requisitae ad demonstrationem sunt necessariae, et sicut sunt necessariae ita sunt perpetuae et incorruptibiles.
| But propositions ensuring the correctness of demonstration are prior and better known than the premisses. Therefore they are necessary, and so it is clear that all propositions required for demonstration are necessary, and just as they are necessary, so they are perpetual and incorruptible.
|- valign="top"
| Quod non est sic intelligendum quod propositiones illae sunt quaedam entia perpetua et incorruptibilia.
| This should not be understood as [meaning] that these propositions are sorts of perpetual and incorruptible beings.
|- valign="top"
| Hoc enim falsum est. Solus enim Deus est perpetuus et incorruptibilis, nec aliquid aliud a Deo potest esse simpliciter perpetuum et incorruptibile quin per aliquam potentiam posset fieri non-ens.
| For this is false. For only God is perpetual and incorruptible. Nor can anything other than God be absolutely perpetual and incorruptible, but that it could by some power be made into a non-being.
|- valign="top"
| Propter quod sciendum quod ‘necessarium’, ‘perpetuum’ et ‘incorruptibile’ dupliciter accipiuntur. Uno modo dicitur aliquid necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibile quia per nullam potentiam potest incipere vel desinere esse; et sic solus Deus est perpetuus, necessarius et incorruptibilis.
| On account of this it should be known that ‘necessary’, ‘perpetual’ and ‘incorruptible’ are taken in two senses. In one sense something is called ‘necessary’, ‘perpetual’ and ‘incorruptible’ because through no power can it begin or cease to be. And thus God alone is perpetual, necessary and incorruptible.
|- valign="top"
| Aliter dicitur necessarium, perpetuum et incorruptibile propositio quae non potest esse falsa; quae scilicet est ita vera quod, si formetur, non est falsa sed vera tantum. Et isto modo demonstratio est necessariorum, perpetuorum et incorruptibilium, hoc est propositionum quae non possunt esse falsae sed tantum verae.
| Otherwise a proposition is called necessary, perpetual and incorruptible when it cannot be false; namely true in the sense that if it is formed, it is not false but true only. And in this way demonstration is of necessary, perpetual and incorruptible propositions, i.e. of propositions which cannot be false, but only true.
|- valign="top"
| Ex quo patet quod quamvis repugnet dictis Aristotelis, tamen secundum veritatem nulla propositio de illis quae important praecise res corruptibiles, mere affirmativa et mere categorica et mere de praesenti, potest esse principium {{p|513}} vel conclusio demonstrationis, quia quaelibet talis est contingens.
| From which it is clear that although it is incompatible with what Aristotle says, still in truth no proposition of those things that convey precisely corruptible things, purely affirmative and purely categorical and purely present [tense], can be the principle or conclusion of demonstration, because any such a proposition is contingent.
|- valign="top"
| Si enim aliqua talis esset necessaria, hoc maxime videretur de tali ‘homo est animal rationale’. Sed haec est contingens, quia sequitur ‘homo est animal rationale, igitur homo est animal’, et ultra ‘igitur homo componitur ex corpore et anima sensitiva’. Sed haec est contingens, quia si nullus homo esset, ipsa esset falsa propter falsam implicationem, quia implicaretur aliquid componi ex corpore et anima, quod tunc foret falsum.
| For if any such were necessary, then especially it would seem to be in a case such as ‘a man is a rational animal’. But this is contingent, because ‘a man is a rational animal, therefore some man is an animal’ follows, and furthermore ‘therefore some man is composed from a body and a sensitive soul’. But this is contingent, because if there were no man, that proposition would be false on account of a false implication, because it would be implied that something was composed from a body and soul, which would then be false.
|- valign="top"
| Nec valet dicere quod ista aequivalet isti ‘si homo est, homo est animal rationale’, quia haec est condicionalis et non categorica. Et ita stat primum dictum, quod nulla talis mere categorica et mere de praesenti est necessaria.
| Nor is it valid to say that this is equivalent to ‘if a man exists, a man is a rational animal’, for this is conditional and not categorical. And thus holds the first thing we said, that no such purely categorical, and purely present tense proposition is necessary.
|- valign="top"
| Et ideo dico quod nulla talis potest esse principium vel conclusio demonstrationis. Hoc tamen non obstante dicendum est quod multae propositiones compositae ex talibus terminis possunt esse principia vel conclusiones demonstrationis, quia propositiones condicionales et de possibili et aequivalentes eis possunt esse necessariae. Haec enim simpliciter est necessaria ‘si homo est, animal est’; et ista ‘si homo ridet, animal ridet’; et ista ‘omnis homo potest ridere’, si subiectum stet pro his quae possunt esse.
| And therefore I say that no such proposition can be a principle or conclusion of demonstration. Notwithstanding this, it must be said that many propositions composed from such terms can be principles or conclusions of demonstration, for conditional propositions and those de possibili and their equivalents can be necessary. For this is simply necessary: "If it is a man, it is an animal," and this, "If a man laughs, an animal laughs," as well as this, "Every man can laugh," if the subject stands for those that can be.
|- valign="top"
| Et eodem modo propositiones aequivalentes eis sunt necessariae. Et ex isto patet quomodo, non obstante quod genera et species et quaecumque universalia distincta a cognitione Dei sunt simpliciter corruptibilia sic quod possunt esse nihil, tamen de eis possunt fieri demonstrationes et scientiae, propter hoc quod, non obstante quod possunt simpliciter destrui, tamen de eis possunt formari propositiones necessariae, quae possunt sciri scientia proprie dicta.
| And in the same way propositions equivalent to these are necessary. And from this it is clear in what way, notwithstanding that genera and species and every universal distinct from the cognition of God are destructible taken simply, so that they can be nothing, demonstrations and sciences can still be produced about them, because, even though they can be destroyed taken simply, necessary propositions can still be formed about them, which can be known by knowledge properly so-called.
|- valign="top"
| Ex isto etiam patet quomodo de contingentibus potest esse scientia; quia secundum quod veniunt in demonstrationem necessaria sunt, hoc est propositiones formatae de terminis importantibus talia contingentia quae veniunt in demonstrationem sunt necessariae, quae non sunt mere {{p|514}} de praesenti et de inesse, categoricae et affirmativae, sed vel sunt negativae vel hypotheticae vel de possibili vel alio modo, vel aequivalentes eis.
| From this it is clear in what way there can be knowledge about contingent things. For according as they enter into demonstration they are necessary, i.e., propositions formed from terms conveying such contingent things that enter into demonstration are necessary, which are not about the present and assertoric, and are categorical and affirmative alone, but are either negative or hypothetical or de possibili or some other mode, or equivalent to these.
|}

==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 2

2025-04-21T23:05:09Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 1|Chapter 1]]|[[../Chapter 3|Chapter 3]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|{{p|508}} CAP. 2. QUI TERMINI INGREDIUNTUR DEMONSTRATIONEM?.

|CHAPTER 2 What terms are included in a demonstration?

|- valign = top
|Ex quo omnis demonstratio est syllogismus, necesse est omnem demonstrationem tres terminos ad eius constitutionem requirere. Non omnes autem termini possunt ingredi demonstrationem affirmativam ex propositionibus mere de inesse et mere de praesenti. Illi enim termini qui de nullo possunt praedicari nisi contingenter vel falso, ipsis sumptis significative, numquam possunt significative sumpti esse partes demonstrationis talis.

|From the fact that every demonstration is a syllogism, it is necessary that every demonstration requires three terms in its constitution. But not all terms can be included in an affirmative demonstration made up from propositions purely assertoric and purely in the present tense. For those terms that are predicated of nothing except contingently or falsely, when they are taken significatively, can never be taken significatively to be parts of such a demonstration.

|- valign = top
|Et ideo tales termini ‘chimaera’, ‘corpus [infini]tum’, ‘creatura infinita’ et huiusmodi non possunt, si significative sumantur, esse termini in demonstratione tali, quamvis possint in demonstratione negativa, quia etiam negative possunt de aliis necessario praedicari.

|And therefore such terms as "chimera" "infinite body" "infinite creature" and the like, if they are taken significatively, cannot be terms in such a demonstration, although they could be in a negative demonstration—for they can also be predicated necessarily of other things negatively.

|- valign = top
|Similiter, quamvis tales termini ‘album’, ‘nigrum’, ‘calidum’ et huiusmodi non possint esse partes propositionum necessariarum mere de inesse et mere de praesenti affirmativarum, quia tamen possunt esse partes propositionum de possibili necessariarum, ideo tales demonstrationem ingredi possunt.

|Similarly, although such terms as "white " "black " "hot," and the like could not be parts of necessary affirmative propositions, purely assertoric and purely present tense, such terms can be included in demonstration because they can still be parts of propositions de possibili of necessary things.

|- valign = top
|Unde breviter, secundum diversitatem demonstrationum, de qua dicetur inferius, omnes termini aliquam demonstrationem ingredi possunt; sed non omnes ingredi possunt demonstrationem potissimam, de qua inferius dicetur.

|Briefly therefore, according to the diversity of demonstrations, which we will talk about below, all terms can be included in some demonstration; but not all terms can be included in the highest sort of demonstration, which we will talk about below.

|- valign = top
|Termini autem illi qui demonstrationem potissimam ingredi possunt, sunt praecise subiectum, passio et definitio. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod passio non est aliqua res inhaerens subiecto, illo modo quo calor inest igni, sed passio est quoddam praedicabile, distinctum a subiecto, et realiter importans illud idem quod [importat/important] subiectum et aliquid plus, vel saltem illud idem alio modo.

|Now those terms that can be included in the highest sort of demonstration are precisely: subject, attribute, and definition For evidence of which, you should know that an attribute is not some reality inhering in a subject, in the way that heat inheres in fire, but an attribute is a certain predicable, distinct from the subject, and really conveying the same thing that the subject conveys, and also something more, or at least, if the same, in a different way.

|- valign = top
|Et eodem modo est de definitione: ut isti termini ex quibus componitur demonstratio mentalis sint ita distinctae res exsistentes in mente {{p|508}} sicut voces correspondentes eis in demonstratione vocali sunt distinctae voces in aere, de quibus diffusius dicetur inferius.

|And it is the same way with definition, so that those terms from which a mental demonstration is composed are distinct realities existing in the mind, just as utterances corresponding to them in a vocal demonstration are distinct utterances in the air. (Of which more detail below).

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 2

2025-04-21T23:04:38Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 1|Chapter 1]]|[[../Chapter 3|Chapter 3]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|{{p|508}} CAP. 2. QUI TERMINI INGREDIUNTUR DEMONSTRATIONEM?.

|CHAPTER 2 What terms are included in a demonstration?

|- valign = top
|Ex quo omnis demonstratio est syllogismus, necesse est omnem demonstrationem tres terminos ad eius constitutionem requirere. Non omnes autem termini possunt ingredi demonstrationem affirmativam ex propositionibus mere de inesse et mere de praesenti. Illi enim termini qui de nullo possunt praedicari nisi contingenter vel falso, ipsis sumptis significative, numquam possunt significative sumpti esse partes demonstrationis talis.

|From the fact that every demonstration is a syllogism, it is necessary that every demonstration requires three terms in its constitution. But not all terms can be included in an affirmative demonstration made up from propositions purely assertoric and purely in the present tense. For those terms that are predicated of nothing except contingently or falsely, when they are taken significatively, can never be taken significatively to be parts of such a demonstration.

|- valign = top
|Et ideo tales termini ‘chimaera’, ‘corpus [infini]tum’, ‘creatura infinita’ et huiusmodi non possunt, si significative sumantur, esse termini in demonstratione tali, quamvis possint in demonstratione negativa, quia etiam negative possunt de aliis necessario praedicari.

|And therefore such terms as "chimera" "infinite body" "infinite creature" and the like, if they are taken significatively, cannot be terms in such a demonstration, although they could be in a negative demonstration—for they can also be predicated necessarily of other things negatively.

|- valign = top
|Similiter, quamvis tales termini ‘album’, ‘nigrum’, ‘calidum’ et huiusmodi non possint esse partes propositionum necessariarum mere de inesse et mere de praesenti affirmativarum, quia tamen possunt esse partes propositionum de possibili necessariarum, ideo tales demonstrationem ingredi possunt.

|Similarly, although such terms as "white " "black " "hot," and the like could not be parts of necessary affirmative propositions, purely assertoric (of inherence) and purely present tense, such terms can be included in demonstration because they can still be parts of propositions de possibili of necessary things.

|- valign = top
|Unde breviter, secundum diversitatem demonstrationum, de qua dicetur inferius, omnes termini aliquam demonstrationem ingredi possunt; sed non omnes ingredi possunt demonstrationem potissimam, de qua inferius dicetur.

|Briefly therefore, according to the diversity of demonstrations, which we will talk about below, all terms can be included in some demonstration; but not all terms can be included in the highest sort of demonstration, which we will talk about below.

|- valign = top
|Termini autem illi qui demonstrationem potissimam ingredi possunt, sunt praecise subiectum, passio et definitio. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod passio non est aliqua res inhaerens subiecto, illo modo quo calor inest igni, sed passio est quoddam praedicabile, distinctum a subiecto, et realiter importans illud idem quod [importat/important] subiectum et aliquid plus, vel saltem illud idem alio modo.

|Now those terms that can be included in the highest sort of demonstration are precisely: subject, attribute, and definition For evidence of which, you should know that an attribute is not some reality inhering in a subject, in the way that heat inheres in fire, but an attribute is a certain predicable, distinct from the subject, and really conveying the same thing that the subject conveys, and also something more, or at least, if the same, in a different way.

|- valign = top
|Et eodem modo est de definitione: ut isti termini ex quibus componitur demonstratio mentalis sint ita distinctae res exsistentes in mente {{p|508}} sicut voces correspondentes eis in demonstratione vocali sunt distinctae voces in aere, de quibus diffusius dicetur inferius.

|And it is the same way with definition, so that those terms from which a mental demonstration is composed are distinct realities existing in the mind, just as utterances corresponding to them in a vocal demonstration are distinct utterances in the air. (Of which more detail below).

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 67

2025-04-20T21:19:56Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 66|Chapter 66]]|[[../Chapter 68|Chapter 68]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 67. De syllogismo facto ex exceptivis

||Chapter 67 On syllogisms made from exceptives.

|- valign = top.
||Circa exceptivas autem est sciendum quod ex omnibus exceptivis in prima figura non sequitur conclusio. Sicut non sequitur 'omnis homo praeter Sortem currit; omne animal praeter animal irrationale est homo; igitur omne animal praeter animal irrationale currit'. Similiter ex maiore exceptiva et minore de inesse non sequitur generaliter conclusio, quia non sequitur 'omnis substantia praeter substantiam corpoream est substantia incorporea; homo est substantia; igitur homo est substantia incorporea'. Similiter in secunda figura et in tertia non valet.

||Regarding exceptives, however, it should be noted that no conclusion follows from all exceptives in the first figure. Just as it does not follow that 'every man except Socrates runs; every animal except an irrational animal is a man; therefore every animal except an irrational animal runs'. Similarly, no conclusion generally follows from the major exceptive and the minor assertoric, because it does not follow that 'every substance except a corporeal substance is an incorporeal substance; man is a substance; therefore man is an incorporeal substance'. Similarly, it does not hold in the second figure and in the third.

|- valign = top
||Per praedicta potest sciri quomodo syllogizandum est ex ailiis propositionibus habentibus plures exponentes.

||Through the above it can be known how to syllogize from other propositions having several exponents.

|- valign = top
||Per praedicta etiam a principio istius tractatus potest sciri quomodo differenter syllogizandum est ex illis de modo et aliis propositionibus habentibus plures exponentes quando propositiones sunt de praesenti, quando de praeterito, quando de futuro, quando de recto et quando de obliquo. Et ista de syllogismis ad praesens sufficiant.

||By the foregoing, also from the beginning of this treatise, it can be known how differently one should syllogize from modal propositions of and other propositions having several exponents when the propositions are about the present, when about the past, when about the future, when in the direct (nominative case) and when in an oblique case. And these things about syllogisms will suffice for the present.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 65

2025-04-20T21:18:02Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 64|Chapter 64]]|[[../Chapter 66|Chapter 66]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 65. De syllogismo facto ex propositionibus habentibus plures exponentes

||Chapter 65. On syllogisms made from propositions having several exponents.

|- valign = top
||Postquam visum est quomodo syllogismus fit ex propositionibus tam de inesse quam de modo quae exponentes places non habent, videndum est quomodo syllogismus fit ex propositionibus plures exponentes habentibus, cuiusmodi sunt exclusivae, exceptivae, reduplicativae et huiusmodi, de quibus dictum est prius<ref>In parte II, cap. 16-18.</ref>.

||After it has been seen how a syllogism is formed from assertoric propositions and of a mode that do not have exponents, we must see how a syllogism is formed from propositions that have several exponents, such as exclusive, exceptive, reduplicative, and the like, which were discussed earlier<ref>In Part II, Chapter 16-18.</ref>.

|- valign = top
||Pro quibus utendum est ista regula generali, quod quandocumque quaelibet exponens conclusionis vel ipsa conclusio sequitur ex aliquibus exponentibus praemissarum vel ex aliqua exponente unius praemissae et alia praemissa, semper est syllogismus bonus, et aliter non. Et ideo ad videndum an talis discursus sit bonus vel non, oportet diligenter videre quae sunt exponentes talium praemissarum et conclusionis et quomodo se habent secundum consequentiam ad invicem. Sicut ad videndum an iste discursus sit bonus ‘omnis homo, in quantum homo, est risibilis; animal est homo; igitur animal, in quantum homo, est risibile', oportet videre exponentes maioris et conclusionis. Unde exponentes maioris sunt istae 'omnis homo est homo', 'omnis homo est risibilis', 'si aliquid est homo, ipsum est risibile’. Exponentes conclusionis sunt istae 'animal est homo', 'animal est risibile', 'omnis homo est risibilis', 'si aliquid est homo, ipsum est risibile’. Nunc autem sequitur 'omnis homo est homo, igitur animal est homo’. Similiter sequitur 'omnis homo est risibilis, {{p|498}} igitur animal est risibile'. Aliae duae exponentes conclusions sunt exponentes maioris. Ex quo patet quod omnes exponentes conclusionis sequuntur ex antecedente, et ita discursus est bonus. Et ideo quilibet talis discursus est bonus 'quilibet logicus, in quantum logicus, differt a grammatico; grammaticus est logicus; igitur grammaticus, in quantum logicus, differt a grammatico’; sed maior est falsa.

||For which we must use this general rule, that whenever any exponent of the conclusion or the conclusion itself follows from some exponents of the premises or from some exponent of one premise and another premise, it is always a good syllogism, and otherwise not. And therefore, to see whether such a discourse is good or not, it is necessary to carefully see what the exponents of such premises and conclusion are and how they relate to each other in terms of consequence. Just as to see whether this discourse is good ‘every man, insofar as he is a man, is able to laugh; an animal is a man; therefore, an animal, insofar as it is a man, is able to laugh’, it is necessary to see the exponents of the major and the conclusion. Hence the exponents of the major are these 'every man is a man', 'every man is able to laugh', 'if something is a man, it is able to laugh'. The exponents of the conclusion are these 'animal is a man', 'animal is able to laugh', 'every man is able to laugh', 'if something is a man, it is able to laugh'. Now, however, it follows 'every man is a man, therefore an animal is a man'. Similarly, it follows 'every man is able to laugh, therefore an animal is able to laugh'. The other two exponents of the conclusions are exponents of the major. From which it is clear that all the exponents of the conclusion follow from the antecedent, and thus the discourse is good. And therefore, any such discourse is good: 'every logician, insofar as he is logical, differs from a grammarian; a grammarian is logical; therefore, a grammarian, insofar as he is logical, differs from a grammarian'; but the major is false.

|- valign = top
||Ex isto patet quod semper in prima figura ex maiore reduplicativa et minore reduplicativa vel non reduplicativa sequitur conclusio reduplicativa. Sicut sequitur 'omnis homo, in quantum rationalis, est susceptibilis disciplinae; animal est homo; igitur animal, in quantum rationale, est susceptibile disciplinae'; 'omne agens, in quantum agens, differt a passo; aliquod passum est agens; igitur aliquod passum, in quantum agens, differt a passo'. Et non solum sequitur conclusio reduplicativa, sed etiam sequitur conclusio sine reduplicatione, quae est praeiacens illius reduplicativae. Quod autem omnes tales syllogismi sunt boni, patet, quia, sicut inductive patet, quaelibet exponens consequentis sequitur ex aliqua exponente antecedentis vel ex aliqua exponente et minore, vel est eadem cum aliqua exponente maioris.

||From this it is clear that in the first figure a reduplicative conclusion always follows from a reduplicative major and a reduplicative or non-reduplicative minor. As it follows: 'every man, insofar as he is rational, is susceptible to discipline; an animal is a man; therefore an animal, insofar as he is rational, is susceptible to discipline'; 'every agent, insofar as he is an agent, differs from the subject; some subject is an agent; therefore some subject, insofar as he is agent, differs from the subject'. And not only does a reduplicative conclusion follow, but also a conclusion without reduplication follows, which is prior to that reduplicative. But that all such syllogisms are good is clear, because as is clear inductively, any exponent of the consequent follows from some exponent of the antecedent or from some exponent and a minor or is the same as some exponent of the major.

|- valign = top
||Sed si minor fuerit reduplicativa et maior non, quamvis sequatur conclusio sine reduplicatione, non tamen sequitur conclusio cum reduplicatione. Unde non sequitur 'omne susceptibile disciplinae est album; omnis homo, in quantum rationalis, est susceptibilis disciplinae; igitur omnis homo, in quantum rationalis, est albus', quia ista exponens consequentis 'si aliquid est rationale, ipsum est album' non sequitur ex aliqua exponente minoris nec etiam cum maiore, sicut inductive patet.

||But if the minor is reduplicative and the major is not, although a conclusion follows without reduplication, a conclusion with reduplication does not follow. Hence it does not follow that 'everything susceptible to discipline is white; every man, insofar as he is rational, is susceptible to discipline; therefore every man, insofar as he is rational, is white', because the exponent of the consequent 'if something is rational, it is white' does not follow from any exponent of the minor nor even with the major, as is clear inductively.

|- valign = top
||Quae dicta sunt, intelligenda sunt quando reduplicatio proprie sumitur et manet non negata. Si enim reduplicatio fuerit negata in maiore et affirmata in conclusione, non valet discursus. Unde quamvis iste discursus sit bonus 'omnis homo, in quantum albus, non est musicus; Sortes est homo; igitur Sortes, in quantum albus, non est musicus', tamen iste discursus non valet 'nullus homo, in quantum albus, est musicus; Sortes est homo; igitur Sortes, in quantum albus, non est musicus'; sed {{p|499}} sequitur ista conclusio 'igitur Sortes non est musicus in quantum est albus’.

||What has been said is to be understood when the reduplication is properly taken and remains unnegated. For if the reduplication is negated in the major and affirmed in the conclusion, the discourse is not valid. Hence, although this discourse is good 'every man, insofar as he is white, is not a musician; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates, insofar as he is white, is not a musician', yet this discourse is not valid 'no man, insofar as he is white, is a musician; Socrates is a man; therefore Socrates, insofar as he is white, is not a musician'; but this conclusion follows 'therefore Socrates is not a musician insofar as he is white'.

|- valign = top
||In secunda autem figura, quaecumque praemissa sumatur cum reduplicatione et alia sine reduplicatione, non sequitur conclusio reduplicativa. Sicut non sequitur 'omnis homo, in quantum animal, est sensibilis; nullum album est sensibile; igitur omne album, in quantum animal, non est homo’.

||But in the second figure, whatever premise is taken with reduplication and another without reduplication, the reduplicative conclusion does not follow. Just as it does not follow that 'every man, as an animal, is sensible; no white thing is sensible; therefore, every white thing, as an animal, is not a man'.

|- valign = top
||Nec potest syllogismus reduci in primam figuram per conversionem, quia reduplicativa non converitur in reduplicativam. Non enim sequitur ‘omnis homo, in quantum animal, est sensibilis, igitur aliquod sensibile, in quantum animal, est homo’, quia conditionalis exponens consequentis non sequitur ad conditionalem exponentem antecedentis, nec ad aliquam aliarum, sicut manifeste patet.

||Nor can a syllogism be reduced to the first figure by conversion, because a reduplicative does not convert into a reduplicative. For it does not follow that ‘every man, insofar as he is an animal, is sensible, therefore something sensible, insofar as it is an animal, is a man’, because the conditional exponent of the consequent does not follow to the conditional exponent of the antecedent, nor to any of the others, as is clearly evident.

|- valign = top
||Quamvis autem in secunda figura ex talibus piopositionibus non sequatur conclusio reduplicativa, sequitur tamen conclusio in qua negatur reduplicatio, et per consequens non est reduplicativa. Unde bene sequitur 'omnis homo, in quantum animal, est sensibilis; nullum album est sensibile; igitur nullum album, in quantum animal, est homo', quia ex praedictis praemissis sequitur ista conclusio 'nullum album est homo', et sequitur 'nullum album est homo, igitur nullum album, in quantum animal, est homo’.

||Although in the second figure a reduplicative conclusion does not follow from such premises, a conclusion nevertheless follows in which reduplication is denied, and consequently it is not reduplicative. Hence it follows well that 'every man, as an animal, is sensible; no white man is sensible; therefore no white man, as an animal, is a man', because from the above premises the conclusion 'no white man is a man' follows, and it follows that 'no white man is a man, therefore no white man, as an animal, is a man'.

|- valign = top
||Si autem omnes praemissae sunt reduplicativae, ita quod in utraque reduplicatio cadens super idem sit affirmativa, sequitur conclusio reduplicativa.

||But if all the premises are reduplicative, so that in each case the reduplicative falling on the same thing is affirmative, a reduplicative conclusion follows.

|- valign = top
||In tertia autem figura, si maior universalis fuerit reduplicativa et alia non reduplicativa, sequitur conclusio reduplicativa, Sequitur enim 'omnis homo, in quantum animal, est sensibilis; omnis homo est albus; igitur aliquod album, in quantum animal, est sensibile’, quia conversa minore {{p|500}} fit syllogismus regulatus per dici de omni in prima figura, Sed si minor fuerit reduplicativa, non sequitur conclusio reduplicativa. Non enim sequitur 'omnis homo est albus; omnis homo, in quantum animal, est sensibilis; igitur aliquod sensibile, in quantum animal, est album’.

|| In the third figure, however, if the major universal is reduplicative and the other non-reduplicative, a reduplicative conclusion follows. For it follows 'every man, as an animal, is sensible; every man is white; therefore something white, as an animal, is sensible', because when the minor is converted, it becomes a syllogism governed by 'dici de omni' in the first figure. But if the minor is reduplicative, a reduplicative conclusion does not follow. For it does not follow: 'every man is white; every man, as an animal, is sensible; therefore something sensible, as an animal, is white'.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 64

2025-04-20T21:16:33Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 63|Chapter 63]]|[[../Chapter 65|Chapter 65]]}} 

{| border="1" cellpadding = 10
|-
! valign="top" width="45%" | Latin
! valign="top" width="55%" | English
|- valign="top"
| '''[Cap. 64. De mixtione propositionum modalium aliarum a praedictis quatuor]'''
| '''[Chapter 64. On the mixture of modal propositions other than the previous four]'''
|- valign="top"
| Si fiat mixtio ex propositionibus modalibus aliorum modorum ab illis quatuor, aut utraque propositio sumitur in sensu compositionis sive in tali sensu per quem denotatur modus verificari de sua de inesse, aut sub alio sensu. Si primo modo, raro valet mixtio, quia numquam valet nisi quando tales modi non possunt verificari de praemissis nisi aliquis eorum verificetur de conclusione sequente ex praemissis. Quod non semper tenet, quia quamvis una praemissa sit scita et alia credita, non oportet conclusionem sciri. Et ita est de aliis.
| If a mixture of modal propositions in other modes than the previous four is made, either both propositions are taken in the sense of composition, or in such a sense through which the mode is denoted to be verified of its assertoric, or in another sense.  If in the first mode, the mixture will rarely be valid, for it is never valid unless such modes cannot be verified of the premises unless one of them is verified of the conclusion following from the premises.  This does not always hold, for although one proposition is known and another believed, the conclusion does not have to be known.  And so for the others.
|- valign="top"
| Si autem praemissae sumantur in alio sensu, tunc si minor inferat suam de inesse in prima figura, semper conclusio sequitur in eadem figura de eodem modo de quo est maior. Sicut sequitur 'omnis homo per se est animal; aliquod album scitur esse homo; igitur aliquod album per se est animal', quia ex eadem maiore et illa de inesse sequitur eadem conclusio; et per consequens eadem conclusio sequitur ex maiore et antecedente ad illam de inesse.
| But if the premisses are taken in another sense, then if the minor implies its assertoric in the first figure, the conclusion always follows in the same figure of the same mode of which it is the major.  For example, 'every man 'per se' is an animal; something white is known to be a man; therefore, something white 'per se' is an animal', for from the same major and the assertoric, the same conclusion follows, and as a consequence the same conclusion follows from the major and the antecedent to that assertoric.
|- valign="top"
| Per ista et praedicta potest studiosus cognoscere quando mixtio ex talibus valet vel non valet in alias figuris. {{p|497}}
| Though this, and from what was previously said, the keen student can know when a mixture from such propositions is valid or not valid in other figures.
|- valign="top"
| Et ista de mixtionibus ad praesens sufficient, quamvis multa causa brevitatis sint omissa, quae tamen ex praedictis a studiosis elici possunt.
| And this suffices, at present, about mixed syllogisms, although many things have been left out by reason of brevity, which can still be found out by the studious from what has been said.
|- valign="top"
| Illa autem quae dicit Aristoteles in mixtionibus suis, quae aliquibus de praedictis videntur contradicere, solvi possunt per aliquas regulas superius datas, quorum solutio expressius patebit super librum ''Priorum'', si contingat me illum librum exponere.
| But those things which Aristotle says in his mixtures, which seem to contradict some of the above, can be solved by some rules given above, the solution of which will be more clearly evident in the book of the Prior Analytics, if I were to expound on that book.
|}

== Notes ==

<references />

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 63

2025-04-20T21:14:31Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 62|Chapter 62]]|[[../Chapter 64|Chapter 64]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 63. De mixtione propositionum de contingenti et aliarum modalium in tertia figura

||Chapter 63. On the mixture of de contingenti propositions and of other modals in the third figure.

|- valign = top
||In tertia figura, si utraque sumatur in sensu compositionis, non valet mixtio respectu conclusionis de contingenti nec respectu conclusionis de possibili, nisi illa de alio modo inferat illam de necessario. Sicut {{p|496}} non sequitur ‘omnem hominem esse Deum est scitum a te; omnem hominem esse humanitatem est contingens; igitur aliquam humanitatem esse Deum est possibile'. Consimiliter est dicendum quando illa de contingenti sumitur in sensu compositionis et alia in sensu divisionis.

||In the third figure, if both are taken in the sense of composition, the mixture is not valid with respect to a conclusion de contingenti nor with respect to a conclusion de possibili, unless the latter infers the former de necessario from another mode. Just as it does not follow: ‘It is known by you that every man is God; that every man is human is contingent; therefore, it is possible that some human is God’. The same must be said when the former is taken de contingenti in the sense of composition and the latter in the sense of division.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu divisionis et subiectum supponat pro his quae sunt et fuerit universalis et alia de modo inferat suam de inesse, sequitur conclusio de contingenti. Et similiter est quando est e converso Consimiliter, si utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, valet mixtio quando illa de alio modo inferat sua de inesse.

||But if the latter is taken de contingenti in the sense of division and the subject supposits for those things which are and were universal and another in a mode infers its own assertoric, the conclusion de contingenti follows. And the same is true when it is the converse. Similarly, if both are taken in the sense of division, the mixture is valid when the former infers its own assertoric from another mode.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 62

2025-04-20T21:10:55Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 61|Chapter 61]]|[[../Chapter 63|Chapter 63]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 62. De mixtione propositionum de contingenti et aliarum in secunda figura

||Chapter 62. On the mixture of contingent propositions and of other modals in the second figure.

|- valign = top
||In secunda figura, si utraque propositionum sumatur in sensu compositionis, non valet mixtio respectu conclusionis de contingenti nec respectu conclusionis de possibili, nisi illa de alio modo inferat illam de necessario. Unde non sequitur 'omnem Deum esse hominem est scitum a te; quamlibet personam divinam non esse hominem est contingens; igitur quamlibet personam divinam non esse Deum est possibile', Nec sequitur 'nullum Deum esse hominem est scitum a te; quamlibet personam divinam esse hominem est contingens; igitur quamlibet personam divinam non esse Deum est possibile’. Si autem illa de modo inferat illam de necessario, est mixtio bona.

||In the second figure, if both propositions are taken in the sense of composition, the mixture is not valid with respect to the conclusion of de contingenti nor with respect to the conclusion de possibili, unless the latter infers it de necessario from another mode. Hence it does not follow that 'every God is known by you to be a man; it is contingent that any divine person is not a man; therefore it is possible that any divine person is not God', nor does it follow that 'no God is known by you to be a man; it is contingent that any divine person is man; therefore it is possible that any divine person is not God'. But if the former infers it de necessario from a mode, the mixture is good.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu compositionis et illa de alio modo in sensu divisionis, si illa de contingenti fuerit negativa, non valet mixtio. Sicut non sequitur 'nullum Deum esse hominem est contingens; quaelibet persona divina scitur esse homo; igitur quaelibet persona divina potest non esse Deus. Similiter, si affrmativa fuerit de contingenti, non valet. Non enim sequitur 'omnem Deum esse hominem est contingens; quaelibet persona divina scitur non esse homo; igitur quaelibet persona divina potest non esse Deus'.

||But if the one is taken de contingenti in the sense of composition and the other of another mode in the sense of division, if the one de contingenti is negative, the mixture is not valid. Just as it does not follow that 'it is contingent for no God to be a man; every divine person is known to be a man; therefore it is possible that every divine person is not God'. Similarly, if the affirmative is taken de contingenti, it is not valid. For it does not follow that 'it is contingent for every God to be a man; every divine person is known to be not a man; therefore it is possible that every divine person is not God'.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu divisionis et alia in sensu compositionis, non valet mixtio. Patet per eosdem terminos. Si autem utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, non valet mixtio, sicut per eosdem terminos patet,

||But if one of the de contingenti is taken in the sense of division and the other in the sense of composition, the mixture is not valid. This is clear from the same terms. But if both are taken in the sense of division, the mixture is not valid, as is clear from the same terms.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 61

2025-04-20T21:07:04Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 60|Chapter 60]]|[[../Chapter 62|Chapter 62]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 61. De mixtione propositionum de contingenti et aliarum modalium in prima figura

||Chapter 61. On the mixture of propositions de contingenti and of other modals in the first figure.

|- valign = top
||Ultimo videndum est de mixtione propositionis de contingenti et ceterarum propositionum modalium. Et prime esset dicendum de mixtione ex propositionibus de contingenti et impossibili, sed illa patet ex mixtione contingentis et necessarii propter causam frequenter dictam<ref>Quia scilicet propositio de impossibili aequivalet propositioni de necessario, ut dictum est supra, cap. 40, lin. 4-5 et cap. 50, lin. 3-4.</ref>;

||Finally, we must consider the mixture of a proposition de contingenti and the other modal propositions. And first we would have to speak of the mixture from propositions of contingency and of impossibility, but that is clear from the mixture de contingenti and de necessario for the reason frequently stated<ref>Because, namely, the proposition de impossibili is equivalent to the proposition de necessario, as was said above, chap. 40, lines 4-5 and chap. 50, lines 3-4.</ref>;

|- valign = top
||ideo dicendum est de mixtione contingentis et aliarum modalium, et primo in prima figura.

||Therefore, we must speak of the mixture of contingency and other modals, and first in the first figure.

|- valign = top
||Et est primo sciendum quod si utraque sumatur in sensu compositionis, si illa de modo non inferat illam de necessario, non valet mixtio. Sicut non sequitur 'omne animal esse hominem est scitum a te; omnem asinum esse animal est contingens; igitur omnem asinum esse hominem {{p|494}} est contingens vel possibile'. Nec sequitur 'omne animal esse hominem est contingens; omnem asinum esse animal est scitum a te; igitur omnem asinum esse hominem est possibile vel contingens'.

||And it must first be known that if both are taken in the sense of composition, if the one does not infer the other de necessario, the mixture is not valid. Just as it does not follow 'every animal is known by you to be a man; that every donkey is an animal is contingent; therefore every donkey is a man is contingent or possible'. Nor does it follow 'that every animal is a man is contingent; every donkey is known by you to be an animal; therefore that every donkey is a man is possible or contingent'.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de modo inferat illam de necessario, est bona mixtio, quia ex tali de necessario et illa de possibili sequitur conclusio de possibili, sicut dictum est prius<ref>Supra, cap. 44.</ref>; sed illa de possibili sequitur ad illam de contingenti, igitur etc.

||But if the modal proposition infers that de necessario, it is a good mixture, because from such a proposition de necessario and that de possibili the conclusion de possibili follows, as was said before<ref>Supra, chap. 44.</ref>; but that de possibili follows to that de contingenti, therefore etc.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu compositionis et alia in sensu divisionis, si illa de contingenti fuerit maior, non valet mixtio, Sicut non sequitur 'omne album esse hominem est contingens; omnis asinus scitur esse albus; igitur omnem asinum esse hominem est possibile'. Si autem illa de alio modo inferat illam de necessario, mixtio est bona. Similiter dicendum est si illa de contingenti sit minor.

||But if the proposition de contingenti is taken in the sense of composition and the other in the sense of division, if the one de contingenti is major, the mixture is not valid, just as it does not follow that 'every white thing being a man is contingent; every donkey is known to be white; therefore every donkey being a man is possible'. But if the proposition of another mode infers the one de necessario, the mixture is good. The same must be said if the one de contingenti is minor.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de contingenti sumatur in sensu divisionis, si sit maior, semper sequitur conclusio de possibili quando minor infert suam de inesse et aliter non, quia dictum est prius<ref>Supra, cap. 54 lin. 26-33.</ref> quod ex tali de contingenti et illa de inesse sequitur conclusio de possibili. Si autem minor non inferat suam de inesse, non valet mixtio. Quando autem illa de contingenti est minor, non valet mixtio; sicut non sequitur 'omne album esse hominem est scitum a te; omnis asinus contingenter potest esse albus; igitur omnis asinus potest esse homo'.

||But if the proposition de contingenti is taken in the sense of division, if it is a major, a conclusion de possibili always follows when the minor infers its own assertoric and otherwise not, because it was said before<ref>Supra, cap. 54 lin. 26-33.</ref> that from such a de contingenti proposition and an assertoric proposition a conclusion de possibili follows. But if the minor does not infer its own assertoric, the mixture is not valid. But when the de contingenti is a minor, the mixture is not valid; just as it does not follow 'every white thing being a man is known by you; every donkey can contingently be white; therefore every donkey can be a man'.

|- valign = top
||Si autem utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, si maior fuerit de contingenti, sequitur conclusio de possibili quando minor infert suam de inesse; quando non infert suam de inesse, non valet. Si autem illa de contingenti fuerit minor, non valet; sicut non sequitur 'omne album scitur a te esse homo; omnis asinus contingenter est albus; igitur omnis asinus potest esse homo'. {{p|495}}

||But if both are taken in the sense of division, if the major is de contingenti, a conclusion de possibili follows when the minor infers its own assertoric; when it does not infer its own of inherence, it is not valid. But if the minor is de contingenti, it is not valid; just as it does not follow 'every white thing is known by you to be a man; every donkey is contingently white; therefore every donkey can be a man'.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 60

2025-04-20T20:57:19Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 59|Chapter 59]]|[[../Chapter 61|Chapter 61]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 60. De mixtione propositionum de possibili et aliarum in tertia figura

||Chapter 60. On the mixture of de possibili propositions and of others in the third figure.

|- valign = top
||Quando autem praemissae tales disponuntur in tertia figura, si utraque sumatur in sensu compositionis, si illa de modo alio non inferat illam de necessario, non valet mixtio. Sicut non sequitur ‘omnem hominem esse Deum est scitum a te; omnem hominem esse humanitatem est possibile; igitur aliquam humanitatem esse Deum est possibile'. Sed si illa de modo inferat illam de necessario, est bona mixtio, tenens virtute istius regulae 'si praemissae sunt possibiles et compossibiles, conclusio est possibilis’ et virtute istius omne necessarium est compossibile possibili'.

||But when such premises are arranged in the third figure, if both are taken in the sense of composition, if the latter does not infer the former from another mode de necessario, the mixture is not valid. Just as it does not follow that ‘every man is known by you to be God; it is possible for every man to be human; therefore it is possible for some human to be God’. But if the former infers the latter de necessario, it is a good mixture, holding by virtue of the rule ‘if the premises are possible and composable, the conclusion is possible’ and by virtue of the latter every necessary is composable with the possible’.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de possibili sumatur in sensu compositionis et alia in sensu divisionis, si illa de possibili non fuerit maior, non sequitur conclusio de possibili si illa de alio modo non inferat illam de necessario. Sicut non sequitur ‘omnem hominem esse Deum est possibile; omnis homo scitur esse humanitas; igitur aliquam humanitatem esse Deum est {{p|493}} possibile’. Similiter non. valet si minor fuerit de possibili. Per eosdem terminos patet.

||But if the one de possibili is taken in the sense of composition and the other in the sense of division, if the one de possibili is not major, the conclusion de possibili does not follow if the one of another mode does not infer it de necessario. Just as it does not follow that ‘it is possible for every man to be God; every man is known to be humanity; therefore it is possible for some humanity to be God’. Similarly, it does not hold if the minor is de possibili. It is clear by the same terms.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de possibili sumatur in sensu divisionis et ila de modo alio in sensu compositionis, si illa de possibili fuerit maior, sequitur conclusio de possibili si minor inferat suam de inesse. Et hoc est verum quando maior est universalis. E converso est quando maior est particularis. Cuius ratio est, quia illa de modo, sicut dictum est, infert suam de inesse; sed ex tali de possibili et illa de inesse est talis mixtio conveniens, sicut dictum est prius<ref>Supra, cap. 34, lin. 26-38 et cap. 58, lin. 20-21.</ref>.

||But if that de possibili is taken in the sense of division and that of another mode in the sense of composition, if that de possibility is major, the conclusion de possibility follows if the minor infers its assertoric. And this is true when the major is universal. The converse is true when the major is particular. The reason for this is that the modal proposition, as has been said, infers its assertoric; but from such a proposition de possibili and that assertoric there is such a suitable mixture, as has been said before.<ref>Supra, chap. 34, lines 26-38 and chap. 58, lines 20-21.</ref>.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de possibili fuerit minor, valet nuxtio; sicut sequitur omnem hominem esse Deum est scitum a te; omnis homo potest esse humanitas; igitur aliqua humanitas potest esse Deus', sumpto subiecto conclusionis pro eo quod potest esse.

||But if the proposition de possibili is minor, the conclusion is valid; as it follows: it is known to you that every man is God; every man can be human; therefore some human can be God,' taking the subject of the conclusion for that which can be.

|- valign = top
||Si autem utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, valet mixtio respectu conclusionis de possibili quando illa de modo infert suam de inesse.

||But if both are taken in the sense of division, the mixture is valid with respect to the conclusion of possibility when it infers its assertoric from the mode.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 59

2025-04-20T20:53:25Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 58|Chapter 58]]|[[../Chapter 60|Chapter 60]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 59. De mixtione propositionum de possibili et aliarum modalium in secunda figura

||Chapter 59. On the mixture of propositions de possibili and of other modes in the second figure.

|- valign = top
||Si utraque istarum propositionum sumatur in sensu compositionis, si ille modus non sit inferior ad necessarium vel aequivalens ei, non valet mixtio in secunda figura. Sicut non sequitur 'nullum Deum esse hominem est scitum a te; quamlibet personam divinam esse hominem est possibile; igitur nullam personam divinam esse Deum est possibile’. Nec sequitur ‘omnem Deum esse hominem est scitum a te; nullam personam divinam esse hominem est possibile; igitur nullam personam divinam esse Deum est possibile’. Si autem illa de modo inferat illam de necessario, sequitur conclusio de possibili. {{p|492}}

||If both of these propositions are taken in the sense of composition, if that mode is not inferior to the necessary or equivalent to it, the mixture in the second figure is not valid. Just as it does not follow that 'no God is known by you to be a man; it is possible for any divine person to be a man; therefore it is possible for no divine person to be God'. Nor does it follow that 'every God is known by you to be a man; it is possible for no divine person to be a man; therefore it is possible for no divine person to be God'. But if the modal proposition infers the proposition de necessario, the conclusion de possibili follows.

|- valign = top
||Consimiliter, si altera sumatur in sensu compositionis et altera in sensu divisionis, si illa de modo non inferat illam de necessario, mixtio non valet; si inferat eam, valet respectu conclusions de possibili.

||Similarly, if one is taken in the sense of composition and the other in the sense of division, if the latter of a mode does not infer the former de necessario, the mixture is not valid; if it does infer it, it is valid with respect to conclusions de possibili.

|- valign = top
||Si autem utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, et illa de alio modo is non inferat illam de necessario, non valet mixtio. Sicut non sequitur 'omnis Deus scitur esse homo; quaelibet persona divina potest non esse homo; igitur quaelibet persona divina potest non esse Deus’. Nec sequitur 'omnis persona divina potest non esse homo; omnis Deus scitur esse homo; igitur quilibet Deus potest non esse persona divina’. Si autem illa de modo inferat illam de necessario, tenet mixtio talis quando ex illa de necessario et illa de possibili valet mixtio.

||But if both are taken in the sense of division, and the one in another mode does not infer the one de necessario, the mixture is not valid. Just as it does not follow that 'every God is known to be man; it is possible that any divine person is not a man; therefore it is possible that any divine person is not God'. Nor does it follow that 'it is possible that every divine person is can a man; every God is known to be a man; therefore it is possible that any God is not a divine person'. But if the one of a mode infers it de necessario, such a mixture holds when from the one de necessario and the one de possibili the mixture is valid.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 58

2025-04-20T20:49:38Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 57|Chapter 57]]|[[../Chapter 59|Chapter 59]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 58. De mixtione propositionum de possibili et aliarum modalium in prima figura

||Chapter 58. On the mixture of propositions de possibili and of other modals in the first figure.

|- valign = top
||De mixtione propositionis de possibili et aliarum modalium a quatuor famosis dicendum est post haec. Et primo in prima figura.

||The mixture of a proposition de possibili and modals other than the four famous ones will be discussed next, and first in the first figure.

|- valign = top
||Et est sciendum quod talis mixtio non valet si ambae praemissae sumantur in sensu compositionis. Sicut non sequitur 'omne animal esse hominem est scitum a te; omnem asinum esse animal est possibile; igitur omnem asinum esse hominem est possibile vel scitum a te’. Tamen quandocumque aliquis modus sumptus est inferior ad necessarium, cuiusmodi {{p|491}} sunt tales modi 'per se demonstrabile', 'per se notum’ et huiusmodi, semper ex tali maiore de tali modo et minore de possibili sequitur conclusio de possibili; et etiam si maior fuerit de possibili et minor de tali

||And it should be known that such a mixture is not valid if both premises are taken in the sense of composition. Just as it does not follow: 'that every animal is a man is known by you; that every donkey is an animal is possible; therefore that every donkey is a man is possible or known by you'. However, whenever any mode taken is inferior to the necessary, of which are such modes as 'per se demonstrable', 'per se known' and the like, always from such a major of such a mode and minor de possibili the conclusion de possibili follows; and even if the major is de possibili and the minor of such a mode.

|- valign = top
||modo. Et ratio est quia illa propositio de tali modo infert illam de necessario in eodem sensu; sed dictum est prius<ref> Supra, cap. 44.</ref> quod ex tali de necessario et tali de possibili mixtio valet respectu conclusionis de possibili,

||
And the reason is that the proposition of such a mode infers that de necessario in the same sense; but it was said before<ref> Supra, cap. 44.</ref> that from such a proposition de necessario and such a proposition de possibili the mixture is valid with respect to a conclusion de possibili,

|- valign = top
||Proportionaliter dicendum est de ista mixtione quando altera sumitur in sensu divisionis et altera in sensu compositionis. Si autem utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, si maior fuerit de possibili et minor de alio modo, valet quandocumque illa de alio modo infert suam de inesse; quia ex tali de possibili et illa de inesse sequitur conclusio de possibili in eodem sensu, sicut dictum est prius<ref>Supra, cap. 34, lin. 26-38.</ref>. Si autem minor non inferat suam de inesse, non valet. Non enim sequitur ‘omnis homo potest esse Deus; Sortes creditur esse homo; igitur Sortes potest esse Deus'.

||This mixture must be said proportionally when one is taken in the sense of division and the other in the sense of composition. But if both are taken in the sense of division, if the major is de possibili and the minor in the other mode, it is valid whenever the latter infers its assertoric in another way; because from such a proposition de possibili and that assertoric the conclusion de possibili in the same sense follows, as was said before<ref>Supra, cap. 34, lin. 26-38.</ref>. But if the minor does not infer its assertoric, it is not valid. For it does not follow that ‘every man can be God; Socrates is believed to be man; therefore Socrates can be God’.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de possibili fuerit minor, raro vel numquam valet mixtio. Sicut non sequitur 'omnis homo scitur esse Deus; humanitas potest esse homo; igitur humanitas potest esse Deus, vel scitur esse Deus'.

||But if the proposition de possibili is minor, the mixture is rarely or never valid. Just as it does not follow that 'every man is known to be God; a human can be man; therefore a human can be God, or is known to be God'.
|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 57

2025-04-20T20:45:07Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 56|Chapter 56]]|[[../Chapter 58|Chapter 58]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 57. De mixtione possibilis et impossibilis in omni figura

||Chapter 57. On the mixture of possible and impossible in every figure.

|- valign = top
||Sequitur videre de mixtione possibilis et impossibilis. Sed de ea potest patere ex illis quae dicta sunt circa mixtionem necessarii et possibles<ref>Supra, cap. 44-46.</ref>, pro eo quod semper illa de impossibili aequivalet alicui de necessario, et ideo de ea non plus ad praesens.

||It follows to see about the mixture of possible and impossible. But it can be clear about it from what was said about the mixture of necessary and possible<ref>Supra, chap. 44-46.</ref>, because that de impossibili is always equivalent to something de necessario, and therefore no more about it for the present.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 56

2025-04-20T20:43:25Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 55|Chapter 55]]|[[../Chapter 57|Chapter 57]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 56. De mixtione possibilis et contingentis in tertia figura

||Chapter 56. On the mixture of possible and contingent in the third figure.

|- valign = top
||In tertia figura, si utraque propositionum sumatur in sensu compositionis, non valet mixtio. Sicut non sequitur 'omnem hominem esse Deum est possibile; omnem hominem esse humanitatem est contingens; igitur aliquam humanitatem esse Deum est possibile'. Nec etiam valet si maior sit de contingenti et minor de possibili. Patet per eosdem ter{{p|490}}minos. Et per eosdem patet quod non valet mixtio si altera sumatur in sensu compositionis et altera in sensu divisionis.

||In the third figure, if both propositions are taken in the sense of composition, the mixture is not valid. Just as it does not follow that 'it is possible for every man to be God; it is contingent for every man to be human; therefore it is possible for some human to be God'. Nor is it valid if the major is de contingenti and the minor de possibili. It is clear from the same terms. And it is clear from the same terms that the mixture is not valid if one is taken in the sense of composition and the other in the sense of division.

|- valign = top
||Si autem utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, si subiectum illius de possibili supponat pro his quae possunt esse et sit maior, sequitur conclusio de possibili. Sicut sequitur 'omnis homo potest esse humanitas; omnem hominem contingit esse Deum; igitur Deus potest esse humanitas'. Si minor est de possibili similiter sequitur 'omnem hominem contingit esse humanitatem; omnis homo potest esse Deus; igitur Deus potest esse humanitas, subiecto utriusque sumpto praecise pro his quae possunt esse et pro his quae sunt, aliter non valet.

||But if both are taken in the sense of division, if the subject of the latter de possibili supposits for those things that can be and is major, the conclusion de possibili follows. As it follows 'every man can be human; every man can be God; therefore God can be human'. If the minor is de possibili it follows similarly 'every man can be human; every man can be God; therefore God can be human', with the subject of both taken precisely for those things that can be and for those things that are, otherwise it does not hold.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-3/Chapter 32

2025-04-20T20:03:00Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 31|Chapter 31]]|[[../Chapter 33|Chapter 33]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
|-
! valign="top" width="45%" | Latin
! valign="top" width="55%" | English
|- valign="top"
| '''[CAP. 32. QUO MODO IN PROPOSITIONIBUS DE INESSE FIT INDUCTIO]'''
| '''[Chapter 32. How induction comes about in assertoric propositions]'''
|- valign="top"
| His visis videndum est quomodo diversae propositiones universales inducuntur ex suis singularibus et quomodo universales inferunt singulares. Et primo de illis de praesenti et de inesse.
| Having looked at these things, we should see how diverse universal propositions are induced<ref>I.e. derived by induction</ref> from their singulars, and how universals imply singulars. And first, of present tense assertoric propositions (i.e., of inherence). 
|- valign="top"
| Et est sciendum quod quandoque talis universalis habet singulares et quandoque non habet singulares. Quando enim subiectum verificatur de aliquo, tunc habet singulares, quando autem non verificatur de aliquo, tunc non habet singulares.
| And it should be known that sometimes such a universal has singulars and sometimes it does not have singulars. For when the subject is verified of something, then it has singulars, but when it is not verified of something, then it does not have singulars.
|- valign="top"
| Et ideo si nullus homo esset albus, ista `omnis homo albus est homo' non haberet aliquam singularem; quando autem aliquis homo est albus, tunc habet singularem.
| And therefore if no man were white, the proposition 'every white man is a man' would not have any singular, but when some man is white, then it has a singular.
|- valign="top"
| Et ita est de aliis. Et ideo aliquando etiam eadem universalis potest inferri ex suis singularibus, quando scilicet habet singulares, et quandoque non potest induci ex suis singularibus, quando scilicet non habet singulares.
| And so for others. And therefore sometimes also the same universal can be inferred from its singulars, namely when it has singulars, and sometimes it cannot be induced from its singulars, namely when it does not have singulars.
|- valign="top"
| Sunt autem istae regulae.
| And there are these rules.
|- valign="top"
| Una est quod quaelibet universalis vera, affirmativa, de praesenti, non aequivalens propositioni de futuro, et {{p|709}} de inesse habet aliquam singularem veram. Si autem sit falsa, non oportet quod habeat aliquam singularem falsam, sed sufficit quod nullam singularem habeat, et tamen quod denotetur habere; sicut per istam `omnis chimaera est' denotatur quod habeat aliquam singularem veram, et nullam habet, ideo est falsa.
| One is that any true affirmative present tense universal proposition, not equivalent to a future tense proposition, and assertoric, has some true singular. But if it is false, it does not have to have any false singular, but it is sufficient that it has no singular, and still it is denoted to have one. For example, by the proposition 'every chimera exists', it is denoted that it has a true singular, and it has none, therefore it is false.
|- valign="top"
| Alia regula est: si omnes singulares alicuius propositionis universalis sint verae, universalis est vera.
| Another rule is that if all singulars of any universal proposition are true, the universal is true.
|- valign="top"
| Et ista regula est generalis tam de affirmativa quam de negativa. Alia regula est: si universalis negativa sit falsa, oportet quod aliqua singularis sit falsa; sicut si haec sit falsa `nullum animal est asinus', oportet quod aliqua eius singularis sit falsa.
| And this rule is common to negatives as well as affirmatives. Another rule is that if the universal negative is false, some singular has to be false. For example, if 'no animal is a donkey' is false, it has to be that one of its singulars is false.
|- valign="top"
| Sed ad veritatem universalis negativae non oportet quod aliqua singularis sit vera, quia non oportet quod habeat aliquam singularem; sicut si nihil sit album, haec est vera `nullum album est coloratum', et tamen nulla singularis eius est vera.
| But for the truth of the universal negative it does not have to be that any singular is true, for it does not have to have any singular. For example, if nothing is white, 'no white thing is coloured' is true, and yet none of its singulars is true.
|- valign="top"
| Si dicatur quod hoc posito haec est vera `hoc album non est coloratum', demonstrato quocumque, dicendum quod quamvis talis sit vera `hoc album non est coloratum', demonstrato quocumque, ista tamen non est singularis huius universalis `nullum album est coloratum'.
| If it is said that, in that case, 'this white thing is not coloured', pointing to anything, it should be said that such a proposition as 'this white thing is not coloured' is true, pointing to anything, that proposition is not a singular of the universal proposition 'no white thing is coloured'.
|- valign="top"
| Nam ad hoc quod aliqua singularis sit singularis alicuius universalis, requiritur quod subiectum universalis vere praedicetur de subiecto singularis. Sic autem non est in proposito; haec enim non est vera, illo posito, `hoc album est album', demonstrato quocumque.
| For, in order that any singular proposition is the singular of some universal proposition, it is required that the subject of the universal is truly predicated of the subject of the singular.  But it is not the case here, for given that, 'this white thing is white' is not true - pointing to anything.
|- valign="top"
| Et si dicatur quod quaelibet singularis est singularis alicuius universalis, dicendum quod hoc non est verum. Unde ista `iste homo est animal', demonstrando asinum, non est singularis alicuius universalis.
| And if it is said that any singular is the singular of some universal, it should be said that this is not true.  Hence 'this man is an animal' - pointing to a donkey - is not the singular of any universal.
|- valign="top"
| Sed quaelibet singularis, in qua non demonstratur aliquid de quo falsificatur terminus communis sibi additus, est singularis alicuius universalis. Non sic autem est hic: hoc album non est coloratum.
| But any singular in which something is pointed to, of which a common term added to it is not falsified, is the singular of some universal.  But this is not the case with 'this white thing is not coloured'.
|- valign="top"
| Circa universalem de praeterito intelligendae sunt regulae sicut de universali de praesenti. {{p|710}} Sed circa inductionem propositionis universalis de futuro est primo sciendum quod dicendum est eodem modo de inductione propositionis universalis de futuro necessariae et impossibilis sicut de illis de praesenti et de praeterito.
| Concerning a universal [proposition] in the past tense, the rules are to be understood just as for a universal in the present tense.  But concerning the induction of a future tense universal proposition, it should be known first that we should speak in the same way of the induction of a future tense proposition of the necessary and of the impossible, as of those of past and present tense.
|- valign="top"
| Sed circa inductionem propositionis universalis de futuro in materia contingenti aliter dicendum est secundum veritatem et aliter secundum intentionem Aristotelis. Et oritur ista diversitas ex hoc quod aliter sentiendum est de veritate propositionis contingentis de futuro secundum veritatem et fidem et aliter secundum intentionem Aristotelis.
| But concerning the induction of a universal proposition in the future tense in contingent material, we must speak in one way according to truth and in another way according to the intention of Aristotle.  And that diversity arises from the fact that we must judge the truth of a future contingent proposition in one way according to truth (and faith), and in another way according to the intention of Aristotle.
|- valign="top"
| Nam Aristoteles ponit quod nulla propositio contingens talis de futuro est vera vel falsa, ita quod secundum intentionem Aristotelis una pars contradictionis in talibus non est magis vera quam alia.
| For Aristotle proposes that no such future contingent proposition is true or false, so that according to the intention of Aristotle, one part of a contradiction involving such propositions is no more true than the other.
|- valign="top"
| Et propter hoc, secundum eum, una pars contradictionis non est magis scita a quocumque intellectu quam alia, quia quod non est magis verum, non est magis scibile. Et propter hoc Aristoteles non posuisset aliquod futurum contingens esse scitum a Deo, cum nullum tale, secundum eum, sit verum, et nihil est scitum nisi verum.
| And because of this, according to him, one part of the contradiction is no more known by any understanding than another, because what is not more true, is not more knowable.  And because of this, Aristotle did not suppose that any future contingent proposition is known by God, since no such proposition, according to him, is true. But nothing is known except what is true.
|- valign="top"
| Sed veritas fidei ponit quod futura contingentia sunt scita a Deo, ita quod una pars contradictionis est scita a Deo et alia non est scita a Deo. Sicut Deus ab aeterno scivit istam `Beata Virgo est salvanda' et numquam scivit istam `Beata Virgo non est salvanda', sicut nec unquam scivit istam `Beata Virgo est damnanda'.
| But the truth of faith supposes that future contingents are known by God, so that one part of a contradiction is known by God, and the other part is not known by God.  For example, God has known from eternity the proposition 'the blessed Virgin is to be saved', and has never known the proposition 'the blessed Virgin is to be damned'
|- valign="top"
| Et propter hoc una pars contradictionis est scita et non alia; ideo una pars est vera, puta illa quae est scita, et alia non est vera, quia non est scita a Deo. Secundum igitur intentionem Aristotelis universalis affirma{{p|711}}tiva de futuro poterit esse vera, quamvis nulla singularis sit vera.
| And because of this, one part of the contradiction is known, and not the other, therefore one part is true, namely that which is known, and the other is not true, because it is not known by God.  Therefore, according to the intention of Aristotle, a future tense universal affirmative proposition could be true, although no singular is true.
|- valign = top
|Sicut ista universalis, secundum eum, est vera `omne futurum contingens erit'; immo, secundum eum, est necessaria. Et tamen, secundum eum nulla singularis eius est vera, quia demonstrato quocumque, haec non est vera, secundum eum, `hoc futurum contingens erit', quia infert istam `hoc est futurum contingens', quae nec est vera nec falsa, secundum eum.
|For example, the universal proposition 'every future contingent will exist' is true, indeed it is necessary. And yet, according to him, none of its singulars is true because by any demonstration, this is not true, according to him: 'this future contingent will exist', because it implies 'this is a future contingent', which is neither true nor false, according to him.
|- valign = top
|Similiter, secundum eum, universalis de futuro poterit esse falsa, quamvis non habeat aliquam singularem falsam. Sicut haec universalis est falsa `nullum futurum contingens erit'; et tamen non habet aliquam singularem falsam, quia quocumque demonstrato, haec non est eius singularis `hoc futurum contingens non erit', secundum eum, propter causam praedictam.
|Similarly, according to him, a universal future tense proposition could be true, even though it does not have any false singular. For example, the universal 'no future contingent will exist' is false, and yet it does not have any false singular, because whatever is pointed to, 'this future contingent will not exist' is not one of its singulars, according to him, on account of the reason given above.
|- valign = top
|Et sicut aliquando talis universalis affirmativa est vera, et tamen nulla singularis, ita aliquando particularis affirmativa est vera, et tamen nulla eius singularis est vera, secundum eum. Et per hoc solveret talia argumenta: probatur enim quod haec est vera `Sortes erit cras', sic 'haec est vera: in aliquo instanti Sortes erit'. Et ista propositio debet concedi, secundum eum, si Sortes sit, quia ponit quod non est dare ultimum rei permanentis in esse.
|And just as sometimes such a universal affirmative is true, and yet no singular is true, so sometimes a particular affirmative is true, and yet none of its singulars is true, according to him. And by this certain arguments would be resolved, for it is proved that 'Socrates will exist tomorrow', thus 'this is true: in some instant Socrates will exist'. And that proposition ought to be conceded, according to him, if Socrates exists, because it is not possible to allow the last instant of a thing in permanent being<ref>I.e. it is not possible for there to be a ''limit'' of an event which is in continuous existence?"Aristotle, and most medievals following him, contended that all motions, as well as the times and distances and the ranges of powers and resistances that might be involved in them, are absolutely ''continuous''. ''Science in the Middle Ages'', David Lindberg, 1978, p. 241</ref>.
|- valign = top
|Si igitur haec sit vera `in aliquo instanti Sortes erit', sit illud instans a. Tunc haec est vera `Sortes erit in a', et ultra `igitur erit in aliquo instanti post a'. Detur illud et sit b; et ultra arguetur, ut prius, `igitur erit in aliquo instanti post b', quia aliter b esset ultimum eius, quod non est possibile. Detur etiam illud et sit c. Et sic tandem devenietur ad diem crastinum: Diceret ad hoc Philosophus quod haec est vera `in aliquo instanti erit Sortes', sed nulla eius singularis est vera, et ideo non est {{p|712}} dandum illud instans in quo erit Sortes. Unde, secundum eum, ista est vera `in aliquo instanti erit Sortes', et tamen nulla istarum est vera `in a erit Sortes', `in b erit Sortes', et sic de singulis. Et ideo nulla istarum est danda.
|Therefore, if 'in some instant Socrates will exist' is true, let that instant be A. Then 'Socrates will exist at A' is true, and also 'therefore he will exist in some instant after A'. Grant that, and let it be B, and further let it be argued, as before, 'therefore he will exist in some instant after B', because otherwise B would be his last instant, which is not possible. Grant that, and let it be C. And so at last we would arrive at the next day. The philosopher would say to this that 'in some instant Socrates will exist' is true, but none of its singulars is true, and therefore that instant in which Socrates will exist should not be granted. Hence, according to him, 'in some instant Socrates will exist' is true, and none of the propositions 'Socrates will exist at A', 'Socrates will exist at B' etc is true. And therefore none of those propositions should be granted.
|- valign = top
|Et eodem modo dicendum est, secundum eum, ad consimilia argumenta. Sed secundum veritatem fidei talis universalis affirmativa, si sit vera et scita a Deo, habet aliquam singularem veram, et hoc quia semper altera pars contradictionis est vera et scita a Deo. Tamen advertendum est quod aliquando aliter est universalis vel particularis vera et aliter singularis.
|And in the same way it should be replied, according to him, to similar arguments. But according to the truth of faith, such a universal affirmative, if it is true and known by God, has some true singular, and this is because one or the other part of a contradiction is true and known by God. Yet it should be noted that a universal or particular is true in one way, and singular in another way.
|- valign = top
|Aliquando enim, secundum unam opinionem, universalis est necessaria et tamen nulla singularis est necessaria, immo quaelibet singularis sic est vera quod quaelibet illarum potest esse falsa et potest numquam fuisse vera.
|For sometimes, according to one opinion, a universal is necessary and yet no singular is necessary, indeed any singular is true in such a way that any of them can be false and can never have been true.
|- valign = top
|Haec enim est necessaria `quodlibet verum futurum contingens est verum', et tamen nulla singularis est ita vera quin potuit numquam fuisse vera. Similiter poterit esse quod particularis sit inevitabiliter vera et tamen quaelibet singularis sit evitabiliter vera. Et in hoc est aliqualis similitudo inter opinionem Aristotelis et veritatem fidei.
|For the proposition 'any true future contingent is true' is necessary, and yet none of its singulars is true in such a way that it could never have been true [false?]. Similarly, it could be the case that a particular could be inescapably true, and yet any singular could be escapably true. And in this there is some kind of similarity between the opinion of Aristotle and the truth of faith.
|- valign = top
|Et sicut dictum est de propositionibus de futuro, ita dicendum est de propositionibus de praeterito et de praesenti, aequivalentibus propositionibus de futuro. Unde sicut ista est vera `iste salvabitur', et tamen possibile est quod numquam fuerit vera, quia sequitur `iste peccabit finaliter, igitur damnabitur'; et ultra `igitur iste non salvabitur'; et ultra `igitur ista numquam fuit vera: iste salvabitur'.
|And just as was said about future tense propositions, so it should be said about propositions of the past and present, equivalent to future tense propositions. Hence 'that person will be saved' is true, and yet it is possible that it was never true, because he will finally sin, therefore he will be damned', and further more 'therefore that person will not be saved', and further 'therefore it was never true that this person will be saved'
|- valign = top
|Et antecedens est possibile, manifestum est, igitur consequens est possibile. Ita ista est modo vera `iste fuit praedestinatus ab aeterno', et tamen possibile est quod numquam fuerit praedestinatus; et hoc est, quia ista `iste fuit praedestinatus ab aeterno' aequivalet isti de futuro `iste salvabitur', et ideo sicut una potest numquam fuisse vera, ita possibile est quod alia numquam fuerit vera.
|And it is manifest that the antecedent is possible, therefore the consequent is possible. So the proposition 'that person was predestined from eternity' is now true, and yet it is possible that he was never predestined, and this is because the proposition 'that person was predestined from eternity' is equivalent to the future tense proposition 'that person will be saved', and therefore, just as one can never have been true, so it is possible that the other was never true.
|- valign = top
|Et ista est differentia inter veritatem propositionum de futuro et eis aequivalentium et veritatem propositionum de praeterito et de prae{{p|713}}senti, quae non aequivalent illis de futuro: quia si aliqua propositio sit vera de praesenti, necessario semper postea erit verum dicere quod illa propositio fuit vera. Sicut si haec sit modo vera `Sortes sedet', haec semper erit postea necessaria `haec fuit vera: Sortes sedet', ita quod impossibile est quod ista tota propositio `haec fuit vera: Sortes sedet' sit unquam postea falsa.
|And that is the difference between the truth of future tense propositions and of propositions equivalent to them, and the truth of past and present tense propositions, which are not equivalent to future tense ones. For if some present tense proposition is true, necessarily it will always be true afterwards to say that it was true. For example, if 'Socrates is sitting' is now true, 'this was true: Socrates sits' will always be necessary afterwards, so that it is impossible that the whole proposition 'this was true: Socrates sits', be ever false afterwards.
|- valign = top
|Et similiter est de propositione de praeterito: nam si haec sit modo vera `Sortes fuit albus', haec semper erit postea necessaria `haec fuit vera: Sortes fuit albus'. Sed secus est de propositione de futuro: nam quantumcumque haec sit modo vera `Ioannes salvabitur', tamen haec erit postea contingens `haec fuit vera: Ioannes salvabitur'.
|And it is similarly the case with past tense propositions. For if 'Socrates was white' is now true, the proposition 'this was true: Socrates was white' will always be necessary afterwards. But it is a different case with a future tense proposition, for however much 'John will be saved' is now true, still 'this was true: John will be saved' will be contingent afterwards.
|- valign = top
|Et per hoc potest patere quod praedestinatio vel reprobatio vel aliquid huiusmodi non potest esse relatio realis inhaerens creaturae praedestinatae vel reprobatae, sicut aliqui dicunt.
|And through this it can be clear that predestination or reprobation or something of that sort cannot be a real relation, inhering in the predestined creature or reprobate, as some say.
|- valign = top
|Nam si esset talis res, sequeretur quod iste qui est praedestinatus non posset damnari. Nam si praedestinatio sit talis res, tunc ista erit vera `iste est praedestinatus propter talem rem sibi inhaerentem'; sicut ista est vera `Sortes est albus propter albedinem sibi inhaerentem', et per consequens haec erit postea necessaria `ista fuit vera: iste est praedestinatus'. Et si hoc, sequitur quod ista sit modo necessaria `iste salvabitur'. Nam sequitur `ista fuit vera: iste est praedestinatus; igitur ista fuit vera: iste salvabitur'. Et antecedens est necessarium, igitur consequens est necessarium, et ex hoc sequitur quod ista est modo necessaria `iste salvabitur'.
|For if there were such a thing, it would follow that a person who is predestined [for salvation] could not be damned. For if predestination is such a thing, then 'this person is predestined on account of some thing inhering in him' will be true, just as 'Socrates is white because of whiteness inhering in him', and as a consequence 'this was true: this person is predestined' will be necessary afterwards. And if this is the case, it follows that 'this person will be saved' is now necessary. For 'this was true: this person is predestined; therefore this was true: this person will be saved'. And the antecedent is necessary, therefore the consequent is necessary, and from this it follows that 'this person will be saved' is now necessary.
|- valign = top
|Per ista etiam potest patere quod propositione aliqua contingente exsistente vera in aliquo instanti, nullo modo potest esse falsa in eodem instanti. Sicut si haec sit modo vera `iste habet actum bonum', impos{{p|714}}sibile est quod in isto instanti sit haec falsa `iste habet actum bonum'.
|From this it can also be clear that when a contingent proposition is true in some instant, it can in no way be false in the same instant. For example, if 'that person has done a good act' is now true, it is impossible that 'that person has done a good act' is false in that instant
|- valign = top
|Cuius ratio est quia propter positionem possibilis in esse numquam negandum est necessarium. Sed posito in esse quod iste peccet, negandum est hoc necessarium post illud instans `ista fuit vera: iste habet actum bonum in a'; et per consequens a exsistente, et illo habente bonum actum in a, haec est impossibilis `iste non habet bonum actum in a', et tamen ante fuit possibilis, sed ex quo positum est in actu non est amplius possibilis.
|The reason of this is that because of a proposition being posited as possible, a necessary should never be denied. But with it being supposed that this person commits a sin, the necessary proposition 'this was true: that person had done a good act at A' should be denied, and as a consequence, with it being at A, and with that person having done a good act at A, the proposition 'that person has not done a good act at A' is impossible, and yet it was possible before, but since it has been actualized, it is no longer possible.
|}
== Notes ==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-2/Chapter 2

2025-04-20T19:14:35Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 1|Chapter 1]]|[[../Chapter 3|Chapter 3]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English
|- valign = top
|{{p|508}} CAP. 2. QUI TERMINI INGREDIUNTUR DEMONSTRATIONEM?.

|CHAPTER 2 What terms are included in a demonstration?

|- valign = top
|Ex quo omnis demonstratio est syllogismus, necesse est omnem demonstrationem tres terminos ad eius constitutionem requirere. Non omnes autem termini possunt ingredi demonstrationem affirmativam ex propositionibus mere de inesse et mere de praesenti. Illi enim termini qui de nullo possunt praedicari nisi contingenter vel falso, ipsis sumptis significative, numquam possunt significative sumpti esse partes demonstrationis talis.

|From the fact that every demonstration is a syllogism, it is necessary that every demonstration requires three terms in its constitution. But not all terms can be included in an affirmative demonstration made up from propositions purely assertoric (of inherence) and purely in the present tense. For those terms that are predicated of nothing except contingently or falsely, when they are taken significatively, can never be taken significatively to be parts of such a demonstration.

|- valign = top
|Et ideo tales termini ‘chimaera’, ‘corpus [infini]tum’, ‘creatura infinita’ et huiusmodi non possunt, si significative sumantur, esse termini in demonstratione tali, quamvis possint in demonstratione negativa, quia etiam negative possunt de aliis necessario praedicari.

|And therefore such terms as "chimera" "infinite body" "infinite creature" and the like, if they are taken significatively, cannot be terms in such a demonstration, although they could be in a negative demonstration—for they can also be predicated necessarily of other things negatively.

|- valign = top
|Similiter, quamvis tales termini ‘album’, ‘nigrum’, ‘calidum’ et huiusmodi non possint esse partes propositionum necessariarum mere de inesse et mere de praesenti affirmativarum, quia tamen possunt esse partes propositionum de possibili necessariarum, ideo tales demonstrationem ingredi possunt.

|Similarly, although such terms as "white " "black " "hot," and the like could not be parts of necessary affirmative propositions, purely assertoric (of inherence) and purely present tense, such terms can be included in demonstration because they can still be parts of propositions of the possibility of necessary things.

|- valign = top
|Unde breviter, secundum diversitatem demonstrationum, de qua dicetur inferius, omnes termini aliquam demonstrationem ingredi possunt; sed non omnes ingredi possunt demonstrationem potissimam, de qua inferius dicetur.

|Briefly therefore, according to the diversity of demonstrations, which we will talk about below, all terms can be included in some demonstration; but not all terms can be included in the highest sort of demonstration, which we will talk about below.

|- valign = top
|Termini autem illi qui demonstrationem potissimam ingredi possunt, sunt praecise subiectum, passio et definitio. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est quod passio non est aliqua res inhaerens subiecto, illo modo quo calor inest igni, sed passio est quoddam praedicabile, distinctum a subiecto, et realiter importans illud idem quod [importat/important] subiectum et aliquid plus, vel saltem illud idem alio modo.

|Now those terms that can be included in the highest sort of demonstration are precisely: subject, attribute, and definition For evidence of which, you should know that an attribute is not some reality inhering in a subject, in the way that heat inheres in fire, but an attribute is a certain predicable, distinct from the subject, and really conveying the same thing that the subject conveys, and also something more, or at least, if the same, in a different way.

|- valign = top
|Et eodem modo est de definitione: ut isti termini ex quibus componitur demonstratio mentalis sint ita distinctae res exsistentes in mente {{p|508}} sicut voces correspondentes eis in demonstratione vocali sunt distinctae voces in aere, de quibus diffusius dicetur inferius.

|And it is the same way with definition, so that those terms from which a mental demonstration is composed are distinct realities existing in the mind, just as utterances corresponding to them in a vocal demonstration are distinct utterances in the air. (Of which more detail below).

|}
==Notes==
{{reflist}}
[[Category:Unchecked translations]]

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 53

2025-04-20T18:51:13Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 52|Chapter 52]]|[[../Chapter 54|Chapter 54]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 53. De mixtione ex propositionibus de necessario et aliis modalibus in tertia figura

||Chapter 53. On the mixture of de necessario propositions and of other modals in the third figure.

|- valign = top
||In tertia flgura, si utraque sumatur in sensu compositionis, raro vel numquam valet mixtio, sicut non sequitur 'omnem Deum esse personam relativam est necessarium; omnem Deum esse immortalem est scitum a te; igitur aliquod immortale esse personam relativam est scitum a te’.

||In the third figure, if both are taken in the sense of composition, the mixture is rarely or never valid, just as it does not follow that 'it is necessary that every God is a relative person; it is known by you that every God is immortal; therefore it is known by you that something immortal is a relative person'.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de necessario sumatur in sensu divisionis, non valet. Patet per eosdem terminos. Si autem utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, si maior sit de necessario et minor de alio modo, semper sequitur conclusio de necessario si minor inferat suam de inesse. Et hoc, quia ex maiore de necessario in sensu divisionis et minore de inesse sequitur conclusio de necessario, et per consequens sequitur eadem conclusio ex antecedente ad illam de inesse et eadem maiore. Unde iste syllogismus est bonus 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal; omnis homo scitur esse albus; igitur aliquod album de necessitate est animal'. Si autem maior fuerit de alio modo et minor de necessario, sequitur conclusio de eodem modo de quo est maior, non de necessario, Unde sequitur 'omnis homo scitur esse albus; omnis homo de necessitate est creabilis; igitur aliquod creabile scitur esse album', sed non sequitur 'igitur aliquod creabile de necessitate est album’.

||But if the proposition is taken de necessario in the sense of division, it is not valid. It is clear from the same terms. But if both are taken in the sense of division, if the major is de necessario and the minor of another mode, the conclusion de necessario always follows if the minor infers its assertoric. And this, because from the major de necessario in the sense of division and the minor assertoric, the conclusion de necessario follows, and consequently the same conclusion follows from the antecedent to that assertoric and the same major. Hence this syllogism is good 'every man is of necessity an animal; every man is known to be white; therefore something white is of necessity an animal'. But if the major is of another mode and the minor de necessario, the conclusion follows of the same mode as the major, not de necessario, Hence it follows 'every man is known to be white; every man is of necessity creatable; therefore something creatable is known to be white', but it does not follow 'therefore something creatable is of necessity white'.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de modo non inferat suam de inesse, mixtio non valet. {{p|488}}

||But if the modal proposition does not infer its assertoric, the mixture is not valid.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 52

2025-04-20T18:48:02Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 51|Chapter 51]]|[[../Chapter 53|Chapter 53]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 52. De mixtione ex propositionibus de necessario et aliis modalibus in secunda figura

||Chapter 52 On the mixture of de necessario propositions and of other modals in the second figure.

|- valign = top
||In secunda figura, quando utraque propositio sumitur in sensu composittonis, raro vel numquam valet mixtio, nisi modus sit inferior ad necessarium. Unde non sequitur 'nullum hominem esse asinum est necessarium; omne album esse asinum est scitum a me; igitur nullum album esse hominem est scitum a me, vel nullum album esse hominem est necessarium'. Sicut non sequitur 'nullum hominem esse asinum est necessarium; Brunellum esse asinum est primo verum; igitur Brunellum non esse hominem est primo verum'; nec etiam sequitur 'igitur Brunellum non esse hominem est necessarium'. Sicut non sequitur 'nullum lapidem esse corpus animatum est necessarium; omne animal esse corpus animatum est primo verum; igitur nullum animal esse lapidem est primo verum, quia praemissae sunt verae et conclusio falsa. Nec sequitur omnem Deum esse tres personas est necessarium; nullum immortale is esse tres personas est creditum a te; igitur nullum immortale esse Deum est creditum a te, vel nullum immortale esse Deum est necessarium’.

||In the second figure, when both propositions are taken in the sense of composition, the mixture is rarely or never valid, unless the mode is inferior to the necessary. Hence it does not follow that 'it is necessary for no man to be a donkey; it is known by me that every white man is a donkey; therefore it is known by me that no white man is a man, or it is necessary for no white man to be a man'. Just as it does not follow that 'it is necessary for no man to be a donkey; it is primarily true that Brunellus is a donkey; therefore it is primarily true that Brunellus is not a man'; nor does it also follow that 'it is necessary for Brunellus not to be a man'. Just as it does not follow that 'it is necessary for no stone to be an animate body; it is primarily true that every animal is an animate body; therefore it is primarily true that no animal is a stone', because the premises are true and the conclusion false. Nor does it follow that: 'it is necessary for every God to be three persons; it is believed by you that no immortal is God; therefore it is believed by you that no immortal is God, or it is necessary for no immortal to be God.'

|- valign = top
||Similiter si illa de necessario sumatur in sensu divisionis, non valet, {{p|487}} sicut per terminos eosdem patet. Similiter si utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, non valet generaliter, sicut non sequitur ‘omnis Deus de necessitate est tres; nullum immortale scitur esse tres; igitur nullum immortale scitur esse Deus, vel nullum immortale de necessitate est Deus. An valeat cum aliquo alio modo, discutiant studiosi.

||Similarly, if the latter is taken de necessario in the sense of division, it is not valid, as is clear from the same terms. Similarly, if both are taken in the sense of division, it is not valid generally, as it does not follow that ‘every God is necessarily three; no immortal is known to be three; therefore no immortal is known to be God, or no immortal is necessarily God'. Whether it is valid in some other way, let the learned discuss.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 51

2025-04-20T18:44:10Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 50|Chapter 50]]|[[../Chapter 52|Chapter 52]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 51. De mixtione propositionum de necessario et de aliis modis ab istis quatuor in prima figura

||Chapter 51. On the mixture of de necessario propositions and of other modes from those four in the first figure.

|- valign = top
||Ultimo circa istam partem videndum est de mixtione propositionum de necessario et de aliis modis ab istis quatuor. Et est primo sciendum in prima figura, quod quando ambae praemissae sumuntur in sensu compositionis, raro vel numquam valet mixtio respectu conclusionis de alio modo quam de necessario. Sicut non sequitur, secundum principia Aristotelis, 'omne animal esse coloratum est necessarium; omnem {{p|485}} hominem esse animal est per se; igitur omnem hominem esse coloratum est per se’. Verumtamen quando unus modus est inferior ad necessarium, tunc semper sequitur conclusio de necessario, sicut sequitur ‘omnem hominem esse coloratum est necessarium; Sortem esse hominem est per se; igitur Sortem esse coloraturum est necessarium’. Sed quando modus ille non est inferior ad necessarium, tunc non valet

||Finally, regarding this part, we must see about the mixture of propositions de necessario and of other modes from these (previous) four. And it is first to be known in the first figure that when both premises are taken in the sense of composition, the mixture is rarely or never valid with respect to the conclusion of a mode other than de necessario. Just as it does not follow, according to Aristotle's principles, 'every animal being colored is necessary; that every man is an animal is per se; therefore that every man is colored is per se'. However, when one mode is inferior to necessity, then the conclusion de necessario always follows, as it follows 'every man being colored is necessary; that Socrates is a man is per se; therefore that Socrates is colored is necessary'. But when that mode is not inferior to necessity, then the mixture does not hold,

|- valign = top
||mixtio nec respectu conclusionis de necessario nec respectu conclusionis de illo modo. Sicut non sequitur 'omne album esse coloratum est necessarium; omnem hominem esse album est scitum a me; ergo omnem hominem esse coloratum est scitum a me', nec sequitur ista conclusio 'omnem hominem esse coloratum est necessarium’. Tamen aliquando sequitur conclusio de tali modo, sicut sequitur 'omnem triangulum habere tres est necessarium; isoscelem esse triangulum est scibile; ergo isoscelem habere tres est scibile. Unde quando aliquis modus non potest competere antecedenti nisi competat consequenti, tunc in tali mixtione sequitur conclusio de tali modo. Huiusmodi autem sunt tales modi 'scibile', large accipiendo scibile, 'credibile', ‘apprehensibile’, ‘cognoscibile', 'proferibile' et huiusmodi.

||neither with respect to a conclusion de necessario nor with respect to a conclusion of that mode. Just as it does not follow that 'every white thing being colored is necessary; every man being white is known by me; therefore every man being colored is known by me', nor does the conclusion 'every man being colored is necessary' follow. However, sometimes a conclusion of such a mode follows, as it follows that 'every triangle having three (angles) is necessary; that an isosceles is a triangle is knowable; therefore that an isosceles has three (angles) is knowable. Hence when some mode cannot belong to the antecedent unless it belongs to the consequent, then in such a mixture a conclusion of such a mode follows. Now of this kind are such modes as 'knowable', knowable understood broadly, 'credible', 'apprehensible', 'cognizable', 'pronounceable' and the like.

|- valign = top
||Si autem utraque sumatur in sensu divisionis, semper valet syllogismus quando illa de modo infert suam de inesse, sicut in illis de inesse respectu conclusionis eiusdem modi de quo est maior, ita quod si maior sit de necessario, conclusio erit de necessario, si maior sit de alio modo, conclusio erit de alio modo. Et ideo tales syllogismi valent 'omnis homo per se est animal; Sortes de necessitate est homo; igitur Sortes per se est animal’; 'omne ens scitur a te esse in actu; persona divina de necessitate est ens; igitur persona divina scitur a te esse in actu ; 'omnis homo de necessitate est animal; Sortes scitur a te esse homo; igitur Sortes de necessitate est animal. Et ratio est, quia quandoque in talibus minor infert suam de inesse; nunc autem dictum est prius quod semper ex tali maiori de modo et minori de inesse sequitur conclusio de consimili {{p|486}} modo. Et quidquid sequitur ad consequens, sequitur ad antecedens, igitur talis mixtio est bona.

||But if both are taken in the sense of division, the syllogism is always valid when the latter infers its assertoric from the mode, as in those of inherence with respect to the conclusion of the same mode as the major, so that if the major is de necessario, the conclusion will be de necessario, if the major is of another mode, the conclusion will be of another mode. And therefore such syllogisms are valid: 'every man is of himself (per se) an animal; Socrates is of necessity a man; therefore Socrates is of himself an animal'; 'every being is known by you to be actual; a divine person is of necessity a being; therefore a divine person is known by you to be actual; 'every man is of necessity an animal; Socrates is known by you to be a man; therefore Socrates is of necessity an animal. And the reason is that sometimes in such cases the minor infers its assertoric; but now it has been said before that from such a major of a mode and an assertoric minor a conclusion of a similar mode always follows. And whatever follows the consequent, follows the antecedent, therefore such a mixture is good.

|- valign = top
||Si autem illa de modo non inferat suam de inesse, tunc non valet mixtio; sicut non sequitur ‘omne immortale de necessitate est Deus; intelligentia inferior Deo creditur esse immortalis; igitur intelligentia illa de necessitate est Deus’, nec etiam sequitur 'igitur creditur esse Deus'. Sicut non sequitur 'omnis Deus de necessitate est persona relativa; aliquod immortale creditur esse Deus; igitur aliquod immortale creditur esse persona relativa’. Et ita patet quod talis mixtio ex propositione de modo, quae non infert suam de inesse, non valet. Tales autem modi sunt huiusmodi 'credibile', 'opinabile', 'ponibile', 'apprehensibile', 'intelligibile' et huiusmodi.

||But if a modal proposition does not infer its assertoric, then the mixture is not valid; just as it does not follow that ‘every immortal thing is of necessity God; an intelligence inferior to God is believed to be immortal; therefore that intelligence is of necessity God’, nor does it follow that ‘therefore it is believed to be God’. Just as it does not follow that ‘every God is of necessity a relative person; something immortal is believed to be God; therefore something immortal is believed to be a relative person’. And so it is clear that such a mixture from a proposition of a mode, which does not infer its assertoric, is not valid. Such modes are of the kind ‘credible’, ‘opinable’, ‘possible’, ‘apprehensible’, ‘intelligible’ and the like.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>

Authors/Ockham/Summa Logicae/Book III-1/Chapter 50

2025-04-20T18:30:26Z

Ragnarr49:

{{Nextpage|[[../Chapter 49|Chapter 49]]|[[../Chapter 51|Chapter 51]]}}

{| border=1 cellpadding=10
!valign = top width=45%|Latin
!valign = top width=55%|English

|- valign = top
||Cap. 50. De mixtione necessarii et impossibilis

||Chapter 50. On the mixture of necessary and impossible propositions.

|- valign = top
||De mixtione necessarii et impossibilis dicendum est post haec. Et est sciendum quod cum, sicut dictum est prius<ref>Supra, cap. 40, lin. 4-5.</ref>, quaelibet propositio de impossibili aequivaleat alicui propositioni de necessario, ad sciendum quando mixtio necessarii et impossibilis valet et quando non, oportet scire aequipollentiam propositionis de impossibili et propositionis de necessario, et quando uniformis de necessario valet et quando non. De uniformi dictum est prius<ref>Supra, cap. 20-22.</ref> de aequipollentia autem inter propositionem de necessario et impossibili dictum est alibi<ref>Cf. Guillelmus1 de Ockham, ''Expositio in Periherm. Aristot, II'', ad textum: Causa autem est (ed. Bononiae 1496); vide etiam infra, Parte III-2, c. 16.</ref>, ideo ad praesens haec de ista mixtione sufficiant.

||The mixture of the necessary and the impossible must be discussed later. And it must be known that since, as was said before<ref>Supra, cap. 40, lines 4-5.</ref>, any proposition about the impossible is equivalent to some proposition de necessario, in order to know when the mixture of the necessary and the impossible is valid and when it is not, it is necessary to know the equivalence of the proposition about the impossible and the proposition de necessario, and when the uniform proposition de necessario is valid and when it is not. The uniform proposition has been discussed before<ref>Supra, cap. 20-22.</ref> but the equivalence between the proposition de necessario and the impossible has been discussed elsewhere<ref>Cf. William of Ockham, ''Exposition in Periherm. Aristotle, II'', to the text: The cause is (ed. Bologna 1496); see also below, Part III-2, c. 16.</ref>, therefore for the present these things about this mixture will suffice.

|}

==Notes==
<references/>